

**TWO HUNDRED AND NINTH
REPORT**

**PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE
(1983-84)**

(SEVENTH LOK SABHA)

**PERFORMANCE OF SUBURBAN SERVICES
OF THE CENTRAL RAILWAY**

MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS

(Railway Board)



Presented in Lok Sabha on 27 April, 1984

Laid in Rajya Sabha on 27 April, 1984

**LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT
NEW DELHI**

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PART II*

Minutes of the sittings of the Public Accounts Committee (1983-84) held on

31.1.1984 (FN)

31.1.1984 (AN)

and

23.4.1984

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(1983-84)

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INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, as authorised by the Committee, do present on their behalf this 209th Report of the Committee on Paragraph 1 of the Advance Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 1981-82, Union Government (Railways) on Performance of Suburban Services of the Central Railway.

2. The Advance Report of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India for the year 1981-82, Union Government (Railways) was laid on the Table of the House on 4 April, 1983.

3. In this Report, the Committee have expressed their concern over the fact that while with the growth of population which increased from 32.51 lakhs in 1950-51 to over 80 lakhs in 1980-81, the number of passengers travelling by suburban services in Bombay has increased more than 5 times i.e from 150 millions in 1950-51 to 772 millions in 1982-83, the number of trains has increased by only $1\frac{1}{2}$ times (821 trains daily in 1982-83 as against 517 trains daily in (1950-51). The result has been heavy overcrowding and consequent hardship to the people. This is evident from the fact that against the carrying capacity of about 1700 passengers 900 sitting and 800 standing, a suburban train of Central Railway carries as many as 3,000 to 3,400 passengers in the morning and evening peak periods. It is high time that the Ministry of Railways realised the magnitude of the problem and prepared a perspective plan to augment its rolling stock as well as line capacity taking into account the growing demand of suburban traffic in the city of Bombay. The Committee have also expressed concern at their unsatisfactory performance of suburban services run by Central Railway in the matter of punctuality, cancellation of trains etc. The Committee have been informed that the main reason for this unsatisfactory performance is large holding of overaged EMUs rakes on the Central Railway. As on 15.3.84 there were as many as 13 rakes (67 coaches) overdue for replacement out of a total stock of 73 rakes with the Central Railway for suburban traffic. In this connection the Committee find that between 1975-76 and 1978-79 there was practically no addition to the stock of EMU coaches because of the indecisiveness of the Ministry of Railways.

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Although an order for 76 DC EMUs was placed on M/s. Jessops in June, 1974, the same was withdrawn in December, 1975 and placed on Integral Coach Factory and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. This was again reinstated with M/s. Jessops on November, 1977. In the mean time precious time was lost. The Committee have desired that such lapses should not recur.

4. The Committee have also found that the programme of the Railways for replacement of rolling stock including overaged EMUs has considerably suffered because of shortage of funds. The Committee were informed by the representative of the Ministry of Railways that right from the Third Five Year Plan, they were having this problem of shortage of funds and even at present railways are having a large number of assets which are due for replacement and which have not been replaced because of financial constraints. Moreover, there is year to year uncertainty about the allocation of funds with the result that Railways are not able to chalk out any long term plan for purchase and replacement of assets. In the opinion of the Committee, it is high time that this matter relating to adequate allocation of funds to the Railways for replacement of their overaged stock, etc. received immediate attention of the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance who should keep it in view while finalising the allocation for the Seventh Five Year Plan.

5. The Public Accounts Committee (1983-84) examined paragraph 1 at their sittings held on 31.1.84 (FN) and 31.1.84 (AN). The Committee considered and finalised this Report at their sittings held on 23 April 1984. The Minutes of the sittings form Part II* of the Report.

6. For facility of reference and convenience, the observations and recommendations of the Committee have been printed in thick type in the body of the report and have also been reproduced in consolidated form in Appendix IV to the Report.

7. The Committee would like to express their thanks to the Ministry of Railway (Railway Board) and Ministry of Industry (Department of Industry) etc. for their cooperation extended by them in giving information to the Committee.

* Not printed. One cyclostyled copy laid on the Table of the House and five copies placed in the Parliament Library.

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8. The Committee also place on record their appreciation of the assistance rendered to them in the examination of this Paragraph by the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

NEW DELHI ;
April 26, 1984

Vaisakha 6, 1906 (S)

SUNIL MAITRA,
Chairman,
Public Accounts Committee.

REPORT

PERFORMANCE OF SUBURBAN SERVICES OF THE CENTRAL RAILWAY

Audit Para

1.1 The Audit Para on Performance of Suburban Services of the Central Railway as appearing in the Advance Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 1981-82, Union Government (Railways) is reproduced at Appendix I of the Report.

Introductory

1.2 The first railway train started out of Bombay V.T. on April 16, 1853 on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the pre-runner of the Central Railway, on its maiden journey of from Boribunder (Bombay V.T.) to Thana over a distance of 33 KMs. The electrification of suburban sections came in late Twenties, and the first electrified section in India was inaugurated between Bombay V.T. and Kurla on 3rd February, 1925. The entire system is equipped with 1500 Volts Direct Current traction power supplied from 20 sub-stations. The suburban services are run with Electrical Multiple unit (EMU) rakes; each rake consisting of 3 units of 9 coaches, each unit consisting of one motor and two trailer coaches.

1.3 The Central Railway's suburban system operates on three corridors known as locallines, main lines and the Harbour branch. These are—

- (a) a pair of lines, known as local lines from Bombay V.T. to Kalyan (54 kms), used exclusively for suburban services ;
- (b) another pair of lines, known as main lines, between Bombay V.T. and Kalyan, which are used for running of fast suburban trains during the peak hours, and also for freight trains, Mail, Express and Passenger trains and for running the industrial pilots;

- (c) a pair of lines between Bombay V.T. and Bandra (14 kms)/Kurla (15 kms.)/Mankhurd (21 kms.), used for suburban trains referred to as the harbour branch. The harbour branch, branches off into two at Raoli junction with one going to Kurla and the other going to Bandra. Some trains now go to Andheri also....

Suburban trains are run beyond Kalyan also, upto Karjat (100 kms from Bombay on the South-east route) and Kasara (120 kms. from Bombay on the North-east route).

1.4 The suburban services of Central Railway serving the Greater Bombay are spread over a route km. of 190 (track km. 484).

1.5 There are 36 suburban stations upto Kalyan and 17 stations beyond Kalyan. There are 15 terminal stations, though at 3 of them viz. Ghatkopar, Badlapur & Asangaon, full complement of terminal facilities is not available.

1.6 The Central Railway suburban services (in the Harbour Section from Bombay V.T.) presently terminating at Bandra were running upto Andheri via. Mahim and Bandra on the Western Railway till March 1956. This service was very popular and of immense benefit to the commuters as it avoided change of route at the busy inter-change point at Dadar. This service was discontinued and terminated at Bandra for want of line capacity in 1956.

1.7 According to Audit, a project for extension of Central Railway's suburban service upto Bandra and beyond through a fly-over was sanctioned during 1976-77 works programme and commenced in the same year at a cost of Rs. 11.22 crores. The work scheduled to be completed by March 1980 was still in progress in 1983-84.

1.8 In This connection, the Ministry of Railways have clarified that the project for construction of fly-over between Bandra and Khar Road Stations to connect the Central and Western Railway Suburban Services was sanctioned by the Board in August 1977 (and not started in 1976-77 as stated). The project, originally scheduled to be completed within 36 months, was actually completed in September 1983 and commissioned on 1 October, 1983. When asked about the reasons for the delay in execution of the project, the Ministry of Railways have stated in a note :

- (i) There was delay in the acquisition of private land, due to presence of religious structures, which was required in connection with the construction of the fly-over. Although the proceedings were initiated in January 1977, the actual possession of land could be obtained only in November, 1978 after a delay of nearly 15 months.
- (ii) During actual implementation of the Project, it was found that certain additional facilities at Andheri were indispensable for receiving and despatching Harbour Branch trains of Central Railway. This involved material modification of the work involving a period of additional 7 months to complete this additional work.
- (iii) The tender for the construction of the fly-over was awarded in October, 1978. However, the diversion of the existing track without disturbing the intensive commuter traffic on Western Railway could be carried out only during night under traffic blocks. The new tracks, laid under very difficult conditions, could not be commissioned before consolidation of the diverted alignment to ensure accident-free operation. This line, therefore, could be shifted to the new location only by July, 1979 and the contractor could complete this portion of the work by August, 1980.

Consequent to the above delays in handing over the work area, clear of obstructions to the contractor after diversion of the rail line, the programme of execution went out of gear. The contractor demanded compensation for the losses suffered which was not agreed to. Fresh tenders were invited and contract awarded in December, 1981. The work could then be completed in all respects by 15.9.1983."

Growth of population and the growth of suburban passengers.

1.9. The population of Greater Bombay in 1950-51 was 32.5 lakhs and this has increased to over 80 lakhs in 1980-81. The growth in the number of suburban commuters is, however, much larger due to development of distant suburbs and the growth of industries. While the number of passengers carried has increased to more than 5 times (772 million in 1982-83 as against 150 million in 1950-51), the number of

trains has increased to only about $1\frac{1}{2}$ times (821 trains daily on 1-10-83 as against 517 trains daily 1950-51). Consequently, as against the carrying capacity of about 1700 passengers (900 sitting and 800 standing), the suburban trains carry as much as 3000 to 3400 passengers per train in the morning and evening peak periods and there is heavy overcrowding. The figures of passengers carried, the passengers Kms. earned and the daily number of suburban trains for the years 1950-51, 1960-61, 1970-71 and year-wise from 1976-77 to 1982-83 are given below :

<i>Year</i>	<i>Passengers carried</i>		<i>Passenger</i>	<i>Kilometres</i>	<i>Number of Scheduled suburban trains per day</i>		
	<i>In million</i>	<i>Index</i>			<i>In million</i>	<i>Index</i>	<i>Total</i>
1950-51	150	100	1980	100	517	65	100
1960-61	218	146	2991	150	692	105	162
1970-71	483	322	8252	411	708	119	183
1976-77	687	437	12093	648	839	150	231
1977-78	738	493	13809	695	853	153	235
1978-79	812	544	15460	770	853	153	235
1979-80	722	483	13071	657	862	154	238
1980-81	758	507	13867	697	864	154	238
1981-82	754	503	13940	701	839	150	231
1982-83	772	514	14789	747	805	136	209
1.10.1983 onwards	—	—	—	—	821	138	212

1.10 The Audit Report points out that while the Western Railway with a holding of 578 DC/EMUs could carry 785 million passengers during 1980-81 and 856 million passengers with a holding of 569 EMUs in 1981-82, the Central Railway could carry only 758 million passengers with 647 EMUs in 1980-81 and 753 million passengers with 659 EMUs in 1981-82.

1.11 It has further been stated in the audit para that the Central Railway is unable to run daily the advertised trains to schedule. During the period from January 1978 to April 1981, out of 853 trains scheduled to run daily only 810 trains were actually run, 42 to 43 trains were cancelled and 116 trains ran late (late by more than 15 minutes). The normal punctuality expected of suburban trains is 98 per cent of the trains run. The punctuality percentage was 64 to 69 per cent on Central Railway whereas, on the Western Railway the punctuality was 96 to 97 per cent. Enquired as to why the Central Railway could not improve the punctuality of its suburban service to the level normally expected (i.e. 98 per cent), the Ministry of Railways have replied in a note :—

“The punctuality of suburban services in metropolitan areas depends on a large number of factors including condition and availability of rolling stock, density of traffic, reactions of travelling public, incidence of flooding in monsoon etc.... While maintenance and availability of rolling stock has contributed to about 30% in punctuality loss, remaining 70% was due to varied reasons some of which like flooding, vandalism alarm chain pulling etc. are beyond the direct control of the Railways.

Due to large percentages of old imported stock on Central Railway and comparatively higher density of traffic on the suburban section of Central Railway, the contribution of rolling stock defects to the loss of punctuality has been higher. However, on the same Railway, punctuality on harbour branch, where these adverse factors are and present, has been of the order of 95% to 96%. With the replacement of a few old imported rakes and development of other facilities, the percentage of punctuality after April, 1983 has already reached a level of 85%. This may show further improvement in future, particularly with the phasing out of overaged stock. In the circumstances prevailing on main line section of Central Railway every effort is being made to improve the performance in this respect.”

1.12 When asked about the basis of Railway Administration's assertion that only about 30 per cent loss of punctuality and consequent inconvenience to commuters is contributed to defective overaged EMUs (and its short supply), the Ministry of Railways have replied :

"The analysis of number of trains which lost punctuality on account of various reasons is given in Appendix I Item 1 of it indicates the loss of punctuality on account of defects, failures and shortage of EMU rakes. The percentage of loss of punctuality on account of this reason as will be seen therefrom is approximately 30%. This percentage would have been lesser if Central Railway did not have 18 imported rakes which have become overaged. Out of imported and indigenous rakes on Central Railway, the number offered for traffic and defects/failures is as given below :

<i>Partiulars</i>	<i>Imported</i>	<i>Indigenous</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. Holding	18	53	71
2. Offered in Service	10	43	53
3. Number of defects/failures during 82-83	468	1052	1520
4. Defects per rake in Service	46.8	24.5	28.7

From the above it will be seen that availability of imported rakes has been much less, and the imported rakes are contributing the loss of punctuality much more.

As some of the imported rakes during recent years had to be replaced, new rakes had been ordered on M/s. Jessops. Due to delays in supply of rakes by M/s. Jessops, availability of rakes in Service went down causing cancellations and loss of punctuality on account of unit shortages. Loss of punctuality on account of shortages has been 3.5, 8.4 and 5.2 per cent during 1980-81, 1981-82 and 1982-83 respectively.

1.13 As regards punctuality percentage, the Ministry of Railways have stated:

“The punctuality percentages of suburban trains on Central Railways in 1981-82, 1982-83 and 1983-84 (up to November 83) are as below:

<i>Months</i>	<i>1981-82</i>	<i>1982-83</i>	<i>1983-84</i>
April	88	83	91
May	87	84	91
June	82	80	90
July	80	87	90
August	81	81	89
Sept.	77	90	92
Oct.	82	90	93
Nov.	85	89	93
Dec.	80	89	
Jan.	85	93	
Feb.	79	94	
March	78	90	

In order to improve the punctuality of suburban trains Central Railway have taken the following measures :

- “1. Replacement of overaged imported coaches with new indigenous coaches.
2. Improvement in the quality of heavy repairs/POH by centralisation of POH at Matunga workshops.
3. Review and rationalisation of inspection schedules.
4. Addition of one motor coach to imported rakes to avoid overloading of motors,

5. Gradual replacement of imported traction motors of Breda Ansaldo coaches with higher horse power BHEL traction motors.
6. Replacement of condemned BHEL's traction motors with imported traction motors from Japan.
7. Raising of level of 10 Kilometres of flood-prone track.
8. Replacement of rails with higher poundage on selective basis.
9. Integrated block working by OHE, S&T and Civil Engineering Departments to speed up maintenance work.
10. Raising of point machines and impedance bonds in flood-prone areas.
11. Adoption of glued joints instead of nylon insulated joints for track circuits.
12. Rehabilitation of imported rakes which may have to be continued in service due to inadequate manufacture of new coaches."

Holding

1.14 The service life of Electrical Multiple Units (EMU) under normal operating conditions is 25 years. A comparative statement of the holding of Central Railway and western Railway, as appearing in the Audit Paragraph in given below:

	<u>(Central Railway)</u>			<u>(Western Railway)</u>		
	1977-78	1980-81	1981-82	1977-78	1980-81	1981-82
(a) Over 25 years of age	61	67	109	46	32	32
(b) below 25 years	628	580		550	546	
TOTAL:	689	647		596	578	
	(71 rakes)			(67 rakes)		

1.15 In this connection the Railway Minister had, in reply to unstarred Question No. 3088, informed Lok Sabha on 15 March 1984 that the holding of EMU rakes on Central and Western Railways had been 73 and 60 respectively as on 31 January, 1984 and the number of rakes over due replacement on Codal life basis on the same date has been 18 on Central Railway and 5 on Western Railway.

