

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (1972-73)

(FIFTH LOK SABHA)

SEVENTY-FIFTH REPORT

Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (Civil) for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71 relating to the Ministries of Industrial Development and Internal Trade (Department of Industrial Development), Health and Family Planning and Works and Housing (D. D. A.).



LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT
NEW DELHI

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PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE

(1972-73)

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SECRETARIAT

Shri Avtar Singh Rikhy—*Joint Secretary.*

Shri B. B. Tewari—*Deputy Secretary.*

Shri T. R. Krishnamachari—*Under Secretary.*

INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee as authorised by the Committee do present on their behalf this Seventy Fifth Report of the Committee (Fifth Lok Sabha) on the Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (Civil) for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71 relating to the Ministries of Industrial Development and Internal Trade (Department of Industrial Development), Health and Family Planning and Works and Housing (D.D.A.).

2. The Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71 were laid on the Table on the 22nd June, 1971 and 7th April, 1972 respectively. The Committee examined the paragraphs relating to the Ministries of Health and Family Planning and Works and Housing included in the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General for the year 1970-71 on the 15th and 22nd September and 3rd November, 1972. Written information in regard to paragraph relating to the Ministry of Industrial Development and Internal Trade (Department of Industrial Development) included in the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General for the year 1969-70 was obtained from the Ministry of Industrial Development.

3. The Committee considered and finalised this Report at their sitting held on the 23rd February, 1973. Minutes of the sittings of the Committee form Part II* of the Report.

4. A statement showing the summary of the main conclusion/recommendations of the Committee is appended to the Report (Appendix IV). For the facility of reference these have been printed in thick type in the body of the Report.

5. The Committee place on record their appreciation of the assistance rendered to them in the examination of the various paragraphs by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

6. The Committee would also like to express their thanks to the officers of the Ministries of Industrial Development and Internal

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Trade (Department of Industrial Development), Health and Family Planning and Works and Housing (D.D.A.). for the cooperation extended by them in giving information to the Committee.

ERA SEZHIYAN,
Chairman,

NEW DELHI,
February 23, 1973

Phalgun 3, 1894 (S).

Public Accounts Committee.

CHAPTER I

MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING

National Malaria Eradication Programme

(i) Set-back suffered by the National Malaria Eradication Programme

1.1. The implementation of the National Malaria Eradication Programme was last reviewed by the Committee in 1969-70. In paragraph 1.21 of the 101st Report (Fourth Lok Sabha), the Committee had the following to say:—

"The Committee are perturbed over the set-back suffered by the National Malaria Eradication Programme. The Scheme, which was started in 1958-59, made satisfactory progress till 1963-64, but lost ground thereafter. The figures of positive cases detected from an examination of blood smears reflect this position. The number of cases, which was 87,306 in 1963, rose to 1,12,942 in 1964, with a marginal fall in 1965, when it was 1,00,185. The number rose again to 1,48,156 in 1966 and nearly doubled to 2,78,621 in 1967, with no appreciable reduction in the subsequent year. As a result, the programme under went a fairly drastic rephasing in 10 out of 17 States. 71.31 Malaria Eradication Units operating in these States and constituting well over a fourth of the total number of units were switched back to the 'attack' or preliminary phase of the programme from the 'consolidation' and 'maintenance' phases. What a major set-back this was would be apparent from the fact that the scheme which Government had expected to complete by 1968-69 would now be prolonged till 1974-75. The outlay for completion of the scheme during the Fourth Plan period has in consequence increased from Rs. 19.21 crores, estimated in 1968, to Rs. 91.74 crores."

1.2. In the Action Taken note dated 4-1-1971 on paragraph 1.23 of 101st Report (Fourth Lok Sabha), the Ministry inter-alia stated: "It may, however, be indicated that the execution of the Programme rests with the States who are constantly advised by the Regional Coordinating Organisation and N.M.E.P. Directorate to enhance the tempo of activities in order to complete the programme by 1975-76, as scheduled. The programme is also annually reviewed in the Central Council of Health meeting and States lagging behind are requested to gear up their activities." In paragraph 1.8 of the

21st Report (Fifth Lok Sabha) on action taken by Government, the Committee had the following further comments to make:—

“The Committee note that Government are taking steps to rectify the deficiencies in the National Malaria Eradication Programme. They that closer coordination will be maintained with State Governments who are the executing agency and hope that the Programme will be completed by 1975-76 according to the revised schedule without any further set-back.”

1.3. Asked during evidence whether the Programme would be completed by 1975-76 as scheduled, the Director, National Malaria Eradication Programme, stated: “The total number of malaria eradication units working in India is 398.25. We started the programme in 1958—the malaria eradication. Till 1964, it progressed very well. Since then there were focal outbreaks in the consolidation and maintenance units and we had to revert 71.38 units from the consolidation and maintenance to attack phase so that we would be in a position to give again insecticidal coverage.

“The present phasing in 1972 is 98 units in attack phase, 66 units in consolidation and about 220 units in maintenance phase. We are thinking that by the end of the 5th Plan, we will be able to achieve 80 per cent of the country in maintenance phase. That is the present line of thinking. Our programme was evaluated in 1970 by an international team of experts who after evaluation have said—and this is also our opinion—that there are nearly 39 units in our country throughout India except in Mysore, Tamil Nadu and Kerala which are continuing to be still in the persistent attack phase in spite of several years of spraying. These experts have advised us to remove these 39 units from the normal phasing and intensify the attack measures so that when they satisfy our epidemiological factors, they can be once again brought back.

“Because of this, we have to extend this programme till the Fifth Plan. Out of about 98 units in attack phase, these 39 are the persistent attack phase and the remaining 60 units nearly are those which were reverted to from the consolidation and maintenance phase. But for the reversion back to the attack phase, we would now have been left with only 39 units which are a difficult problem and which we are tackling in all possible ways.”

1.4. According to the Secretary, Department of Health, 100 per cent eradication will be possible by the second year of the Sixth Plan, i.e., 1981. Explaining the reasons for the further set-back the Director, National Malaria Eradication Programme deposed: "This is all due to epidemiological factors. I said nearly 39 units are in the persistent attack phase because there are areas where the conditions have become very difficult; there are areas where the mosquito won't bite inside, but it will only bite outside. It has become a problem. DDT spraying is not possible or effective. It has developed resistance. There are difficult areas which cannot be approached. We are now carrying out field experiments to find out the effect of the measures taken. In the light of the results of the experiments carried out, we have to intensify our measures." He added: "We have got 20 units along the international borders with Nepal, Pakistan, Bangla Desh, Burma...."

1.5. Referring to the delay involved in procuring the insecticides, the witness said: "Because of the delay that was involved previously, in 1971 we have procured 19,000 tonnes of insecticides sufficient to carry forward for 1972-73. This year too, we have drawn up such a programme and there will be no difficulty. We are making procurement one year in advance....the reverse or set-back started in 1964-65, when we had a problem of getting our insecticides in time. We were getting our insecticides from abroad, a major part of the stuff from USAID. With the advent of the Indo-Pak war in 1965, there was delay in the arrival of shipment from the US ports. The late arrival of the insecticides held up the spraying work. That was one of the main factors. So we are making advance procurement, one year in advance and the delay factor has once and for all been eliminated."

1.6. It has been mentioned in the Annual Report of the Department of Health for the year 1971-72 that the Programme was evaluated in depth by a team which included experts from the WHO and USAID in September/October, 1970. The Committee desired to know their conclusion. The witness stated: "Their conclusion was, except in 9 per cent of the areas, in 91 per cent of the areas, the eradication has been achieved or is feasible. In these 9 per cent of the areas, it should be intensified."

1.7. The total malaria cases reported from the States from 1966 as given by the Secretary are as follows:

Year	No. of malaria cases (in lakhs)
1966	1.48
1967	2.78
1968	2.75
1969	3.48
1970	4.72

1.8. Admitting that there has been deterioration, the Secretary stated: "The deterioration has been to a considerable extent due to late supply of insecticides, which we have tried to correct now. It is also due to resistance having appeared. It is further due to the fact that in the countries across the border, their programme is not progressing as fast as it should. About alternative insecticides, that is also being pursued. We have started thinking in terms of a very large scale biological control. There is a small research programme in Delhi but we are extending it."

1.9. As regards resistance, the witness added: "The resistance may be due to physiological resistance or simple adaptability. Physiological resistance is due to the change in the genetic structure. Our own people working in the various States and in the National Institute of Communicable Diseases have carried out susceptibility tests along with WHO experts. For this we do not need assistance from foreign experts." Adverting to international cooperation in the matter of eradication, he went on to say: "There is international co-operation. Not long ago a meeting was held in Nepal, in which both countries participated, where a comprehensive co-operative programme was chalked out. These meetings are held periodically."

1.10. Dealing with the urban malaria eradication, the Secretary stated: "We always bring it to the notice of the State Governments. Although it is not within the purview of the programme, we have tried to introduce an urban malaria eradication programme. We have suggested a number of urban areas for taking up this programme to a number of States. Unfortunately, some States have not responded either to our suggestions or even to our offer of monetary help."

1.11. List of areas comprising 9 per cent of population where eradication has not been achieved so far as furnished by the Ministry at the instance of the Committee is reproduced at Appendix I. As regards the measures taken to intensify efforts in these areas, the Ministry submitted the following:

"Special epidemiological and entomological investigations, as indicated below, are being undertaken in persistent transmission areas with a view to find out reasons for persistent transmission.

(i) *Special Investigations:*

(a) Infant parasite surveys.

(b) Determination of transmission period.

(c) Susceptibility of the vector.

(d) Vector bionomics.

(ii) Provision of third round of insecticidal spray in certain areas and change in timing of spray schedule.

(iii) Provision of additional surveillance staff for difficult terrain and sparsely populated areas on the basis of one surveillance worker for 35 sq. miles areas.

(iv) In areas, where vector species is resistant to DDT/BHC, an alternative insecticide 'Malathion' is being provided which is more expensive.

(v) With Health Education, people are persuaded to accept spray and not to mud-plaster after spray. The leaders in tribal community as well as various religious groups are being contacted.

