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**STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE
(1995-96)**

TENTH LOK SABHA

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

DEFENCE POLICY, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

SIXTH REPORT



**LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT
NEW DELHI**

March, 1996/Phalgun, 1917 (Saka)

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
DEFENCE POLICY, PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT

Presented to Lok Sabha on.....

Laid in Rajya Sabha on.....

8 MAR 1996



सत्यमेव जयते

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NEW DELHI

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C.O.D. No. 06

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March, 1996 (Pahargana, 1917 (Zaka))

CORRIGENDA
TO
'THE SIXTH REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
ON DEFENCE POLICY, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT'

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COMPOSITION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
(1995-96)

CHAIRMAN

- * Shri Sharad Dighe

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

- ** 2. Shri Ayub Khan
3. Shri Nurul Islam
4. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
5. Shri Nandi Yellaiah
*** 6. Shri Rajaram Shankarrao Mane
7. Shri Manikrao Hodalya Gavit
8. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
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18. Shri Gabhaji Mangaji Thakore
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20. Shri Amal Datta
21. Shri Hannan Mollah
22. Shri Indrajit Gupta

* Appointed w.e.f 8 February, 1996 *vice* Shri Indrajit Gupta resigned from the Chairmanship w.e.f. 22 January, 1996

** Ceased to be a Member of the Committee consequent upon his appointment as Minister w.e.f. 13.09.95

*** Expired on 04.12.95

23. Shri Pratap Singh
24. Dr. Mumtaz Ansari
25. Shri Chhedi Paswan
26. Shri Chun Chun Prasad Yadav
27. Shri C. Sreenivaasan
28. Shri Abhay Pratap Singh
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Rajya Sabha

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33. Shri Hiphei
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36. Shri Prabhakar B. Kore
37. Shri K.R. Malkani
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39. Shri S. Jaipal Reddy
40. Shri M.P. Abdussamad Samadani
41. Shri Satchidananda
42. Shri Sushil Kumar Sambhajirao Shinde
43. Shri Digvijay Singh
44. Shri Gopalsinh G. Solanki
- ***45. Shri R. Margabandu

SECRETARIAT

1. Dr. A.K. Pandey — *Additional Secretary*
2. Shri G.R. Patwardhan — *Joint Secretary*
3. Shri K.L. Narang — *Deputy Secretary*
4. Shri A.K. Singh — *Under Secretary*

* Ceased to be a Member of the Committee consequent upon his appointment as Minister w.e.f. 13.09.95

** Ceased to be a Member of the Committee consequent upon his retirement from Rajya Sabha w.e.f. 24.7.95

*** Nominated w.e.f. 17.8.95.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Chairman of Standing Committee on Defence having been authorised to submit the Report, on their behalf, present this Sixth Report on 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management'.

2. The subject was taken up for examination by the Standing Committee on Defence (1993-94) of the Tenth Lok Sabha which considered the replies to a detailed questionnaire on the subject as furnished by the Ministry of Defence and also the views of two former Directors and present Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi on the subject.

3. The Committee wish to express their thanks to the officers of the Ministry of Defence for placing before them detailed written information as was desired by the Committee in connection with the examination of the subject and sharing with the Committee their views on matters concerning defence and security of the country which came up for discussion during evidence. The Committee also appreciate the frankness with which the officers shared their views, preceptions and constraints with the Committee.

4. The Committee also express their thanks to the following experts/organisations for placing before them requisite written material and for giving evidence thus rendering assistance to the Committee in connection with detailed examination of the subject:

- (i) Shri Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
- (ii) Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Ex-Secretary, Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence; Former Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; and Consulting Editor, The Economic Times.
- (iii) Shri P.R. Chari, Former Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; and Research Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.

5. The Committee would also like to place on record their appreciation for the work done by the Standing Committee on Defence (1993-94) and also the Standing Committee on Defence (1994-95) especially the then Chairmen, Shri Buta Singh and Shri Indrajit Gupta for their able guidance to the Committee in obtaining information and taking evidence for in-depth examination of the subject. The Composition of the Committees 1993-94 and 1994-95 are given at Appendices I and II to this Report.

6. The Report was considered and adopted by the Committee at their sitting held on 20th February, 1996.

7. The Report is divided into three chapters—each is devoted to specific aspects. The Committee have *inter alia* made the following important recommendations in the Report:

- (i) The Government should examine the feasibility of preparing a formal National Defence Policy document for being placed before the Parliament.
- (ii) The Government should urgently come up with formal institutional mechanism with adequate support structures to monitor the state of our Defence preparedness and to oversee progress on Defence programmed modernisation/upgradation/acquisition/re-equipment apart from achieving speedy decision making on crucial issues affecting national security.
- (iii) The Government should evolve suitable mechanism as to ensure that the Government must firmly commit funds at least for those projects and acquisitions which are high on the priority list of Defence.
- (iv) The Government should mobilise resources to provide a substantially additional outlay in the light of projections made by the Ministry of Defence to meet the minimum inescapable needs of the Services for modernisation vital for security of the country during the remaining period of Eighth Five Year Plan.
- (v) The possibilities of appointment of retired Senior Services Officers and others as Advisors in the Ministry of Defence to provide professional expertise in the working of the Ministry should also be examined.
- (vi) The Ministry should chalk out a time-bound strategy in a mission-mode for maximum indigenisation of whole range of weapon systems and adhere to the targets fixed thereunder.

The Government should take expeditious decision regarding serial production of Agni Missile for induction into the Armed Forces.

- (vii) The Government should undertake quinquennial review of the performance of the Joint Intelligence Committee with a view to revamping this organisation so as to provide long-term intelligence assessment for systematic and efficient long-term planning in critical areas of Defence preparedness.

(vii)

8. For facility of reference the conclusions/recommendations have been printed in thick type in the body of the Report.

NEW DELHI;
February 28, 1996

Phalguna 9, 1917 (Saka)

SHARAD DIGHE,
Chairman,
Standing Committee on Defence.

CHAPTER I

DEFENCE POLICY

1.1 National Defence Policy is an integral part of national security policy, which by its very nature, is multi-disciplinary in character and encompasses all aspects that enhance a nation's strength and thus furthering its security. Following from this, the National Defence Policy addresses specific issues directly concerned with the defence of the nation and its territorial integrity.

1.2 According to the Ministry of Defence, although, there has been no specifically written document called India's National Defence Policy yet it has been articulated clearly and unambiguously through various policy statements over the years. The policy articulated since independence is as follows:

“That our military capability is to be directed to ensuring the defence of the national territory over land, sea and air encompassing among others the inviolability of our land borders, island territories, offshore assets and our maritime trade routes. Government have repeatedly made it clear that it is not our objective to influence/interfere/dominate region on the basis of military strength.”

1.3 Defence Policy has to evolve from the identification and acceptance of national interests and their relative importance. On being asked to elaborate national interests, the Ministry of Defence have stated as follows:

“National interests, by their very definition, are formulated in a democracy through consensus. In our case, it is best expressed in the preamble to the Constitution which enumerates clearly the objectives before the nation. It may also be defined as preserving the core values of the nation from external aggression and internal subversion.”

1.4 The undermentioned aspects according to the Ministry, fully depict the national security interests:

- (i) Defence of national territory over land, sea and air, encompassing among others the inviolability of our land borders, island territories, offshore assets and our maritime trade routes.
- (ii) To secure an internal environment whereby our Nation State is insured against any threat to its unity or progress on the basis of religion, language, ethnicity or socio-economic dissonance.

- (iii) To enable our country to exercise a degree of influence over the nations in our immediate neighbourhood to promote harmonious relationship in tune with our national interests.
- (iv) To be able to effectively contribute towards regional and international stability.
- (v) To possess an effective out-of-the country contingency capability to prevent destabilisation of the small nations in our immediate neighbourhood that could have adverse security implications for us.

Defence Doctrine and its Integration into Defence Policy

1.5 Explaining the Defence Doctrine, the Ministry of Defence have stated as follows:

“The defence doctrine of the armed forces follows the Government’s defence policy. In line with this, the doctrine attempts to implement the directions of the Government by evolving a military strategy in conformity with Government policies.

India does not have an offensive military doctrine as it firmly believes in the defence only of its own territory and national interests. It has no territorial ambitions against other countries.

Defence doctrine ensures the planning for the defence of the country based on a policy of dissuasion and deterrence. Dissuasive capability envisages the defence of the nation’s territory through sufficient and strong defence deployment on the borders to deny the enemy success at crossing the borders. This includes both a deployed force as well as a counter attack capability to throw the enemy out of possible encroachments. Deterrence posture ensures a reserve force to absorb an enemy’s attack on our territory and then to launch a counter-offensive into enemy territory.

Defence doctrine is constantly upgraded by the Services in tune with the changes in the capability of our adversaries and technological changes in Weapon-systems. These doctrines have to successfully implement the operational directives issued by the Government to the three Services Chiefs. This ensures that the Defence doctrine adheres to the operational directives and is completely integrated into the Government’s Defence policy”.

Formulation of Defence Policy

1.6 National Defence Policy is formulated based on an objective assessment of a number of factors. Some of the more prominent of these are:

- (a) The international security environment including the interests and influences of major world powers, their policies and capabilities, their ability to project force and influence military capability in our neighbourhood.
- (b) The regional security environment in our area of national interests. These include developments on a wider Southern Asian framework, policies of nation's within this area including their security relationship with other countries, their military capabilities and potential.
- (c) The military capabilities and potential of our neighbours, their defence policies, security strategies and external military linkages. Possibilities of their obtaining assistance from outside powers including military technological capability, assistance they may provide to subversive organisations in our country.
- (d) An analysis of the global and regional military technological developments. Introduction of sophisticated weapon systems or technologies in the region and their impact on the security environment.
- (e) The acquisition and availability of weapons of mass destruction and their possible use against our country.
- (f) The internal security environment in the country. Analysis of terrorist organisations, their orientation, external support and capability.
- (g) All this has to be managed within budgetary constraints, which is a constant factor.

1.7 In regard to the defence preparedness in pursuance of Defence Policy the Hon'ble Prime Minister in his reply to the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence has informed the House on 28.04.1993 as follows:

“.....that optimum level of preparedness has not been affected and will never be affected. There will be variations. I do not feel as the Defence Minister of the country today, as I felt in 1985, because the resource crunch is very much there today, which was not felt to that extent by the Defence Minister in 1985 or thereafter for some years. Therefore, while these variations will always be there, the necessary preparedness for the

purposes of our defence policy, in pursuance of the defence policy, will never be allowed to be lowered.”

1.8 The Defence Secretary informed during the evidence that the National Security Doctrine encompasses the whole range of national interests and the core values of our country have been clearly enunciated and the National Security basically is all about preserving and protecting core values of the nation. The Ministry, however, accepted that it was true that India was not having a separate document on National Security Policy.

1.9 The Defence Secretary, however, clarified:

“It is true that we do not have separate document. But all the elements of the doctrine are well known and have been incorporated from our Constitution downwards. There have been several publications. There have been policy pronouncements by Ministers in Parliament. So, our national security doctrine is well known and the absence of a written document I would respectfully submit, does not create any confusion or any lack of clarity in this matter. I however accept the point that we do not publish it as a document as such.”

1.10 During the course of evidence the Committee desired to know as to what was the strategic approach designed to fulfil National Security goals, the Defence Secretary explained the position as under:

“The primary approach of the nation or of the Government to ensure this doctrine is of two-fold. One is on the diplomatic and political front. Second is on the military front. Diplomatic and political efforts of the Government are centred around building bridges of peace in our neighbourhood. The Government is always on the forefront in this effort to have friendly relations with all our neighbours, even with our neighbours with whom we may have border disputes. On military front, the doctrine is well known. There is a top secret document which the Government has given to the Services Chiefs which is known by the term ‘Operational Directives’. This clearly lays down what exactly should be the approach in the event of hostility. So, the concerned agencies are well aware of these aspects. To that extent, there is no confusion on this.”

1.11 When the Committee again pointed out that they were referring to the strategic policy which should be discussed publicly, the Defence Secretary clarified:

“.....In the Ministry of Defence, we prepare a paper called the Strategic and Technological Environment Assessment. This is an inter-Ministerial multidisciplinary study undertaken under the aegis of the Director-

General of Defence Planning in the Ministry with representatives of all the concerned Ministries *viz.* Defence, Home, External Affairs, Finance and Science and Technology. All the concerned Ministries are associated with the study and the strategic and technological environment the country is likely to face within the next 20 years is forecast. Based on those studies, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force prepare their Perspective Plans. These encompass a time span of 15 years. The present studies undertaken in 1992 on the strategic and technological environment will go up to the period 2012. In 1985, based on an earlier study, we had our Long-Term Perspective Plans which go up to 2000 A.D.”