1.16 During evidence the Chairman, Railway Board stated in this regard:

“With regard to the Central Railway, we have a fairly large number of coaches which are overaged beyond 25 years. The normal age taken by us for the suburban services for a satisfactory service is about 25 years. But we have nearly 67 coaches over 25 years old in a condition wanting replacement and 580 coaches of less than 25 years old on the Central Railways. We want replacements for the 67 coaches.

On the western Railway, we have 32 coaches over 25 years old. On the Central Railway, during 1980-81 we had 647 coaches and during 1981-82 we had 778 coaches on the EMU services. On the Bombay western Railway, we have 567 coaches on the EMU Services today.

Many of the coaches have been set aside for two reasons. One is for corrosion repairs and the other is that these require extensive rehabilitation of electrical items.”

1.17 Explaining the factors responsible for corrosion he stated:

“These coaches are running in a saline atmosphere in Bombay. By corrosion repairs is meant the repair to the bottom portions of the coach which are corroded or perforated or rusted. This phenomenon is not new in Bombay where the atmosphere is saline. We have to take these coaches once in seven years during POH for extensive corrosion repairs by cutting the members which are corroded and welding new pieces in lieu.

There is another phenomenon also which occurs due to overcrowding. This comes about especially where baskets of fish and other things are over-loaded, where due to very heavy

concentration of load in a particular length, the under frame sags and which requires recambering.

These are the two main problems that exist especially with regard to older coaches. We have made a study recently about five months ago, in Bombay. We found that while five old coaches belonging to only one of two companies which had been imported required to be condemned, nearly 50 other coaches could be rehabilitate and put back into service. This step has been taken. Due to these studies and due to the rehabilitation having been done both by recambering and corrosion repairs and the replacement of the electrical items for the motor coaches, we have been able to put back into service a substantial number of coaches on to the rails and the services which had come down to nearly 796 or even 769 trains per day, has now gone up to 821 today on Central Railway and we expect that by April, we will be able to run 842 trains per day.

Moreover, in the past there used to be heavy, cancellations every day even though the number of trains were 830. There used to be 30 cancellations per day. You would be glad to know that the cancellations have come down to 4.2 per day.

Besides, we have been able to improve the punctuality. Today the punctuality stands at 95% on the Central Railway suburban services which used to be pretty bad earlier."

1.18 Asked whether the Ministry of Railways had planned replacement of EMU coaches keeping in view the codal life span of the coaches the witness stated :

"As you would be aware, the order for coaches, especially for the imported ones, is done over a limited period and many coaches come together. A large number is imported together on a commitment order... We have imported coaches up to March 1958... These all fell due on the codal life of 25 years together somewhere about 1981-83, but it is not necessary that all of them require immediate replacement. There might be 5 to 6 coaches which due to very heavy corrosion and due to uneconomic repairs, we might have to condemn... We plan assuming the

life of these coaches is 25 years. Based on that, we expect that the older coaches need replacement in phases and we also make a provision for incremental traffic year by year in the suburban section which comes to 6%. It is on this basis, that the orders are placed. There would be a particular figure of requirement. It may not always be possible for us to place that much amount of order due to financial stringency. Again we have to distribute this between DC/EMUs which are peculiar to Bombay and AC/EMUs which are peculiar to Madras, Calcutta and Delhi. This proportion we have to strike based on the availability of funds and programme is chalked out. The figures of coaches required is calculated and we have that figure with us. We know how many coaches are over-aged and how many require replacement. But we defer replacement and manage with the existing coaches of even more than 25 years old by getting these repaired ensuring, at the same time, that there is no problem posed to the safety of the travelling public, all this we do mainly because of financial constraint. The question of repairing the old ones comes up mainly because of financial stringency. It is also due to the lower manufacturing capacity of DC/EMU Units by the public sector undertaking like Jessops."

1.19 In this connection, Member (Traffic) Railway Board stated :

"The planning for coaching or any of the rolling stock has to be made within the resources which are made available during the successive plans. We have always been subjected to a squeeze in the availability of resources."

1.20 When asked from when the Ministry was feeling the constraint of funds, he replied that "from that the Third Plan onwards we were having this problem."

1.21 To a question whether this fact was brought to the notice of Government, the witness replied in affirmative and stated :

"Even today we are having a large number of our assets which are due for replacement and which we have not been able to replace because of financial constraints."

1.22 On this, the attention of the representatives of the Ministry of Railways was drawn to the facts mentioned in Audit Paragraph that the funds provided in the budget specially for the purchase of EMUs were not utilised as detailed below :

<i>Year</i>	<i>Delivery of EMUs</i>		<i>Funds provided (Rs. in lakhs)</i>	<i>Actually utilised</i>	<i>Funds not used</i>
	<i>Expected</i>	<i>Actual</i>			
1978-79	36	Nil	132.0	Nil	132
1979-80	38	Nil	606	537.4	68.6
1980-81	88	3	1232	444	788
1981-82	80	31	1120	846	274
Total :	242	34	3090.0	1827.4	1262.6

1.23 In this connection the Member (Traffic), Railway Board stated :

“The funds are made available for the total rolling stock and when the total availability is less than what we find is necessary, some adjustments are made. Either we have to utilise it for the manufacture of locos or for the manufacture of ordinary passenger coaches or for wagons. In making this adjustment, since the total availability is less than our requirements, what happens is that in certain sectors it has not been possible for us to make use of it.”

1.24 The Chairman, Railway Board added in this regard :

“That is if you take in isolation with regard to coaching stock. But if you take overall rolling stock totally, there were no funds left which were not used.... There is a shortfall for DC EMU for various reasons.”

1.25 Clarifying the position further he stated :

“..... With regard to funds allotted which went essentially to meet the requirements of funds for the Jessops-for 1978-79 Rs. 1.73

crores were given and Rs. 1.36 crores were utilised. It was fully utilised.

The figures, represented the total allotment made with regard to the availability of funds for the various EMUs but actually what happened in this particular case was that the amount which was made available but not used is as follows : For Jessops for 1979-80 the budget estimate was Rs. 13.08 crores and funds used was Rs. 4 crores. Rs. 9 crores were not utilised. 1980-81 budget estimate was Rs. 13.90 crores and Rs. 6.52 crores were used and Rs. 7.4 crores were not used. In 1981-82 budget estimate was Rs. 17.20 crores and funds utilised was Rs. 10.50 crores and Rs. 6.70 crores were not utilised. But orders were placed on them."

1.26 The Chairman, Railway Board suggested in this regard as under :

"We would certainly like to have more availability of funds to remove all the overage coaches and also to provide the coaches which will be available for incremental traffic. I would appreciate if at the beginning of each Plan period we are given funds adequately so that all the production units which we have got either in the public sector or in the Railways sector, they work to their full capacity."

1.27 The Committee pointed out that while the Railway Board was complaining of constraint of funds for maintaining the existing suburban services, new services were being introduced. In this connection the Committee desired to know the number of coaches introduced in Delhi. The Chairman, Railway Board stated during evidence that the number of AC/EMU coaches introduced in New Delhi were 24. When his attention was drawn to the reply given by the Railway Minister that against the original projection of carrying 2 lacs passengers by the Ring Railway in Delhi it was carrying only 209 passengers, the Chairman, Railway Board stated :

"A Committee was set up with regard to the utilisation of the Ring Railway in Delhi. There has to be proper extension service in and around Delhi. There are various areas here where there is heavy over-crowding... The service is to be extended to Ghaziabad which is in the periphery of Delhi. There is heavy

commuter traffic coming to Delhi every day from there. We are following the recommendation of the Committee..... It cannot be said that there has been no expansion or there is no attempt on our part to increase the services. We have to strike a balance and there are long-distance passenger traffic; there is overcrowding; we have to draw a line between suburban and long-distance requirements.”

1.28 The witness further stated :—

“Ring Railway concept itself envisages extension in various directions besides the core ring part of it. Ghaziabad is there; Palwal is there....It is not only a question of rakes being available. You have to construct proper platforms and stations. The platform should be raised to enable them to receive and deal with these coaches. They should be at the proper level to the entrance to these coaches.”

1.29 Asked why these things were not visualised at the initial stage itself, the witness stated :—

“2 or 3 years time would be needed to construct the platforms, for extension service, to keep the services going etc. We always try to coordinate all these things. And we see that all these things fall in line together. But unfortunately when there is acute constraint of funds, we are not able to keep pace with each phase other work.”

Placement of orders for new Coaches

1.30 According to Audit para, the Central Railway were allotted a total of 172 new coaches on replacement account and for meeting additional traffic during 1974-75 to 1979-80. After eliminating the overaged stock, the Railway Administration was expected to hold about 78 rakes (735 coaches) by 1980-81, 80 rakes by 1981-82 and 85 rakes by 1982-83. These new coaches were to be received from out of the supplies under the contracts placed by the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) in June 1974 for 76 DC/EMUs at a cost of Rs. 7.56 crores and again in November 1978 for 146 EMUs at a cost of Rs. 15.62 crores on M/s. Jessops.

1.31 The earlier order for 76 EMU coaches was withdrawn in December 1975 in the context of drastic cut in the plan allocation for

coach production during 1975-76 and 1976-77 and an inter ministerial decision (October 1975) to stop coach production by Jessops to enable better utilisation of capacities of Integral Coach Factory (ICF) and Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML).

1.32 Asked as to why the order for 76 DC EMUs placed on M/s. Jessope in June 1974 could not be progressed, the Ministry of Railways stated :

“Almost immediately after placement of the contract by the Railway for manufacture of DC/EMUs, a decision was taken on 21.10.75 by a Secretaries Committee to discontinue production of Railway Rolling Stock at Jessops. Thus the order placed on them could not be progressed.”

1.33 In this connection the Ministry of Heavy Industry have stated :—

“Only letter of intent was placed in June’ 74 for 76 EMUs comprising 25 Nos. 3-car units and one spare motor coach. This letter of intent was subsequently cancelled by Railways in December 1975. Jessops immediately requested Railway Board to restore the letter of intent on the ground that they had made arrangement for steel procurement, which was not a free supply item then. Since the order was not restored, the question of its progressing did not arise.”

1.34 To a question whether Jessops production programme for EMU coaches and its capacity utilisation suffered owing to withdrawal of Railway Board’s order in December, 1975, the Ministry of Railway have replied :-

“M/s. Jessops production and its capacity did not suffer due to withdrawal of order in December 1975... Subsequently, as Jessops could not find alternative load and due to various other factors, a decision was taken in October, 1977 to resume production of rolling stock at Jessops. Immediately, thereafter i.e. in November 1977 the Ministry of Railways re-transferred the order to Jessops.”

1.35 However, the Ministry of Heavy Industry have stated as under :-

“At the time of withdrawal of Railway Board’s letter of intent for 76 and 17 Coaches in December 1975. Jessops were executing the previous order for 216 EMU Coaches (comprising 71 units and 3 spare motor coaches) which was placed in December 1972. The delivery of the Coaches against this order commenced in December 1973. The major portion of the order was completed by March 1977 (210 coaches i.e. 67 units) and Jessops were left with only 16 coaches (4 units+3 spare motor coaches) for production in 1977-78. Had these letters of intents for 76 and 17 coaches not been withdrawn in 1975 for which arrangement of steel procurement had been made, Jessops could have continued the EMU production against these letters of intent along with 216 EMU coaches and could have commenced the delivery of coaches against these letters of intent in 1977-78 and completed in 1978-79.

In 1977-78, Jessops could not fix a higher production target as with the withdrawal of 76 EMU coaches Jessops were left with only 15 coaches to manufacture at the end of 1976-77. Next order for 239 EMU coaches was received in November 1978.

Thus Jessops Production programme for EMU coaches and capacity utilization suffered owing to the withdrawal of Railway Board’s order in December 75.”

1.36 Elaborating the point further, the Chairman and Managing Director. Jessops stated during evidence :-

“Our capacity is 24 units i.e. 72 coaches, at 100% capacity. As explained by the Chairman. Railway Board, we achieved almost 95% of capacity utilisation in the years-1974-75 that is 69 coaches. This was the maximum capacity achieved by Jessops. In this particular year, that is in 1975, the order was cancelled after placement of it. In 1972-78 our previous order was over. We can see from the records, the company had manufactured 66 coaches in 1976-77 They could manufacture only 15 coaches in 1977-78...We had to redeploy the entire idle labour completely upsetting the programme.”

He added :

“Then we diversified in certain areas like the paper machinery and the mining machinery. As a matter of fact, we also stopped out production in the wagon side. But as a matter of fact, this coach building which started in 1958, as certain special facilities and all the workers engaged in this could not be utilised in other areas.”

1.37 To a question whether the Ministry of Railways or the Committee of Secretaries consulted M/s. Jessops before withdrawing the order, the Chairman, Railway Board stated that “the decision would not have been taken without consulting them.”

1.38 Asked as to why the order on Integral Coach factory was placed when the capacity of M/s. Jessops was under-utilised the Chairman, Railway Board stated that a decision had been taken in the Secretaries' Committee that Jessops will not manufacture EMUs coaches- the letter of intent was placed on Jessops on 11.6.1974. It was only a letter of intent. not order for the supply of material. During Evidence he deposed that 'ICF did not supply DC EMUs, during these years no any order was placed on them.'

1.39 When the attention of the witness was drawn to the fact mentioned in the Audit Para that the order for 76 coaches was withdrawn in December 1975 in the context of drastic cut in the plan allocation and toward the Ministry of Railway's reply to the Committee's Advance Questionnaire that the letter of intent was withdrawn on 12 December, 1975 and transferred on 14 April, 1976 to ICF. who could not plan production in 1975-76 he stated :

“The orders on ICF and other were not adequate for their capacity for which they were geared. In that context, it was decided that ICF and BEML capacity should be fully utilised. At that time, the ICF capacity was for 750 coaches. But the constraint of funds was very much there at that time and the order was cut back...They (Jessops) were supposed to diversify to other lines, but they found after two years that no orders for the diversified activities were forthcoming.”

1.40 In this regard the Adviser (Electrical), Railway Board clarified as under :-

“There was a constraint of funds and that was why the Secretaries met together to decide what should be done. And it was said that the Railways themselves have to regulate their production in their own units. At that time, it was not a cancellation of order only on Jessops. At that time a letter of intent was given to ICF since Jessops were going to diversify into something else and they were not going to manufacture EMUs. ICF were told that the actual deliveries would depend on the availability of funds and the actual manufacture should commence when funds become available and they were to manufacture the EMUs at a reduced pace. They were to manufacture only 500 coaches instead of 750. In other words, when the order on Jessops was cancelled, simultaneously there was a reduction of production at ICF also.”

1.41 When asked about the composition of the Committee of Secretaries who recommended cancellation of orders with Jessops the Committee were informed that it consisted of the Secretaries of the Ministries of Heavy Industry and Finance and the Chairman, Railway Board.

1.42 In reply to a question why the order was placed on ICF after cancelling the same on Jessops, when there was constraint of funds, he stated :—

“If there is constraint of funds, I have to apply it first on the units which are directly under me. Therefore, against the capacity of 750 coaches per year, I had to cut it back to 575.”

In this regard the Adviser (Electrical), Railway Board clarified ;—

While the letter of intent was given to ICF to start its manufacture, simultaneously they were also told that there was a constraint of fund and that they should not start production. At that time, there was no assumption that Jessops would come back. If Jessops had not come back into the field ICF would have started it when funds became available. Thus the letter of intent was only for future. It was not intended that they should manufacture the EMUs in that year. The reason was that there was a shortage of fund.”