(vi) Central assistance for intensifying antilarval operations in urban areas, where malaria is a problem, is being provided."

1.12. According to the Annual Report of the Department for the year 1971-72, persistent transmission was reported from the contiguous States of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. Besides delay in supply of insecticides, the reasons for high malaria incidence in these States are stated to be as follows:—

"I. Administrative.

(a) Vacancies in respect of key posts in some of the States resulting in inadequate supervision.

- (b) Delay in procurement and distribution of insecticides from 1965 onwards to carry out spray operations in time.

II. *Operational* .

- (a) Refusal to accept DDT spray by large sections of the community on religious and other grounds.
- (b) Constant movement of population due to construction and other development projects where adequate anti-malaria operations are not being undertaken.
- (c) Problem of nomads.
- (d) Mud-plastering of houses by the villagers.
- (e) Increased incidence in urban areas due to inability of local bodies to carry out anti-larval operations. The foci of infection in urban areas have become a focus for dissemination of malaria to neighbouring rural areas.

III. *Technical*.

- (a) Development of resistance to DDT and BHC in urban vector *A. stephensi* leading to high incidence of malaria in some of the urban areas.
- (b) Resistance to DDT and BHC or both in rural vector *A. culicifacies* requiring change-over to costly insecticide i.e. 'Malathion' in certain parts of Maharashtra and Gujarat."

(ii) *Outlay on National Malaria Eradication Programme.*

1.13. In paragraph 1.87 of the 101st Report (Fourth Lok Sabha) the Committee took note of the investment on the National Malaria Eradication Programme as follows:—

"Over the years, Government have made a substantial investment in the National Malaria Eradication Programme. The data given earlier in this report would show that between 1958-59 and 1967-68, the investment amounted to Rs. 154.64 crores, a little over one-fifth of this investment involving expenditure in foreign exchange. The investment in the scheme amounts to 12.72 per cent of the total Central and State health budget. Government have, therefore, a vital stake in the scheme and its successful implementation is of paramount importance."

1.14. The table below gives the details of expenditure during the period 1968-69 to 1971-72 furnished by the Ministry:—

(Expenditure in Rupees in crores)

Year	Material and Equipment			WHO assistance	Operational cost	Total
	Loan	Govt. of India	Total			
1968-69	3.04	2.79	5.83	0.22	12.58	18.63
1969-70	1.84	3.10	4.94	0.12	7.80	12.86
1970-71	1.58	4.31	5.89	0.08	9.00	14.97
1971-72	..	8.46	8.46	..	9.15	17.61
GRAND TOTAL: Rs. 64.07 crores						

1.15. The estimated total requirement of funds for the programme for the years 1972-73 to 1980-81 has been intimated by the Ministry as follows:—

Year		Estimated requirement of funds (Rupees in lakhs)				
IV Plan	1972-73	2676.93	
	1973-74	1739.91	4416.84
V Plan	1974-75	2156.23	
	1975-76	1944.72	
	1976-77	1635.34	
	1977-78	1522.36	
VI Plan	1978-79	1233.42	8492.07
	1979-80	908.91	
	1980-81	741.46	1650.37
		Total: Say		14559.28 145.60		crores

(iii) Shortfall in supply of insecticides.

1.16. A statement indicating the requirements of insecticides, stock brought forward, indigenous procurements, imports and the shortfall

furnished by the Ministry is given at Appendix II. The following position emerges therefrom:

Year	Requirement in terms of DDT 75% in tons	Consumption	Total availability	Shortfall	Remarks
1968-69	13,148	10,128	11,678	1,470	Due to late receipt.
1969-70	15,900	9,806	12,129	3,771	Due to non-formulation of 2850 tons DDT tech.
1970-71	14,806	10,739	13,008	1,798	Due to non-formulation of DDT Tech. and due to late receipt from HIL.
1971-72	14,170	10,160	13,618	552	Due to late receipt.

1.17. As regards future programme for insecticide procurement, the Ministry have intimated that all attempts will be made to meet the requirements from indigenous supplies and that it is proposed to procure more BHC 50 per cent from 1973-74 onwards from indigenous sources thereby reducing the import of DDT from abroad.

1.18. It was stated that upto 1965 supplies of insecticides were adequate and timely. The Committee desired to know the reason for untimely and inadequate supplies subsequently. The Ministry had the following to state:

"The insecticide received from June onwards each year could not be utilised in the interior of the field, after the onset of the monsoon and only those areas, which could be easily approached, mostly the roadside localities, were given the second round of spray and rest of the stock was brought forward for the first round during next year. So, it will be apparent that subsequent to 1965 the very philosophy of eradication i.e. prevention of reinfection by cutting down the transmission was not achieved as the insecticide was not procured and supplied in time as a result of which the positive incidence in different States increased by leaps and bounds necessitating reversion of units in 1968 from maintenance and consolidation to attack phase once again and even after reversion of the units, as the insecti-

cide position to cover two rounds of spray was not satisfactory, further deterioration continued to occur till 1971. It is only in 1971 when all-out efforts were made by the NMEP Directorate|DGHS|MOH, advance procurement of insecticide was done in time and supplied to the States for spray during 1972-73 in time for cutting down the transmission and prevention of reinfection. It will take time to revert back to the original position in 1965 in view of the large quantum of infection already prevalent in the community."

(iv) Steps to meet requirement of insecticides

1.19. The Committee enquired about the prospects for producing the insecticides to meet the entire requirements in the country. The Secretary, Ministry of Health explained:

"In our Ministry we are in favour of increasing production. But we are not able to carry the Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. with us. I am told that they want a ten year guarantee. But unfortunately it is not possible to do that though personally I could have given any guarantee."

1.20. The representative of Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals deposed: "The question is whether we should expand the capacity. Now the future of DDT is very uncertain, according to our assessment. I do not know whether there will be sustained demand for it, particularly for the health programmes. This point was taken up in a meeting held in the Planning Commission and we decided that if we can be assured of adequate demand for a long enough period, we could have a second unit. The Planning Commission has requested the Ministry of Health to put up a paper on this. That is where the matter stands at present." He elaborated further thus: "I would submit... that if one could be sure of the future demand for DDT—because there is some controversy about its future—we could do something. The point was also made that the mosquitos are becoming DDT-resistant. Apart from the requirement for Health, we are using it for plant protection. From the production point of view, if we can be sure of a sustained off-take, certainly there would be no objection to going in for expansion." "At the moment, the Hindustan Insecticides is the only sole producer of technical DDT and mainly it is taken by the health programmes and for plant protection. Unless one is sure of the offtake, one cannot take an investment decision; if one is sure of the offtake, then it would be easier to take the decision in consultation with the Finance Ministry. The matter has also to be discussed further with the Planning Commission."

1.21. Asked as to how long it would take to expend the production if the green signal were given, the witness stated that saying offhand it might be about 2 years.

1.22. The Ministry of Health letter dated 6th October, 1972 addressed to the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals regarding increase in production of DDT by HIL furnished to the Committee is reproduced at *Appendix III*.

(v) *High Power Central Administrative Working Committee of National Malaria Eradication Programme*

1.23. The High Power Central Administrative Working Committee of National Malaria Eradication Programme was constituted on 22nd April, 1958. It was stated during evidence that the composition of the Committee was as follows:

1. Secretary, Ministry of Health—*Chairman*
2. Financial Adviser
3. D.G.H.S.
4. D.D.G. (Development)
5. Director, National Institute of Communicable Diseases
6. Director, N.M.E.P.—*Member-Secretary*.

1.24. According to the Secretary the above Committee lay down policies and give decisions on points that may crop up from time to time in order to facilitate the implementation of the National Malaria Eradication Programme.

1.25. The Ministry intimated the following in a note:

“This Committee had six meetings in all, three during 1958, two during 1959 and the last meeting in 1968. Four of these meetings were held under the chairmanship of Shri V.K.D. Pillai, the then Secretary, Union Ministry of Health and one meeting under the chairmanship of the then Hon'ble Health Minister, Shri D. P. Karmarkar. The last meeting of this Committee was held on 16-3-68 under the Chairmanship of Shri Govind Narain, the then Union Secretary of Health. During the meeting held on 16.3.1968- the following agenda items were discussed:

1. Streamlining the procedure for timely receipt of supplies of insecticide, drugs etc. from abroad by putting in advance indents in the month of June every year in anticipation of budget allocation.

2. Procedure to get indigenous supplies through DGS & D in time.
3. Expediting the proposal regarding minimum supervisory staff for Basic Health Services for vigilance operations in the maintenance phase areas till such time as the recommendations of the Mukherjee Committee were accepted in full.
4. Urgency of bringing urban malaria operation under the purview of NMEP, so far this aspect of NMEP was left to the resources of local bodies with disappointing results.
5. Urgency of stepping up manufacture of DDT in the country as self-sufficient measures and manufacture of drug like Primaquine which is being imported at present.
6. Replenishment of the NMEP transport fleet of 20 per cent on annual basis.

Regarding Agenda items 1, 2 and 5 above, it was decided that orders should be sent to M/s. Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. six months in advance and the first six monthly orders be sent latest by 31st March and second six monthly orders by July.

Regarding expansion of DDT manufacture, it was decided that for future procurement of DDT, the Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. would provide equivalent to 3000 tons of Technical DDT annually to NMEP.

Regarding import of DDT from abroad, it was decided that the entire required quantity should be allowed to be imported as 75 per cent DDT w.d.p.

Regarding procurement of BHC, it was decided that if the Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. was able to formulate BHC 50 per cent w.d.p., then priority would be given to meet the requirement of NMEP out of their production. The DGS & D was requested to explore all possibilities of expediting supplies of BHC 50 per cent w.d.p. to NMEP from other local sources.

Regarding Lindane, the Chairman advised that the question of use of Lindane be examined without much loss of time with regard to its toxicity, availability of financial implications in consultation with the Director, NICD, DGTD to tide over the present situation of insecticides.

Regarding drugs, it was indicated that when enough tabletting capacity was available within the country the drugs should be imported in powder form to get the material tabletted within the country. In this connection, special mention about the capacity of IDPL was also made.

Regarding local procurement of drugs, the DGTD was requested to expedite the same.