1.12 The Committee while making a reference to the conclusion contained at para 1.66 of the Nineteenth Report of the Estimates Committee (1992-93) wherein it was recommended that the country should have a formal National Security Doctrine desired to know the action taken on the recommendation of the Estimates Committee. To this, the Defence Secretary submitted:

“..... there is a policy; the only thing is that it is not written down as a separate document and published as such.”

1.13 The Defence Secretary elaborated:

“As a matter of policy we have not published such a document and the Government has not been in favour of publishing a separate document. It is only the United States in my knowledge which annually publishes a document called National Security Doctrine*. Non-publication of the document does not mean in any way non existence of the policy.”

1.14 Replying to the debate during discussion in Lok Sabha on 16.05.95 on Demands for Grants (1995-96) of the Ministry of Defence, the Prime Minister in this context has stated as follows:

“We do not have a document called India’s National Defence Policy. But we have got several guidelines which are followed, strictly followed and observed This policy is not merely rigid in the sense that it has been written down, but these are the guidelines, these are the objectives, these are the matters which are always kept in view while conducting our Defence Policy....”

1.15 The Committee note from the submissions made before them as well as Statements made in the House that India as a nation throughout history has never had any territorial expansionist desire or designs. Immediately

* As per news report appearing in the *Times of India* dated 8th December, 1995, the Chinese authorities released on November 17, 1995 a white paper on “China’s national security policy, arms control and disarmament”.

after Independence, major interest of India was the consolidation of the new republic, ensuring its survival and socio-economic development of people of the country. India's primary strategic priority and goal even at present remains the rapid and well managed socio-economic development of its people. This requires a stable and durable environment of peace and security at global, regional, national and societal levels.

1.16 The Committee note that as stated by the Ministry of Defence, the principal objective of India's Defence Policy is to promote and sustain durable peace. Towards that end, our Defence Forces have to be kept adequately equipped to foil any attempt to challenge the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty and to contribute towards regional and international stability. India has a Defence-oriented policy with no designs to conquer other countries and has no aggressive designs in its arms build-up.

1.17 It has also been stated by the Government that there has not been any specifically written document called India's Defence Policy but the policy articulated since Independence is that our military capability is to be directed to ensure the Defence of the national territory over land, sea and air, encompassing, among others, inviolability of our land borders, island territories, offshore assets and our maritime trade routes.

1.18 The Committee are informed that there is no formal written document called India's National Defence Policy. However, these are guidelines, these are the objectives which are being strictly followed and observed since Independence while conducting the Defence Policy. There is a policy but there is no policy document. In the absence of any document explaining articulated policy with stated national objectives and national interests it is not possible for the policy to be analysed and modified. The Committee, therefore, desire the Government to examine the feasibility of preparing a formal National Defence Policy document for being placed before the Parliament.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1.19 Most of the nation States have set up institutional mechanism in the form of an agency at the apex level to carry out the national security policy analysis, formulation of the military strategy and comprehensive long term perspective in our national security planning to attain the national security objectives. In India a National Security Council was constituted *vide* Government Resolution No. 50/4/18/88-TS dated 24.8.90 with the Prime Minister as Chairman and Ministers of Defence, Finance, Home and External Affairs as Members to provide a framework in which various aspects pertaining to national security can be viewed in a co-ordinated manner. To provide a broader cross-section of views on the working

of the National Security Council, it had been decided to set up a National Security Advisory Board which consisted of 35 Members under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister.

It was proposed that the Members of the National Security Council will be permanent invitees of the National Advisory Board. Prime Minister may also invite other Ministers to attend the meetings of the Board.

The Advisory Board was to assist the National Security Council in the following manner:

- (a) provide a broad range of informed views and options for decision making on crucial issues affecting national security;
- (b) comment on the options presented before it for planning responses in the long and near-term based on the developing situation and related threat perceptions;
- (c) strive for a consensus and broad understanding in a non-partisan atmosphere on national security issues to enable continuity of policies and programmes on national security matters; and
- (d) promote better understanding of basic national security issues and problems in the country.

1.20 On being enquired as to what had happened to the National Security Advisory Board which was formed under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister way back in 1990, the Defence Secretary stated during the evidence:

“As I stated in the beginning, national security comprises the entire governance of the nation. It is not a single Ministry’s subject and as a co-ordinating department, the Cabinet Secretariat is the Department of the Government which deals with the National Security Council. This is merely by way of stating a fact for elucidation. With regard to your question as to what has happened to this National Security Council, as you would recall, the Council had one meeting when it was constituted. The Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee was designated as the Secretary of the National Security Council. Then there was a change of Government. The new Government has since then been examining as to how they should restructure this Council and make it as a very useful committee which could holistically go into the question of national security. The Cabinet Secretariat, I understand, is in the process of working on this. I think the Hon. Prime Minister during the last debate on our budget demands did mention in the Parliament about this that he was thinking of restructuring it and reconstituting it.”

1.21 In regard to the setting up of National Security Council, the Prime Minister has informed the House on 28.4.1993 as follows:

“Now, it has been felt that, in view of the need for speedy decision-making, confidentiality and flexibility relating to strategic and security matters affecting the nation, the setting up of a formal institutional mechanism such as the National Security Council may not prove to be very successful. This matter has been discussed back and forth for years and years. I have come to the conclusion that for certain purposes, a National security Council may be a good idea, although not for all purposes. So, I have taken up this matter for a review which is going on and we will come, as soon as possible, to Parliament to report on what has been decided. The need for a National Security Council for certain long-term purposes is being felt and I personally think that this has to be set up, this has to be, once again, resuscitated, resurrected, if it has been allowed to wither away and I will have more to say to the House after sometime.”

1.22 The Defence Secretary, clarifying the specific reasons for the inordinate delay in the matter and also no progress even after the Prime Minister had made a statement on the floor of the House (on 28.4. 93), submitted:

“The Government is giving serious attention to this matter. The Government is considering how best to restructure this and make it an effective instrument.”

The Defence Secretary added that the Cabinet Secretariat was processing the paper and the same was with them at present.

1.23 In a post evidence reply the Ministry stated that various support structures for the proposed National Security Council were also to be constituted. The original proposal had the drawbacks of duplication of structure; non-provision of interface of the NSC with the existing official and political structure and multi-tiered structures which hindered speedy and flexible decision-making. Strategic and security matters affecting the nation need to be handled with confidentiality and flexibility. The question of restructuring the NSC with a view to achieving the right institutional mechanism to be able to achieve speedy decision making is under consideration of the Government.

1.24 The Committee referred to the statement made by the Prime Minister in Rajya Sabha (on 2.5.94) in reply to a debate on the working of the Ministry of Defence while discussing the Demands for Grants of the Ministry for the year 1994-95 and desired to know from the Defence Secretary as to what was precisely the concept of the newly proposed National Security Council. The Defence Secretary submitted:

“This again is at a stage where no decisions have been taken by the Government. So, I would not be at liberty, at this moment to give what are the official level recommendations.”

1.25 In his reply to the discussion on Demands for Grants (1995-96) of the Ministry of Defence in Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister stated that the National Security Council as it existed from 1990 was found a little unworkable. He further stated that they had undertaken a thorough review of the mechanism and came to the conclusion that a number of changes would be required because: (1) the National Security Council was not much different from the CCPA. It was a kind of mechanical addition and not a functional addition; and (ii) the Advisory Board appeared to be somewhat unwieldy and discussions in such a body, large body, would tend to lose focus and make the whole exercise blurred and confusing. He opined that consultations with experts outside the Government including Members of Parliament and experts in academic and other institutions were important and advantageous. But such consultation was best done in small well-knit groups with persons having specialised knowledge or expertise of that specific subject concerning national security.

He further stated that they had come to the conclusion that national security was a very wide subject. It consisted of so many items and it was better to concentrate on each item and while discussing that item, it was better to have experts in that particular item, in that area, rather than having every expert in a big body and losing focus. Such experts could be associated at the stage of preparation of strategic policy papers as well as during discussion of such papers at a higher level.

The Prime Minister also stated that they were veering to the view that specific Committees of Ministers or groups of Ministers could be set up for different aspects of national security whenever strategy or policy papers were brought up for consideration of the Ministers. This flexible arrangement would provide inclusion of the concerned Ministers-in-charge as well as other Ministers, the Chief Ministers and persons in public life including Members of Parliament who have specialised knowledge and experience and whose contribution would be valuable.

1.26 He also informed:

“Even though a separate National Security Council is not in place today, mechanisms and systems do exist for consideration of national security issues. The Joint Intelligence Committee in the Cabinet Secretariat constantly interacts with the concerned Ministries and agencies. There is regular consideration of the defence aspects of national security in the

Chiefs of Staff Committee who have their own Secretariat. The Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee and heads of other agencies interact with the Service Chiefs. We have all these working even now. The core group of Secretaries is also there. They look into these matters of internal security. These mechanisms and systems have been working well but this is where the difference comes that we are not satisfied with the present dispensation.

We would like to have an over-arching body which looks into the conclusions drawn, the reports sent by these different mechanisms. While these mechanisms and systems have been working well, we still feel that there is a need for strengthening the present arrangement in certain respects. But one thing is that the resource persons including experts from outside the Government need to be associated more in the study and preparation of policy papers. There is also need for having papers prepared from a central point of view instead of from one Department or Ministry. Therefore, the need for an over-arching body is felt here.

On many aspects of national security a holistic approach and an integrated action plan involving a number of Ministries and agencies can be better achieved if the paper is prepared in an Inter-Ministrial Group or a nodal agency instead of any one Ministry or Department. So, both aspects, the specialised aspect of a particular area of activity or an item being considered in a specialised mechanism plus the general aspect, the holistic aspect from the national security angle by a body which is not unwieldy but which is an over-arching body which takes into account and co-ordinates with all these views is necessary. And I feel that we should be able to come to the right conclusions and the right pattern of the Committee very very shortly.....we are in the process of giving a final shape to our proposals.....”

1.27 The Committee note that National Security Council was set up on 24 August, 1990 with the Prime Minister as Chairman and Ministers of Defence, Finance, Home and External Affairs as Members to provide the framework in which various aspects pertaining to national security could be viewed in a co-ordinated manner. To provide a broader cross-section of views on the working of the National Security Council and to assist it, National Security Advisory Board consisting of 35 Members under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister was also set up. The Committee further note that the Council met only once on 5 October, 1990 and the National Security Advisory Board which was required to meet at least twice a year had not met even once.

1.28 The Committee further note that the Government have undertaken a review on the continuation of National Security Council and National Security Advisory Board in the existing forms.

National Security is a very wide subject consisting of so many items. While discussing an item, it is better to have experts for that particular item rather than having every expert in a big body and losing focus. The Ministry intend to have such Experts who could be associated at the stage of preparation of strategic policy papers and discussion of such papers at a higher level and that the Ministry were veering to the view that the specific Committees of Ministers or groups of Ministers could be set up whenever strategy on policy papers were brought for consideration of the Ministers. The Committee also note that the Ministry consider that for integrated and holistic approach on national security, a body which was not unwieldy but an over-arching body was necessary and the proposals in this regard were being given final shape.

1.29 The Committee are not sure whether under the intended 'flexible arrangements', separate Committees/groups of Ministers for different aspects of national security would attain the desired objectives. The Committee, however, feel that the Government should urgently come up with formal institutional mechanism with adequate support structures to monitor the state of our Defence preparedness and to oversee progress on Defence programmed modernisation/upgradation acquisition/re-equipment apart from achieving speedy decision making on crucial issues affecting national security.

CHAPTER II

DEFENCE PLANNING

2.1 The Defence Planning is the formulation of policies and strategies that will govern the allocation of funds and acquisition, use and disposition of resources to achieve these objectives. Systematic planning as an instrument for effective monitoring, review and updating defence strategy and defence systems was conceived of and introduced in India in 1964. With the passage of years, the planning mechanism in the Ministry of Defence has been progressively refined. Planning units are functioning in all the Departments of the Ministry and the three Service Headquarters. Institutional arrangements have been evolved for close consultation, interaction and co-ordination among the planning units ensuring effective budgetary control and economy.

Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff (DPS)

2.2 A high level Inter-Service Organisation called the Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff (DPS) has been created to assist the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is a multi-disciplinary organisation with representatives drawn from the three Services, the Ministries of External Affairs and Finance, and the Defence Research and Development Organisation. Its functions include —

- (a) Threat analysis and formulation of threat assessments for various time frames;
- (b) Evolution of military aims;
- (c) Formulation of the concept of combined operations;
- (d) Conception of and recommendations regarding balanced force levels to achieve military aims;
- (e) Carrying out joint training and joint logistic management;
- (f) Co-ordinating perspective planning for 15/20 years periods; and
- (g) Close interaction with R & D, Defence Production, Industry and Finance.

2.3 The DPS is responsible for preparation of co-ordinated perspective Defence Plans based on projections received from Perspective Planning Directorates in respective Services Headquarters, the Department of Defence Production & Supplies and the Department of Defence Research and Development.

2.4 During the evidence, the Committee pointed out that during the last six years, six DGs of the Defence Planning Staff had been changed. The Committee asked as to what role did the Ministry of Defence think, the Directorate General of the Defence Planning Staff could play when its Director-Generals were being changed too frequently. The Defence Secretary replied:

“Factually, you are right. Our effort should be towards ensuring a stable tenure of at least two years for this post. We have taken due note of the observations made by the Committee. Within the constraints of administrative difficulties we will try to do something in the matter.”

2.5 The Committee desired to know as to what was the rationale in changing the Chiefs of the Defence Planning Staff after every two years, the Defence Secretary submitted:

“It is the Head who will be there for two years. There are other staff also who will continue to remain there for longer terms. I am only talking about the Director General. For him two-year term is considered to be reasonable. Even at the level of Army Commanders, we give two-year tenure.”

2.6 During the course of evidence the Committee pointed out that these frequent changes did indicate the fact that very little importance was being attached to this particular institution by the Government. To this, the Defence Secretary submitted:

“I would not subscribe to that view with the greatest deference to what you have said. There have been certain overriding administrative problems justifying these transfers. As I said, we have taken note of your observation. We are in agreement with that. We will make efforts to ensure stable tenures.”

2.7 The Committee note that the Planning mechanism for Defence strategy and Defence systems in the Ministry of Defence has been established comprising a high level Inter-Service Organisation called the Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff (DPS) to assist the Chiefs of the Staff Committee. DPS also performs certain vital functions which *inter alia* include periodic threat assessments, evolution of military aims, evolving suitable mix of force levels and weaponry for three Services, co-ordinating perspective planning for 15-20 years, interaction with R & D, Defence Production, Industry and Finance. The Committee are, however, dismayed to note that over a span of six years, the Directorate had seen six Chiefs, which indicates that due importance is not being attached to this vital organisation. The Committee need not stress that frequent changes at the

Director General level do not augur well and makes it well nigh impossible for the Directorate to provide coherent and co-ordinated assessments for perspective planning, achieve positive results and generate the desired level of involvement in the planning process.

2.8 The Committee, therefore, recommend that Ministry of Defence should make it a matter of Policy to ensure a stable tenure of minimum two years for the post of Director-General, Defence Planning Staff so as to enable the Directorate to achieve its objectives.

DEFENCE PLANS

2.9 First Five Year Plan for Defence was formulated for the period 1964-69, followed by a Plan for the period 1969-74. Anticipating the rapidly changing security environment and the need to adapt to emerging technologies, the concept of 'Roll-On' Plan was adopted in 1970 i.e. the Plan was to be updated every year by the addition of another year. The first Roll-On Plan was drawn up for the period 1970-75. The Plan was upset by the events of 1971 war and financial constraints during the early seventies. The situation was reviewed in 1973 and a Plan for the period 1974-79 was drawn up. This was modified in 1975 keeping in view the lessons of the West Asian War in October, 1973, large scale acquisition of military hardware by our immediate neighbour in the West and the hike in Oil price and its resultant considerations.

The next Defence Plan was prepared for the period 1979-84. The Plan was reviewed during 1981-82 taking the changed security environment into consideration, induction of modern weapon systems in our immediate neighbourhood and the desirability of making the Defence Plan coterminous with the National Plan 1980-85. This was followed by the Defence Plan 1985-90.

The Eighth Defence Plan exercise was initiated in the year 1989. However, this could not be finalised due to serious economic difficulties faced by the country and the mis-match between the projections of the Services and the resources available. In the meanwhile, the time-frame for the National Plan was changed from 1990-95 to 1992-97.

2.10 Draft Defence Plans are considered by the Committee on Defence Planning (CDP). The CDP was established in 1977 to undertake regular assessment relevant to defence planning in the light of all factors having a bearing on national security and defence. The Committee consist of the Cabinet Secretary, Principal Secretary to PM, Defence Secretary, Secretary DP & S, Secretary R & D, Finance Secretary, Secretary Planning Commission, Secretary (R) in the Cabinet Secretariat and the three Services Chiefs. Internal consultation with Finance is also done and approval of Cabinet/CCPA is obtained for the Defence Plans.

2.11 It has been submitted before the Committee by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director, IDSA, that the Ministry of Defence is not even linked up obliquely into the Planning Commission's allocation of resources. The Planning Commission sets aside a total out of national resources. They do not examine the planning done by the Services.

2.12 The Committee during the course of evidence desired to know the details about the Defence Planning, assumption of scenario for which the Ministry was planning and also other details about the Five Year Defence Planning process.

Explaining the position, the Defence Secretary stated:

".....the basis of the Five-Year Plans is the Strategic and Technological Environment Assessment which is first made by all the concerned Ministries, that is, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Finance, MHA etc. All these Ministries together prepare a strategic and technological assessment which is seen at the level of Raksha Mantri. Based on these reports, a long-term perspective Plan for each Service is prepared, covering a period of fifteen years. The Five Year Plan is prepared on the basis of Long-term perspective Plan of each Service. The Perspective Plan as well as the Technological and Environment Assessment Plan are secret documents. Ultimately what is published is only the Five Year Plan which is just the figures of allocations."

2.13 The representative added:

"Strategic and Technological Environment Assessment gives us a projection of what our potential adversaries are likely to acquire or what they are developing over the next fifteen or twenty years' horizon. So, the Services, taking these into consideration, prepare their long-term perspective Plans to enable them to meet those threats as and when they develop. Most of these will relate to research and development projects to be undertaken, or arms acquisition proposals which will have to be undertaken. That is a Long-term perspective Plan. It is not a finance-oriented plan. It is the plan to meet threat over the next fifteen years', sometimes twenty years' horizon. So, that is what each Service prepares. That ultimately gets transferred into certain financial figures and those are discussed with the Planning Commission as well as the Finance."

2.14 Regarding the feasibility of formulation of Five Year Defence Plan, the Ministry have stated that giving assurance about a five year budgetary allocations will not be feasible under the present system. Budget being a yearly allocation

has to take note of the latest assessment of availability of resources, change in requirements and changes imposed by external factors. In the context of present resource crunch, guarantees about the assured availability of resources in terms of five year budgetary allocations may not be feasible. Nonetheless efforts towards securing advanced indication about resource allocation in a plan period are continuing.

2.15 The Ministry has stated that Defence Plans are normally kept coterminous with the National Plans. Defence Plan finalisation has been generally delayed on account of the fact that the defence outlays indicated to the Services have been found to be inadequate. There has been a significant gap between Services' projections of requirements and the resources actually available. This mismatch between requirements and resources available has necessitated prolonged exercises and discussions. It is in the aforesaid background that the Seventh Defence Plan prepared for 1985-90 could be finalised only in August, 1988.

Eighth Defence Plan (1992-97)

2.16 The draft Eighth Defence Plan was prepared 1990-95 and the exercise for same was initiated in 1989. But due to economic difficulties, the time-frame of the National Plan was changed from 1990-95 to 1992-97. A draft Defence Plan 1992-97 has since been prepared, as Defence Plans are normally kept coterminous with the National Plan. Efforts are being made to finalise it in the near future. This would be possible after the position regarding resources likely to be available for the period 1992-97 is finalised.

2.17 In their latest reply dated 21 January, 1996, the Ministry have intimated as follows:

“Efforts are being made to finalise the Eighth Defence Plan incorporating the essential and inescapable modernisation requirements of the Defence Services, which are being determined after careful scrutiny and review.”

2.18 In response to a query, the Defence Secretary informed the Committee as follows:

“The factual position is, after the conversion of the Eighth Plan from 1990-95 to 1992-97, the Ministry of Defence has prepared a Draft Plan which has been examined by the Ministry of Finance. There were some divergences of opinion with regard to the provisions required. This has been discussed in the meeting of the Committee on Defence Planning presided over by the Cabinet Secretary. It appears that essentially we have prepared a defence plan but it is under discussion at appropriate levels.”

2.19 In regard to the machinery at the highest level for consideration of draft Plans for Defence, the Defence Secretary explained during evidence as follows:

“As you are well aware, the Cabinet Committee on Defence had been replaced by the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet during the 1962 operations. After 1962 it was subsequently replaced by the Cabinet Committee on Internal Affairs. Thereafter the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs and now the whole Cabinet is dealing with it. Planning for Defence started only in 1964 on a five-year basis.”

2.20 Asked to explain as to why the draft Eighth Defence Plan was postponed from 1990-95 to 1992-97, the Defence Secretary stated:

“Basically, the 1990-95 Plan had to be abandoned after it was framed because precisely at that time the country was passing through an unprecedented financial crisis. The Plan was formulated with an outlay of Rs. 10,07,000 crores. As the Government approved it, there was a change of Government, along with which the financial situation changed. The successor Government which assumed power, thought that the Plan had to be realistic *vis-a-vis* the financial position and the Defence needs of the country. In the meanwhile the national Five Year Plan formulation also had been postponed. Normally, the Defence Plan is coterminous with the national Five Year Plan. The national Five Year Plan had to be recast for 1992-97 and the Defence Plan also had to be recast along with it. That is why the Defence Plan had to be postponed to 1992-97.”

2.21 Explaining further the background, the Ministry stated in post-evidence reply:

“During the consideration of the Defence Budget, 1992-93, it was considered appropriate that the plan period for Defence may be the same as the National Plan and accordingly MoD was asked to suggest a Defence Plan for the period 1992-97 taking the allocation for 1992-93 as a base and on the assumption that the Defence expenditure shall remain at a constant percentage of GDP.”

2.22 The Ministry also informed that the salient features of the VIII Defence Plan are as follows:

- (a) The Plan has been prepared by the DGDPS based on a thorough assessment of the likely Strategic and Technological Environment and needs of the Defence Services.
- (b) It spells out National Security objectives, Military Strategy, Force structure and planning imperatives.

- (c) It has definitive force development objectives, namely:
 - (i) Deterrent capability,
 - (ii) Quick Reaction Forces,
 - (iii) Augmentation of Amphibious Capabilities,
 - (iv) Addition of Force Multipliers.
- (d) Other goals are:
 - (i) Consolidation to improve organisational stability.
 - (ii) Making up of shortfalls in the existing strength.
 - (iii) Improvements to C3I especially in Strategic and Tactical communication.
 - (iv) Reorganisation of formations for optimum equipment utilisation.
 - (v) Building up of reserves of equipment and ammunition.

2.23 Enquired whether there were any other drawbacks noticed besides the one drawback observed while comparing the Seventh Plan & Eighth Plan i.e. existence of huge gaps between plan outlay and resource allocation, the Defence Secretary stated as follows:

“...lack of resources to meet the immediate projected requirements was a major drawback. Another drawback is that under ideal situation we would like to have a plan figure approved ahead of the beginning of the Plan period so that it is properly planned and executed at an even pace. In the case of Seventh Plan, we got the final approval, in the very last year of the Plan. That was another drawback. There were other minor drawbacks as well.”

2.24 Explaining the position further, the Ministry in their post-evidence reply have stated as follows:

“Certain drawbacks were noticed during the implementation phases of the earlier plans, most importantly huge gaps which existed between plan outlays and resource allocations. For example, the Seventh Defence Plan had visualised an outlay of Rs. 71938 crores. However, the aggregate of the allocations during the five years amounted to Rs. 58,188 crores only. The achievements on the ground in terms of modernisation targets was less than projections due to the curtailed allocations. The main reasons for these shortfalls were:

- (a) High cost of acquisition from abroad as a result of the sharp depreciation of the rupee.
- (b) High cost of indigenous production due to inflation.
- (c) Rising manpower costs, in terms of pay and allowances as well as pension.
- (d) Uncertainty in actual fund availability till the 4th year of the Plan.