1.43 The Ministry of Railways have informed the Committee that the capacity of ICF is only 100/125 EMUs a year and target is limited by funds outlay. During the period 1976-77 to 1978-79 while no DC EMU was produced 198 AC EMUs during the period and the balance capacity was utilised for coach building consistent with funds provision. DC/EMUS could not be planned as 12/18 months time is needed to start a new line and before ICF could organise themselves, Jessops indicated their willingness to resume production of DC EMUs.

1.44 Though this order for manufacture of DC EMUs was diverted to ICF in April 1976, the ICF did not commence any work on this order till 1977-78 due to constraint of funds and for want of priority for this order. The same order was again restored to M/s. Jessops in November 1977 alongwith an additional order for 17 EMUs in December 1977. The delivery of these coaches was to commence from 1978-79. Though the supplies under the above three orders (239) were all to be completed by 31.3.1982, this firm had commenced delivery of coaches only from 1979-80 and supplied only 21 coaches by the end of March 1982. Of these, only one was motor coach and hence no additional rake could be formed out of the new coach procured so far by Central Railway (November 1982).

1.45 When the Committee desired to know the reasons for non-completion the order for manufacture of 239 DC EMUS within the original delivery schedule, the Ministry of Railway have *inter-alia* stated in note :—

“...the order was re-transferred to this firm during Nov. 1977. The firm's capacity to manufacture DC/EMUs is only 72 and normally it would have taken them 3½ years even if they had produced at the peak and thus the order could have been earliest completed by Feb. 82. However, the delivery date was shown as March 1982 in the contract in line with the firm's quotation. It required some time for the firm to re-deploy their men organise material and other inputs and commence production to get back to production again after the decision to close down Rolling Stock manufacture was rescinded and the unit has been steadily improving its performance thereafter. While in 1980-81 Jessop only produced 3 EMU coaches in 1981-82 they produced 31 and in 82-83-43. This year, Jessops are expected to reach their full capacity of 72 Nos. They are expected to complete the order by March, 1985.

Regular meetings are held with them and matter is taken up periodically with their controlling Ministry."

1.46. In this connection the Ministry of Heavy Industry have stated :—

"The order for 239 Coaches was received in Nov. 78 with the stipulation that the delivery should commence within 12/14 months *i.e.* by January 80 and completed by 31-3-82. Jessops had an installed capacity of 72 EMU coaches per year and at least 40 months are required to complete the order of 239 coaches. Thus it was not possible to complete the order within 31.3.82 *i.e.* within 27 months.

The delivery of trailer coaches however commenced from March 1981 and the delivery of Motor Coaches commenced in January 82. The main reason for delay in commencement of delivery was due to delay in receipt of free supply inputs such as steel, electric traction equipment and wheelsets.

A statement showing the receipt of free supply items is attached Appendix III.

The status of manufactures till 31-3-83 is as follows :—

Non-driving Trailer Car	A	—	30
Motor Car	B	—	21
Driving Trailer Car	C	—	27
			78

Considering the lead time of 3 months required to convert motor coach electrics into a finished motor coach only those sets received by Jessops within December 82 could be effectively used for production upto March, 83. This figure was 22 sets as on 31st December 1982. Thus Jessops production of motor coaches nearly matched the availability of coaches (21 motor coaches against 22 sets of electrics). On the basis of availability of free supply items (wheelsets upto January 1983 and electric traction equipment upto December 1982) only 82

coaches (22 motor coaches and 60 trailer coaches) could be manufactured within 31.3.83. Against this, Jessops completed 78 coaches (21 Motor Coaches and 57 trailer coaches) within 31.3.83.

Jessops manufacturing programme for the remaining 161 coaches is as under :—

1983-84	=	72 Coaches
1984-85	=	72 Coaches
1985 upto June	=	17 Coaches

The above production programme is contingent upon the receipt of free supply inputs from the Railways in time.”

1.47 The Chairman and Managing Director, Jessops added during evidence :—

“The order was finally placed in November 1978. In this particular case the Railways are to supply us certain material which we call free issue material. The material such as steel as per the available record which was to be supplied by April 1979 was received by us in October 1979. Then the electrics which were to be received in September 1979 were received by us in January 1981. It is also free issue item. That means in other words, the Railways buy it and deliver it to us. The wheel sets for motor coach which were to be delivered again in September 1979 were received by us in October 1981.

As a matter of fact, you will kindly see that we could not supply in 1978-79 and 1979-80 anything because the materials were really not available with us. These are the free supply items; the materials started arriving in October 1979. The electrics and the wheel sets for motor coaches were received in January-October 1981. Our actual production has started picking up somewhere in 1980-81. In 1981-82 it was more or less in full swing. In 1982-83 it further picked up and in 1983-84 it had further picked up. So, year by year, the production of number of coaches had started picking up. In 1977-78

we were left with 15 coaches from earlier order. The order for the next year was not there. There was a gap, due to that workers were diverted in other area. Afterwards, after our persuasion etc. in that year some of the workers were brought back in the coach production and the preparatory work was started in 1980-81 while the assembly work started in 1981-82. Thereafter we had started picking up the work."

1.48 It is stated in the Audit Paragraph that by March 1982 Jessops had supplied only 21 coaches of which only one was motor coach in which electrics was used. However, till March 1982 and November 1982, the BHEL had already supplied 20 and 27 sets respectively. The Committee therefore desired to know as to why Jessops could not supply EMUs with more of motor coaches despite availability of more electrics. The Ministry of Railway have stated :—

"M/s. Jessops had supplied 34 EMUs upto March, 1982 of which were motor coaches. 24 EMUs were supplied from April, 1982 to November, 1982 of which 8 were motor coaches, M/s. BHEL had supplied 20 electric sets upto March 1982 and further 7 sets from April, 1982 to November 1982. M/s. Jessops could not supply adequate number of motor coaches due to their internal problem. The performance of this firm with regard to production of Rolling Stock in general has not been satisfactory since this decision of stopping production of Railway Rolling Stock in October 1975 and this has been brought to the notice of the management of Jessops from time to time. The attention of the Ministry of Heavy Industries has also been drawn to the subject."

1.49 However the Ministry of Heavy Industry have stated as under :—

"BHEL had supplied upto March 82. 20 sets of Motor Coach Electrics, out of which 4 sets were diverted to Central Railway and hence only 16 sets were available to Jessops. From April 1982 to November 82 BHEL further supplied 7 sets out of which one set was in transit. Therefore, the net motor coach electrics available to Jessops upto end of November 82 were 22 sets.

The company had supplied 27 coaches upto March 82 as detailed below :—

Non-driving Trailor Cars	(A)	—	18
Motor Cars	(B)	—	2
Driving Trailor Cars	(C)	—	7
			27

Note : Further 7 coaches comprising 2 non-driving trailor cars 2 Motor Cars and 3 Driving Trailor Cars were completed, inspected and passed by Purchaser's Inspectorate within 31.3.82 and these were awaiting pullin gout by the representative of Railways within 31.3.82.

Further electrics in coaches can be fitted only after wheelsets have been mounted. Wheelsets, a free supply item by Railways, require a lead time of about 2 months. Having regard to this, upto the end of January 1982, Jessops had received only 9 sets of Motor Coach wheelsets from Railways to complete production of coaches upto March 1982 although they had 15 sets of electrics. This factor also contributed to lower production.

The target that would have been achieved within 31.3.82 on the basis of availability of free supply item (wheelsets upto Jan 82 and electrics upto Dec.81) was 45 coaches (36 trailor coaches and 9 motor coaches), Against this, Jessops achieved a production of 34 coaches (30 trailor coaches & 4 motor coaches.)”

1.50 It is pointed out in the Audit Paragraph that as per the terms of the contract electrics, steel and wheelsets are free supply items. For the total quantity an a order (239 EMUs). 81 sets of 'Electrics' were required to be supplied. But the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) placed order on BHEL only in February 1979 for supply of 52 sets with delivery schedule at the rate of 6 sets in 1979-80, 26 sets in 1980-81 and 20 sets in 1981-82. The BHEL had supplied only 20 sets upto the end

of March 1982. Anticipating, therefore, a shortfall in the requirements of electrics, a contract was also placed by the Railway Board on a Japanese firm in June 1980 for the balance requirement (29 sets) through BHEL.

1.51 As the contract for the supply of 76 EMU to Central Railway was placed in June, 1974 and had been kept alive by transfer to ICF in 1975 and then retransferred to Jessops in 1977 with orders for additional number, the Committee wanted to know the reasons for placing the orders on BHEL for supply of Electrics only in February 1979. The Ministry of Railways have informed the Committee as under :

“Only a letter of intent was placed on M/s. Jessops on 11.6.1974 and due to suspension of M/s. Jessops’s production in 1975 this letter of intent was withdrawn on 12.12.75 and transferred to ICF on 14.4.76. As ICF could not plan production in 75-76 electrics were not ordered. In the meantime on the request of M/s. Jessops order was restored on 18.11.77. Immediately after issue of letter of intent the GM/ICF were asked to place the order on M/s. BHEL on 6.2.78 for electric traction equipment to meet the requirement of M/s. Jessops and arrange delivery during 79-80 and 80-81. The letter for intent of 32 sets were placed on M/s. BHEL by GM/ICF on 19.4.78 indicating the delivery schedule as under :

1979-80 -6

1980-81 -26

Subsequently in January, 79, it was decided that the procurement of electrics be made by the Railway Board and the letter of intent for 52 sets was placed on 6.2.79.”

1.52 Elaborating the point further, the Chairman, Railway Board stated during evidence :

“The formal order was placed on 9.10.1980 on the BHEL covering the earlier two orders. In the formal order, the following delivery schedule was indicated. The delivery was to comm-

ence from September 1980 at three sets per month and supplies to be arranged are under ;

1980-81	22 sets.
1981-82	17 sets.
1982-83	14 sets.

The formal order could be issued only in October 1980 since the prices for the electrics were under discussion between the Railway Board and the BHEL and the final prices were communicated on 1.7.1980. The deliveries of electrics by BHEL were monitored in Tripartite meetings held between Railway Board, Jessops and BHEL and the final delivery schedule mutually agreed upon was as under :

1980-81	12 sets.
1981-82	7 sets.
1982-83	10 sets.
1983-84	23 sets.

BHEL have been supplying the Electrics according to this delivery schedule. There has been no delay in placement of orders of electrics on BHEL. The supplies of electrics by BHEL to Jessops were being regularly monitored in tripartite meetings as per the requirement indicating by Jessops for their production. This should hence not form part of the specific reasons for the failure of the Jessops. There would be other reasons which perhaps, the (BHEL) will be in a better position to explain that is, as far as the failure of production or of meeting the targets are concerned."

1.53 Asked why orders for electrics were not placed simultaneously on the BHEL, the witness stated :

"The electrics were ordered on BHEL for fitting the same when the coaches were ready.....orders are placed only when funds are allocated to us."

1.54 In reply to a question whether the Ministry need funds separately for purchasing components for coaches, he said :—

“Once we get the sanction for the funds, we place the orders for all the items required as long lead items after 12 to 18 months.”

In this connection a representative of the BHEL informed the Committee as under :—

“When the earlier order from the Railway Board for Jessops was cancelled then the BHEL diversified production of its equipment since, we had to supply the equipment from 1979-80 onwards, we could not do so because of the long delivery items from abroad such as that of copper. Ancillary industries which were earlier giving some items for DC EMU traction equipment also had diversified their capacity. So, as we had earlier pointed out to the Railways that this production should not be discontinued because once a line is discontinued, it takes a long time to establish.”

1.55 Asked as to why orders were placed on BHEL for only 22 sets of electrics in February 1979 when 81 sets were required for manufacture of the ordered quantity of 239 EMUs, the Ministry of Railway have replied as under :—

“Against 81 sets for 239 EMU coach order, an order for supply of 52 sets of electrics was placed on M/s. BHEL in 1979 and for the balance, order was placed for import with a view to match the targeted production requirement of M/s. Jessops. BHEL had indicated that they could not supply all the 81 sets within the time schedule as indicated by us. In retrospect this decision appears to be correct as in 1984-85 in addition to the expected supply of 18/24 sets from BHEL we may get 24/36 sets from imports and this would enable utilisation of the combined capacity of 150/200 EMUs of Jessop and ICF put together.”

1.56 Stating the reasons for importing electrics the Chairman, Railway Board deposed :

“Once an order was resumed on Jessops and based on their earlier performance a question came up for making available these sets. Tripartite meetings were held to find out how these sets from BHEL would come. In this context, when we found that BHEL had committed itself and its capacity

was only 52 sets, the question of importing other 29 sets came up. Based on the dialogues and the production schedule, we found that BHEL would not be in a position to supply them and hence we went in for import."

1.57 Asked about the comparative prices of the imported and the indigenous electrics, he replied :—

"There is no doubt that today the imported prices of electricals are much higher than those of BHEL's. It is about 200 per cent. It is including the duty also."

1.58 Justifying their decision to import the electrics, the Adviser (Electrical), Railway Board stated :—

"They (Electrical) are basically the same, if we see the performance ...But the improvement is in respect of the reliability ...But what BHEL is manufacturing today is of a design which is about 20 years old. What we have now imported, as a new design of modern technology. BHEL has now got the right to manufacture the new design. The contract stipulated that they would pass on the more modern and reliable design to BHEL. BHEL has to start manufacturing as per these designs which we have now imported."

1.59 When the Committee desired to know why BHEL had not catered to this requirement of Railways, the representative of the BHEL stated :

"The BHEL has taken up the expansion work of the traction equipment manufacturing capacity. Now the traction expansion programme will be fully operational from next year."

1.60 In this connection, the Chairman, Railway Board stated that 'the motors which we have imported have come last year from Japan. That technology for manufacture they are passing on to the BHEL.' The representative of the BHEL assured the Committee that they were introducing the changes in the motors to meet the requirements.

1.61 In reply to a question whether BHEL had capacity to supply all the 81 sets of electrics by the end of March, 1982 if ordered on them in 1979-80, the Ministry have stated :—

M/s. BHEL have a capacity for supply of 50 EMU sets (AC & DC types) per year. As they were supplying equipment for AC also, and as the order position during the period in question was satisfactory, the question of their supplying all the 81 sets in March, 1982 if orders were placed in 1979-80 does not arise. Against the orders for 52 sets placed in 1978-79 the firm has so far supplied only 33 sets. The total supply of electrics by BHEL during the period 79-80 to 82-83 is as below :

<i>Year</i>	<i>AC</i>	<i>DC</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
79-80	35	—	35	Sufficient orders for
80-81	22	8	30	AC or DC was always availa-
81-82	33	12	45	ble on BHEL
82-83	33	10	43	

Supplies were constrained due to their own internal problems/bottlenecks.”

1.62 In this connection the Chairman, Railway Board clarified :—

“The total capacity that we are now considering, as far as BHEL is concerned, both AC and DC put together, is 50 sets per year. Now, this figure varies between AC and DC. If you deduct figures of different years from 50 you will find that their capacity will be limited to give us only 17 sets.”

1.63 To a question whether the capacity of the BHEL replied in was fully utilised, the representative of the BHEL the affirmative and stated that in 1982-83, we produced 33 AC and 10 DC electrics...For DC coaches, we had no demand. When the attention of the Chairman, Railway Board was drawn to the above statement, he stated :

“For other fields BHEL has to supply us various other items like traction generators, diesel generators etc. They have not supplied them in time, because of modernisation of their factory, and so many other things. I will check up why there were no orders.”

For the year 1983-84 BHEL were committed to supply 24 AC and 24 DC electrics.