Regarding vehicles, it was decided that a Pilot Project for demonstration of reconditioning of NMEP vehicles through USAID may be put on the ground quickly before further decision was taken."

1.26. The Committee are deeply disturbed over the successive setbacks suffered by the National Malaria Eradication Programme. The scheme which was started in 1958-59 initially expected to be completed by 1968-69 and rephased for completion by 1974-75 is now nowhere near completion. The scheme was reviewed by the Committee in 1969-70 and they were informed in January, 1971 that the programme was scheduled for completion by 1975-76. The Committee expressed a hope that there would be no further setback. The Committee are taken aback to learn after just a year that the programme has suffered yet another major setback. The Committee cannot too strongly emphasise that the organisation should be geared up fully to meet this serious situation so as to successfully implement the programme in the field not later than 1980-81.

1.27. Since the starting of the programme in 1958 Government have invested Rs. 219 crores upto the end of 1971-72. The estimated total requirement of funds for the years 1972-73 to 1980-81 is stated to be Rs. 145 crores. In view of a substantial outlay of the order of about Rs. 364 crores Government have a vital stake in the successful implementation of this programme.

1.28. Till 1963-64 the programme progressed well. To what extent it suffered badly subsequently is seen from the fact that the number of malaria cases reported which was 0.87 lakh in 1963 trebled upto 2.79 lakhs in 1967 and further went upto 4.72 lakhs in 1970. Out of 393.25 malaria eradication units, still 98 are in attack phase and 66 in consolidation phase as per the phasing in 1972. In respect of 9% of population eradication has not been achieved so far. Nearly 39 units throughout the country except in Mysore, Tamil Nadu and Kerala are stated to be in the persistent attack phase. The Committee trust that the Directorate of Malaria Eradication Programme will intensify the measures in these areas.

1.29. The Committee would like to refer to some important aspects of the programme requiring urgent attention. First, the problem of border areas should be tackled in concert with the countries concerned—Nepal, Pakistan, Bangla Desh, Burma—and a comprehensive co-operative programme chalked out for implementation. Secondly, there should be a close coordination between the rural and urban eradication programmes as at present the latter is not within the purview of the NMEP and the local bodies are stated to be unable to carry out anti-larval operations.

1.30. Thirdly, a solution to the increasing phenomenon of resistance to the insecticides should be found soon by extending the research efforts. Finally, administrative inadequacy and inefficiency should be attended to promptly.

1.31. Although setback started in 1964-65 when there was problem of getting insecticides in time no effective steps seem to have been taken to rectify the position soon. The Committee find that even during the period 1968-69 to 1971-72 there was significant shortfall in the availability of insecticides and the actual consumption was considerably less than the availability. The consumption was only to the extent of 77 percent, 62 per cent, 73 per cent and 72 per cent of the requirement during these years. It is no wonder that incidence of malaria increased by "leaps and bounds". It needs, therefore, hardly any emphasis that there should be neither any further gap between requirement and availability nor any shortfall in consumption.

1.32. The shortfall in availability of insecticides during 1969-70 was about a fourth of the requirement. This was due to import of DDT Tech. and the delay in its formulation indigenously. The Committee have dealt with this in some detail in the succeeding section of this Report.

1.33. Incidentally the Committee would like to emphasise the need for stepping up indigenous production of insecticides in order to attain self-sufficiency. The representative of Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals informed the Committee that from the production point of view if sustained off-take of DDT could be ensured there could be no objection to go in for expansion of the Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. The Ministry of Health have already given the necessary indications in this regard. As it has been stated that it will take two years to expand production the Committee desire that the matter should be processed in consultation with the Planning Commission so as to come to a quick decision. In this connection the Committee would also like Government to take into account the warnings given by some scientists against the excessive use of DDT as it constitutes a hazard to human health.

1.34. The Committee note that the high power Central Administrative Working Committee on National Malaria Eradication Programme was constituted on 22nd April, 1958 with the Health Secretary as its Chairman, Financial Adviser, Director General, Health Services, Deputy Director General (Development) and Director, National Institute of Communicable Diseases as members and Director, N.M.E.P. as the member-Secretary. This Committee was expected to lay down policies and give decision on points that may crop up from time to time in order to facilitate implementation of the programme. However, it is disappointing to learn that the Committee had only 6 meetings in all since 1958. The fifth meeting was in 1959 and the sixth and the last one was in 1968. The Committee feel strongly that this high powered Committee should have been active enough to find timely solutions to the problems that beset this programme. They hope that at least in future this Committee will assume an effective role in decision-making and coordination.

Formulation of D.D.T. Technical

Audit Paragraph

1.35. In March 1968 the High Power Central Administrative Working Committee of the National Malaria Eradication Programme recommended that, instead of importing the total quantity of D.D.T. required for use in 1969-70 in formulated form, 3,000 tonnes of D.D.T. technical might be imported after ensuring the possibilities for its formulation in the country and timely delivery for use. Considering the inadequate capacity and poor performance of the indigenous formulators, the Directorate of National Malaria Eradication Programme apprehended that it might not be possible to get 3,000 tonnes of D.D.T. technical duly formulated to D.D.T. 50 per cent w.d.p. of the required quality in time for the spraying season. It was also observed that import of 3,000 tonnes D.D.T. technical and its formulation to 6,000 tonnes D.D.T. 50 per cent w.d.p. would entail additional expenditure of Rs 42.68 lakhs as compared to the cost of importing formulated D.D.T. 75 per cent which was hitherto being imported. The Directorate, therefore, advised the Ministry to restrict import of D.D.T. technical to 1,000 tonnes. However, on the advice of the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals and the Directorate General of Technical Development it was decided by the Ministry of Health and Family Planning in March 1968 to import 3,000 tonnes of D.D.T. in technical form so that the idle capacities with the various private indigenous formulators, who were in a position to formulate D.D.T. technical into D.D.T. 75 per cent or 50 per cent w.d.p. could be utilised

and foreign exchange saved. Accordingly, 3,000 tonnes of D.D.T. technical (valued at Rs. 90 lakhs) were imported from the U.S.A. during November, 1968 to May, 1969.

1.36. It was subsequently found that the private indigenous formulators did not have adequate technical know-how for formulation of imported D.D.T. technical as it was for the first time they had started formulating imported D.D.T. technical, and also the private formulators did not have adequate modern machinery like cooling plants, etc. In view of this, orders for formulating 1,000 tonnes only in the first instance were placed on two concerns in June 1969. According to the terms of the agreements with them, formulation was to be completed by July, 1969, but only 641 tonnes were formulated upto July, 1971. The balance of 359 tonnes, which were not lifted by those formulators, was got formulated subsequently in July/August, 1971 by other firms at extra cost of Rs. 2.08 lakhs. Although the agreements with the two formulators provided for recovery of the extra cost, recovery could not be made as the agreements had not been signed by an officer duly authorised to do so.

1.37. In October 1969 when there was 2,359 tonnes of D.D.T. technical still in stock, it was decided to import 755 tonnes more and this quantity was imported in July, 1970 at a cost of Rs. 22.65 lakhs. Out of the total available stock (3,114 tonnes) lying with the Directorate, 2,955 tonnes were issued for formulation to seven firms during February, 1971 to September, 1971.

1.38. The delay in formulation of D.D.T. technical resulted in short supply of insecticides during 1969-70 and consequent prolongation of the malaria eradication programme. Indigenous formulation also entailed additional expenditure of Rs. 68.38 lakhs as compared to the cost of imported formulated D.D.T. 75 per cent w.d.p. There was, however, a saving of Rs. 57.59 lakhs in foreign exchange as compared with the amount which would have been spent had formulated D.D.T. been imported.

1.39. The Ministry stated (November, 1971) that with concerted efforts and the cooperation of the private formulators and Hindustan Insecticides Ltd., almost the entire quantity of D.D.T. technical had been formulated and a little balance, which was under process of formulation, was expected to be completed by the middle of December, 1971.

[Para 31 of the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 1970-71, Union Government (Civil)]

1.40. The representative of the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals deposed: "I would like to place before the Committee one or two facts. Upto 1968 we were importing 75 per cent w.d.p. powder from USA. When USA aid was stopped we thought it would be less expensive from the point of view of foreign exchange if DDT technical was imported. 3,000 tonnes import would have meant a saving of foreign exchange to the tune of Rs. 56 lakhs. At that time we had received several representations from the industry that if technical material is imported and it is formulated here the idle capacity here would be utilised. We had taken the advice of the experts and we had detailed discussion with the industry and it was found that it would be possible for them to formulate about 3,000 tonnes on the basis of 300 tonnes per month if technical material is made available to them in time. On the advice of the technical experts we had furnished to the Ministry of Health a list of possible formulators who would be in a position to take up this but I would submit again that this was being done for the first time in the country—formulation of 50 per cent w.d.p. was not done before. Only 50 per cent BHC was being done. It was thought on the basis of expertise and knowledge it would be possible for them to do this. Therefore, this view of assessment was taken on the basis of information that was available and on the basis of judgement that could be taken on the advice and technical information which we got from various people including the representatives of the industry." He clarified "When I mentioned DDT formulation being manufactured for the first time. I referred not to the Hindustan Insecticides, but to the private sector."

1.41. Asked as to how the indigenous capacity for formulation was assessed, the witness stated: "After this high-power meeting by the Health Secretary, inter-ministerial discussions were held twice in the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals at which representatives of NMEP, Industry, DGTD, DCSSI and Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation were also present. This question was gone into at length. I would submit that in the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals we go by the advice given by the technical advisers. DGTD and DCSSI act as technical consultants to the whole of Government of India. We also informed the Ministry of Health as to what are the capacities of the different units. We have sent a letter to the Ministry of Health."