The Ministry of Finance is being requested to provide adequate funds for the VIII Defence Plan so that the modernisation plans of the Services do not suffer."

2.25 Asked to explain the action which the Government was contemplating for timely finalisation of plan keeping in view the fact that delay in finalisation of Five Year Defence Plan was a recurring feature, the Defence Secretary stated:

"Unfortunately, I am not in a position to give today a straight forward answer. I will only submit that the Ministry of Defence did finalise its plan projections well ahead of the plan period. But because of very severe resource constraint, the Government have not been able to approve that Plan well in time. We only hope that with the picking up of the economy, in future these time gaps would, perhaps, be eliminated. It is only a hope and it is not an assurance."

2.26 In their latest reply dated 21 December, 1995, the Ministry have intimated the status of the Eighth Defence Five Year Plan as follows:

"..... In pursuance of the Cabinet Secretary's advice and in the light of the Prime Minister having desired a Paper indicating the minimum inescapable needs of the Services for modernisation, the issue was raised by the Defence Secretary with the Principal secretary to the Prime Minister. The Principal Secretary to the PM has held a series of meetings with the three Services Chiefs. An exercise to prioritise projects, as part of the modernisation requirements of the three Services, is currently underway. This exercise is aimed at identifying the shortfall in resources in the VIII Plan for the purposes of modernisation so that the additional resources can be made available either during the remaining two years of the VIII Plan or during the IX Plan period."

2.27 Asked whether it was felt necessary by the Ministry of Defence to enhance Defence Expenditure as percentage of GDP, the Defence Secretary reacted:

".....allocations for defence must be need-based, they should not be fixed percentage-wise of the GDP. In the Indian system, we would prefer need-based allocation rather than having fixed percentage of GDP."

2.28 On being asked whether the Ministry would be able to complete all major projects scheduled for completion during VIII Plan within the allotted funds and if not, the reasons and the cost and time overruns in each case, the Ministry informed in post-evidence reply as follows:

“During the first three years of the Plan, i.e. 1992-95, the Ministry has been allotted Rs. 17,581 crores, Rs. 21,500 crores and Rs. 23,000 crores respectively.

The Ministry of Defence has requested the Ministry of Finance to indicate the magnitude of resource availability in the remaining years. Unless the entire picture becomes clear it would not be possible to comment definitely on the adequacy of allocated resources for timely completion of projects.

Ministry of Defence have been broadly advised that adequate resources will be available to ensure that the essential requirements of national security are met. It may be recalled that the budgetary allocation for the years 1993-94 and 1994-95 have already been significantly enhanced, consistent with this understanding.”

2.29 The Committee note that First Five Year Defence Plan was formulated for the period 1964-69, followed by the Second Plan 1969-74. Thereafter successive Plans were formulated, reviewed and modified keeping in view the changing security environment, lessons of the West-Asian War 1973, hike in oil prices, large scale acquisition and induction of modern weapon systems in our immediate neighbourhood, etc.

2.30 The Ministry of Defence have pointed out that Defence Plan finalisations have been generally delayed on account of the fact that there has been a significant gap between Services' projections of requirements and the resources actually available. This mismatch between requirement and resources available necessitates prolonged exercises and discussions. It is in this background that the Seventh Plan 1985-90 could be finalised only in August, 1988 i.e. in the last year of the Plan and the Eighth Plan 1990-95 and later changed to 1992-97 initiated in 1989 has not so far been finalised though we are in the 4th year of the Plan.

2.31 The Ministry have further stated that this situation is due to the economic difficulties faced by the country and the resource crunch in the Government of India.

2.32 The Committee note that Defence Plans are normally kept coterminous with the National Plans. The Committee also note that the

Planning Commission sets aside a total out of national resources without examining the planning done by the Services.

2.33 The Committee are constrained to observe the adhocism in systematic planning in Defence Sectors as is amply evident from the fact that in a period of about 20 years, 6 Defence Five Year Plans were prepared but none could be completed for one reason or the other and had to be either deferred or reframed midway. The Committee are deeply concerned to find that 7th Five Year Plan for the period 1980-85 could be finalised only in the last year of plan and the 8th Five Year Plan for the period 1990-95 later revised to 1992-97 still not finalised even though nearly four years of the plan period are already gone.

2.34 The Committee note the reasons advanced by the Ministry for delay in finalisation of the Plans and the external factors having a bearing on the same. The Committee are convinced that had the Ministry taken adequate precautions and the planning mechanism available with them had functioned effectively, the delays could have been avoided to a great extent. The Committee wonder as to how there has been a mismatch between the projections of the Ministry and the plan outlays sanctioned by the Finance Ministry particularly when internal consultations with Finance are also reportedly done before the plans are drafted as also the fact that the Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff (DPS) which is co-ordinating perspective planning for 15/20 years periods has representatives from Three Services, Ministry of External Affairs, Finance and Defence Research and Development Organisation on it and the Committee on Defence Planning (CDP) which is again a very high level body headed by Cabinet Secretary, having Defence Secretary, Finance Secretary, Secretary, Planning Commission etc. as Members to consider and finalise the plans before being sent to CCPA/Cabinet for approval. The Committee fail to comprehend a further mismatch at the time of resource allocation *vis-a-vis* plan projections and the huge gaps therein which was nearly 13,750 crores in 7th Defence Plan which visualised an outlay of 71,938 crores against actual allocations amounting to Rs. 58,188 crores only despite internal consultation and elaborate planning mechanism. The Committee are undoubtedly aware that there will always be competing demands in our developing economy from various sectors. The Committee desire that the Committee on Defence Planning should make its role more meaningful and purposeful for securing allocation of resources for approved Defence Plans of minimum inescapable requirements.

2.35 The Committee need not emphasise the utmost necessity of long-term planning clearly spelling out the strategies and objectives governing the

allocation of funds and acquisitions, use and disposition of resources. As the long-term Defence plans of the country have never taken off in real sense due to a variety of reasons particularly the absence of long-term financial commitments, the Committee would like the Government to evolve suitable mechanism as to ensure that the Government must firmly commit the funds at least for those projects and acquisitions which are high on the priority list of the Defence.

2.36 The Committee also expect the Ministry to take adequate remedial measures to overcome the drawbacks noticed in the earlier plans and to ensure that finalisation of Ninth Defence Plan would be completed well ahead of the beginning of the plan and the firm commitment of the Government for allocation of resources would be available in time so that the targets fixed and the major projects scheduled for completion during the Plan are completed without cost and time overruns.

2.37 The Committee regret that the 8th Defence Five year Plan (1992-97) has not yet been finalised. The Committee are concerned that inadequate allocation will have adverse impact on many of the modernisation programmes and also result in deferring of priority programmes and procurements to the next Defence Plan.

The Committee would, therefore, like to impress on the Government the imperative necessity for adequate availability of resources as to ensure that prioritised Defence acquisitions/projects/schemes and modernisation programmes are implemented within stipulated time-frame.

The Committee also recommend that the Government mobilise resources to provide a substantially additional outlay in the light of projections made by the Ministry of Defence to meet the minimum inescapable needs of the Services for modernisation vital for security of the country during the remaining period of Eighth Five Year Plan.

INTEGRATION OF HIGHER MILITARY ORGANISATION IN GOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK

2.38 Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director, IDSA, has informed the Committee that Defence (Service) Headquarters perform a dual function: one of Operational Command (with its Operational Planning Staff) and other as Planning Staff (for Defence Policy formulation). The Operational Command function is directly related to Force Employment. This requires its own planning processes and mechanisms. Force employment functions have to be in context of current and short term threats, the forces already in being, and the operational plans to use these forces for the requisite tasks. Theoretically, these functions can be performed

by Theatre Commander. The nature of the bulk activities and functions at the Defence Headquarters are such that they can be clubbed together as Force Development Planning—a qualitatively different function than that of, a operational command of forces. These are related to resource planning and have to be undertaken with long-term perspective to meet future challenges. Current planning decisions decide the force levels and structures at a future date, on the basis of long-term assessments and resource allocation. By definition these are Governmental responsibilities which subordinate Service Headquarters cannot effectively undertake especially if it has no close interaction with other Government Agencies/Departments. The Ministry of Defence in U.K. has an integrated staff of Military and Civil professionals since long. In U.S. also the pentagon provides an Integrated Planning Staff to the U.S. President through the Chairman JCS and Secretary for Defence.

2.39 It was pointed out to the Ministry of Defence that India was the only democratic country where the higher military organisation was not integrated into the Governmental framework and structure. The Ministry of Defence in their reply submitted that each country adopts a system to suit its conditions. There is a continuous interaction between the Ministry and the Services Hqrs. The Chiefs of Staff are invariably associated in formulating the policies of the Government. Defence Minister's Weekly Meeting is one such forum. CDP is another. A major advantage of this system is that it provides an opportunity for an independent in-depth analysis and re-evaluation of the proposed policy before it is approved.

Ministry of Defence draws heavily on Services and their professional & technical expertise for analysis and examination of Defence related issues.

2.40 The Ministry of Defence further submitted that the Service Chiefs have a clearly defined role within the Governmental system. They provide military advice, which form one of the inputs for decision making at the highest levels of the Government on matters pertaining to Defence and security. As the Chiefs of each of the Services, they implement the tasks assigned to them by the Government.

2.41 As regard the advantages/disadvantages of integrating higher military organisation (especially the force planning functions) into the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry submitted that integration beyond this point would tantamount to merger of the two organisations which would neither be desirable nor practicable. The integration of the higher Military Organisation in the Ministry will have the two disadvantages *viz.* (i) The system of an independent analysis will be lost. (ii) The Military discipline would deter the Services Officers manning Ministry posts to modify any proposal forwarded by Service Chiefs. We have adopted a pattern wherein the Civil Services provide secretarial support to the elected executive. The system has worked well and there does not appear to be any need to change it at present.

2.42 On the question of having Chiefs of Staff as part of the Ministry of Defence, the Committee were informed during the course of evidence by the Defence Secretary:

“...the Chiefs of Staff are not being designated as Secretaries to the Government but on Defence matters Government seek advice of the Chiefs of Staff. They have direct access to the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. So, there is a very close interaction.

2.43 Upon this, when the Committee pointed out that since the expert opinion was in favour of bringing the Chiefs of Staff as part of Governmental framework, the Defence Secretary stated:

“...our country with our genius as you put it, has evolved a system over last 40 years and we have not found anything fundamentally wrong with it to necessitate change and change for the sake of change, we would not like to have.”

2.44 The Committee pointed out that it was perhaps one of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Committee that the Chiefs of Staff should be a part of the Secretariat or for that matter the Ministry of Defence.

The Defence Secretary reacted:

“It is a part of this. There are several other recommendations.”

2.45 The Committee note that considering the advantages of an integrated Civil-Defence Staffed Organisation, all major countries in the world have opted for integrated higher military organisations with Governmental framework. In our country, however, Chiefs of Staff and Service headquarters function outside the framework of Government. The Committee are informed by the Ministry of Defence that the system has worked well during the last 40 years and that they are not in favour of any change with the existing system.

2.46 The Committee are, however, of the opinion that the long-term planning in Defence has been highly erratic due to preoccupation of higher military establishment with operational role, inadequate attention to the planning and force development components and absence of direct interaction with other Government agencies and departments. The Committee feel that the issue requires in-depth study and analysis as to find ways and means to enhance the level of interaction and ensure better co-ordination amongst the Service Headquarters, the Ministry and other Government agencies and departments.

2.47 The Committee would also like the Ministry to examine the possibilities of appointment of Advisors, who may among others be retired Senior Services Officers, in the Ministry of Defence to provide professional expertise in the working of the Ministry besides acting as yet another source of advice outside the ambit of military discipline.

SYSTEM OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OR CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

2.48 In a note on shifting over to integrated command system of three Armed Forces from the present system of each Service functioning independently, the Ministry have expressed their views as follows:

“Integrated Joint Command has two clear elements. One is the integration of the three Services HQrs. under a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff or Chief of Defence Staff. The other is a combined HQrs. at theatre level. Both these have their own specific characteristics and countries adopt different structures based on their own operational requirements. It is felt that in our strategic environment, the existing system of higher defence organisation meets the requirements of national defence effectively.