1.64 It is seen from the Audit paragraph that due to lack of proper planning for manufacture of EMUs and inadequate arrangement for free supply of the main components by the Railway Board the expected delivery of the EMUs to Central Railway as provided for in their rolling stock budget during the years from 1978-79 to 1981-82 could not be made.

1.65 In the context delayed supplies of DC EMU coaches from Jessops, the Railway Board have since decided (November 1982) to place an order for 50 such coaches on ICF for delivery to Central Railway by 1983-84. The Minister of Railways, while replying to Unstarred Question No. 3088 dated 15 March, 1984 stated that total number of rakes required by Central Railway increasing the frequency of services to 5, 4 and 3 minutes are 85,102 and 111 rakes respectively. He had also informed the House that the number of rakes ordered by Railway Board for Central Railway is 31 and the revised delivery schedule of new EMU coaches is 12 rakes upto 1983-84 ; 9 rakes during 1984-85 and the schedule for the year 1985-86 and onwards was yet to be programmed.

1.66 During evidence, the Chairman, Railway Board stated in this regard :

“Funds are required for augmentation of EMUs in all Major cities. There are only 3 factories. Unless additional factory is there, we can't meet rehabilitation and incremental traffic requirements arising from year to year.”

He informed the Committee in this regard that an additional coach factory was sanctioned by Government in 1982-83.

1.67 Suburban trains serve as a lifeline for people in Bombay. People travel from far-flung areas in the city as well suburbs to reach their places of work. Suburban services in Bombay are provided both by the Central and Western Railways. The Committee are concerned to find that while with the growth of population (which increased from 32.5 lakhs in 1950-51 to over 80 lakhs in 1980-81), the number of passengers travelling by suburban services in Bombay has increased more than 5 times (number of passengers being 772 million in 1982-83 as against 150 million in 1950-51), the number of trains has increased by only 1½ times

(821 trains daily in 1982-83 as against 517 trains daily in 1950-51). The result has been heavy overcrowding and consequent hardship to the people. This is evident from the fact that against the carrying capacity of about 1700 passengers (900 sitting and 800 standing) a suburban train carries as many as 3,000 to 3,400 passengers in the morning and evening peak periods. What is still more disturbing is that with the continuous increase in the number of passengers and the inability of the railways to meet this increased demand due to shortage of EMU rakes and inadequate line capacity, the position is likely to further deteriorate. In the opinion of the Committee, it is high time that the Ministry of Railways realised the magnitude of the problem and prepared a perspective plan to augment its rolling stock as well as line capacity taking into account the growing demand of suburban traffic in the city of Bombay.

1.68 The Audit para has highlighted various aspects of the unsatisfactory working of the suburban services run by the Central Railway in Bombay. While the Western Railway, with a holding of 578 DC EMUs could carry 785 million passengers, the Central Railway with 647 EMUs carried only 758 million passengers during 1980-81. The Central Railway was unable to run daily trains as per schedule. During the period from January, 1978 to April, 1981, out of 853 trains scheduled to run daily, only 810 trains were actually run and 42 to 43 trains were cancelled. Against an expected punctuality rate of 98 per cent of suburban trains, the punctuality rate of suburban trains run by the Central Railway was as low as 64 to 69 per cent while on the Western Railway, the same was 96 to 97 per cent.

1.69 The Committee have been informed that the main reason for this unsatisfactory performance is large holding of overaged EMU rakes on the Central Railway. The Committee find that as on 15.3.1984, out of 73 rakes with the Central Railway for suburban traffic, as many as 18 (67 coaches) were overdue for replacement having passed their useful life of 25 years. The Ministry of Railways have pleaded that these rakes could not be replaced because of shortage of funds. The Committee, however, do not find this argument convincing in view of the fact that even the funds allocated for purchase of EMUs were not fully utilised. In 1978-79, against the provision of Rs. 132 lakhs for the purpose, not a single rupee was spent and in 1979-80, 1980-81 and 1981-82 out of the funds allocated for the purpose, Rs. 68.6 lakhs, Rs. 788 lakhs and Rs. 274 lakhs respectively remained unspent. According to the reply of the representative of the Ministry of Railways given during evidence, due to overall inadequate allocation of funds for rolling stock these funds were diverted for other purposes. This, in the opinion of the Committee is highly disturbing. The Committee are unhappy that while on the one hand,

a vital service like the suburban service which caters to a large number of commuters in a city like Bombay was allowed to deteriorate because of shortage of EMU coaches, the funds allotted for the purpose were diverted to other purposes.

1.70 The Committee find that between 1975-76 and 1978-79, there was practically no addition to the stock of the EMU coaches because of the indecisiveness of the Ministry of Railways. In June, 1974, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) placed an order for 76 DC EMUs on M/s Jessops and Company, a Public Sector Undertaking. However, in December 1975 the order was withdrawn from M/s Jessops and Company as it was decided to utilise the capacity of the Integral Coach Factory and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. The order was not restored inspite of request of M/s Jessops that they had made arrangements for steel procurement.

What is really, surprising is that although the order with M/s Jessops was cancelled no firm order was placed on the Integral Coach Factory. Only a letter of intent was issued. The result was that the ICF did not manufacture a single coach. The same order was again restored to M/s Jessops in November, 1977 along with an additional order for 17 EMUs in December, 1977. However, as M/s Jessops had diverted their labour force to other purposes, it took them considerable time to restart the production of EMU coaches with the result that the delivery of these coaches has been considerably delayed. While in 1980-81, Jessops produced only 3 EMU coaches, in 1981-82, they produced 31 and in 1982-83, 43 coaches against their full capacity of 72. From these facts, the Committee cannot but conclude that the decision to cancel the orders with M/s Jessops in December 1975 was ill-conceived and there has been a complete absence of perspective planning, foresight and realistic appraisal of production capacity of ICF on the part of the Ministry of Railways. If the Railways now find themselves saddled with a large number of overaged coaches, they are themselves to blame. The Committee desire that such lapses should not recur.

1.71 The Committee observe that the deliveries of these coaches by M/s Jessops were to commence from 1978-79 and were to be completed by 31 March, 1982. In this connection, the Ministry of Heavy Industry have stated that the order for 239 coaches was received by them in November 1978 (Not in November 1977 as stated by the Ministry of Railways) with the stipulation that the delivery should commence within 12 to 14 months, i.e., by January 1980 and completed by 31 March 1982. As Jessops had an installed capacity of 72 EMU coaches per year and at least 40 months were required to complete this order of 239 coaches, it was not possible to complete the order by 31

March, 1982 i.e., within 27 months from the date of placement of order. This shows that before placing the order for enhanced supplies on the Jessops the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) had not satisfied themselves as to the capacity of the M/s Jessops to supply as per schedule. It is also not clear as to why Jessops had agreed to the above date of delivery when they did not have the capacity to do so. As it turned out, Jessops could supply only 3 EMU coaches in 1980-81, 31 in 1981-82 and 53 in 1982-83 and they are now expected to complete the order by June 1985. The main reason for delay in commencing the delivery, as stated by the Ministry of Heavy Industry, was delay in receipt of free supply items such as steel, electric traction equipment and wheel-sets for motor coaches from the Railways. In this connection, the Chairman and Managing Director, Jessops informed the Committee during evidence that the steel and electric which were to be supplied by the Railways by April 1979 and September 1979 respectively were received by them in October 1979 and January 1981. It is distressing that the Ministry of Railways did not properly estimate the extent to which these free supply items would be required and failed to arrange their timely supply while placing the orders for procurement of coaches.

1.72 It is also seen from the Audit paragraph that by the end of March 1982, the Jessops could supply only 21 coaches of which only one was motor coach and thus rake could be formed out of the new coaches till November 1982. In this connection, the Ministry of Heavy Industry have stated that upto the end of January 1982 Jessops had received only 9 sets of motor coach wheel-sets from the Railways to complete production of coaches upto March 1982 as wheel sets, a free supply item by Railways, required a lead time of about 2 months. Jessops could achieve a production of 34 coaches (30 trailer coaches and 4 motor coaches) only. The Committee would like to be apprised of the reasons for delay in supplying the free supply items in particular steel, wheel-sets, etc.

1.73 The Committee find that as per the terms of the contract, electric, steel and wheel sets, which are free supply items, were to be supplied of the Ministry of Railways to M/s Jessops and against the total order of 239 EMUs, 81 sets of electric were required to be supplied. The Committee note that the Ministry of Railways placed order on BHEL only in February 1979 for supply of 52 sets against their requirement of 81 sets with delivery schedule at the rate of 6 sets in 1979-80, 26 sets in 1980-81 and 20 sets in 1981-82. However, the BHEL had supplied only 20 sets upto the end of March 1982. Anticipating a shortfall in the requirements of electric, a contract was placed by the Railway Board on a Japanese firm in June 1980 for the balance requirements of 29 sets of electric through BHEL. It is not

clear to the Committee as to why the order on BHEL for supply of electrics was placed only in February 1979. Had the Railway Board shown the prudence expected of it and placed orders for electrics simultaneously with the BHEL in November 1977 when the order was re-transferred to Jessops along with an order for additional numbers, the scarce foreign exchange now being spent on procuring 29 electrics from abroad could have been saved. The Railway Board have tried to justify their decision to import these electrics on the plea that the BHEL was producing electrics of a design which was about 20 years old and by importing these electrics of modern technology, BHEL would get the right to manufacture the electrics of new design as it has been stipulated in the contract that the Japanese firm would pass on the more modern and reliable design of electrics to the BHEL. In the view of the Committee, this is nothing but an afterthought and a belated attempt to justify their lapse. The Committee recommend that failure on the part of Ministry of Railways to order these electrics with BHEL in time should be enquired into and responsibility for the same fixed.

1.74 In the context of delayed supplies of DC EMU coaches from Jessops, the Committee find that the Railway Board have since decided in November, 1982 to place an order for 50 such coaches on ICF for delivery to Central Railway in 1983-84. The Minister of Railways while replying to USQ No. 3048 in Lok Sabha on 15 March 1984 informed the House that the number of rakes ordered by the Railway Board was 31 and the revised delivery schedule of new EMU coaches is 12 rakes upto 1983-84, 9 rakes during 1984-85 and the programme for the year 1985-86 and onwards was yet to be finalised. The Committee hope that at least now the present programme of supply of EMU rakes would be adhered to scrupulously by M/s Jessops and Integral Coaches Factory.

1.75 The Committee note that the Central Railway suburban services in the harbour section from Bombay VT presently terminating at Bandra were running upto Andheri via, Mahim and Bandra on the Western Railway till March 1956. This service which was very popular and of immense benefit to the commuters as it avoided change of route at the busy inter-change point at Dadar, was discontinued and terminated at Bandra for want of line capacity in 1956. In August 1977 a project for extension of Central Railways suburban services upto Bandra and Khar road stations for connecting the Central and Western Railway suburban services through a flyover was sanctioned by the Railway at a cost of Rs. 11.22 crores. The project, originally scheduled to be completed within 36 months, was actually completed in September, 1983 and commissioned in October 1983 only. The Committee have been informed that

the delay in execution of this project was mainly due to delay of about 15 months in acquisition of private land having religious structures, execution of certain additional works involving material modification at Andheri to remove the inadequate facilities for receiving and despatching of harbour branch trains which took an extra period of 7 months and carrying out the work only through nights under traffic blocks without disturbing the intensive commuter traffic on Western Railway resulting in completion of work of this portion by the contractor only by August 1980. Besides the above reasons for delay, fresh tenders had also to be invited and new contract awarded in December 1981. The Committee feel that all these reasons could have been foreseen by the Railway authorities and necessary steps taken to avoid the delays. Because of this lapse on their part, the commuters in Aombay were deprived of an essential facility for considerable period. The Committee would like to express their unhappiness over this lack of proper planning on the part of Railways. The Committee would like to be informed of the estimated cost, actuals, time over-run in execution of this flyover and compensation, if any paid to the previous contractor. They would also like to know whether the construction of this flyover has resulted in increasing the efficiency of the Central Railway and if so, to what extent.

1.76 The Committee find that the programme of the Railways for replacement of rolling stock including overaged EMUs has considerably suffered because of shortage of funds. The Committee were informed by the representative of the Ministry of Railways that right from the Third Five Year Plan, they were having this problem of shortage of funds and even at present Railways are having a large number of assets which are due for replacement and which have not been replaced because of financial constraints. Moreover, there is year to year uncertainty about the allocation of funds, with the result that Railways are not able to chalk out any long term plan for purchase and replacement of assets. As Railways have to acquire their rolling stock from either their own production units or from the public sector units and the time gap between placement of order and the the actual supply is between 20 to 40 months, any subsequent cut in the allocation not only adversely affects the Railways' programme for the acquisition of rolling stock but also the programmes of these production units as any reduction in the orders leads to idle capacity in these units. The Committee, therefore find sufficient weight in the statement of the Chairman, Railway Board made before the Committee that "I would appreciate if at the beginning of each Plan period we are given funds adequately so that all the production units which we have got either in the public sector or in the Railways sector work to their full capacity". The Committee feel that it is high time that this matter relating to adequate allocation of funds to the Railways for

replacement of their overaged stock, etc received immediate attention of the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance who should keep it in view while finalising the allocation for the Seventh Five Year Plan.

1.77 Another disturbing aspect about the planning in the Railways is that while the Railways are not able to maintain even their existing services and replace their existing stock of EMU coaches and other rolling stock because of shortage of funds, they are spending huge funds on running of new services which have failed to appeal to the public. It is surprising that while Railways could not replace overaged EMU coaches in Central Railways because of shortage of funds, a new ring railway was introduced in Delhi at a huge cost (Rs. 36.21 crores) on which only about 1000 passengers travel daily against an anticipated projection of 2.87 lakh passengers. The Chairman of the Railway Board tried to justify this on the plea that the service would be extended to nearby areas like Ghaziabad and Palwal but this would involve construction of proper platforms and stations which would take 2 to 3 years. The Committee feel that if the idea was to extend the service to nearby areas, the Railway authorities should have visualised the need of platforms, stations etc. necessary for the same in the beginning itself and started the work in this direction in advance so that the Ring Railway Service could have been properly utilised. The Committee desire that having already incurred an expenditure of a huge amount on the project, the Ministry of Railways should take all necessary steps to make it financially viable.

Inadequate POH and repair facilities

1.78 It has been pointed out in the Audit Paragraph that there is no prescribed (target) percentage of ineffectives specifically for EMUs, though for all types of coaches in passenger service, a target of 14 per cent for ineffectives is laid down. Asked whether the Railway Board have fixed any norms of ineffectives for EMU coaches, the Ministry of Railways have stated :

“As the operating conditions for the DC and AC EMU suburban services are different between the suburban areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi, no uniform norms of ineffectives in respect of EMU stock were laid down by the Railway Board in the past. The zonal Railways constantly keep a watch on the ineffective position of EMU Coaches so as to make maximum number of coaches available for traffic.”

1.79 In the absence of a norm for ineffectives in EMUs, a comparison of the position of ineffectives EMUs obtaining in this regard on Central and Western Railways is as under :

	<i>Ineffective percentage on Central Railway</i>		<i>Ineffective percentage on Western Railway</i>	
	<i>Motor coach</i>	<i>Trailer coach</i>	<i>Motor coach</i>	<i>Trailer coach</i>
1980-81	22.7	16.6	11.8	9.4
1981-82	25.9	17.5	11.1	9.5
1982-83	19.2	16.0	10.5	9.7
1st quarter				
1983-84	16.0	15.0	11.2	9.0

1.80 Asked as to why the percentage of ineffective EMUs motors on Central Railways was so high, the Ministry of Railways have stated :

“The ineffective percentage of imported and indigenous types of motor coaches of Central Railway are as below :

year	Ineffective percentage of motor coaches			Remarks
	Imported	Indigenous	Total	
1982-83	34.3		10.6	19.2 * } * Ineffective percentage of indigenous

1st quarter

1983-84

25.0

11.6

16.0

motor coaches of C.Rly is thus comparable with that of W. Rly. However, the same is much higher for imported stock.