1.42. The representative of DGTD stated: "I would like to submit that Hindustan Insecticides, a public sector project, is the main producer of DDT in India. They have got all the necessary equipment etc. for producing w.d powder. We had indicated a list of five

firms, who had vast experience in this line and who can also produce water dispersible powder in the country and also the quantity they can formulate. We had suggested that this should be verified because it always depends on the order book position. This was in connection with units in the organised sector. We do not handle small scale units. But there was also information given by the Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industry that there were certain units in the small scale, who would be able to carry on this work. Since major order was placed on the SSI units and not on any of the organised sector units, we cannot comment about their performance." He continued: "We had indicated that the Hindustan Insecticides would be able to make 200 tonnes over and above their normal supplies, Tatas 500, Bharat 500, Sandoz, Bombay 100 tonnes, Parry Madras 100 tonnes. This meant a total of 1400 tonnes." "We had suggested this had to be verified as this would depend on their order book position DCSSI had indicated that 1500 tonnes would be available with the Maharashtra small scale industries. That was not our advice."

1.43. As regards the inclusion of small scale industries, the Committee desired to know whether the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals satisfied themselves of their capacity. The representative of the Ministry stated: "In the Ministry we have not made any independent check about this." The Health Secretary said that "one of the persons who gave assurances was the Development Commissioner of Small Scale Industries." He added: "He must have made enquiries because in his letter he has stated that he would strongly recommend that we may place the entire order with the Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation and that MSSIDC is a competent organisation for executing such orders with full satisfaction in respect of quality, standard and specifications."

1.44. On being asked about the basis on which orders were placed on only two concerns, the Secretary explained: "This was done after calling for rate of enquiries. And from the comparative statement it was found that M/s. Esso Standard Eastern Inc. offered the lowest rate of Rs. 1350/- per M. ton of the formulated material." "On the other hand the rate quoted by M/s. Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation, Bombay, which is a State Government Undertaking at Rs. 1650/- M. ton though higher than the rates quoted by the other firms, would still appeared to be suitable and economical because of various concessions and facilities offered by them like free transportation of Tech. material from the 3 ports to the firm premises at Bombay, free transportation of the finished material to ultimate consignees, free storage of Technical and finished material for

60 days etc. which had not been offered by any other firm. Furthermore they had offered to undertake formulation of the entire 3000 tonnes DDT Tech. in time i.e. by the end of May, 1969 which no other firm had offered to do. NMEP being time scheduled, assurance of timely supply of the whole material by a Government Undertaking assumes added significance. Further it is always preferable to have a single contract than to have several piecemeal contracts. In this context, it may here be stated that this organisation had said that they would get the formulation done from large and small formulating units.

"Since NMEP has no requisite organisation for entering into contracts with private formulators and for dealing with them individually it was felt that arrangements with any Government Organisation like Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation would be much more satisfactory as they could undertake the entire work rather than entering into contracts with a number of private formulators.

"It was therefore considered that quotations of MSSIDC, Bombay may be accepted and the entire work of formulation may be entrusted to this Corporation. As an additional safeguard to protect Government interest, it was suggested that the Secretary, Department of Industries, Maharashtra State, Bombay may be approached by Ministry of Health, Family Planning and Urban Development for participation in the matter and for negotiating with M/s. Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation, Bombay, for bringing down their rate further by as much as possible before the contracts were finalised with them."

1.45. The Committee pointed out that in October, 1969, when there was 2359 tonnes of D.D.T. Tech. still in stock it was decided to import 755 tonnes more. The Secretary stated: "There was a discussion in detail at a meeting held in the Department of Petroleum and Chemicals. There it was decided." The representative of Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals added: "It was decided at the meeting that the import may be reduced. This was consistent with the earlier decision to import 3000 tonnes. Since 2000 tonnes were carried over, therefore, it was felt that it might be possible to formulate an additional 1000 tonnes. The capacity of the various firms had been indicated in the list of firms."

1.46. Indicating the formulation of 3755 tonnes of D.D.T. Tech., the Secretary stated: "We got following parties to formulate the material which I indicate against each:—

M/s. MISSIDC	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	616.250	M. tons
M/s. ESSO	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	25.125	
									G. TOTAL	641.375
M/s. MSSIDC	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	50.00	
									100.00	
M/s. BP Mills	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	150.00	
									75.00	
M/s. Tata Fison	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	50.00	
M/s. Pesticides	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	200.00	
M/s. Central Paint	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	50.00	
M/s. Industrial	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	100.00	
Mineral & Chem.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	51.234	
M/s. Standard Min.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	41.051	
									TOTAL	867.285

Thus the total formulation when the second batch is added to the previous formulation of MSSID and ESSO comes to 1508 tonnes. Hindustan Insecticides did 2112 tonnes and 134.34 tonnes were used by the States in technical form. The total is 3755 tonnes."

1.47. The Committee were informed that rate enquiries were called for from 13 firms in October, 1968. Asked about the delay in doing so, the Director, National Malaria Eradication Programme stated: "We requested the HIL whether they will be able to do the formulations for us. We also requested the DGTD. They said they are not in a position to help. They said that HIL were the only (concern) who could do this and we again requested the HIL. They said that they have got their own DDT. They could do about 400 tonnes. But the rate was about Rs. 2300. The cost was more. Then we requested Medical Stores, who are our own people, whether they will be able to do this for us. They also regretted that they are not in a position to do."

1.48. Referring to the orders placed on the HIL subsequently, the Committee desired to know the rate. The witness informed that it was Rs. 1699 only.

1.49. Detailing further the attempts made, the witness went on to say: "We got the rates from different people. Seven people did not give their rates. We prepared a statement and submitted to our D.G.H.S. for formal approval. Because it was not done in a regular manner, because it was not according to the approved procedure, they suggested that we should call for a regular tender enquiry. Tender enquiry was made on 3rd December, 1968 and we received quotations from all these people. We prepared a statement and submitted to D.G.H.S. and our Ministry for approval. Since in the quotations given by ESSO and all these people—the quantities offered were small—our Ministry decided that we should once again request DGTD whether will do this for us. On 3-6-69, we requested the D.G.T.D. whether they will be in a position to do this work. Then D.G.T.D. also did not agree. Then finally we decided that we should accept the lowest of the quotations that were received. ESSO were given one hundred tonnes and 900 tonnes were given to Maharashtra Small Scale Industries. By July, 1969, they should have delivered. They could not deliver. They requested the Ministry to give them extension of two months time because they said there was some fire accident etc." He added that before the schedule date (20th July, 1969) they could deliver only 298.5 tonnes. Again a fresh agreement was signed by them on 15th May, 1970 according to which they should have delivered the balance by 31st May, 1970. The order was kept alive as the agreement was not signed by a proper person.

5.50. The object of indigenous formulation was according to the Secretary, to save foreign exchange and not rupee expenditure. The Committee were informed by Audit that in a meeting held on 7th January, 1971, the Ministry decided that no more Tech. D.D.T. should be imported.

1.51. The Committee regret to find that without actually verifying the capacity for the indigenous formulation, 3755 tonnes of DDT Tech. were imported against the requirements of insecticides for the National Malaria Eradication Programme for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71. The delay in formulation resulted in short supply of insecticides during these years and consequent prolongation of the malaria eradication programme. Although D.G.T.D. had indicated a capacity for formulation of 1400 tonnes in the organised sector units,

no orders were placed in the first instance on any of such units. A capacity of 1400 tonnes with the Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Corporation was assumed on the basis of the assurance given by the Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries, which proved to be unreliable. The Committee have been informed that the Ministry have since decided that no more D.D.T. Tech. should be imported. However, in view of the seriousness of the consequences that ensued, the Committee hope that the Department would come to an independent assessment of the position before taking such decisions in future.

1.52. In the first instance orders for formulating 1000 tonnes were placed in June, 1969—900 tonnes on the Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Corporation and 100 tonnes on ESSO. Although formulation was to be completed by July, 1969, only 641 tonnes were formulated upto July, 1971. The balance was got formulated by other firms at an extra cost of Rs. 2.08 lakhs. This extra cost could not be recovered from the defaulting concerns as the agreements had not been signed by an officer duly authorised to do so. The lapse on the part of the officer concerned in not realising his limitations which put Government to a considerable loss, should be suitably dealt with.

1.53. Although 3000 tonnes of DDT Tech. were imported by May, 1969 and 755 tonnes in July, 1970, major quantity was issued for formulation only during February, 1971 to September, 1971. The delay in doing so requires to be gone into. Incidentally, the Committee find that the Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. which quoted a rate of about Rs. 2300 per tonne for formulation initially in 1968, subsequently quoted Rs. 1699 only. In view of the high rate quoted initially, no orders could be placed on them. The Committee feel that Government should have decided in detail in advance about the public sector or private sector undertakings which were to formulate them, the rate to be paid and the time to be taken by them for formulation and supply. It should have been possible for Government to have the formulation done on urgent basis from Hindustan Insecticides Ltd., a Government undertaking.

CHAPTER II

MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERENAL TRADE

(Department of Industrial Development)

Iodisation Plants

Audit Paragraph

12. For manufacture and distribution of iodised salt in the goitre-affected regions in the eastern States, six iodisation plants were received by the Salt Department for installation at Government Salt Golahs, Howrah. Of them, four plants have so far been installed—one pilot plant in December 1964 and three others in March 1968 at a total cost of Rs. 50,951. The remaining two plants are still lying in packed condition. The pilot plant and one of the other three plants were commissioned in June 1965 and August 1968 respectively. The other two plants were also worked in rotation. The expenditure on their running and maintenance during the five years ending 1969-70 was stated to be as follows:—

	Rs.
1965-66	34,000
1966-67	40,707
1967-68	49,982
1968-69	1,89,073 (including Rs. 1,37,579 being the cost of potassium iodate).
1969-70	41,950

2.2. The annual estimated demand of iodised salt for the area was estimated to be 1,54,522 tonnes and the total annual capacity of six plants was 1,32,000 tonnes. Against this the supply of iodised salt in a year did not exceed 4,071 tonnes (1968) which was far less than the annual capacity (12,000 tonnes) of the pilot plant alone installed in December 1964. Without adequate arrangement for distribution the installation of additional three plants in March 1968 resulted in nugatory expenditure.

2.3. The reason for under-utilisation of the capacity has been adduced by the Department to be the failure of the State Govern-

ments to finalise arrangements to introduce only iodised salt in all goitre-affected areas by banning entry of non-iodised salt. The Ministry stated (December 1970) that at the time of installation of three additional plants, it could not be foreseen that the State Governments would not be in a position to implement the Goitre Control Project. Except Manipur and Nagaland none other State has issued ban orders. The scheme is likely to work satisfactorily as the State Governments gradually impose ban on the import of non-iodised salt in the affected areas.