Some recommendations have been made in the past, mainly in strategic journals, for a combined theatre HQ; with the Army and the Air Force, the Navy and the Air Force and all the three Services together. A combined theatre HQ exists only in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands under FORTAN (Fortress Commander, Andaman).

The US Forces adopt the concept of an integrated theatre HQ, as this is necessary in their operational environment where their strategic commitments are entirely overseas. Forces allocated to such commands such as CINPAC, (Commander in Chief Pacific) and CENTCOM (Central Command, in the Gulf) are permanent and it is necessary to train and integrate these forces in their respective operational environments. This example has no direct relevance to our situation.

In India, wars are to be fought from within the country in its close vicinity, where theatre commands have no direct relevance. Fixed allocation of forces to such commands may well restrict flexibility in allocation of resources. There is a clean demarcation of operational responsibilities between GOCs-in-C of each Service command and effective co-operation is ensured through close interaction and clear allocation of tasks. Where it is operationally necessary, such as in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, an integrated theatre command already exists.”

2.49 The Committee drew attention of the Defence Secretary to the fact that in most of the developing countries there was a Joint Chief of Defence Staff as a part of the Defence Ministry for better planning and unified command and desired to know how in India we had a different system and what were the advantages of this system. The Defence Secretary submitted:

“There are two aspects to it. First of all we do not have a system of joint Chiefs of Staff in the country. We do not have what is referred to in some other countries as single point advice system. Our country has developed a system suitable to its ethos. The system which we have adopted since independence is that the Services’ Chiefs have a very important role to play in the formulation of defence policy and in advising Government on defence matters but they are not a single point advice. Government have independently another source of advice. That is the way it functions. In the Indian context, the Chiefs of Staff have command of their respective forces viz. the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In the system which you are contemplating, Chiefs do not have command of forces. They become essentially bureaucrats. Government, after a careful consideration, had opted our present system of administration.”

2.50 Upon this, the Committee reacted that if the Chiefs of Staff were managing field formulations, they would be left with very little time or energy for giving higher directions and asked the representative the manner in which our system was better than the system operating in other countries.

The Defence Secretary submitted:

“Having a separate Joint Chief of Staff with independent field commanders has a relevance in countries like the United States where military has a global role to play. Our Armed Forces are structured for functioning within the geographical limits of our country and Service Chiefs can through their field commanders-in-Chief control operations.

United Kingdom, till recently, two-three decades back, had a global force. Those countries had structured their defence set up to suit their requirements.”

2.51 Asked as to what was the structure in the United Kingdom, the Defence Secretary submitted that they were continuing with Joint Chief of Staff system. same was the case in France and probably in Germany as well.

On being asked to explain the system obtaining in Pakistan, the Defence Secretary stated:

“Pakistan, for example, started this experiment in 1976 but, their

experience has been that the Joint Chief of Staff have been really useful only during actual execution of war. This is what our study of the Pakistan's experience shows anyway."

2.52 The Committee note that Joint Chiefs of Staff/Chief of Defence Staff has been preferred in major countries to efficiently meet the needs of the Armed Forces and for integrated planning and unified command. In India, we do not have a system of Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Ministry have explained the position stating that the requirement of our Armed Forces is to function within the geographical limits of our country and the control of operations by Service Chiefs through their field commanders, unlike, United States where military has a global role to play.

The Committee feel that an in-depth study of the System of Joint Chiefs of Staff and its relevance in the Indian context may be immediately undertaken.

CHAPTER III

DEFENCE MANAGEMENT

3.1 Shri P.R. Chari, Research Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi stated before the Committee that the aim of management was to achieve the objectives of any organisation with the greatest possible efficiency and at the least possible cost. The primary aim of defence management remained to achieve the greatest possible operational efficiency whilst keeping within the resources allocated to the defence Services.

3.2 It has also been stated that there was a continuous requirement of defence management for:

- (1) better inventory control;
- (2) mission analysis which involves identification of missions and tasks and identification of the conflict theatres in which those tasks would need to be accomplished and also the weapons needed for those particular tasks on a consideration of the intensity and duration of conflict;
- (3) high-low mix which refers to identification of the nature of threat. The defence forces have some very high-tech equipment for accomplishment of combat task. They also have low tech-equipped forces which are there for other tasks. Thus high-low mix is a question of judgement;
- (4) systems analysis which would permit alternative weapons;
- (5) project management technique which means thinking in terms of various projects, tasks and jobs as far as defence R&D is concerned. Under the technique tasks under a project are clearly chalked out with the time schedule and allocation of resources;
- (6) greater integration between the Service Headquarters and the Ministries of Defence and Finance; and
- (7) improving serviceability of equipment, checking the consumption of POL and standardisation of end user of items.

3.3 As per the written material furnished by the Ministry, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces vests in the President of India. The responsibility

for national defence rests with the Cabinet. This responsibility is discharged by the Government through the Ministry of Defence. The Raksha Mantri, who is the head of the Ministry, is assisted by Raksha Rajya Mantri in the discharge of his functions.

3.4 The Defence Secretary functions as head of the Department of Defence, responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the three Departments in the Ministry. The principal functions of the Departments in the Ministry of Defence are:

- (a) *Department of Defence*—This is headed by the Defence Secretary, who deals with the Three Services and Inter-Services Organisations, Budget, Establishment, matters relating to Parliament, Defence Policy, Defence Co-operation and Co-ordination of activities in the Ministry.
- (b) *Department of Defence Production & Supplies (DDPS)*—This is headed by the Secretary (Defence Production & Supplies), who deals with matters pertaining to Defence production, indigenisation of imported stores, equipment and spares, planning and control over the Departmental production units and Defence Public Sector Undertakings.
- (c) *Department of Defence Research and Development (DRDO)*—This is headed by Secretary (R&D), who is also the Scientific Adviser to Raksha Mantri. He is engaged in rendering advice on scientific aspects of military equipment and development plans of equipment used by the Services.

The Finance Division of the Ministry of Defence is headed by Financial Adviser (Defence Services). He is required to exercise financial control over proposals involving expenditure from the Defence Budget. He is also charged with the task of internal audit and accounting of the Defence expenditure and this task is executed through the Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA). He assists the Ministry of Defence in the discharge of its responsibilities, functioning closely with the Departments and the Services Headquarters.

3.5 A number of committees dealing with different aspects of defence related activities assist the Raksha Mantri in the discharge of his responsibilities. He holds weekly meetings which are attended by the Raksha Rajya Mantri, Defence Secretary, Secretary (DDPS), Secretary (DRDO), Principal Secretary to PM, Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Secretary, FA (DS) and the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services. The Raksha Rajya Mantri also holds meetings with the Secretaries in

the Defence Ministry and the Financial Adviser to review various important programmes.

3.6 *The Chiefs of Staff Committee* is a forum in which the Service Chiefs discuss matters having a bearing on the activities of their services and tender advice to the Ministry. The Chief of Staff having the longest tenure on this Committee functions as its Chairman. The Committee is assisted by various sub-committees, dealing with specific aspects such as planning, training, communications, etc.

3.7 Shri K. Subramanyam, Former Director, IDSA, submitted before the Committee that since 1985, we have had one or two Defence Ministers and Prime Ministers have mostly been the Defence Ministers. Earlier, it was thought that Prime Minister being a Defence Minister was a good thing because he came into contact with the Chiefs of Staff and thus things would move. But the experience had been that many other things pre-empt PM's attention and therefore, enough attention was not being paid to Defence when the Prime Minister holds the Defence portfolio.

3.8 During the discussion on Demands for Grants (1995-96) of the Ministry of Defence in Lok Sabha, the matter of retaining the Defence portfolio by the Prime Minister was raised. The Prime Minister in his reply submitted that he was keeping Defence with him not because there was no other Minister or no other capable person to take that, but he thought, the time had come when the Prime Minister had to continue to be the Defence Minister.

3.9 Shri P.R. Chari also submitted before the Committee that because of the highly specialised nature of Defence management and also because the resources were difficult to come by, Defence planning had to be much more clever and Defence effort had to be reviewed much more purposively and intelligently, there was a need for a Defence management cadre. As such there was a great need to develop more expertise for people who were in the highest echelons of the Ministry of Defence and Service Headquarters particularly in planning techniques. And for that, there was a very excellent institution called as the College of Defence Management at Secunderabad. All senior officers of the Services and the Ministry of Defence should be put through a course at the college so as to inculcate a kind of management culture in them.

3.10 The Committee note that the primary aim of Defence Management is to achieve the greatest possible operation efficiency whilst keeping within the resources allotted to the Defence Services. The Committee also note the management structure in the Ministry of Defence.

3.11 The Committee note that since 1985 mostly the Prime Ministers have been looking after the work of Ministry of Defence. Under the Parliamentary System of Government which India has adopted, it is the prerogative of the Prime Minister to entrust any of the portfolios to any Minister or to keep any portfolio with him. It is a matter of great satisfaction that the Prime Minister attaches great importance to the Defence of the country and that in view of his past experience in External Affairs, Defence, Home, etc., he has kept Defence portfolio with him.

MODERNISATION AND INDIGENISATION

3.12 The Director, IDSA in his briefing to the Committee stated as follows:—

“Bulk of the equipment in the Armed Forces will become due for replacement towards the turn of the century. We already have a situation where no modernisation has taken place, for 6-7 years.... Now the Defence capability is running into serious problems. Our equipment supplies are under stress. We do not have the money. Even we expect that there will be no war....., there is a question of keeping up preparedness. If we do not use up-to-date equipments we will lose the war. China is going in for massive modern technology. The Chinese Defence capability is being developed in a big way, but the Indian capability is not.

Because 85 per cent of Pakistani equipment is of Chinese origin, as China gets better technology Pakistan upgrades and may not even require technology from U.S. and Europe.

We are not making adequate kind of assessment.... which take into account all these factors including monitoring of technology, etc. What will be the technology by 2010 or 2015. These are the factors which will have to be looked into.”

3.13 The Committee enquired as to what was being done in the direction of self-reliance especially on the aspects of modernisation and indigenisation. In reply, the Ministry of Defence have stated as follows:—

“Several Task Forces have been constituted to oversee efforts for time-bound indigenisation in identified areas, the thrust of these efforts being aimed at securing import substitution of important Soviet origin/design equipment/spares. These Task Forces function as Empowered Committees to implement the recommendations of the Task Forces.

A strong and diversified base exists in the country for developing and producing a large number of weapon systems. The current focus of

Department of Defence Research and Development is on development of the battle tanks, combat aircrafts, guns, critical missiles, Naval weapons & sensor systems, electronics warfare systems and operational support system required by the Services. The results of these projects will provide enhanced self-reliance towards modernisation and indigenisation of critical Defence systems. Similar efforts are being made by all the agencies in the Ministry. Whenever, new acquisitions are made, it is as far as possible, tied up with technology transfer and progressive indigenisation."

3.14 During the evidence the Committee enquired about the efforts being made by the Ministry of Defence to secure import substitution of important Soviet origin/design equipment/spares keeping in view the fact that 80 per cent of our equipment were of Soviet origin and the extent to which these efforts were successful. The Committee also desired to know the types of links India was having with the units of erstwhile Soviet Union in that regard. In regard to relationship with Russia, the Defence Secretary submitted as follows:-

"The emphatic reply to this question is that the relationship with the Soviet Union, now Russia and the other CIS countries is not off; it is very much on."

3.15 As regards supplies of spares from Russia, the Defence Secretary stated the position as under:-

"In passing between 1990-92 during the stage of disintegration of the Soviet Union, we did face genuine problems with regard to supply of spares from Soviet Union/Russia as well as Eastern Block countries.

We took very conscious efforts over the last one year in two or three directions. Earlier we found that over the last two years the centralised agencies in Russia had totally lost control over the manufacturing units. We decided that we would try and establish direct links with the manufacturing units. Such links have been established for the last one year. The second aspect was that due to the extremely difficult financial crunch in those countries today the interest rate is more than 200 per cent. So the inflation rate is very high. We found that if we persisted with the old system of asking for credit it would no longer work. So we have modified our procurement procedures to suit the new situation in that part of the world. We are now sending delegations from this country. We have also strengthened our Purchase Mission in Moscow. The delegations comprise experts and specialists, representatives from the Ministry of Defence and Defence Finance.