The condition of imported EMU coaches deteriorated considerably due to overloading and ageing of traction motors. It became necessary to replace traction motors of Breda Ansaldo stock, as these traction motors could not withstand service conditions. This increased ineffective percentage of imported coaches. BHEL/TDK motors are now being procured for their replacement and 12 motors coaches have already been converted. This has brought down ineffective percentage of motor coaches to 19.2% during 1982-83 and to 16% during 1st quarter of 1983-84. In order to reduce failures of imported traction motors, rakes have also been formed with 5 motor coaches instead of 4. Further, as per RDSO's advice, the booked speed has also been reduced from 72 KMPH from 15.5.1982. to 65 KMPS This had salutary effect on availability. Also the EMUs on Central Railway sections compared to Western Railway sections work on more steeper graded sections, which would directly contribute to higher wear and tear and hence causes a higher ineffective percentage comparatively."

1.81 It has further been stated in the Audit Para that the higher percentage of EMU coaches under repairs or PCH on the Central

Railway as above was mainly due to lack of centralised periodical overhaul and running repair facilities on that Railway.

(a) Lack of centralised POH facilities

1.82 Running repairs and POH (Periodical overhaul) of electrical portion of EMUs is undertaken at Kurla car shed, whereas POH of mechanical portion is attended to at Matunga located at a distance of 5 km. Due to problems of coordination and movement of coaches at restricted speed over the busy lines, the Central Railway takes 58 and 36 days for POH of a motor and a trailer coach against a target POH period of 18 and 12 days respectively. The transit time between the two shops alone accounted for an average of 11 days per coach.

1.83 The Chairman, Railway Board admitted during evidence that the transit time 'is on a high side'. Asked about the planning of Railway Board in this regard, he stated :

"These are some of the reasons due to which we have stated that the entire work must be concentrated at Matunga....A decision was taken that they must be at one place and not at two places. This was one of the main reasons."

1.84 In reply to a question as to when the decision was taken, he stated that the decision was taken in 1972-73 and by 1983 quite a bit of work has been completed and the work of POH, electrical, motor coaches etc. has already started.

1.85 In this connection the Audit have stated that during 1970-72 a Committee of Engineers appointed by the Railway Board recommended that the POH be centralised at Matunga on Central Railway as this would reduce the POH period by 13 days. Though these recommendations were accepted by the Railway Board in 1973, it did not approve the execution of this scheme as proposed by the Central Railway at a cost of Rs. 5.00 crores in 1974-75 and 1975-76 works programmes owing to constraint of funds. In June 1978, a committee of two General Managers (Central and Western Railways) examined, *de novo*, the merits of

the scheme to centralise the POH at Matunga at the instance of Railway Board and on the recommendation of the second committee this scheme was approved for execution in June 1979 at a cost of Rs. 7.40 crores. This work is expected to be completed in 1984-85 only.

1.86 Asked as to why the scheme for provision of centralised POH facilities for the EMU stock on central Railway at Matunga workshop was not sanctioned in 1974-75 or 1975-76 works programmes, the Ministry of Railways have stated :

“In 1971, Railway Board asked Central Railway to survey the proposals of centralisation of EMU POH. A committee of J.A. grade officers which carried out survey submitted its report during the year 1972 to centralise EMU POH at one location and recommended Matunga workshop for this purpose if Matunga Workshop could adhere to POH period of 15 days per coach laid down by the Railway Board. On the basis of this POH period, the capacity of Matunga Workshop was assessed as 23.4 units per day and this could permit shifting of electrical POH work which was being carried out at Kurla to Matunga Workshop in addition to the mechanical POH work which was being carried out there. Central Railway made the efforts to submit the proposal for this centralisation in following years during 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76. However, these could not be included in Final Works Programme due to paucity of funds. But some running repair facilities of Kurla and Kalwa Car shed were augmented to an extent in the mean time to help maintenance and running repairs, pending development of the POH facilities at Matunga.”

1.87 During evidence, the Chairman, Railway Board stated that ‘the provision of funds had not been made till 1979.... It is because of constraint of funds, we could not execute’. He added in this regard :

“In between there was a change of decision. EMU set had to be moved to Kalwa for stabling and lighter attention and heavier

attention could be given at Kurla. All this was tried. Ultimately heavy delay was involved in shuttling between these two places."

1.88 Clarifying the position further, he stated :

"Even though the decision was taken somewhere in 1972, ultimately the work was included only in 1979-80 work programme as part of the scheme for modernisation. As I mentioned, in the mean time, another method was tried thinking that perhaps Kalwa and Kurla will be able to do POH on EMU satisfactorily with a less number of days. But the actual fact of the case turned out to be otherwise. Hence in 1978, this work was transferred to Matunga as part of the scheme of modernisation and cut down the POH period. We expect that by middle of 1984, all the work will be completed. Most of the work has been completed and already coaches started going to Matunga workshop."

1.89 The Committee also desired to know the reasons for examining the merits of this scheme *do nove* again in 1978 when a Committee of Engineers had already examined this aspect in detail earlier during 1970-72 and recommended execution of this work at Matunga. The Ministry of Railway have stated :

"Besides Matunga Workshop scheme an alternate proposal of having new POH workshop for EMUs at Kalwa was proposed by Central Railway and also an additional workshop for POH of conventional coaches to deal with increases in their holding on Central and Western Railways in western region, J.A. grade Officers Committee in their report of 1972 had recommended centralisation of EMU POH at Matunga workshop to have spare capacity if Matunga workshop could adhere to POH period of 15 days laid down by Railway Board and if the

carriage and wagon activities as well as wagons repair activities being carried out in Matunga Workshop could be terminated. Central Railway did not find it feasible to adhere to POH period of 15 days and on the basis of larger number of days actually being taken on account of heavy repairs involving the capacity of Matunga workshop were scaled down from 23.4 units per day to 14.5 units per day. This necessitated modernisation to workshop and Central Railway thought that it would be preferably for EMU POH to be done at Kalwa due to certain advantageous features. Railway Board, however, thought that POH could be better centralised in Matunga workshop only and a new workshop for POH of conventional coaches could be set at Bhopal if required to off-load Matunga workshop. Thus the need arose to examine the merits *denove* again in 1978 in further detail."

1.90 It has been stated in Audit Report that the Western Railway, due mainly to centralised POH of EMUs in its Mahalaxmi workshops, was able to carry out the POH of motor and trailer coaches in 17.5 and 12.5 days respectively. There is no overdue POH of EMUs on Western Railway. On the Central Railway, due to POH still being done at two places, POH period is longer, outturn is less, and the number of EMUs overdue for POH increased year after year (40 in 1977-78 increased to 110 in 1980-81).

1.91 Reduction of minimum of 13 days in the existing time for POH per coach would result in a saving of 2.4 rakes for service which meant an extra earning potential of Re. 1.37 crores per year.

1.92 According to the Central Railway Administration, the POH performance at Kurla car shed has deteriorated due to heavy repairs needed on imported stock during the last 2/3 years. The average number of working days, including idle period for POH on an imported coach was 54 days vis-a-vis 23 days for indigeneous coach at Kurla shed in 1981-82. As a result, coaches overdue for POH has increased without consequent increase in outturn.

1.93 The Committee find that there is no prescribed percentage of 'ineffectives' for EMUs, though for all types of coaches in passenger service, a target of 14 per cent for 'ineffectives' is laid down. The Ministry of Railways have tried to justify the same on the ground that as the operating conditions for DC & AC EMU suburban services are different between the suburban areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi, no uniform norms of "ineffectives" in respect of EMU stocks could be laid down. Even if it were so, the Railway Board should have laid down different targets for different suburban areas so that the actual performance as against targets could have been judged. The Committee recommend that this should be done at least now without any delay.

1.94 From a comparison of the position of the ineffective EMUs in the Central and Western Railways, the Committee note that the percentage of "ineffectives" on Central Railway of motor coaches and trailer coaches has been between 16 to 25.9 and 15 to 17.5 during the years 1980-81 to 1983-84 (1st quarter) against the percentage of 10.5 to 11.8 and 9.0 to 9.7 for the same in Western Railway. The Ministry of Railways have informed the Committee that the ineffective percentage of indigenous motor coaches of Central Railway is comparable with that of Western Railway and that the same is, however, much higher for imported stock.

1.95 The higher percentage of EMU coaches under repairs of periodical overhaul (POH) on the Central Railways is mainly due to lack of centralised periodical overhaul and running repair facilities on that Railway. Running repairs and POH of electrical portion of EMUs is under taken at Kurla car shed whereas POH of mechanical portion is attended to at Matunga located at a distance of 5 kms. The Committee are concerned to note that due to problems of coordination and delay in movement and of coaches, the Central Railway takes 58 and 36 days for POH of a motor and a trailer coach respectively as against 17.5 days and 12.5 days in the Western Railway. What is surprising to the Committee is the fact that the transit time between the two shops alone which involves a distance of 5 kms. accounts for a delay of 11 days per coach. The Chairman, Railway Board was candid enough to admit during evidence that the transit time 'is on a high side' and "to cover the distance between these two places it might take two days or one day." How dearly this lapse on the part of Central Railways is costing the public exchequer can be seen from the fact that a reduction of 13 days

in the existing time of POH per coach would result in an extra earning of Rs. 1.37 crores per year, besides improving performance of the Railway. It raises the comprehension of the Committee how this state of affairs has been allowed to continue for so long. The Committee, therefore, recommend that the reasons for this delay in transit should be looked into and till the entire work is centralised at Matunga the transit time should be brought down to a day or so against 11 days at present.

1.96 The Committee find that during 1970-71, a Committee of Engineers appointed by the Railway Board had recommended that the POH be centralised at Matunga on Central Railways as this would reduce the POH period by at least 13 days. Though these recommendations were accepted by the Railway Board in 1973, it did not approve the execution of the scheme as proposed by the Central Railway estimated to cost Rs. 5 crores in 1974-75 and 1975-76 works programme owing to constraint of funds. In the meantime, some running repair facilities at Kurla and Kalwa Car shed were augmented in the hope that this would reduce the time taken in POH work. However, in actual practice, this led to further delay. Hence a Committee of the General Managers of Western and Central Railways was appointed in June, 1978 to examine the scheme *de novo*. The Committee are surprised at this decision. As the recommendations of the earlier Committee were already accepted by the Railway Board in 1973, it is not clear as to why in June 1978 a Committee of two General Managers of Central and Western Railways was again appointed to examine, *de novo* the merits of the scheme. In the opinion of the Committee, this has only unnecessarily delayed the approval of the scheme till June 1979 apart from escalation in estimated cost from Rs. 5.00 crores to Rs. 7.40 crores which, in actual practice, may turn out to be much more. As the matter has already been much delayed, the Committee desire that the recommendations of the Second Committee of General Managers should be implemented without any further loss of time. In this regard, the Chairman, Railway Board had assured the Committee that all the work on centralisation of POH facilities at Matunga would be completed, by the middle of 1984. The Committee hope that this assurance would be kept. The Committee desire that they should be informed by July 1984 about the completion of this project. The Committee further desire that the number of days for POH should be reduced to a period of 15 days, as laid down by the Railway Board, so as to enable the Central Railway to provide better service to commuters.

(b) Excessive overloading of EMU motors

1.97 There had been excessive overloading of EMU motors, specially during peak hours, due to the suburban trains running with over crushing capacity resulting in high ineffective percentage of coaches. The condition of coaches in service over 20 years deteriorated due to this overloading as well as ageing of equipment so much so that 82 of such motor coaches developed reverse camber involving major body repairs for prolonged periods during 1979-80. Though the Research, Designs and Standards organisation (RDSO) had recommended in 1978 that the booked speed of suburban trains be reduced from 72 kmph to 65 kmph to ensure appropriate loading of traction motors, this reduction in speed was made effective from may 1982 only.

1.98 The western Railway had already implemented the recommendations of the RDSO in this regard immediately after 1978.

(c) Inadequate facilities for maintenance schedules and running repairs.

1.99 The Audit has pointed out that the existing car shed at Kurla, looking after the electrical portion of POH, was the only shed for the day to day running repairs, etc. This shed has capacity to maintain only 500 EMU coaches. Keeping in view the increase in holding of coaches to over 500 and the need to give relief to the existing Car shed at Kurla, the Committee of 1972, referred to above, recommended creation of a separated shed at Kalwa for day to day repairs. Though the work was included by the Central Railway Administration in its works programme for the year 1974-75 at a cost of Rs. 5.00 crores so that the repair facilities envisaged could be made ready by April 1977, the Railway Board approved this project in 3 phases in 1974-75, 1976-77 and 1980-81 works programmes at a total estimated cost of Rs. 7.56 crores (actuals to end of March 1982 Rs.5.53 crores).

1.100 Asked as to why the Project for setting up a new car shed at Kalwa (for additional holdings) was not sanctioned by the Railway Board in accordance with the requirements projected by the survey committee in 1974-75 itself, the Ministry of Railways have stated :—

“Survey Committee, in its report of July 1972 had envisaged optimum holding of 60 rakes of 9 coaches and about 600 coaches for Kurla car shed and had projected 2 phased plan for Kalwa car shed as holding of EMU coaches was going to

be in excess of 600 coaches. First phase was to be of 30 rakes by 1.4.1977 and second 60 rakes by 1.4.1981, which was further reviewed by Survey Committee and reduced to 21 and 56 rakes respectively. The estimated cost of phases was Rs. 650 and 276 lakhs respectively. It had further recommended that phase I may be further split up into part A, B and further recommended that in that in the first instance, the approval is restricted to the provision of facilities of phase A for part I."

The project for setting up a new car shed at Kalwa was decided to be sanctioned from 1974-75 in various phases i.e. I-A, I-B, I-C and II and as per the recommendation of the survey committee, phases I-A, I-B, I-C have already been sanctioned as per below:

Phase I-A	---	1974-75
Phase I-B.	---	1976-77
Phase I-C	---	1980-81

The above sanctions have been in accordance with the maintenance requirements and the availability of additional rakes."

1.101 It is also seen from the Audit Paragraph that in January 1980 during execution of the last phase of the work, Central Railway realised the need for inspection pits for three more lines, two washing sidings, bridges and certain earth work etc. costing Rs.76.47 lakhs and added these works in 1980-81 works programme. The Administration have stated that the shed was commissioned in January 1981 and the facilities were in the process of being established. When the Committee desired to know the reasons for not including these facilities which are fundamental for repair sheds in the initial stage itself, the Ministry of Railways have stated:

"The requirement of facilities for maintenance such as inspection pits (9 Nos.), washing sidings (2 No.) were envisaged and planned in the beginning itself. Provision of these were included as per the anticipated progressive increase in holding in different phases as below;

Phase 1-A	=3 inspection lines+3 inspection pits.
Phase 1-B	=3 inspection lines.
Phase 1-C	=3 inspection lines +6 inspection pits +2 washing sidings.

It was considered that till phase 1-C gets completed, the rakes will continue to be washed in Kurla car shed. However, anticipating some delay in completion of phase I-C, and in view of operational difficulties experienced in movement of rakes for washing from Kalwa to Kurla, it was decided to prepone the provision of washing sidings and 3 inspection pits and complete these works as material modification to Phase 1-A and Phase 1-B schemes.

The Kalwa car shed which was commissioned in January, 1981 is presently catering to the maintenance need of 15 rakes after completion of Phases 1-A and I-B. Phase I-C is programmed to be completed by March 1986. With this, it will be possible to maintain 21 rakes."