[Paragraph 32 of the Report of C&AG (Civil) for the year 1969-70].

I. Introductory

2.4. *Consequent upon a reference by the late Prime Minister of India in the Cabinet meeting held on 19th August, 1952, to the practice (in certain countries) of fortifying salt with iodine to make up deficiency of iodine in the human system and to prevent epidemic goitre chiefly among the children, the Directorate General, Health Services, New Delhi, the Director of Health Services of erstwhile Punjab Government and the Salt Department embarked upon a joint effort to undertake production of iodised salt and its distribution among the goitre affected population in the sub-Himalayan Region. A small portable pilot plant was purchased and installed at Sambhar Lake in 1957-58 and salt was iodised in it by dry mixing method. Salt thus iodised was supplied to the experimental areas and the results on the prevalence of goitre were watched. These proved to be quite encouraging. Thus the Goitre Control Programme was launched during the second Plan.

2.5. *The World Health Organisation was also requested to intimate if it could assist the Government in its drive against goitre which was prevailing in a serious form mainly in the entire sub-Himalayan terrain from Jammu and Kashmir in the north-west to Nagaland in the east, along the Siwalik Hills of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and the hilly areas of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Assam etc., and where incidence of goitre was found to be about 40 per cent of the population mostly amongst the children who were suffering from deafness, dumbness and other deformities. W.H.O. offered to assist the Government by making available necessary number of iodisation plants for manufacture of iodised salt provided Government undertook installation, running and maintenance of the plants for manufacturing iodised salt and to conduct necessary survey to delimit the areas affected by goitre and distribution of iodised

salt in those areas. The first two dry mixing type iododisation units were installed at Sambhar Lake in 1962 and commissioned into service for production of 40-50 thousand tonnes of iodised salt in 1963.

II. Requirement and capacity created for production of iodised salt

2.6. According to Performance Budget of the Department of Health for 1970-71, "Goitre is endemic in the entire sub Himalayan belt from Jammu and Kashmir to NEFA extending about 2400 K.M. It has been estimated that about 9 to 10 million people are suffering from this disease and about 45 million are living in this endemic areas and are exposed to the risk of Goitre. The area so far surveyed shows a variable prevalence rate from about 10 per cent to 50 per cent and the average prevalence rate is about 28 per cent."

2.7. Taking into account the per capita consumption of 6 Kgs per head per year, the total requirement of iodised salt for the population of 45 million of the affected areas works out to 2.70 lakh tonnes. Projecting this on the basis of population increase as revealed in 1971 census, the requirement would work out to more than 3.00 lakh tonnes. It is stated in the Performance Budget for the year 1971-72: "For the production of iodised salt, which is considered to be a specific for the cure of this disease, iodisation plants have been installed, with the assistance of the UNICEF, at Sambhar Lake (Rajasthan), Kharagoda (Gujarat) and Calcutta with an annual production capacity of 2 lakh metric tonnes."

III. Production of iodised salt

2.8 The following table shows the quantities of iodised salt supplied from the plants at Sambhar Lake, Kharagoda and Calcutta during the calendar years 1966 to 1971:—

Year	Quantity supplied (in metric tonnes)			
1966	48,488.5			
1967	55,655.0			
1968	56,218.0			
1969 (Upto Sept.)	38,527.8			
1970	60,000.0 (Approx.)	Do.	1970-71	
1971	71,500.0 (Approx.)	Vid: Performance Budget of Dept. of Health for 1972-73.		

IV—Survey of incidence of disease

2.9. According to the Annual Report of the Department of Health for the year 1969-70, the Goitre Control Programme comprises demarcation of endemic areas and supply of iodised salt in these areas. The programme was started during the second Five Year Plan. "The scheme has been continued in the Third and Fourth Five Year Plans and upto date (September, 1969) 1,98,889.3 metric tonnes of iodised salt has been distributed for the benefit of the affected population in addition to undertaking survey operations in these areas. Re-survey undertaken in certain areas where iodised/iodate salt had been supplied during the intervening period showed a marked reduction in the incidence of Goitre. There has been a fall in the prevalence rate from 38 per cent in 1956 to 9.9 per cent in 1968 in Kangra District; from 52.3 per cent in 1968 to 42.3 per cent in 1969 in the Gurdaspur District; and from 40.3 per cent in 1968 to 23.6 per cent in 1969 in the Hoshiarpur District." The Annual Report of the Department of Health for the year 1970-71 stated: "The Chittaranjan National Cancer Research Centre, Directorate General of Health Services surveyed the Union Territories of Manipur, Tripura and Chandigarh in 1970. The team is presently engaged in surveying the endemic areas in Jammu and Kashmir." The Central Goitre Survey Team which completed the survey of Jammu and Kashmir where the prevalence rate of the disease was detected as 27 per cent (vide Annual Report, 1971-72).

2.10. Asked to state whether Government had conducted any systematic survey of the areas which are affected by Goitre, the Ministry of Industrial Development in their note dated 14th August, 1972 stated in so far as the eastern region is concerned that the two survey teams under the Directorate General of Health Services and the three teams under the Government of Assam are conducting surveys in the endemic areas.

2.11. As regards the prevalence rate of the disease on the basis of the survey conducted so far in these areas, the Ministry gave the following figures:—

Nagaland	32.4%
Manipur	31.7%
Tripura	17.07%
West Bengal (5 districts of North Bengal)	24.3%
Bihar	27.1%

V—Utilisation of the installed capacity of iodisation plants

2.12. It is seen from the Annual Report of the Department of Health for the year 1969-70 that the installed capacity of the plant at Sambhar Lake of 40—50 thousand tonnes has been more or less utilised. It is understood from Audit that “in 1964, while reviewing the proposal for supply of additional equipment, UNICEF recommended allocation of funds for procurement of spray type units instead of dry mixing type supplied to Sambhar as the former had the advantages of (a) lower initial cost, (b) lower building cost to house the equipments, and (c) substantially lower operating costs owing to lower electrical power requirement. As, however, the spray type plants were first of their kind in India, it was decided to instal one plant immediately and watch its working before additional spray type units were installed. The first spray type plant (pilot plant) was installed in December, 1964 and put into commission in Calcutta in 1965.”

“It was decided in July, 1967 that besides the pilot plant 6 additional plants should be installed in Calcutta to feed goitrous area in Manipur, NEFA, Nagaland, Bhutan five districts of West Bengal and six districts of North Bihar. However, in January, 1968, it was decided that only five additional plants would do. Accordingly 5 plants, in addition to the pilot plant commissioned in 1965, were supplied by UNICEF for installation in Calcutta. Three plants were received in Calcutta from UNICEF direct. The other two plants, which had been sent initially to Kharagoda, were transferred to Calcutta from there. The 3 plants were installed in March, 1968 but the remaining two are still lying in packed condition. The need for the six plants was worked out on the basis of annual estimated demand for iodised salt for the goitre affected areas of the eastern sector as 1,54,522 tonnes.”

2.13. Asked to state how the annual demand of iodised salt to be supplied from Calcutta plants was estimated to be 1,54,522 tonnes and what the present demand was, the Ministry of Industrial Development stated as follows:—

“Taking into account the per capita consumption of 6 Kgs. per head per year and the population figures of Bhutan and each district/

State as per 1961 census, the demand for iodised salt for different States were arrived as follows:—

		(figures in metric tonnes)
1. Bhutan	· · · · · · · · ·	3,700
2. Manipur	· · · · · · · · ·	4,228
3. Nagaland	· · · · · · · · ·	2,001
4. NEFA	· · · · · · · · ·	1,824
5. West Bengal (Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, West Dinajpur, Malda and Cooch Bihar)	· · · · · · · · ·	31,160
6. North Bihar (Champaran, Saran, Muzaffarpur, Dharbhanga Saharsa and Purnea)	· · · · · · · · ·	1,11,612
		<hr/> <u>1,54,525</u>

Anticipated annual requirement on the basis of 1971 census

2.14. Anticipated annual requirement of iodised salt on the basis of population figures of 1971 census are as given below:

	(Figures in thousand tonnes)
1. Nagaland	3·1
2. Manipur	6·4
3. Arunachal Pradesh	2·7
4. Tripura	9·3
5. West Bengal (Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Malda, West Dinajpur and Cooch Bihar)	44·5
5. North Bihar (Saran, Muzaffarpur, Dharbhanga, Saharsa and Purnea)	124·00
	<hr/> <u>190·0</u>

2.15. The total annual capacity of the 6 plants is 1,32,000 tonnes and the capacities of the pilot plant commissioned in June, 1965 and the other 3 plants commisioned in August, 1968 are 12,000 and 72,000 (on two shift basis) respectively. As against this, the quantities of iodised salt manufactured during the years 1965-66 to 1971-72 were as given below:

Year		Quantity (in tonnes)
1965-66	· · · · ·	4764·0 (Pilot plant only)
1966-67	· · · · ·	3599·0 Do.
1967-68	· · · · ·	1954·4 Do.
1968-69	· · · · ·	5215·0 (Pilot plant and other 3 plants working in rotation)
1969-70	· · · · ·	1957·5 Do.
1970-71	· · · · ·	1328·5 Do.
1971-72	· · · · ·	10730·0 Do.

2.16. The percentages of utilisation of the capacity of the plants (84,000 tonnes) installed and commissioned at Calcutta were 2.3, 1.6 and 13.0 respectively during 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72. The remaining two plants are stated to be still lying in packed condition.

VI—Running and maintenance expenditure on plants at Calcutta

2.17. The expenditure on running and maintenance during the five years ended 1969-70 is given in the Audit paragraph. The expenditure incurred during 1970-71 and 1971-72 was stated by the Ministry to be Rs. 43,179.82 and Rs. 67,407.54 respectively.

VII—Distribution of iodised salt

2.18. The following table shows the requirement and distribution of iodised salt in the affected areas of eastern and north-eastern regions.