These people have been given powers to directly go to the production units, identify the spares, negotiate the prices and place orders. In some cases we have given them even hard currency payments. I am very happy to inform the Committee that this has produced remarkable results.

The second aspect is that in 1991-92 when we were really badly off, we had set up in the Department of Defence Production eight empowered task forces with the specific charter of identifying of the spares which we are importing and how many of them could be indigenised and how soon it could be done. This is being monitored at the level of Secretary Defence Production and encouraging results have come from that direction also. A large number of items have been identified. We are now placing orders on Indian companies for the spares already indigenised."

3.16 Enquired about the details of the indigenisation process which had been initiated in the country, the Defence Secretary stated that there had been 10 Technical Committees in the Department of Defence Production which had been engaged in the process of indigenisation. A Committee exists to identify the aircraft items to be indigenised, another is for Armament items, a third is for electronic items, a fourth is for engineering items, a fifth is for marine items, a sixth is for medical items, a seventh is for general items of stores, an eighth is for vehicles, a ninth is for infantry combat vehicles and a tenth one is for (Vehicle Factory-Jabalpur) vehicles.

3.17 The Defence Secretary further stated:-

"These 10 Committees together have developed indigenously and placed orders for a total of 93,620 items as on 31.12.95. I have the details Committee-wise and the estimated production value of these items is going to be about Rs. 3,600 crores (the value of the items as on 31.12.95). This is the level of indigenisation which has taken place.

There is a further proposal by these 10 Committees for doing more indigenisation. In addition to these 10 Committees I also mentioned a little while ago that empowered committees had also been set up in 1991. For armament stores there is a committee. They have identified 2,761 items for indigenisation and the approximate value of these items is expected to be Rs. 40 crores. Out of this, 1,721 items have already been developed and the value of orders for these will be Rs. 30 crores. The second one is for the Army vehicles and engineering

stores. This Committee has identified 415 sub-assemblies for indigenisation. Out of these 415 sub-assemblies, 116 have already been developed and orders have been placed on them for the next three to five years' requirements. The third Committee is for electronic stores for the Army. They have identified 22 items and when these 22 items are developed, the annual value of these 22 items would be Rs. 39.89 crores at present costs. These are still under development. For the Navy there is another empowered Committee which has identified 55 items as the first priority. These are major assemblies. The value of these assemblies would be about Rs. 13.66 crores. Another 250 assemblies and sub-assemblies have been identified for indigenisation in the next phase but the work is yet to start. Out of the 55 items which I mentioned in the beginning, 24 have already been produced and orders worth Rs. 5.0 crores have been placed for them. The fifth empowered Committee is on air defence equipments. 1,470 items have been identified by this Committee for local development. The value of these items per year would be Rs. 92.74 crores at current value. These are under development. In fact, one of them has been developed already and an order has been placed. The next Committee is for aircraft items. In this Committee 29,624 items have been identified for indigenisation by the Air Force and 3,657 items have been identified for the Navy. In addition to this, another 10,000 items are slated for indigenisation in 1995-96. The value of these items would be Rs. 45.60 crores. Out of these, 3,989 have already been indigenised and orders have been placed. A seventh empowered Committee has been set up for indigenising flying clothes and lubricated oils for the Air Force. 49 types of lubricating oils and 12 items of flying clothes have been identified by this Committee for indigenisation. Out of 49 lubricating oils, 27 have been produced and 22 are under development. We expect to complete it shortly. Out of 12 items of flying clothes, 9 have already been indigenised and 3 are under advanced stage of development.

In addition to this, recently we have set up one more empowered Committee for indigenisation of the spares of the 155 mm Howitzer 'gun'. 3,105 items of spares are required for this gun and these are to be taken up for indigenisation, shortly.

Mr. Chairman, the Hon. Member also wanted to know as to what is the share of the private sector in the indigenisation process. In terms of value of these items which I mentioned to you, 67 per cent comes from the private sector."

3.18 In regard to preference being given to the indigenisation of technologies in respect of the important Soviet origin/design equipment/spares, the Defence Secretary stated as follows:-

“What I mentioned earlier was that there were 10 technical committees till 1991-92. Since then, 8 more Empowered Committees have been added bringing it to a total of 18. The role of these Committees is to indigenise the spareparts. For the indigenisation of the whole range of weapon systems, a detailed study had been ordered by the Government of India by a group under the Chairmanship of the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister. This Committee has given a self-reliance report as to how many items are to be indigenised totally in the next 10 years. That report has been presented to our Prime Minister on 31st December, 1993. Follow-up action is now being taken on that report. The whole system of weapon systems indigenisation will be taken up in a mission-mode form after this report is analysed and accepted, subject to availability of resources.”

3.19 In a written reply to the points raised in Rajya Sabha it has been stated that a goal has been set that by the year 2005, about 70% of Services' annual acquisition should be met from indigenous development and production (compared to 30% as on now).

3.20 The Committee raised the point that assuming that there was no financial constraints in the area of indigenisation of equipment of Soviet origin; how much time did India need to achieve this target keeping in view the fact that the items involved appear to be very large in number and also that some of them must be very sophisticated items.

Upon this, the Defence Secretary stated:-

“I can only make a very general remark since as you have yourself mentioned a very wide range of equipment of different types of sophistication are involved. We are working towards a target of 4-5 years to indigenise the whole range of items where production will be viable.”

3.21 The Committee are happy to note that Ministry of Defence has made efforts to minimise the impact of disintegration of Soviet Union on the supply of spares and design equipments for weapon systems of Soviet origin. The Committee also note the steps taken viz., establishing direct link with the manufacturing units, dispatching empowered purchase delegations to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and strengthening our Purchase Mission in Moscow for securing the import substitution and

indigenisation as to overcome the difficulties arising due to dislocation of supply from erstwhile Soviet Union and Eastern Block countries.

3.22 The Committee also note that 10 Technical Committees and 8 Empowered Committees have been established and are engaged in the process of indigenisation and a detailed study for indigenisation of whole range of weapon systems and self reliance has been done by a group under the Chairmanship of Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister. The Committee also note that a goal has been set up that by the year 2005 about 70% of the Services annual acquisition should be made from indigenous development and production as compared to 30% as of now.

3.23 The Committee are appreciative of the efforts made by the Ministry of Defence to overcome the crisis situation which emerged after the disintegration of Soviet Union and measures initiated for indigenisation of various items/spares.

3.24 The Committee further note that apart from problem in securing spareparts and ancillaries for ex-Soviet equipments, there are various other technology control regimes that are being established in the international system, and that are being very restrictive. The Committee therefore desire that DRDO should not only double its efforts to indigenise the equipment from ex-Soviet sources but also maximise self-reliance on Defence technology particularly in weapons development.

3.25 The Committee would like the Ministry to chalk out a time-bound strategy in a mission-mode for maximum indigenisation of whole range of weapon systems in pursuance to the self-reliance report given by the Study Group headed by SA to Defence Minister. The Committee would like the Ministry to adhere to the targets fixed thereunder and impress upon the Ministry of Finance for making available adequate resources to achieve the targets set for self-reliance in this regard. The Committee would like to be apprised of the follow up action taken on the said Report.

3.26 The Committee are of the view that due to resource crunch in the Government of India during the last several years, Defence preparedness is not receiving the attention it deserves. Cuts in the budget allocation for Defence have hampered the modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces. As a result India could not keep pace with hostile neighbours in acquiring and upgrading its weaponry. Defence funding has been just adequate and barely sufficient to meet inescapable requirements and to maintain the required operational levels.

3.27 No country can afford compromise on its Defence preparedness and complacency in dealing with matters concerning national security. In view of the threat posed by rapid military build up and modernisation of Armed Forces and other new generation Defence capabilities in the neighbourhood, the Committee desire that Government should accord priority to modernisation and upgradation of weapon systems, chalking out a phased induction programme for new weapon systems, aircrafts and ships for qualitative improvement of offensive capabilities and maintaining combat effectiveness of the Services.

3.28 In view of the change in the strategic environment and developments of military significance in the neighbourhood having bearing on the security of the nation the Committee feel that the time has come when the Government should review their Technology Demonstrator-Agni missile project and that a decision is expeditiously taken to go in for serial production of this strategic missile for induction into the Armed Forces.

3.29 The following issues which have also come to notice of the Committee deserve consideration by the Government:

- (i) Our Armed forces personnel deserve better compensation for the hazard of their profession and the rigorous of their daily lives.
- (ii) Adequate allocation of resources for indigenous development/production of major Defence equipments within laid down time-frame should be ensured.
- (iii) Commitment of a fixed percentage of the gross domestic product say four per cent, to be allocated to Defence outlays to enable the Services, long-term planning, acquisitions/re-equipment and research and development for maintaining superior offensive capabilities.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

3.30 Joint Intelligence Committee is a Committee with representatives of the following:

- (i) Ministry of Defence
- (ii) Ministry of External Affairs
- (iii) Ministry of Home Affairs
- (iv) Intelligence Bureau
- (v) RAW
- (vi) Military Intelligence
- (vii) Naval Intelligence
- (viii) Air Force Intelligence

Representatives of CRPF and BSF are special invitees to JIC. Representatives from other Ministries/Organisations are invited on as and when required basis. JIC charter is to co-ordinate intelligence reviews of the concerned authorities in the Government.

3.31 Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Former Director, I.D.S.A. has submitted before the Committee that our Five year Defence Plans are not based on long term intelligence assessment. It was tried only once in 1978 and the practice has not been followed through. Today we never have long term intelligence assessments on which Five Year Defence Plans are based. Various Chiefs of Staffs had also been of the view that JIC had not been able to provide long term intelligence assessment. In other words JIC had not been able to produce a Five Year assessment and the Chiefs were making their own plan on the basis of those assessments.

3.32 Asked to explain the factual position regarding the point that there were complaints that Intelligence agencies and others who were to provide inputs to the JIC did not always give all the inputs to the Committee with the result that reports of JIC were subsequently criticised of not having adequate depths, the Ministry in their written reply have submitted that the JIC meeting is held fortnightly where representatives of concerned agencies interact with their counterparts. Inputs available with various agencies are discussed at the JIC meetings. Analytical papers are also prepared on various issues and forwarded to the JIC. All relevant inputs available are generally forwarded to the JIC.

3.33 During the course of evidence the Committee desired to know as to what was the procedure through which the JIC provided its inputs, to whom did it provide and how those inputs were analysed, synthesised and made use of. Explaining the position, the Defence Secretary stated as follows:

“The Joint Intelligence Committee has officers taken on deputation from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force basically from their intelligence wings—from the Ministry of Home Affairs—from the Research and Analysis wing—then there are two academics who are specialists in certain fields. The J.I.C. gets its inputs from various intelligence agencies. These reports are analysed and synthesised by the J.I.C. secretariat which put up papers which are considered by the J.I.C. twice in a month. The intelligence reports are extensively and in-depth discussed by the Committee and thereafter the JIC prepares fortnightly summaries. These are sent to the concerned departments for their consumption. In addition, various Ministries like the Ministry of External Affairs, Defence etc. commission the JIC to conduct specific studies on certain issues. The intelligence agencies are asked to

furnish more detailed and more specific information in respect of those subjects and these are prepared as papers by JIC Secretariat. These papers are again discussed in the JIC meeting before they are finalised and then furnished to the concerned departments. This is how the intelligence reports are synthesised and presented to the concerned agencies which become an important input to us, particularly in the Ministry of Defence.”

3.34 Asked to explain how the inputs provided by the JIC were made use of, the Defence Secretary submitted:

“When we prepare our threat assessments, these reports are used as an important input. For example, last year we had commissioned them to undertake a very detailed study of the Pakistani Naval capabilities. For our Naval plans when we prepare our strategy, this becomes a significant input.”

3.35 The Committee pointed out that they were still not clear about the optimum utilisation of the reports of the JIC and also to the fact whether proper attention to the JIC reports was given or not. The Defence Secretary stated:

“As I mentioned when the reports are received; in so far as they relate to the Defence Ministry, I can tell you that they are given due attention. They are analysed. The Chairman, JIC is also associated with the weekly meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to consider all intelligence aspects.”

3.36 Explaining further the system being followed by the JIC regarding the studies to be undertaken by them, the Defence Secretary has stated that basically the system is, each year there is, a Steering Committee for the JIC presided over by the Cabinet Secretary. The Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary are all Members of this Committee. The Steering Committee discusses the JIC studies to be undertaken and specific studies are accordingly made. These Study reports are submitted by the JIC to the concerned Ministries. The Ministries analyse them and put them up to the concerned Ministers.