1.102 The Audit paragraph reveals that the approval of this project in three phases in 1974-75, 1976-77 and 1980-81 by the Railway Board and its execution in stages, has delayed the augmentation of the repair facilities for EMUS up to 1981-82 and failed to give relief to Kurla car shed which was attending to both POH and running repairs of EMUs though the need for such relief was identified as early as in 1972.

1.103 According to Railway Administration (October 1982) the performance of Kurla car shed with reference to coaches under repairs deteriorated mainly due to non augmentation of repair/overhaul facilities between 1969-70 and 1980-81 in spite of a 48 per cent increase in the holding during this period.

1.104 According to Audit, EMU coaches had also to be stabled for long periods at Kurla shed due to non-availability of material such as tyres/wheels and traction motors. During the period January 1979 to February 1981, 25 coaches were stabled for periods in excess of 100 days in each case. The departmental capacity of 5 to 6 armatures rewinding per month was inadequate to cope with the actual arisings of the order of 7 to 8 armatures per month. The Railway Admini-

station did not also programme, on a regular basis, the offloading of the additional requirements of rewinding of armatures either to trade or on BHEL, thereby contributing to higher percentage of ineffectives among EMU motors.

1.105 Asked what has been the level of arisings of armatures of EMU motors for rewinding on Central Railway during 1981-82 and 1982-83 and whether this continues to be in excess of the existing departmental capacity, the Ministry of Railways have stated:

“The level of arisings of armatures of EMU traction motors for rewinding during 1981-82 and 1982-83 are given below:

S.No. Month	<i>Period</i>	
	1981-82	1982-83
	Nos.	Nos.
1. April	3	20
2. May	13	21
3. June	7	22
4. July	15	13
5. August	7	21
6. September	11	14
7. October	16	9
8. November	11	21
9. December	13	28
10. January	10	15
11. February	20	8
12. March	16	12
Total	142	204

1.106 In this connection the Ministry of Railways have stated that prior to commissioning of Nasik workshop, there was some accumulation due to arisings being more than capacity. Such contracts are not required to be awarded now on account of assistance forthcoming from Nasik workshop and Kalyan Loco Shed. The following table gives the details of orders which were placed with outside firms for rewinding of EMU stock Traction Motor Armatures to avoid accumulation :

Sl. No.	Particulars of Contract	Quantity
1.	No. CLA/RS//WKS/10 dated 22.3.1979 on M/s. BHEL, Andheri, Bombay, for rewinding 133 AZ/AY type armatures.	30 Nos. (Done 10)
2.	No. CLA/RS/WKS/12 dated 23.7.1979 on M/s. Venus Electronics & Controls Private Ltd., Andheri, Bombay for rewinding of English Electric type armatures of Imported Stock.	5 Nos. (Done 1)
3.	No. CLA/RS/WKS/15/Evans dated 6.9.1979 on M/s. Evans Electric Pvt. Ltd., Andheri, Bombay for rewinding of English Electric type armatures of Imported Stock.	5 Nos. (Done 5)
4.	No. CLA/RS/WKS/11/B dated 21.11.1980 on M/s. Susaka Pvt. Ltd., Bombay for rewinding of English Electric type armatures of Imported Stock.	30 Nos. (Done 27)

Another factor which affected the availability was the withdrawal/condemnation of large number of imported EMU coaches on account of development of reverse (negative) camber in their under frames.

1.107 Due to excessive overcrowding on the suburban section of Bombay Division over Central Railway, these underframes started sagging and losing upward profile (positive camber). In the past, these EMU coaches with negative camber used to be withdrawn from service and scrapped. In 1978 the Railway Board directed the Central Railway

Administration that no DC/EMU coach should be condemned as far as possible on account of negative camber or for corrosion. After carrying out tests to determine the increase in negative camber when the coach is loaded from tare to peak dense crushload. RDSO instructed Central Railway Administration in February 1980 for recambering/rehabilitation repairs of the EMU coaches with negative camber of 11/12mm and more and permitted to run the coaches having negative camber upto 10 mm in regular service. A total of about 75 coaches needed recambering and these were withdrawn from service. A detailed estimate for Rs 183.50 lakhs including both mechanical and electrical portion of the work was sanctioned in May 1981 (revised to Rs. 450.73 lakhs in July 1981). Of the above 47 number of coaches recambered; 16 numbers were withdrawn from service either for further recambering or were condemned or proposed for condemnation by the Administration. This affected the running of regular suburban train service leading to change in Suburban Time Table.

1.108 Asked how many of the old EMU coaches were selected for recambering and how many of the coaches were recambered and at what cost, the Ministry of Railways stated:

“In the course of time, due to overcrowding of passengers, some underframe of coaches may sag in the centre. Such coaches were attended in workshops and put back into service.

Coach by coach survey was carried out in December 1980 of all imported 198 coaches for any specific attention. Metro Cammell coaches commissioned in 1951 had completed nearly 30 years as against code life of 25 years and were withdrawn on condition basis. Other coaches were taken up for detailed repairs and upto June 1983, 44 coaches have been repaired and this work is being continued.

As recambering is a normal maintenance procedure, all the coaches which have been recambered are still in service and none of the coaches which have been attended to have been condemned so far. Only one coach of indigenous make out of these which was involved in fire set by public agitators had to be condemned. The cost of detailed repairs and rehabilitation including recambering etc. of such imported coaches of more than 25 years service is approximately Rs. 3 lakhs per coach.”

1.109 The Committee find that there had been excessive overloading of EMU motors specially during peak hours, resulting in high "ineffectives" of motor coaches. The condition of coaches in service over 20 years so much deteriorated due to this overloading as well as ageing of equipment that 82 of such motor coaches developed reverse camber involving major body repairs for prolonged period during 1979-80. The Committee are surprised to learn that although the RSDO recommended in 1978 that the booked speed of suburban trains be reduced from 72 km. p.h. to 65 km. p.h. this reduction in speed was made effective from May, 1982 only. The Committee would like to be informed of the reasons for this.

1.110 The Committee note that the existing Car shed at Kurla, looking after the electrical portion of POH, was the only shed for the day to day running repairs. This shed had capacity to maintain only 500 EMU coaches. Keeping in view the increase in holding of coaches to over 500 and the need to give relief to the existing car shed, the Committee of 1972 referred to above, recommended setting up of a separate shed at Kalwa for day to day repairs. The Committee are surprised to find that though the Central Railway administration included it in its works programme for the year 1974-75 so that the repair facilities could be made available by April, 1977, the Railway Board approved this project in three phases in 1974-75, 1976-77 and 1980-81 works programmes, which has delayed the augmentation of repair facilities for EMU upto 1981-82 and failed to give any relief to Kurla car shed. The Committee would like to know the estimated and actual cost of this project and the time by which the project is likely to be completed as well as the reasons for delay in the execution of the project.

1.111 The Committee observe from the Audit paragraph that EMU coaches had also to be stabled for long periods at Kurla car shed due to non-availability of materials such as tyres, wheels and traction motors. During the period January 1979 to February 1981, about 25 coaches were stabled for periods in excess of 100 days in each case. The Committee recommend that steps to keep adequate stocks of these items should be taken. The departmental capacity of 5 to 6 armatures re-winding per month was inadequate to cope with the actual arisings of the order of 7 to 8 armatures per month. The Committee are unhappy that the Railway administration did not even programme on regular

basis the off-loading of the additional requirements of re-winding of armatures either to trade or on the BHEL, thereby contributing to higher percentage of "ineffectives" among EMU motors. During 1979-80, out of 70 armatures 43 were got re-wound from the outside firms. However, with the commissioning of Nasik workshop, rewinding works are not to be awarded now to the outside firms. The Committee are concerned to find a steep rise in the level of arisings of armatures of EMU traction motors for rewinding from 142 in 1981-82 to 204 in 1982-83. The Committee recommend that the Railway Board should go into the causes for increase in the level of arising of armatures for re-winding and take necessary remedial measures.

NEW DELHI ;
April 26, 1984

Vaisakha 6, 1906 (S)

SUNIL MAITRA,
Chairman,
Public Accounts Committee.

APPENDIX I

Audit Para

1. Performance of suburban services of the Central Railway

1. Introduction

1.1 The suburban services of Central Railway, serving the Greater Bombay, are spread over in four sections with a Km, of (track Km. 484) as under :

- (i) Bombay VT to Kurla/Kalayan/Karjat
- (ii) Bombay VT to Kurla/Kalyan/Kasara
- (iii) Bombay VT to Vadala/(Raoli) /Kurla/Mankhurd
- (iv) Bombay VT to Vadala (Raoli)/Bandra

1.2 There are 53 stations on the suburban routes *ibid.* The services are run with 1500 Volts Direct Current (DC) traction power supplied from 19 sub-stations. Each Electrical Multiple Unit (EMU) train or rake comprise 3 units of 9 coaches; each unit consists of one motor and two trailer coaches.

1.3 The daily commuters by Bombay are also served by the suburban services run by the Western Railway which has only a single section of 60 route Km (208 track Km) from Churchgate to Virar. There are 28 stations in this route which obtain (DC) traction power supply from 15 sub-stations. While the Western Railway with a holding of 578 DC EMUs could carry 785 million passengers the Central Railway with 647 EMUs carried only 758 million passengers during 1980-81. The Central Railway is unable to run daily the advertised trains to schedule. During the period from January 1978 to April 1981, out of 853 trains scheduled to run daily only 810 trains actually run, 42 to 43 trains were cancelled and 116 trains ran late (late by more than 15 minutes).

1.4 The normal punctuality expected of suburban trains is 98 per cent of the trains run. The punctuality percentage was 64 to 69 per cent on Central Railway whereas that, on the western Railway, was 96 to 97 per cent.

1.5 The main factors affecting the performance of Central Railway were large holding of overaged EMU coaches, non-receipt of new EMUs on replacement, inadequate Periodical Over Haul (POH) and repair facilities resulting in high percentage of ineffectives (i.e. awaiting or under repairs) and increasing number of EMUs overdue POH. Besides, delayed implementation of certain rehabilitation works relating to overhead electric equipment (OHE), existing power distribution system, etc. had affected the running of suburban trains to schedule. These factors are further analysed below :

II. Holding

	Central Railway		Western Railway	
	1977-78	1980-81	1977-78	1980-81
(a) Over 25* years of age	61	67	46	32
(b) Below 25 years	628	580	550	456
	689	647	596	578
	(71 rakes)		(67 rakes)	

* The service life of EMUs under normal operating conditions is 25 years.

1.6 Keeping in view the overaged EMUs and traffic growth, the Central Railway were allotted a total of 172 new coaches on replacement account and for meeting additional traffic during 1974-75 to 1979-80. After eliminating the overaged stock, the Railway Administration was anticipated to hold about 78 rakes (735 coaches) by 1980-81, 80 rakes by 1981-82 and 85 rakes by 1982-83. These new coaches were to be received from out of the supplies under the contracts placed by the Ministry of Railway (Railway Board) in June 1974 for 76 DC EMUs at a cost of Rs. 7.56 crores and again in November** 1978 for 146 DC EMUs at a cost of Rs. 15.62 crores on M/s Jessops.

1.7 The earlier order for 76 EMU coaches was withdrawn in December 1975 in the context of drastic cut in the plan allocation for coach production during 1975-76 and 1976-77 and an inter ministerial decision (October 1975) to stop coach production by Jessops to enable better utilisation of capacities of Integral Coach Factory (ICF) and Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML). Though this order for manufa-

** This contract with Jessops was actually for 239 EMUs taking into account the EMUs ordered earlier.

cture of DC EMUs was diverted to ICF in April 1976, the ICF did not commence any work on this order till 1977-78 due to constraint of funds and for want of priority for this order. The same order was again restored to M/s Jessops in November 1977 along with an additional order for 17 EMUs in December 1977. The delivery of these coaches was to commence from 1978-79.

1.8 Though the supplies under the above three orders (239) were all to be completed by 31.3.1982, this firm had commenced delivery of coaches only from 1979-80 and supplied only 21 coaches by end of March, 1982. Of these, only one was motor coach and hence no additional rake could be formed out of the new coaches procured so far by Central Railway (November 1982).

1.9 Thus, as a result of withdrawal of the orders from M/s Jessops in December 1975 and inadequate priority for production of DC EMU coaches by ICF during 1976-77 and 1977-78 (after this order was diverted to them in April 1976) there was no supply of the EMUs to Central Railway under this order till 1978-79. Thereafter, from 1979-80, the production from M/s Jessops did not pick up at the expected level mainly due to inadequate availability of Electrics (a set of traction motor, traction generator, control gear equipments, etc.) to be supplied by M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals (BHEL).

1.10 As per the terms of the contract, Electrics, steel and wheelsets are free supply items. For the total quantity on order (239 EMUs), 81 sets of 'Electrics' were required to be supplied. But the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) placed order on BHEL only in February 1979 for supply of 52 sets with delivery schedule at the rate of 6 sets in 1979-80, 26 sets in 1980-81 and 20 sets in 1981-82. The BHEL had supplied only 20 sets to the end of March 1982. Anticipating, therefore, a shortfall in the requirements of electrics, a contract was also placed by the Railway Board on a Japanese firm in June 1980 for the balance requirements (29 sets) through BHEL. Till November 1982, the cumulative supply to Jessops from BHEL was only 27 sets of electrics including 3 sets from import.

1.11 Thus, due to lack of proper planning for manufacture of EMUs and inadequate arrangements for free supply of the main components by the Railway Board to the expected delivery of the EMUs to Central Railway as provided for in their rolling stock budgets during the year from 1978-79 to 1981-82 could not be made. The funds provided in the budget specifically for this purchase could not also be utilised as detailed below :

Year	Delivery of EMUs		Funds provided	Actually utilised	Funds not used
	Expected	Actual			
(Rs. in lakhs)					
1978-79	36	Nil	132.0	Nil	132
1979-80	38	Nil	606	537.4	68.6
1980-81	88	3	1232	444	788
1981-82	80	31*	1120	846	274

1.12 In the context of delayed supplies of DC EMU coaches from Jessops, the Railway Board have since decided (November 1982) to place an order for 50 such coaches on ICF for delivery to Central Railway by 1983-84.

III. INADEQUATE POH AND REPAIR FACILITIES

1.13 There is no prescribed (target) percentage of ineffectives specifically for EMUs, though for all type of coaches in passenger service, a target of 14 per cent for ineffectives is laid down. In the absence of a norm for ineffectives in EMUs, a comparison of the Position of ineffective EMUs obtained in this regard on Central and Western Railways during 1980-81 has been made by Audit as under :

	Central	Western
Percentage of EMU coaches under/awaiting repairs and POH to total holding :		
(i) Motor coaches	22.7	11.8
(ii) Trailer coaches	16.6	9.4

1.14 The higher percentage of EMU coaches under repairs or POH on the Central Railway as above was mainly due to lack of centralised periodical overhaul and running repair facilities on that Railway. These factors have been further analysed below :

* As per production statement furnished to the Railway Board by Jessops.

(i) Lack of centralised POH facilities

1.15 Running repairs and POH of electrical portion of EMUs is undertaken at Kurla car shed, whereas POH of mechanical portion is attended to at Matunga located at a distance of 5 km. Due to problems of coordination and movement of coaches at restricted speed over the busy lines, the Central Railway takes 58 and 36 days for POH of motor and trailer coach against a target POH period of 18 and 12 days respectively. The transit time between the two shops alone accounted for an average of 11 days per coach.

1.16 During 1970-72, a Committee of Engineers appointed by the Railway Board recommended that the POH be centralised at Matunga on Central Railway as this would reduce the POH period by 13 days. Though these recommendations were accepted by the Railway Board in 1973, it did not approve the execution of this scheme as proposed by the Central Railway at a cost of Rs. 5.00 crores in 1974-75 and 1975-76 works programmes owing to constraint of funds. In June 1978 a committee of two General Managers (Central and Western Railways) examined, *de novo*, the merits of the scheme to centralise the POH at Matunga at the instance of Railway Board and on the recommendation of the second committee this scheme was approved for execution in June 1979 at a cost of Rs. 7.40 crores. This work is expected to be completed in 1984-85 only.