Area	Requirement in thousand tonnes		Quantity distributed			
	1961 census	1971 census	1968-69	1969-70	1970-71	1971-72
Manipur . .	4.2	6.4	1.372	0.090	0.045	3.397
Nagaland . .	2.0	3.1	2.250	1.050	0.676	4.657
Arunachal Pradesh .	1.824	2.7	0.743	0.863	0.608	1.103
Tripura . .		9.3				
West Bengal, (Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, West Dinajpur, Malda and Cooch Bihar)	31.16	44.5	0.809			1.350
North Bihar (Champaran, Saran Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Saharsa and Purnea)	111.612	124.0

2.19. The Committee desired to know the arrangements for distribution of iodised salt. The Ministry of Industrial Development, in a written note, intimated: "The State Government nominees procure raw salt in the open market and make it available to the Superintendent, Salt Golahs for iodisation at the Golahs according to their demands. The iodisation and bagging are carried out by the departmental agency. No charges are levied for the iodisation of salt.

Empty wagons meant for distribution of iodised salt from Calcutta are programmed for by the Assistant Salt Commissioner, Calcutta in fortnightly meetings with the Joint Director (Coal), Ministry of Railways, Calcutta. In accordance with this programme, wagons are supplied by the Railways at Golah sidings and salt iodised and packed in gunnies is loaded into these wagons for despatch to destinations." It was further intimated: "The Railway Board has upgraded the category of movement of iodised salt from category 'C' to category 'B'. It is expected that movement of iodised salt will be smooth and enough wagons will be made available for the supply of iodised salt to the Goitre-affected areas."

VIII—Fourth Plan allocation and the expenditure

2.20. It is seen from the Performance Budget of the Department of Health for the year 1971-72 that a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs has been provided in the Fourth Plan for the purpose of implementation of the Goitre Control Programme. The subsequent year's budget states: "It is proposed to further expand the production of iodised salt by increasing production in the existing iodisation plants as well as by the installation of two additional plants, at present lying unused at Calcutta."

2.21. The progress of expenditure against the Plan allocation of Rs. 40 lakhs as ascertained from the relevant demand for grants is as follows:—

Year	Budget Estimate	Actual expenditure
(Rupees in lakhs)		
1969-70	3.60	1.75
1970-71	4.00	3.42
1971-72	3.77	3.16 (Revised Estimate)
1972-73	3.42	3.42 (Budget Estimate)
TOTAL	14.79	11.75

IX—Difficulties in the implementation.

2.22. The Performance Budget of the Department of Health for 1970-71 states: "To ensure that the ordinary salt does not find its way in goiterous belts the concerned State Governments have been advised to strictly ban entry of non-iodised salt into Goitre belts. The Governments of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, U.P., Bihar, Nagaland and Manipur have already issued necessary notifications to this effect." The subsequent budgets take note of the difficulties in the implementation of the programme as follows:—

"The programme has been confronted with the following main two difficulties:

- (i) Non-placement of indents regularly by the State salt nominees on the iodisation plants.
- (ii) Laxity in the enforcement of orders, under the Essential Commodities Act, banning the entry of non-iodised salt in the endemic areas.

To overcome these two difficulties, the State Governments have been repeatedly urged to ask their salt nominees not to default in placing regular indents for supply of iodisation salt on the salt authorities. They have also been approached several times to take immediate steps for ensuring rigid enforcement of the orders prohibiting entry of non-iodised salt in Goiterous areas."

2.23. Stating the present position in regard to implementation of the programme by the States in the eastern and north-eastern regions, the Ministry of Industrial Development observed:

"Only two State Governments in the North East Region viz. Nagaland and Manipur have so far issued the necessary ban order restricting the import of non-iodised salt into their States. Arunachal Pradesh Government have also issued instructions to District Officers to import only iodised salt into their districts. The formal ban on the entry of non-iodised salt has, however, not been issued as yet."

"The State Government of West Bengal have not as yet issued the required notification for banning entry of non-iodised salt in the five districts, namely, Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Malda, West Dinajpur and Cooch Bihar. Some movement of iodised salt is, however, taking place to Darjeeling district, at present."

"The State Government of Bihar have also not issued orders banning the entry of non-iodised salt in the five districts, namely, Saran, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Saharsa and Purnea."

"The Government of Tripura have also not issued the necessary notification banning the import of non-iodised salt to that State."

2.24. The Committee desired to know whether the Ministry had sought the co-operation of the State Governments on implementation of the project before installing the plants at Calcutta. The Ministry of Industrial Development stated: "The State Governments representatives were associated with the formulation of the Goitre Control Programme from the very beginning. They were also requested to issue notifications for banning the entry of non-iodised salt into the areas proposed to be brought under the programme. The plants were, however, installed in the expectation that the State Governments would issue the necessary notifications in this regard, as the Goitre Control Programme was in the interest of the health of the people in those areas."

2.25. Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 empowers the Central Government to prohibit supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in any commodity. Section 5 of the Act reads as under:

"5. The Central Government may, by notified order, direct that the power to make orders or issue notifications under Section 3 shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also by—

- (a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or
- (b) such State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government, as may be specified in the direction."

2.26. It is seen from the Annual Report of the Department of Health for the year 1969-70 that "the cost of iodisation is being met by the Government of India and the iodised salt is made available to the public at the same rate at which ordinary common salt is sold in the endemic areas."

2.27. The Committee enquired as to why demand for iodised salt could not be created even in the absence of ban on non-iodised salt when iodisation is not being charged for. The Ministry of Industrial Development stated in a written reply:—

"Salt is transported to Calcutta from the West Coast and Tuticorin by sea. Thereafter it is iodised in the iodisation plants installed in the Salt Golahs and then transported by rail to the Goitre-affected areas in the North East Region. The cost of this salt is more than the cost of salt moved by the all-rail route from the West Coast or Rajasthan. Therefore, even though iodisation is done free of charge, there is reluctance on the part of the dealers to take iodised salt from Calcutta. The demand for iodised salt can be enhanced only if the State Governments impose a ban on the entry of non-iodised salt into the Goitre-affected areas."

2.28. Goitre, which is a communicable disease, is endemic in the entire sub-Himalayan belt from Jammu and Kashmir to Arunachal Pradesh extending about 2400 Kms. It has been estimated that about 9 to 10 million people are suffering from this disease and about 45 million are living in the endemic areas and are exposed to the risk. The survey of areas so far conducted shows a variable prevalence rate of about 10 per cent to 50 per cent and the average prevalence rate is about 28 per cent. The incidence of goitre was found to be mostly amongst the children who were suffering from deafness, dumbness and other deformities. The need to fortify salt with iodine to make up deficiency of iodine in the human system and to prevent epidemic goitre chiefly among the children was felt by Government as early as August, 1952. The Goitre Control Programme was launched during the Second Five Year Plan period by the Government of India in collaboration with the UNICEF. As against the total requirement of more than 3 lakh tonnes of iodised salt, the capacity for production so far created is only of the order of about 2 lakh tonnes. The quantities supplied to the affected areas however reached a maximum of 71,000 tonnes only in the year 1971. The Committee are distressed to note the tardy implementation of this vital programme during the past 15 years. They desire that Government should comprehensively review the programme with a view to identifying the deficiencies and devising immediate measures to meet the requirements of iodised salt fully which is necessary to control and eradicate goitre.

2.29. The Committee are under the impression that a detailed survey to assess the prevalence of the disease and periodical resurveys to assess the impact of the measures taken so far to control the disease have not been undertaken in all the affected areas. They would, therefore, like to know the arrangements made in this regard and the progress achieved.

2.30. Out of the total requirement of over 3 lakh tonnes of iodised salt, a quantity of 1.90 lakh tonnes is the estimated requirement for the eastern and the north-eastern regions. The Committee note that the requirements of the other affected regions are at present met only to the extent of about 50 per cent. While the reasons for the inadequate supply to the eastern and north-eastern regions have been intimated to the Committee, they do not get any idea as to why the production and consumption of the iodised salt could not be stepped up to the required level in other regions. They accordingly wish that Government should examine this aspect in detail and intimate the action taken to make available iodised salt to the extent of 100 per cent in affected areas, to the Committee within six months.

2.31. The requirements of the eastern and north-eastern regions have been met only to the extent of 5.5 per cent during 1971-72. It is a matter of concern to the Committee that as against estimated annual requirement of 44.5 thousand tonnes for West Bengal, the supplies made during the three years ended 1971-72 were to the extent of only 1.35 thousand tonnes, whereas no supplies were made during this period to Tripura and North Bihar, whose requirements were estimated to be 9.3 thousand tonnes and 124 thousand tonnes respectively. The Ministry of Industrial Development have intimated that Government of Tripura have not issued necessary notification for banning the import of non-iodised salt to that State and that similarly Governments of West Bengal and Bihar also have not as yet issued the necessary notifications for banning the entry of non-iodised salt in the affected districts. The Committee, however, note from the Performance Budget of the Department of Health for the year 1970-71 that the Government of Bihar have already issued necessary notification. The Committee would urge that the Government of India should impress upon the States which have not as yet issued the ban orders, the necessity to do so forthwith in the interest of health and wellbeing of the people.

2.32. While the installed capacity of the iodisation plant in the western sector has been more or less utilised, the capacity of the plants installed at Calcutta has been utilised only to the extent of 2.3 per cent, 1.6 per cent and 13 per cent during 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72 respectively. Further, the two plants, which were received in the year 1968, are stated to be still lying in packed condition. The running and maintenance expenditure on the plants that are working at Calcutta have been of the order of Rs. 40,000 to 68,000 per annum. This unsatisfactory performance does not lend any hope about the expansion of the production of the iodised salt and installation of additional plants as envisaged in the Performance Budget

of the Department of Health for the year 1972-73. Unless drastic steps are taken to create conditions for the increased intake of the iodised salt, the Committee are afraid that the gross under-utilisation of the capacity will continue with the attendant increase in the overhead expenses and that the condition of the two plants which have not been installed and commissioned for over 4 years now was bound to deteriorate.