3.37 Subsequently in a note furnished to the Committee the Ministry of Defence has stated that JIC Reports are partly made use of while preparing Strategic & Technological Environment Assessment for the decade.

3.38 The Committee note that Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which consists of representatives of Ministries of Defence, External Affairs and Home, Intelligence Bureau, RAW, Military, Naval and Air Force Intelligence with Special invitees from CRPF and BSF and from other Ministries and

Organisations provides co-ordinated Intelligence views to the concerned authorities in the Government. The Committee further note that JIC also undertakes specific studies on the recommendations of a Steering Committee chaired by Cabinet Secretary with Defence Secretary, Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary as Members. The Committee also understand that JIC Reports are partly made use of while preparing Strategic and Technological Environment Assessments for the decade.

The Committee, however, desire that the Government should undertake quinquennial review of the performance of JIC after ascertaining the views of the user agencies by an Expert committee consisting of inter alia experts independent of the Government with a view to revamping this organisation so as to provide accurate and effective intelligence assessment for systematic and efficient long-term planning in critical areas of Defence preparedness.

NEW DELHI;
February 28, 1996
Phalgunā 9, 1917 (Saka)

SHARAD DIGHE,
Chairman,
Standing Committee on Defence.

MINUTES OF THE SEVENTH SITTING OF STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE (1993-94)

The Committee sat on Monday, the 12th July, 1993 from 1500 hours to 1730 hours.

PRESENT

Shri Buta Singh - *Chairman*

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Ayub Khan
3. Shri Nurul Islam
4. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
5. Shri Rajaram Shankarrao Mane
6. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
7. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
8. Shri Sharad Dighe
9. Shri Yoganand Saraswati
10. Shri Prakash Narain Tripathi
11. Shri Gabhaji Mangaji Thakore
12. Shri Pratap Singh
13. Dr. Mumtaz Ansari
14. Shri Chun Chun Prasad Yadav
15. Shri Hannan Mollah
16. Shri Indrajit Gupta
17. Maj. Gen. R.G. Williams

Rajya Sabha

18. Shri Misa R. Ganesan
19. Shri Hiphei
20. Shri Suresh Kalmadi

21. Shri Prabhakar B. Kore
22. Shri S. Jaipal Reddy
23. Shri Satchidananda
24. Shri Sushil Kumar Sambhajirao Shinde
25. Shri Gopalsinh G. Solanki

SECRETARIAT

1. Shri G.L. Batra — *Additional Secretary*
2. Smt. P.K. Sandhu — *Deputy Secretary*
3. Shri Ashok Sarin — *Assistant Director*

EXPERT

Shri Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Members of the Standing Committee on Defence. The Committee invited Shri Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses to give presentation on the subject to the Members. Shri Jasjit Singh then made his presentation with the help of slides. Thereafter, he replied to various questions asked/clarifications sought by Members.

3. A verbatim record of the proceedings was kept.

4. The Chairman thanked Shri Jasjit Singh for explaining at length some of the basic issues related to our country's defence and giving valuable information to the Committee.

(The witness then withdrew.)

The Committee then adjourned to meet again on 13th July, 1993.

23. Shri Sushil Kumar Sambhajirao Shinde
24. Shri Gopalsinh G. Solanki

SECRETARIAT

1. Shri G.L. Batra – *Additional Secretary*
2. Smt. P.K. Sandhu – *Deputy Secretary*
3. Shri Ashok Sarin – *Assistant Director*

EXPERT

Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Ex-Secretary, Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence; Former Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and Consulting Editor, The Economic Times.

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed Shri K. Subrahmanyam. The Committee invited Shri Subrahmanyam to share with Members his experience on matters of defence policy, planning and the strategies that the country should have. Shri Subrahmanyam then presented his views on the subject. He also replied to various questions asked/clarifications sought by Members.

3. A verbatim record of the proceedings was kept.

4. The Chairman thanked Shri Subrahmanyam for his mature advice and the guidance which he gave to the Committee.

(The witness then withdrew.)

The Committee then adjourned.

MINUTES OF THE TENTH SITTING OF STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE (1993-94)

The Committee sat on Thursday, the 9th September, 1993 from 1500 hours to 1700 hours.

PRESENT

Shri Buta Singh - *Chairman*

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Nurul Islam
3. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
4. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
5. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
6. Shri Umrao Singh
7. Shri Sharad Dighe
8. Shri Yoganand Saraswati
9. Shri Prakash Narain Tripathi
10. Shri Jagat Vir Singh Drona
11. Shri Pandurang Pundlik Fundkar
12. Shri Pratap Singh
13. Shri Mumtaz Ansari
14. Shri Indrajit Gupta

Rajya Sabha

15. Shri Misa R. Ganesan
16. Shri Hiphei
17. Shri Satchidananda
18. Shri Digvijay Singh
19. Shri Gopalsinh G. Solanki

SECRETARIAT

1. Smt. P.K. Sandhu — *Deputy Secretary*
2. Shri Ashok Sarin — *Assistant Director*

EXPERT

Shri P.R. Chari, Former Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; and Research Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Members of the Standing Committee on Defence. The Committee invited Shri P.R. Chari to share with the Members *inter alia* information and his expert views on the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management'.

3. A verbatim record of the proceedings was kept.

4. The Chairman thanked Shri P.R. Chari for his expert opinion on the subject.

(The witness then withdrew.)

The Committee then adjourned.

MINUTES OF THE FIFTEENTH SITTING OF STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE (1993-94)

The Committee sat on Tuesday, the 8th February, 1994 from 1500 hours to 1700 hours.

PRESENT

Shri Buta Singh - *Chairman*

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Ayub Khan
3. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
4. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
5. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
6. Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha
7. Shri Umrao Singh
8. Shri Sharad Dighe
9. Prof. Ashokrao Anandrao Deshmukh
10. Shri Yoganand Saraswati
11. Shri Pratap Singh
12. Shri Abhay Pratap Singh
13. Maj. Gen. R.G. Williams

Rajya Sabha

14. Shri Misa R. Ganesan
15. Shri S. Jaipal Reddy
16. Shri Satchidananda
17. Shri Digvijay Singh
18. Shri Gopalsinh G. Solanki

SECRETARIAT

1. Shri G.L. Batra — *Additional Secretary*
2. Shri V.N. Gaur — *Director*
3. Shri T.R. Sharma — *Under Secretary*

WITNESSES

Ministry of Defence

1. Shri K.A. Nambiar — *Defence Secretary*
2. Shri Abraham Prathipati — *Additional Secretary*
3. Shri T.K. Banerji — *Additional Secretary*
4. Shri A.K. Ghosh — *F.A. (DS)*
5. Shri A.K. Jain — *Joint Secretary (G)*
6. Shri M.S. Malik — *Joint Secretary (P&C)*
7. Shri Vinod Rai — *Joint Secretary (Air)*
8. Dr. Sandeep Khanna — *Joint Secretary (Navy)*
9. Shri Amitabh Pande — *Joint Secretary (O)*
10. Shri R.K. Singh — *Director (G)*

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Defence Secretary and his colleagues to the sitting of the Committee and invited their attention to the provisions contained in Directions 55 and 58 of the Directions by the Speaker, Lok Sabha.

3. The Committee heard oral evidence of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence on the points arising out of examination of the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management'. The evidence was not concluded.

4. A verbatim record of the evidence was kept.

5. The Committee decided to take further evidence of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence on the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management' on the 9th February, 1994.

(The witnesses then withdrew.)

The Committee then adjourned.

MINUTES OF THE SIXTEENTH SITTING OF STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE (1993-94)

The Committee sat on Wednesday, the 9th February, 1994 from 1100 hours to 1300 hours.

PRESENT

Shri Buta Singh – *Chairman*

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Ayub Khan
3. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
4. Shri Nandi Yellaiah
5. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
6. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
7. Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha
8. Shri Umrao Singh
9. Shri Sharad Dighe
10. Shri Yoganand Saraswati
11. Shri Gabhaji Mangaji Thakore
12. Shri Pratap Singh
13. Dr. Mumtaz Ansari
14. Shri Abhay Pratap Singh
15. Shri Chun Chun Prasad Yadav
16. Shri Hannan Mollah
17. Maj. Gen. R.G. Williams

Rajya Sabha

18. Shri Misa R. Ganesan
19. Shri S. Jaipal Reddy
20. Shri Sushil Kumar Sambhajirao Shinde
21. Shri Digvijay Singh
22. Shri Gopalsinh G. Solanki

SECRETARIAT

1. Shri G.L. Batra — *Additional Secretary*
2. Shri V.N. Gaur — *Director*
3. Shri T.R. Sharma — *Under Secretary*

WITNESSES

Ministry of Defence

1. Shri K.A. Nambiar — *Defence Secretary*
2. Shri Abraham Prathipati — *Additional Secretary*
3. Shri T.K. Banerji — *Additional Secretary*
4. Shri A.K. Ghosh — *F.A. (DS)*
5. Shri A.K. Jain — *Joint Secretary (G)*
6. Shri M.S. Malik — *Joint Secretary (P&C)*
7. Shri Vinod Rai — *Joint Secretary (Air)*
8. Dr. Sandeep Khanna — *Joint Secretary (Navy)*
9. Shri Amitabh Pande — *Joint Secretary (O)*
10. Shri R.K. Singh — *Director (G)*

2. The Committee resumed evidence of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence on the points arising out of examination of the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management'. The evidence was not concluded.

3. A verbatim record of the evidence was kept.

4. The Committee decided to take further evidence of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence on the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management' on a future date.

(The witness then withdrew.)

The Committee then adjourned.

MINUTES OF THE SECOND SITTING OF STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE (1994-95)

The Committee sat on Thursday, the 2nd June, 1994 from 1500 hours to 1700 hours.

PRESENT

Shri Buta Singh - *Chairman*

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Ayub Khan
3. Shri Nurul Islam
4. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
5. Shri Nandi Yellaiah
6. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
7. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
8. Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha
9. Shri Umrao Singh
10. Shri Prakash Narain Tripathi
11. Shri Jagat Vir Singh Drona
12. Shri Gabhaji Mangaji Thakore
13. Shri Pratap Singh
14. Dr. Mumtaz Ansari
15. Shri Amal Datta
16. Shri Hannan Mollah
17. Maj. Gen. R.G. Williams

Rajya Sabha

18. Shri B.B. Dutta
19. Shri Misa R. Ganesan
20. Shri K.R. Malkani
21. Shri A. Nallasivan
22. Shri S. Jaipal Reddy
23. Shri Digvijay Singh

SECRETARIAT

1. Shri G.L. Batra — *Additional Secretary*
2. Shri V.N. Gaur — *Director*
3. Shri T.R. Sharma — *Under Secretary*

WITNESSES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

1. Shri K.A. Nambiar — *Defence Secretary*
2. Shri T.K. Banerji — *Additional Secretary (B)*
3. Shri G.P. Rao — *Additional Secretary (R)*
4. Shri A.K. Ghosh — *F.A. (DS)*
5. Shri A.K. Jain — *Joint Secretary (G)*
6. Shri V.P. Raja — *Joint Secretary (APO & W)*
7. Shri Vinod Rai — *Joint Secretary (Air)*
8. Shri Amitabh Pande — *Joint Secretary (O)*
9. Dr. Sandeep Khanna — *Joint Secretary (Navy)*
10. Shri M.S. Sokhanda — *Joint Secretary (E)*
11. Smt. Mala Srivastava — *Joint Secretary (Trg) & CAO*
12. Shri P.M. Nair — *Joint Secretary (S)*
13. Shri P.R. Sivasubramanian — *Additional F.A. (P)*
14. Maj. Gen. R. Swaminathan — *Director P&RM (DRDO)*
15. Shri S. Krishnaswamy — *OSD, DRDO*
16. Lt. Col. Rakesh Puri — *L.O. (DS)*
17. Shri R.K. Singh — *Director (G)*

2. At the outset, the Chairman, welcomed the Members of the Standing Committee on Defence and the Defence Secretary and his colleagues to the sitting of the Committee.

3. The Committee resumed evidence of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence on the points arising out of examination of the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management'. The evidence was not concluded.