1.17 The Western Railway, due mainly to centralised POH of EMUs in its Mahalaxmi workshops, was able to carry out the POH of motor and trailer coaches in 17.5* and 12.5 days respectively. There is no overdue POH of EMUs on Western Railway. On the Central Railway, due to POH still being done at two places, POH period is longer, outturn is less, and the number of EMUs overdue POH increased year after year (40 in 1977-78 increased to 110 in 1980-81).

1.18 Reduction of minimum of 13 days in the existing time for POH per coach would result in a saving of 2.4 rakes for service which meant an extra earning potential of Rs. 1.37 crores per year.

1.19 According to the Central Railway Administration, the POH performance at Kurla car shed has deteriorated due to heavy repairs

* Data from the Monthly Reply of General Manager, Western Railway for March, 1982.

needed on imported stock during the last 2/3 years. The average number of working days, including idle period for POH of an imported coach was 54 days vis-a-vis 23 days for indigeneous coach at Kurla shed in 1981-82. As a result, coaches overdue for POH has increased without a consequent increase in outturn.

1.20 As already stated, the overaged coaches are retained in service due to non-receipt of new coaches on order from 1974 as a result of defective planning of the procurement by Railway Board.

(ii) Excessive overloading of EMU motors

1.21 There had been excessive overloading of EMU motors, specially during peak hours, due to the suburban trains running with over crushing capacity resulting in high ineffective percentage of motor coaches. The condition of coaches in service over 20 years deteriorated due to this overloading as well as ageing of equipment so much that 82 of such motor coaches developed reverse camber involving major body repairs for prolonged period during 1979-80. Though the Research, Desings and Standard Organisation (RDSO) had recommended in 1978 that the booked speed of suburban trains be reduced from 72 kmph to 65 kmph to ensure appropriate loading of traction motors, this reduction in speed was made effective from May 1982 only.

(iii) Inadequate facilities for maintenance schedules and running repairs

1.22 The existing car shed at Kurla, looking after the electrical portion of POH, was the only shed for the day to day running repairs, etc. This shed has capacity to maintain only 500 EMU coaches. Keeping inview the increase in holding of coaches to over 500 and the need to give relief to the existing car shed at Kurla, the Committee of 1972 referred to above, recommended creation of a separate shed at Kalwa for day to day repairs. Though the work was included by the Central Railway Administration in its works programme for the year 1974-75 at a cost of Rs. 5.00 crores so that the repair facilities envisaged can be made ready by April 1977, the Railway Board approved this project in 3 phases in 1974-75, 1976-77 and 1980-81, works programme at a total estimated cost of Rs. 7.56 crores (actuals to end of March 1982 Rs. 5.53 crores). In January 1980 during execution of the last phase of the work, Central Railway realised the need for inspection pits for three more lines, two washing siding, bridges and certain earth work etc. costing Rs,

76.47 lakhs. The Administration have stated that the shed was commissioned in January 1981 and the facilities were in the process of being established.

1.23 The approval of this project in three phases in 1974-75, 1976-77 and 1980-81 by the Railway Board and its execution in stages has delayed the augmentation of the repair facilities for EMUs upto 1981-82 and failed to give relief to Kurla car shed which was attending to both POH and running repairs of EMUs though the need for such relief was identified as early as in 1972.

1.24 According to Railway Administration (October 1982) the performance of Kurla car shed with reference to coaches under repairs deteriorated mainly due to non-augmentation of repair/overhaul facilities between 1969-70 and 1980-81 in spite of a 48 per cent increase in the holding during this period.

1.25 EMU coaches had also to be stabled for long periods at Kurla shed due to non-availability of material such as tyres/wheels and traction motors. During the period January 1979 to February 1981, 25 coaches were stabled for periods in excess of 100 days in each case. The departmental capacity of 5 to 6 armatures rewinding per month was inadequate to cope with the actual arisings of the order of 7 to 8 armatures per month, The Railway Administration did not also programme on a regular basis, the offloading of the additional requirements of rewinding of armatures either to trade or on BHEL, thereby contributing to higher percentage of ineffectives among EMU motors.

IV. DELAY IN STRENGTHENING OF POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND OVERHEAD EQUIPMENT (OHE)

1.26 The existing sub-stations at Bombay VT (Wadi Bunder), Dadar and Raoli Junctions had been overloaded resulting in power crisis and major failures in DC distribution with frequent restrictions of train service from 1978-79. The Railway Board approved provision of additional sub-stations at Chinchpokli-Ghatkopar, Bhandup, Kalwa and Dombivili (in all 5 sub-stations) at a cost of Rs. 4.12 crores in March 1978.

All these works intended to strengthen the power distribution have progressed only to the extent of 50 per cent (November 1982) mainly due to delay in coverage of orders for supply of vital components such as high speed circuit breakers etc.

1.27 Similarly, some of the old type OHE fittings, such as common cross span wire assembly, with its corroded parts due for replacement on age-cum-condition basis are yet to be replaced. Besides, the acid fumes emitted through chimneys and waste drains of chemical factories between kalyan, Ambernath and Titwala have a highly corrosive effect on the aluminium conductors. other metallic parts and steel structures of the transmission lines causing their faster deterioration resulting in frequent failures and interruption to traction power supply. Effective action to combat this factor, is yet to be taken. In the meanwhile recurring expenditure on preventive maintenance of the order of Rs. 1.20* lakhs per year continued to be incurred in protecting the OHE equipments and other installations.

1.28 Major works of replacement rehabilitation of transmission line, contact wires, switchgear fittings, common cross span wire assembly, costing Rs. *2.17 crores were approved between 1976-77 and 1980-81 but these works are still in progress.

1.29 Thus the combination of all the factors detailed above had been affecting the speed and punctuality of suburban trains resulting in cancellation of scheduled trains and trains running late. The cancellation of scheduled trains causes great inconvenience to the commuters and results in vandalism leading to the destruction of Railway property worth lakh of rupees as happened on 26.5.78, 7.11.79, 22.5.81, 31. 8. 81 and 21. 6. 82.

1.30 According to the Central Railway Administration (October 1982), the poor availability of the EMUS affecting the performance of its services to schedule, was on account of excessive repairs to the overaged stock still in service and improvement can be expected only when this overaged stock are withdrawn.

1.31 The Railway Administration further explained that unit defects/unit failures contribute to about 30 per cent of loss of punctuality whilst the balance 70 per cent are caused due to alarm chain pulling, tresspassing, rail fracture, S&T operating and OHE power supply failures.

* Figure derived by Audit on the basis of arenage of expenditure from 1967 to 1979.

V. CONCLUSION

- (i) The performance of EMU services on Central Railway had deteriorated specially from 1977-78 due to the overaged stock requiring excessive repairs.
- (ii) Due to lack of proper planning for procurement from the existing production units, inadequate timely arrangement for free supply items by Railway Board, the programmed addition of 172 coaches by end of March 1982 not materialised except for 21 coaches. Bulk of the funds allocated for this purchase from 1978-79 could not also be utilised.

Even of the additions (21), the product mix of motor and trailer coaches was not balanced; only one motor coach was available and hence no additional rake could be formed.

- (iii) Lack of centralised POH facilities resulted in longer POH time for EMUs.

Inadequate repair and maintenance facilities have led to higher percentage of coaches under repair from 1978-79 restricting availability of EMUs for suburban services.

- (iv) There had been abnormal delay of over seven years in sanctioning the scheme of centralised POH work at Matunga which would have reduced the existing POH time of EMUs by 13 days and thereby saved 2.4 rakes for service with an extra earning potential of Rs. 1.37 crores per year.
- (v) Investment of Rs. 5.53 crores has not fructified due to sanctioning the project for a new repair shed at Kalwa in three phases. The new shed, though commissioned from January 1981, has been partly made available for operational use in 1981-82.
- (vi) Delay in strengthening of power distribution and rehabilitation of OHE have been resulting in frequent disruptions in suburban traffic affecting its punctuality. Scheduled train

services as per published time table never ran due to daily cancellation of 42 to 43 trains on an average resulting in discomfort to the daily commuters.

- (vii) Effective action to combat man-made corrosion affecting the OHE are yet to be devised.

[Paragraph 1 of the Advance Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 1981-82, Union Government (Railways)]

APPENDIX II

Vide Para 1.12

Cause-wise Analysis of Suburban Trains which lost Punctuality.

S.No.	Cause	Total No. of cases of loss of punctuality during			Percentage total cases during		
		1980-81	1981-82	1982-83	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83
1.	Unit defect/failures & shortage.	11727	14483	9210	26.80	28.99	27.63
2.	ST failures.	398	1000	925	0.91	2.00	2.77
3.	OHE failures	1204	1612	1022	2.75	3.23	3.07
4.	Rail Fracture/Engg.	2037	3983	2998	4.66	7.97	8.99
5.	Line clear	6482	6541	4427	14.82	13.09	13.28
6.	Tresspasser/A.R.O.	1433	1501	1088	3.28	3.00	3.26
7.	Flood/Heavy rain.	3504	2577	1132	8.01	5.16	3.39
8.	Accident/Derailment	1675	3479	2635	3.83	6.96	7.90

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9.	Loco failures.	1036	1267	541	2.37	2.54	1.92
10.	C&W.	307	481	255	0.70	0.96	0.76
11.	Vandalism.	639	857	544	1.46	1.72	1.63
12.	Western Railway	692	369	291	1.58	0.74	0.87
13.	Staff	578	1238	356	1.32	2.48	1.07
14.	Alarm chain Pulling	2196	2666	2067	5.02	5.34	6.20
15.	Misc.	6700	3597	2439	15.32	7.20	7.32
16.	S&T/Misc	1004	582	1409	2.29	1.16	4.23
17.	OHE/Misc	720	397	151	1.65	0.79	0.45
18.	Public agitation	74	698	612	0.17	1.40	1.84
19.	Operating	600	1035	492	1.37	2.07	1.47
20.	Planned due to blocks	187	258	384	0.43	0.54	1.15
21.	Elec.	120	234	30	0.27	0.47	0.09
22.	MSEB/TATA	140	711	98	0.32	1.42	0.29

23.	Commercial	4	—	2	0.009	—	0.006
23.-A.	BPT Railway	—	—	28	—	—	0.08
24.	Speed restriction	—	383	—	—	0.77	—
24.-A.	Engg. Const.	283	—	—	0.65	—	—
25.	Security	—	—	94	—	—	0,28
Total :		43740	49949	33330			

APPENDIX III

(Vide Para 1.46)

Statement Showing Receipt of First Matched set of Free Supply Item

	Lead time required.	Delivery date with respect to lead time	Matched first set received in works from Rlys.	Delay in commencement supply.
Steel	9 months	April 1979	October 79	6 months.
Electric Traction Equipment.	4 months	Sept. 1979	January 81	16 months.
Wheelsets for Motor Coach.	4 months	Sept. 1979	October 81	25 months.

APPENDIX IV

Statement of Observations and Recommendations

S. No.	Para No.	Ministry Department concerned	Observation/Recommendation
1	3	3	4
1.	1.67	Ministry of Railway	Suburban trains serve as a lifeline for people in Bombay. People travel from far-flung areas in the city as well as suburbs to reach their places of work. Suburban services in Bombay are provided both by the Central and Western Railways. The Committee are concerned to find that while with the growth of population (which increased from 32.5 lakhs in 1950-51 to over 80 lakhs in 1980-81) the number of passengers travelling by suburban services in Bombay has increased more than 5 times number of passengers being 772 million in (1982-83 as against 150 million in 1950-51), the number of trains has increased by only 1½ times (821 trains daily in 1982-83 as against 517 trains daily in 1950-51). The result has been heavy overcrowding and consequent hardship to the people. This is evident from the fact that against the carrying capacity of about 1700 passengers (900 sitting and 800 standing) a suburban train carries as may as 3,000 to 3,400 passengers in the morning and evening peak periods. What is still more disturbing is that with the continuous increase in the number of passengers and the inability of the railways to meet this increased demand due to shortage of EMU rakes and inadequate line capacity the position is likely to further

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deteriorate. In the opinion of the Committee it is high time that the Ministry of Railways realised the magnitude of the problem and prepared a perspective plan to augment its rolling stock as well as line capacity taking into account the growing demand of suburban traffic in the city of Bombay.

2. 1.68 Ministry of Railways

The Audit para has highlighted various aspects of the unsatisfactory working of the suburban services run by the Central Railway in Bombay. While the Western Railway, with a holding of 578 DC EMUs could carry 785 million passengers, the Central Railway with 647 EMUs carried only 758 million passengers during 1980-81. The Central Railway was unable to run daily trains as per schedule. During the period from January, 1978 to April, 1981, out of 853 trains scheduled to run daily, only 810 trains were actually run and 42 to 43 trains were cancelled. Against an expected punctuality rate of 98 per cent of suburban trains, the punctuality rate of suburban trains run by the Central Railway was as low as 64 to 69 per cent while on the Western Railway, the same was 96 to 97 per cent.

3. 1.69 do

The Committee have been informed that the main reason for this unsatisfactory performance is large holding of overaged EMU rakes on the Central Railway. The Committee find that as on 15.3.1984, out of 73 rakes with the Central Railway for suburban traffic, as many as 18 (67 coaches) were overdue for replacement having passed their codal life of 25 years. The Ministry of Railways have pleaded that these rakes could not be replaced because of shortage of funds.

1	2	3	4
		do :	<p>The Committee; however, not find this argument convincing in view of the fact that even the funds allocated for purchase of EMUs were not fully utilised. In 1978-79, against the provision of Rs. 132 lakhs for the purpose, not a single rupee was spent and in 1979-80, 1980-81 and 1981-82 out of the funds allocated for the purpose, Rs.68.6 lakhs Rs. 788 lakhs and Rs.274 lakhs respectively remained unspent. According to the reply of the representative of the Ministry of Railways given during evidence, due to overall inadequate allocation funds for rolling stock these funds were diverted for other purposes. This, in the opinion of the Committee, is highly disturbing. The Committee are unhappy that while on the one hand, a vital service like the suburban service which caters to a large number of commuters in a city like Bombay was allowed to deteriorate because of shortage of EMU coaches, the funds allotted for the purpose were diverted to other purposes.</p>
4.	1.70	Ministry of Rlys, Deptt. of Heavy Industry	<p>The Committee find that between 1975-76 and 1978-79, there was practically no addition to the stock of the EMU coaches because of the indecisiveness of the Ministry of Railways. In June, 1974, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) placed an order for 76 DC EMUs on M/s Jessops and Company, a Public Sector Undertaking. However, in December 1975 the order was withdrawn from M/s Jessops & Company as it was decided to utilise the capacity of the Integral Coach Factory and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. The order was not restored in spite of request of M/s Jessops that they made arrangements for steel procurement.</p>

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What is really surprising is that although the order with M/s Jessops was cancelled no firm order was placed on the Integral Coach Factory, 'Only a letter of intent was issued. The result was that the ICF did not manufacture a single coach. The same order was again restored to M/s Jessops in November, 1977 alongwith an additional order for 17 EMUs in December, 1977. However, as M/s Jessops had diverted their labour force to other purposes, it took them considerable time to restart the production of EMU coaches with the result that the delivery of these coaches has been considerably delayed. While in 1980-81, Jessops produced only 3 EMU coaches, in 1981-82, they produced 31 and in 1982-83, 43 coaches against their full capacity of 72. From these facts, the Committee cannot but conclude that the decision to cancel the orders with M/s Jessops in December 1975 was ill-conceived and there has been a complete absence of perspective planning, foresight and realistic appraisal of production capacity of ICF on the part of the Ministry of Railways. If the Railways now find themselves saddled with a large number of overaged coaches, they are themselves to blame. The Committee desire that such lapses should not recur.