2.33. The Committee find that a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs has been provided in the Fourth Plan for the purpose of implementation of the Goitre Control Programme. Against this Plan outlay, the amount provided for in the Annual Budgets of the Department of Health for the first 4 years of the Plan totalled upto only Rs. 14.79 lakhs and there is also significant shortfall in spending even the amount allotted. The Committee hope that the shortfall would be made up during the current year as well as during 1973-74.

2.34. The Committee have been given to understand that the demand for the iodised salt can be enhanced only if the State Governments impose a ban on the entry of non-iodised salt into the goitre affected areas. In this connection they find that Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 empowers Government of India to prohibit supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in any commodity. They also note that under Section 5 of the Act the power in this regard could be delegated to be exercisable also by State Governments. When even after 15 years of starting this programme of goitre control, a number of State Governments have not as yet banned the entry of non-iodised salt in the affected areas, the Committee are not able to appreciate why the Government of India did not act on their own under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. They expect Government to examine this aspect forthwith in order to take effective action. Further, any laxity in the enforcement of the orders under the Act should be promptly taken up with the State Governments concerned as such a laxity is stated to have come in the way of effective implementation of the programme.

2.35. Another difficulty which the programme is stated to have been confronted with is the non-placement of indents regularly by the State Salt nominees on the iodisation plants. Although it has been stated in the Annual Report of the Department of Health for the year 1969-70 that the cost of iodisation is being met by the Government of India and that the iodised salt is made available to the public at the same rate at which ordinary common salt is sold in

endemic areas, it has been intimated by the Ministry of Industrial Development that the cost of iodised salt moved by sea and rail is more than the cost of the salt moved by the all-rail route from the West Coast or Rajasthan to the eastern and north-eastern regions. Thus, even though iodisation is done free of charge, there is stated to be reluctance on the part of the dealers to take iodised salt from Calcutta. The Committee do not think that there has been effective coordination between the Department of Health and the Ministry of Industrial Development and that this aspect of higher cost of iodised salt sold from Calcutta has been considered. The Committee, therefore, wish that the feasibility of subsidising this element of cost also should be carefully considered taking into account the increase in intake that would result thereby which would in turn mean higher production and lower overhead expenses.

2.36. From the foregoing analysis the Committee could not resist an impression that Goitre Control Programme has not been implemented with the requisite vigour and imagination. The implementation machinery is evidently weak and there appears to have been no effective coordination between the concerned Ministries of Government of India on the one hand and between the Government of India and the concerned States on the other. This is hardly the way to achieve the aim of an important Plan programme affecting the health of people such as this. The Committee, therefore, expect that a comprehensive review of the programme as suggested by them would be made forthwith and the results thereof as well as the concrete steps taken or proposed to be taken to put matters right intimated to them within six months. A breakthrough in this could serve as an important case-study to help effective implementation of allied Plan programmes.

CHAPTER III

MINISTRY OF WORKS AND HOUSING

Delhi Development Authority

Delay in raising of demands

Audit paragraph

3.1. Consequent on very large enhancements in the compensation payable for land having been awarded by the Courts, the Delhi Administration in April 1969 decided that "in the case of undeveloped land where allotment had been made at the old pool rate, additional recovery at the rate of Re. 1.00 per sq. yd. should be made from all Co-operative Societies, Institutions, etc.". The Delhi Administration in September 1969 transferred to the Authority the work relating to 26 co-operative house building societies. Additional recovery was required to be made from 10 out of these 26 societies. As late as December 1971, demands relating to undeveloped land measuring 283.39 acres (13,71,608 sq. yds.) allotted to 5 societies had not been raised.

3.2. The Authority stated that the amount due from one of these five societies, with which perpetual lease deed had not yet been executed, would be recovered before the deed is executed.

3.3. In the case of another society enhanced compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs had been realised for a part of the total land (333.3 acres) allotted to it, the additional amount for the rest of the land allotted to it has not yet been determined (December 1971).

3.4. The Authority stated (December 1971) that the details of actual enhancement of compensation in the remaining four cases were being collected.

[Paragraph 53 of the Report of Comptroller and Auditor General of India (Civil) for the year 1970-71].

3.5. From the information made available to the Committee it is seen that a Revolving Fund was created in June, 1961 for implementing the 'Scheme of large-scale acquisition, development and disposal of land in Delhi', which was conceived as an adjunct of the Delhi

Master Plan. The Fund was created with an initial capital of Rs. 1.25 crores. This amount was increased to Rs. 5 crores during 1963-67. The details regarding its break-up are as follows:—

year	(Amount in crores Rs.)
1961	1.25
1962-63	2.00
1963-64	1.50
1964-65	1.00
	5.75
1966-67	(-0.75)
	5.00

3.6. During evidence the Committee desired to know the progress made in the scheme for which the Revolving Fund was created. The Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority explained as under:—

“The basic point is that the Government of India started the D.D.A. with the idea of having a Master Plan and with a view to ensuring that Delhi is developed according to that Master Plan; and, as an adjunct to that Master Plan, a scheme was drawn up and it was given the land for large-scale development. The D.D.A. was given the primary task of development of land and carrying out other development works under the scheme, whereas the acquisition had to be carried out by the Delhi Administration because this was a State Government, and under the law also, the land acquisition collector and the Secretaries of the Departments have to acquire the land and place it at the disposal of the D.D.A. The revolving fund was technically placed at the disposal of the Chief Commissioner at that time and now, the Lt.-Governor. The basic point is that with the revolving fund of Rs. 5 crores, the land would be acquired and given to different agencies. The Department of Cooperation was one agency and the D.D.A. the other. All the receipts which came from the disposal of the land had to be credited to the revolving fund and further programme carried out. So far, we have been able to revolve that fund to the extent of about Rs. 90 crores from the initial amount of

Rs. 5 crores. That means from Rs. 5 crores we have increased it to Rs. 90 crores."

3.7. The witness further added: "At the initial stage, the Government gave an initial deposit of Rs. 5 crores. What we did was that we acquired a portion of the land. We acquired and developed that land. We sold some plots; then with those returns we further developed. Therefore, the phase of development of acquisition was so arranged that whatever we initially acquired, became our asset. With them, we further developed and acquired further land and so on. Otherwise, the initial expenses would have been about Rs. 600 crores. The basic idea was that we gradually acquire land, developed it and sell these and go on repeating this process."

3.8 As regards the present position of the Revolving Fund, the Ministry of Works and Housing have in a written note intimated: ".....the Fund had a cash and bank balance of Rs. 48.46 lakhs on that date (31st March, 1972). In addition, 17,476 acres of land valuing about Rs. 33 crores (at cost price) was also then available with the Fund. The use to which this land has been or is being put to is indicated below:—

(a) Under development	3,995	acres
(b) Under temporary cultivation, etc.	2,906	
(c) Green Lands	3,200	,
(d) Land acquired but possession yet to be taken over by the Delhi Administration	2,057	„
(e) Land for G.H.C.C. sites etc.	1,428	„
(f) Land recently transferred to D.D.A. for development and disposal	3,890	„
(g) Cooperative Societies	2,832	„
TOTAL	20,208	„

3.9. The Committee were informed during evidence that besides Rs. 5 crores, the D.D.A. had in addition received about Rs. 7 crores from the Central Government which were also credited to the Revolving Fund. The circumstances leading to advancement of this loan by the Government to D.D.A. have been explained by the Ministry of Works and Housing in a note as follows:—

"The main reasons for making available the additional amount of Rs. 1.50 crores (as asked for under this Ministry's letter

No. 12011 (1)/68-UD, dated 15th March, 1969 addressed to A.G.C.R.) for the year 1968-69, and a sum of Rs. 5.81 crores during the years 1969-70 [as authorised under this Ministry's letter No. 12011 (1)-68-ID, dated 11th September, 1969 and 9th October, 1969 addressed to A.G.C.R.] to the Revolving Fund are given below:—

- (i) The Supreme Court decided that the time gap between the proceedings under Sections (4) and (6) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must not exceed 3 years and in cases where it does, the notifications issued under Section (4) would lapse. The result of this decision was that the proceedings under Section (6) had to be initiated in all pending cases with a view to ensuring that the ceiling of 3 years did not expire in any case and payments of compensation at higher rates arising otherwise avoided. This led to increased expenditure on the acquisition of lands already notified as the period of acquisition had to be compressed to 3 years.
- (ii) Upto 1967-68, the amount of enhanced compensation paid worked out to Rs. 3.75 crores. However, during the year 1968-69, large number of cases were decided by the Courts and the total amount to be paid by way of enhanced compensation was about Rs. 4.50 crores
- (iii) By 1967-68, Delhi Development Authority had invested a sum of Rs. 3.77 crores on the activities pertaining to the Fund partly from the loan sanctioned to it by Government and partly from the surplus funds available in Nazul Account. Since a separate revolving capital had been provided for the Fund, this investment made by the Delhi Development Authority was objected to by Audit and the amount was, therefore, withdrawn from the Fund during 1967-68, which depleted substantially the cash position of the Fund. Consequently, additional financial assistance had become necessary. [Para 109 (c) of the Central Audit Report (Civil) 1963].

The transactions relating to the Fund are reflected in the Consolidated Fund of India and the assets and liabilities arising from the Fund belong to the Central Government; the Delhi Development Authority is operating on the Fund only on agency basis. It would thus be clear that the subject additional amount of Rs. 7.31 crores paid into the Fund was not a loan to the Delhi Development Authority

as such. The amount was, no doubt, originally required for a short period as it was expected that the circumstances which had necessitated it would improve in the years to follow. But as the expenditure on acquisition as well as payment of enhanced compensations continues to be large and the expenditure on development has also substantially increased, it is considered that the withdrawal of the additional amount from the fund would not be in the interest of speedier execution of the Scheme for which the Fund has been created."

3.10. The Committee called for information about the loans taken by DDA from LIC and other organisations and the manner in which these loans have been utilised. In this connection, the Ministry of Works & Housing have in a note stated: "....the Delhi Development Authority had taken an aggregate amount of Rs. 11.42 crores as loan from various sources by 31st March, 1972. The loans were mainly taken for executing housing and development schemes. By the same date, a sum of Rs. 1.18 crores had been paid back to the lenders, leaving a sum of Rs. 10.24 crores as loan liability of the Delhi Development Authority on that date. The loans received have been fully utilised for the purpose for which these were sanctioned and paid."