4. The representatives of the Ministry of Defence were asked to collect the points raised in Rajya Sabha during discussion on the working of Ministry of Defence on 26 & 27 April, 1994 which were not replied to by the Minister of State for Defence/Prime Minister and furnish the Government's point of view thereto for the benefit of the Committee.

5. A verbatim record of the evidence was kept.

(The witness then withdrew.)

The Committee then adjourned.

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH SITTING OF STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE (1994-95)

The Committee sat on Thursday, the 15th September, 1994 from 1500 hours to 1700 hours.

PRESENT

Shri Buta Singh - *Chairman*

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Ayub Khan
3. Shri Manikrao Hodalya Gavit
4. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
5. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
6. Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha
7. Shri Sharad Dighe
8. Maj. D.D. Khanoria
9. Shri Yoganand Saraswati
10. Shri Prakash Narain Tripathi
11. Shri Gabhaji Mangaji Thakore
12. Shri Pratap Singh
13. Dr. Mumtaz Ansari
14. Shri Chhedi Paswan
15. Shri Chun Chun Prasad Yadav
16. Shri Amal Datta
17. Shri Hannan Mollah
18. Maj. Gen. R.G. Williams

Rajya Sabha

19. Shri B.B. Dutta
20. Shri Hiphei
21. Shri A. Nallasivan
22. Shri Digvijay Singh

SECRETARIAT

1. Shri V.N. Gaur — *Director*
2. Shri A.K. Singh — *Assistant Director*

WITNESSES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

1. Shri K.A. Nambiar — *Defence Secretary*
2. Shri T.K. Banerji — *Additional Secretary (B)*
3. Shri G.P. Rao — *Additional Secretary (R)*
4. Shri A.K. Ghosh — *F.A. (DS)*
5. Shri A.K. Jain — *Joint Secretary (G)*
6. Shri R.K. Singh — *Joint Secretary (APO & W)*
7. Shri Vinod Rai — *Joint Secretary (Air)*
8. Dr. Sandeep Khanna — *Joint Secretary (Navy)*
9. Shri K.G. Goel — *Joint Secretary (O)*
10. Shri V.P. Raja — *Joint Secretary (P&C)*
11. Shri M.S. Sokhanda — *Joint Secretary (E)*
12. Smt. Mala Srivastava — *Joint Secretary (Trg) & CAO*
13. Shri P.M. Nair — *Joint Secretary (S)*
14. Shri P.R. Sivasubramanian — *Additional F.A. (P)*
15. Maj. Gen. R. Swaminathan — *Director P&RM (DRDO)*
16. Lt. Col. Rakesh Puri — *L.O. (DS)*

2. At the outset, the Chairman, welcomed the Members of the Standing Committee on Defence and the Defence Secretary and his colleagues to the sitting of the Committee. The Chairman then invited the attention of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence to the provisions contained in Directions 55 and 58 of the Directions by the Speaker, Lok Sabha.

3. The Committee heard evidence of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence on the remaining points on the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management'.

4. The evidence was concluded.

5. A verbatim record of the evidence was kept.

(The witness then withdrew.)

The Committee then adjourned.

MINUTES OF THE TENTH SITTING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE (1995-96)

The Committee sat on Tuesday, the 20th February, 1996 from 1500 hours to 1630 hours.

PRESENT

Shri Sharad Dighe – *Chairman*

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
3. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
4. Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha
5. Shri Umrao Singh
6. Shri Yoganand Saraswati
7. Shri Hannan Mollah
8. Shri Chhedi Paswan
9. Shri Abhay Pratap Singh
10. Maj. Gen. R.G. Williams

Rajya Sabha

11. Shri Misa R. Ganesan
12. Shri Prabhakar B. Kore
13. Shri K.R. Malkani
14. Shri Satchidananda
15. Shri Digvijay Singh

SECRETARIAT

1. Dr. A.K. Pandey – *Additional Secretary*
2. Shri G.R. Patwardhan – *Joint Secretary*
3. Shri K.L. Narang – *Deputy Secretary*
4. Shri A.K. Singh – *Under Secretary*

2. At the outset, Members welcomed Shri Sharad Dighe on his appointment as the new Chairman of the Committee. The Committee then placed on record their appreciation of work done and valuable guidance given to the Committee by Shri Indrajit Gupta during his tenure as Chairman, Standing Committee on Defence.

3. ** *** **
 ** ** **

4. The Committee then considered the draft Report on the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management'. The Committee deliberated over the suggestions made by the Members for modifications/amendments in the Draft Report. The Committee also considered and acceded to the request of the Ministry of Defence for deletion of some paras in the Draft Report in the national interest.

5. The Committee adopted the Report with modifications/amendments as given in the Annexure.

The Committee authorised the Chairman to make verbal and consequential changes and finalise the Report for presentation to the Parliament.

6. ** ** **
 ** ** **

The Committee then adjourned.

SECRETARIES

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---|----------------------|
| 1. Dr. A.K. Pandey | - | Additional Secretary |
| 2. Shri G.R. Palwardhan | - | Joint Secretary |
| 3. Shri K.L. Narang | - | Deputy Secretary |
| 4. Shri A.K. Singh | - | Under Secretary |

At the outset, Members welcomed Shri Sharda Dighi on his appointment as the new Chairman of the Committee. The Committee then placed on record their appreciation of work done and valuable guidance given to the Committee by Shri Indrajit Gupta during his tenure as Chairman, Standing Committee on Defence.

[See Para 5 of the Minutes of 10th sitting of the Standing Committee on Defence (1995-96)]

Modifications/Amendments in the Sixth Report on the subject 'Defence Policy, Planning and Management'

Para(s)	Line(s)	Modifications/Amendments
1	2	3
1.15	8	<i>For</i> "must remain" <i>Substitute</i> "remains"
1.16	7	<i>Delete</i> "exclusively"
	9	<i>For</i> "Defence" <i>Substitute</i> "arms"
2.23 to 2.25, 2.29 230 and 233		<i>Delete</i> paras 2.23 to 2.25, 2.29, 2.30 and 2.33
2.40	7	<i>For</i> "Ministry" <i>Substitute</i> "Government"
2.42		<i>Recast</i> para 2.42 as follows: "The Committee regret that the 8th Defence Five Year Plan (1992-97) has not yet been finalised. The Committee are concerned that inadequate allocation will have adverse impact on many of the modernisation programmes and also result in deferring of priority programmes and procurements to the next Defence Plan. The Committee would, therefore, like to impress on the Government the imperative necessity for adequate availability of resources as to ensure that prioritised Defence acquisitions/projects/schemes and modernisation programmes are implemented within stipulated time-frame. The Committee also recommend that the Government mobilise resources to provide a

1	2	3
		substantially additional outlay in the light of projections made by the Ministry of Defence to meet the minimum inescapable needs of the Services for modernisation vital for security of the country during the remaining period of Eighth Five Year Plan."
2.52	2	<i>After</i> "may" <i>Insert</i> "among others"
2.57		<i>Recast</i> para 2.57 as follows: "The Committee note that Joint Chiefs of Staff/Chief of Defence Staff has been preferred in major countries to efficiently meet the needs of the Armed Forces and for integrated planning and unified command. In India, we do not have a system of Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Ministry have explained the position stating that the requirement of our Armed Forces is to function within the geographical limits of our country and the control of operations by Service Chiefs through their field commanders, unlike, United States where military has a global role to play. The Committee feel that an in-depth study of the System of Joint Chiefs of Staff and its relevance in the Indian context may be immediately undertaken."
2.58 to 2.62		<i>Delete</i> paras 2.58 to 2.62.
3.12		<i>Delete</i> para 3.12.
3.26	2	<i>After</i> "for" <i>Insert</i> "maximum"
3.28 to 3.32		<i>Delete</i> paras 3.28 to 3.32.
3.33	4 5 to 7	<i>Delete</i> "its" <i>For</i> "by China and acquisition of the state-of-the-art weaponry by Pakistan under recent US arms package"
3.35		<i>Substitute</i> "in the neighbourhood" <i>Delete</i> items (i), (v), (vi) and (vii)

APPENDIX-I

COMPOSITION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (1993-94)

Chairman

Shri Buta Singh

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Ayub Khan
3. Shri Nurul Islam
4. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
5. Shri Nandi Yellaiah
6. Shri Rajaram Shankarrao Mane
7. Shri Manikrao Hodalya Gavit
8. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
9. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
10. Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha
- *11. Shri Umrao Singh
12. Shri Sharad Dighe
13. Prof. Ashokrao Anandrao Deshmukh
14. Maj. D.D. Khanoria
15. Shri Yoganand Saraswati
16. Shri Prakash Narain Tripathi
17. Shri B.L. Sharma Prem
18. Shri Jagat Vir Singh Drona
19. Shri Gabhaji Mangaji Thakore
20. Shri Pandurang Pundlik Fundkar
21. Shri Pratap Singh
22. Shri Mumtaz Ansari
23. Shri Chhedi Paswan

* Nominated w.e.f. 26.8.93 Vice Shri Sunil Dutt resigned from the Committee.

24. Shri Abhay Pratap Singh
 25. Shri Chun Chun Prasad Yadav
 26. Shri Amal Datta
 27. Shri Hannan Mollah
 28. Shri Indrajit Gupta
 29. Shri C. Sreenivaasan
 30. Maj. Gen. R.G. Willians

Rajya Sabha

31. Shri Misa R. Ganesan
 32. Shri Hiphei
 33. Shri Suresh Kalmadi
 34. Shri R.K. Karanjia
 35. Shri Prabhakar B. Kore
 36. Shri A. Nallasivan
 37. Shri S. Jaipal Reddy
 38. Shri Satchidananda
 39. Shri Sushil Kumar Sambhajirao Shinde
 40. Shri Digvijay Singh
 41. Shri Gopalsinh G. Solanki
 *42. Shri K.R. Malkani
 *43. Shri B.B. Dutta

SECRETARIAT

1. Shri G.L. Batra — *Additional Secretary*
 2. Smt. P.K. Sandhu — *Deputy Secretary*
 3. Shri Ashok Sareen — *Under Secretary*

APPENDIX-II

COMPOSITION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
(1994-95)

Chairman

*Shri Indrajit Gupta

MEMBERS

Lok Sabha

2. Shri Ayub Khan
3. Shri Nurul Islam
4. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda
5. Shri Nandi Yellaiah
6. Shri Rajaram Shankarrao Mane
7. Shri Manikrao Hodalya Gavit
8. Sqn. Ldr. Kamal Chaudhry
9. Shri Vijay Naval Patil
10. Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha
11. Shri Sharad Dighe
12. Prof. Ashokrao Anandrao Deshmukh
13. Shri Umrao Singh
14. Maj. D.D. Khanoria
15. Shri Yoganand Saraswati
16. Shri Prakash Narain Tripathi
17. Shri B.L. Sharma Prem
18. Shri Jagat Vir Singh Drona
19. Shri Gabhaji Mangaji Thakore
20. Shri Pandurang Pundlik Fundkar
21. Shri Pratap Singh
22. Dr. Mumtaz Ansari

* Appointed w.e.f. 23 March, 1995 Vice Shri Buta Singh ceased to be Member/Chairman consequent upon his appointment as Minister w.e.f. 10.2.95.

23. Shri Chhedi Paswan
24. Shri Chun Chun Prasad Yadav
25. Shri Abhay Pratap Singh
26. Shri Amal Datta
27. Shri Hannan Mollah
28. Shri C. Sreenivaasan
29. Maj. Gen. R.G. Williams

Rajya Sabha

30. Shri B.B. Dutta
31. Shri Misa R. Ganesan
32. Shri Hiphei
33. Shri Suresh Kalmadi
34. Shri R.K. Karanjia
35. Shri Prabhakar B. Kore
36. Shri K.R. Malkani
37. Shri A. Nallasivan
38. Shri S. Jaipal Reddy
39. Shri Satchidananda
40. Shri Sushil Kumar Sambhajirao Shinde
41. Shri Digvijay Singh
42. Shri Gopalsinh G. Solanki
- *43. Shri M.P. Abdussamad Samadani

SECRETARIAT

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| 1. Dr. A.K. Pandey | - | <i>Additional Secretary</i> |
| 2. Shri G.R. Patwardhan | - | <i>Joint Secretary</i> |
| 3. Shri K.L. Narang | - | <i>Deputy Secretary</i> |
| 3. Shri A.K. Singh | - | <i>Under Secretary</i> |