- 5 1.71 Ministry of Railways The Committee observe that the deliveries of these coaches by M/s. Jessops were to commence from 1978-79 and were to be completed by 31 March, 1982. In this connection, the Ministry of Heavy Industry have stated that the order for 259 coaches was received by them in November 1978 (Not in November 1977 as stated by the Ministry of Railways) with the stipulation that the deli-

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very should commence within 12 to 14 months i.e., by January 1980 and completed by 31 March 1982. As Jessops had an installed capacity of 72 EMU coaches per year and at least 40 months were required to complete this order of 239 coaches, it was not possible to complete the order by 31 March, 1982 i.e., within 27 months from the date of placement of order. This shows that before placing the order for enhanced supplies on the Jessop the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) had not satisfied themselves as to the capacity of the M/s. Jessops to supply as per schedule. It is also not clear as to why Jessops had agreed to the above date of delivery when they did not have the capacity to do so. As it turned out, Jessops could supply only 3 EMU coaches in 1980-81, 31 in 1981-82 and 53 in 1982-83 and they are now expected to complete the order by June 1985. The main reason for delay in commencing the delivery, as stated by the Ministry of Heavy Industry, was delay in receipt of free supply items such as steel, electric traction equipment and wheel-sets for motor coaches from the Railways. In this connection, the Chairman and Managing Director, Jessops informed the Committee during evidence that the steel and electric which were to be supplied by the Railways by April 1979 and September 1979 respectively were received by them in October 1979 and January 1981. It is distressing that the Ministry of Railways did not properly estimate the extent to which these free supply items would be required and failed to arrange their timely supply while placing the orders for procurement of coaches.

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Ministry of

It is also seen from the Audit paragraph that by the end of March 1982, the Jessops could

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Railways Dept. of Heavy Industry	supply only 21 coaches of which only one was motor coach and thus no rake could be formed out of the new coaches till November 1982. In this connection, the Ministry of heavy Industry have stated that upto the end of January 1982 Jessops had received only 9 sets of motor coach wheel-sets from the Railways, to complete production of coaches upto March, 1982 as wheel sets, a free supply item by Railways, required a lead time of about 2 Months. Jessops could achieve a production of 34 coaches (30 trailer coaches and 4 motor coaches) only. The Committee would like to be apprised of the reasons for delay in supplying the free supply items in particular steel, wheel-sets, etc.		
7.	1.73	do	<p>The Committee find that as per the terms of the contract, electrics, steel and wheel sets, which are free supply items, were to be supplied by the Ministry of Railways to M/s Jessops and against the total order of 239 EMUs, 81 sets of electrics were required to be supplied. The Committee note that the Ministry of Railways placed order on BHEL only in February 1979 for supply of 52 sets against their requirement of 81 sets with delivery schedule at the rate of 6 sets in 1979-80, 26 sets in 1980-81 and 20 sets in 1981-82. However, the BHEL had supplied only 20 sets upto the end of March 1982. Anticipating a shortfall in the requirements of electrics, a contract was placed by the Railway Board on a Japanese firm in June 1980 for the balance requirements of 29 sets of electrics through BHEL. It is not clear to the Committee as to why the order on BHEL for supply of electrics was placed only in</p>

February 1979. Had the Railway Board shown the prudence expected of it and placed orders for electrics simultaneously with the BHEL in November 1977 when the order was re-transferred to Jessops along with an order for additional numbers, the scarce foreign exchange now being spent on procuring 29 electrics from abroad could have been saved. The Railway Board have tried to justify their decision to import these electrics on the plea that the BHEL was producing electrics of a design which was about 20 years old and by importing these electrics of modern technology, BHEL would get the right to manufacture the electrics of new design as it has been stipulated in the contract that the Japanese firm would pass on the more modern and reliable design of electrics to the BHEL. In the view of the Committee, this is nothing but an afterthought and a belated attempt to justify their lapse. The Committee recommend that failure on the part of Ministry of Railways to order these electrics with BHEL in time should be enquired into and responsibility for the same fixed.

8. 1.74 Ministry of Railways In the context of delayed supplies of DC EMU coaches from Jessops, the Committee find that the Railway Board have since decided in November, 1982 to place an order for 50 such coaches on ICF for delivery to Central Railway in 1983-84. The Minister of Railways while replying to USQ No. 3088 in Lok Sabha on 15 March 1984 informed the House that the number of rakes ordered by the Railway Board was 81 and the revised delivery schedule of new EMU coaches is 12 rakes upto 1983-84, 9 rakes during 1984-85 and the programme for the year 1985-86 and onwards was yet to be finalised. The Committee hope that at least now the

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			present programme of supply of EMU rakes would be adhered to scrupulously by M/s. Jessops and Integral Coaches Factory.
9	1.75	do	<p>The Committee note that the Central Railway suburban services in the harbour section from Bombay VT presently terminating at Bandra were running upto Andheri via Mahim and Bandra on the Western Railway till March 1956. This service which was very popular and of immense benefit to the commuters as it avoided change of route at the busy inter-change point at Dadar, was discontinued and terminated at Bandra for want of line capacity in 1956. In August 1977 a project for extension of Central Railways suburban services upto Bandra and Khar road stations for connecting the Central and Western Railway suburban services through a flyover was sanctioned by the Railway at a cost of Rs. 11.12 crores. The project, originally scheduled to be completed within 36 months, was actually completed in September 1983 and commissioned in October 1983 only. The Committee have been informed that the delay in execution of this project was mainly due to delay of about 15 months, in acquisition of private land having religious structures, execution of certain additional works involving material modifications at Andheri to remove the inadequate facilities for receiving and despatching of harbour branch trains which took an extra period of 7 months and carrying out the work only through nights under traffic blocks without disturbing the intensive commuter traffic on Western Railway resulting in completion of work of this portion by the contractor only by August 1980. Besides the above reasons for delay, fresh tenders had also to</p>

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be invited and new contract awarded in December 1981. The Committee feel that all these reasons could have been foreseen by the Railway authorities and necessary steps taken to avoid the delays. Because of this lapse on their part, the commuters in Bombay were deprived of an essential facility for considerable period. The Committee would like to express their unhappiness over this lack of proper planning on the part of Railways. The Committee would like to be informed of the estimated cost, actuals, time over-run in execution of this flyover and compensation, if any, paid to the previous contractor. They would also like to know whether the construction of this flyover has resulted in increasing the efficiency of the Central Railway and if so, to what extent.

10. 1.76 Ministry of Railways
Ministry of Finance
(Deptt. of Expenditure)/
Planning
Commission
- The Committee find that the programme of the Railways for replacement of rolling stock including overaged EMUs has considerably suffered because of shortage of funds. The Committee were informed by the representative of the Ministry of Railways that right from the Third Five Year Plan, they were having this problem of shortage of funds and even at present Railways are having a large number of assets which are due for replacement and which have not been replaced because of financial constraints. Moreover, there is year to year uncertainty about the allocation of funds, with the result that Railways are not able to chalk out any long-term plan for purchase and replacement of assets. As Railways have to acquire their rolling stock from either their own production units or from the public sector units and the time gap between placement of order and the actual supply is between 20 to 40 months; any subsequent cut in the allocation not only

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			<p>adversely affects the Railways' programme for the acquisition of rolling stock but also the programmes of these production units as any reduction in the orders leads to idle capacity in these units. The Committee, therefore find sufficient weight in the statement of the Chairman, Railway Board made before the Committee that "I would appreciate if at the beginning of each Plan period we are given funds adequate so that all the production units which we have got either in the public sector or in the Railways sector work to their full capacity." The Committee feel that it is high time that this matter relating to adequate allocation of funds to Railways for replacement of their overaged stock etc. received immediate attention of the Planing Commission and the Ministry of Finance who should keep it in view finalising the allocation for the Seventh Five Year Plan.</p>
11	1.77	Ministry of Railways	<p>Another disturbing aspect about the planning in the Railways is that while the Railways are not able to maintain even their existing services and replace their existing stock of EMU coaches and other rolling stock because of shortage of funds they are spending huge funds on running of new services which have failed to appeal to the public. It is surprising that while Railways could not replace overaged EMU coaches in Central Railways because of shortage of funds, a new ring Railway was introduced in Delhi at a huge cost (Rs. 36.21 crores) on which only about 1000 passengers travel daily against an anticipated projection of 2.87 lakh passengers. The Chairman of the Railway Board tried to justify this on the plea that the service would be extended to nearby areas like Ghaziabad and Palwal</p>

but this would involve construction of proper platforms and stations which would take 2 to 3 years. The Committee feel that if the idea was to extend the service to nearby areas, the Railway authorities should have visualised the need of platforms, stations etc. necessary for the same in the beginning itself and started the work in this direction in advance so that the Ring Railway Service could have been properly utilised. The Committee desire that having already incurred an expenditure of a huge amount on the project. The Ministry of Railways should take all necessary steps to make it financially viable.

12. 1.93 Ministry of Railways The Committee find that there is no prescribed percentage of 'ineffectives' for EMUs, though for all types of coaches in passenger service, a target of 14 per cent for 'ineffectives' is laid down. The Ministry of Railways have tried to justify the same on the ground that as the operating conditions for DC & AC EMU suburban services are different between the suburban areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi, no uniform norms of "ineffectives" in respect of EMU stocks could be laid down. Even if it were so, the Railway Board should have laid down different targets for different suburban areas so that the actual performance as against targets could have been judged. The Committee recommend that this should be done at least now without any delay.

13. 1.94 do From a comparison of the position of the ineffective EMUs in the Central and Western Railways, the Committee note that the percentage of "ineffectives" on Central Railway of motor coaches and trailer coa-

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ches has been between 16 to 25.9 and 15 to 17.5 during the years 1980-81 to 1983-84 (1st quarter) against the percentage of 10.5 to 11.8 and 9.0 to 9.7 for the same in western Railway. The Ministry of Railways have informed the Committee that the ineffective percentage of indigenous motor coaches of Central Railway is comparable with that of western Railway and that the same is, however, much higher for imported stock.

- 14 1.95 Ministry of The higher percentage of EMU coaches
Railways under repairs or periodical overhaul (POH)
on the Central Railway is mainly due to lack
of centralised periodical overhaul and run-
ning repair facilities on that Railway. Run-
ning repairs and POH of electrical portion of
EMUs is undertaken at Kurla car shed
whereas POH of mechanical portion is
attended to at Matunga located at a distance
of 5 kms. The Committee are concerned to
note that due to problems of coordination
and delay in movement of coaches. the
Central Railway takes 58 and 36 days for POH
of a motor and a trailer coach respectively as
against 17.5 days and 12.5 days in the
Western Railway. What is surprising to the
Committee is the fact that the transit time
between the two shops alone which involves
a distance of 5 kms. accounts for a delay
of 11 days per coach. The Chairman,
Railway Board was candid enough to admit
during evidence that the transit time 'is on
a high side' and "to cover the distance bet-
ween these two places it might take two days
or one day." How dearly this lapse on the
part of Central Railways is costing the public
exchequer can be seen from the fact that a
reduction of 13 days in the existing time of

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			<p>POH per coach would result in an extra earning of Rs. 1.37 crores per year, besides improving performance of the Railway. It raises the comprehension of the Committee how this state of affairs has been allowed to continue for so long. The Committee, therefore, recommend that the reasons for this delay in transit should be looked into and till the entire work is centralised at Matunga the transit time should be brought down to a day or so against 11 days at present.</p>
15.	1.96	do	<p>The Committee find that during 1970-72, a Committee of Engineers appointed by the Railway Board had recommended that the POH be centralised at Matunga on Central Railway as this would reduce the POH period by at least 13 days. Though these recommendations were accepted by the Railway Board in 1973, it did not approve the execution of the scheme as proposed by the Central Railway estimated to cost Rs. 5 crores in 1974-75 and 1975-76 works programme owing to constraint of funds. In the meantime, some running repair facilities at Kurla and Kalwa Car shed were augmented in the hope that this would reduce the time taken in POH work. However, in actual practice, this led to further delay. Hence a Committee of the General Managers of Western and Central Railways was appointed in June, 1978 to examine the scheme <i>de novo</i>. The Committee are surprised at this decision. As the recommendations of the earlier Committee were already accepted by the Railway Board in 1973, it is not clear as to why in June 1978, a Committee of two General Managers of Central and Western Railways was again appointed to examine, <i>de novo</i>, the merits of the scheme. In the opinion of</p>

the Committee, this has only unnecessarily delayed the approval of the scheme till June 1979 apart from escalation in estimated cost from Rs. 5.00 crores to Rs. 7.40 crores which, in actual practice, may turn out to be much more. As the matter has already been much delayed, the Committee desire that the recommendations of the Second Committee of General Managers should be implemented without any further loss of time. In this regard, the Chairman, Railway Board had assured the Committee that all the work on centralisation of POH facilities at Matunga would be completed, by the middle of 1984. The Committee hope that this assurance would be kept. The Committee desire that they should be informed by July 1984 about the completion of this project. The Committee further desire that the number of days for POH should be reduced to a period of 15 days as laid down by the Railway Board, so as to enable the Central Railways to provide better service to commuters.

16 1.109

The Committee find that there had been excess-overloading of EMU motors specially during peak hours, resulting in high "ineffectives" of motor coaches. The condition of coaches in service over 20 years so much deteriorated due to this overloading as well as ageing of equipment that 82 of such motor coaches developed reverse camber involving major body repairs for prolonged period during 1979-80. The Committee are surprised to learn that although the RSDO recommended in 1978 that the booked speed of suburban trains be reduced from 72 km. p.h. to 65 km. p. h. this reduction in speed was made effective from May, 1982 only. The Committee would like to be informed of the reasons for this.

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17. 1.110 do The Committee note that the existing car shed at Kurla, looking after the electrical portion of POH, was the only shed for the day to day running repairs. This shed had capacity to maintain only 500 EMU coaches. Keeping in view the increase in holding of coaches to over 500 and the need to give relief to the existing car shed, the Committee of 1972 referred to above, recommended setting up of a separate shed at Kalwa for day to day repairs. The Committee are surprised to find that though the Central Railway administration included it in its works programme for the year 1974-75 so that the repair facilities could be made available by April, 1977, the Railway Board approved this project in three phases in 1974-75, 1976-77 and 1980-81 works programmes, which has delayed the augmentation of repair facilities for EMU upto 1981-82 and failed to give any relief to Kurla car shed. The Committee would like to know the estimated and actual cost of this project and the time by which the project is likely to be completed as well as the reasons for delay in the execution of the project.

18. 1.111 do The Committee observe from the Audit paragraph that EMU coaches had also to be stabled for long periods at Kurla car shed due to non-availability of materials such as tyres, wheels and traction motors. During the period January 1979 to February 1981, about 25 coaches were stabled for periods in excess of 100 days in each case. The Committee recommend that steps to keep adequate stock of these items should be taken. The departmental capacity of 5 to 6 armatures re-winding per month was inadequate to cope with the actual arisings of the order of 7 to 8 armatures per month. The Committee are unhappy that the Railway administration did not even programme on regular basis the off loading of the additional requirements of re-winding of armatures either to trade or on the BHEL, thereby contributing to higher percentage of

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"ineffectives" among EMU motors. During 1971-80, out of 70 armatures 43 were got re-wound from the outside firms. However, with the commissioning of Nasik workshop, rewinding works are not required to be awarded now to the outside firms. The Committee are concerned to find a steep rise in the level of arisings of armatures of EMU traction motors for rewinding from 142 in 1981-82 to 204 in 1982-83. The Committee recommend that the Railway Board should go into the causes for increase in the level of arisings of armatures for re-winding and take necessary remedial measures.