3.11. The Committee desired to know whether any periodical appraisal of the working of DDA had been made and if so the results thereof. In a note the Ministry of Works & Housing have stated:

"The accounts of the transactions of the Delhi Development Authority are compiled regularly in the forms approved by the Central Government in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. These are also subjected to Audit by the Comptroller & Auditor General of India. The annual statement of accounts including the balance-sheet (wherever prescribed) is also prepared along with the audit comments thereon for being laid through the Central Government before the both Houses of Parliament (Section 25 of Delhi Development Act, 1957)."

3.12. The Committee enquired about the DDA's policy in regard to fixation of price of land ready for allotment. During evidence the Vice-Chairman, DDA deposed:

"The land is given at what we call pre-determined price or the fixed price or the land is allotted at the option price. There is fixed price at which land is allotted to the co-

operative house building societies which are required to develop land for the members—even individuals—low and middle income groups and then this land has to be obtained in auction. The houses we have to give to low and middle income people at fixed price.

While fixing the price for low and middle income group it is for the low income which is absolutely at cost basis. For the lowest income it is subsidised. For middle income it is on cost of production but with a little margin to cover subsidised price and so on. We are allotting to the low and middle income group and lowest income group either on cost price basis or on subsidised basis, to the co-operatives on the cost basis. To the high income group for residential plot we are selling by auction and all commercial plots by auction. That is the broad mode of disposal."

3.13. As regards the margin of profit included in the price recovered, the witness explained:

"When we are operating on bulk of land say 34,000 acres of land, we have 4 or 5 thousand acres of land which is green. So, an area like India Gate which has to be kept green, for that I have to pay the cost of acquisition, cost of development, arrange for the cost of maintenance. This is the negative expenditure that is being incurred. We might be making profit from the sale of commercial plots, sale of plots to the high income group. This is balanced in the end. When we say profit that is really not the profit because this is also for the general public. Somebody is going to use the land of India Gate and we have to provide for it. That is the rational basis for the scheme.

Nobody would have developed this green area which is necessary for the future of the country and for the proper environment of the city. When we talk of profit we have to take this into consideration. This is the liability which we are discharging and the whole balance of the scheme lies in this—whatever money we generate we have to spend on it. Really there is no profit."

3.14. Subsequently in a note on the subject furnished to the Committee, the Ministry of Works & Housing have stated:

The basic consideration governing this policy is that whenever land is allotted otherwise than by auction, the expenditure actually incurred on acquisition, development etc. is fully recovered from the beneficiaries and no element of profit is taken into account while fixing the price of land allotted. The price of residential plots allotted to persons in the low income group is, however, subsidised by correspondingly increasing the price of similar plots allotted to persons in middle income group in the same residential scheme. Similarly, the allotments made to schools, colleges, hospitals, cultural charitable religious etc. institutions are also made at less than the cost price in cases where it is possible to recover the amount thus short recovered from other beneficiaries of the connected schemes. In cases where this recovery is not possible the land is allotted on the basis of actual cost i.e. pre-determined rates.

The above basic policy is, however, not followed in cases of allotment of land to Government Commercial Departments, like Railways, Government Undertakings and Statutory Corporations. In their case, the land allotted is charged at cost price or commercial price depending upon the purpose for which the land is allotted."

3.15. Referring to the transfer to DDA by Delhi Administration of the work relating to 26 co-operative societies, the Vice-Chairman, DDA stated during evidence:

"The position is that the land was originally allotted by Delhi Administration to certain number of co-operative societies. They were categorised in four groups, whom I may refer later, but there were 41 societies of a particular category, to which under Government orders, certain preferences had to be given because certain payments had been made by them before the start. These 41 societies were given land at an earlier stage and 15 at much later stage."

"When the scheme of acquisition was started, at that time there were some societies which had purchased land through their own means. They had purchased some isolated piece. That is one type of society. Another type of societies is which had approached Delhi Administration for acquisition of land for them, because the land under

the Land Acquisition Act can be acquired for a public purpose and that was thought that it was a public purpose. Certain notifications had also been issued by the Delhi Administration. The third category of societies were that they also owned land, but they were not covered by our own scheme of 34,000 acres, but that was covered by another scheme. These were the three categories of Societies. In the earlier stages, it was decided that we must satisfy these Societies. We acquired these lands, and we gave them alternative lands in accordance with the Master Plan and the zonal plan in the residential area according to the pattern. These were 59 co-operative societies; they were categorised in what we call, Group 1, 2 and 3. These 59 societies were given land by us. Out of these 41 were those whom we said, "you develop the land for yourself" and 18 were those, who had too small pieces of land. We said, "We will consolidate and the DDA will develop for you and then we will give this to Members". These 41 and 18 societies were satisfied in the first lot. They were given land as and when the land was acquired. There was no fixed period. The process of allotment started in 1962 and went upto 1967.

Then there are other Societies, for which no commitment implied or had been made by the Government. These societies also approached us and we categorised them as Group 4. We told them the areas in which the land could be available if they were interested. Out of 151 societies, 96 responded to that offer and 96 societies have been allotted land at a later stage. DDA is developing its own land and executes leases with the individuals. Where the societies are developing the land, later such leases have to be executed with the individuals.

The 26 co-operative societies which had developed the land and for which leases were being executed by individuals and for which later on only the administration had to be carried out, were transferred to the DDA for the purpose of administration."

3.16. In a note submitted to the Committee, the Ministry of Works and Housing have stated: "The decision for the transfer of work pertaining to 26 societies to the DDA was taken by the Lt. Governor as a stage had come where sub-leases were to be executed with individual members. As the work of execution of leases with individuals was already being done in DDA in respect of the

plots|flats sold by the DDA, a decision was taken that the sub-leases in respect of the plots allotted to various members of the Co-operative Societies be done by the DDA also so that the administration work of leases is looked after by one authority."

3.17. The Committee enquired whether besides the 26 co-operative societies whose work had been transferred to DDA, the work of other co-operative societies will also be transferred to DDA. To this the Vice-Chairman, DDA replied that this matter was under the consideration of the Lt. Governor, Delhi.

3.18. In this connection the Ministry of Works and Housing have stated: "The Lt. Governor had subsequently passed orders on 22nd November, 1971 that the work pertaining to all the remaining Co-operative Societies should also be transferred to the DDA for reasons given in Para 2 of the orders. Delhi Administration have already decided that the work of remaining Societies would be transferred to the Delhi Development Authority as soon as the perpetual leases with the Societies are executed.

One of the basic reasons for transfer of the work was that the DDA is the main field agency and it is now executing and administering thousands of other leases in respect of the plots|houses sold. It would be only appropriate that the work relating to the execution of sub-leases and administration thereof should also be handled by the DDA, which has field agencies and necessary staff. If the work of leases is partly handled by the DDA and partly by the Land and Building Department, it would lead to unnecessary duplication and diffusion."

3.19. Giving the latest position about the recovery of dues from different Co-operative Societies referred to in the Audit paragraph, the Vice-Chairman, DDA stated:

"There are 10 societies mentioned therein. 4 societies executed (lease deeds) afterwards and money was recovered from them. For the 5th there is this agreement that they would pay the money and 7 per cent of interest in 6 months. In respect of 5 societies these agreements were executed. It has also been provided that if the cost goes up because of decision given in the higher court etc. the additional amount will be recovered. At the time when Audit para was discussed certain information was not available with us. We have collected those figures and we find, no amount is due from any of the societies because the enhancement given is within the amount we have collected."

CORRIGENDA TO THE 70TH REPORT OF THE PUBLIC
ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (1972-73) PRESENTED TO THE
LOK SABHA ON 23.3.1973.

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>For</u>	<u>Read</u>
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plots/flats shold by the DDA, a decision was taken that the sub-leases in respect of the plots allotted to various members of the Co-operative Societies be done by the DDA also so that the administration work of leases is looked after by one authority."

3.17. The Committee enquired whether besides the 26 co-operative societies whose work had been transferred to DDA, the work of other co-operative societies will also be transferred to DDA. To this the Vice-Chairman, DDA replied that this matter was under the consideration of the Lt. Governor, Delhi.

3.18. In this connection the Ministry of Works and Housing have stated: "The Lt. Governor had subsequently passed orders on 22nd November, 1971 that the remaining Co-operative Societies be transferred to the DDA. The reasons given in Part I of the order are that the Lt. Governor had already decided that the work of leases is to be transferred to the DDA, which would be done by the Lt. Governor by the DDA, which would be only a question of sub-leases and the work of leases is part and parcel of the work of the Lt. Governor's Building Department and diffusion."

One of the basic reasons given in Part I of the order is that the Lt. Governor's Building Department is the main office of the DDA, which is catering thousands of people. It would be only a question of sub-leases and the work of leases is part and parcel of the work of the Lt. Governor's Building Department and diffusion."

3.19. Giving the reasons for the transfer of work of 26 different Co-operative Societies to the DDA, the Vice-Chairman, DDA said:

"There are 10 societies which have sub-leased (lease) their plots from them. The amount which they would pay is Rs. 600/- per month. 10 societies have not been executed. The reason is that they have given up because of the enhancement of the amount of the additional amount. Audit part of the work is not available with us. We have collected those figures and we find, no amount is due from any of the societies because the enhancement given is within the amount we have collected."

3.20. In reply to a question the witness further added: "We have verified. Whatever is there, we have recovered and no amount is due from the Society."

3.21. The Committee note that till date a sum of Rs. 12.31 crores had been credited to the Revolving Fund which was created in June, 1961 for implementing the scheme of large scale acquisition, development and disposal of land in Delhi. As on 31st March, 1972 the Fund had a cash and bank balance of Rs. 48.46 lakhs, besides 20,308 acres of land which is valued at Rs. 38.40 crores at cost price. In addition to the Revolving Fund from which funds are made available the D.D.A. has taken an aggregate amount of Rs. 11.42 crores as loans from various sources such as LIC etc. for executing housing and development schemes. It is seen that apart from the compilation of annual accounts which are also audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India no evaluation of the work done by the D.D.A. since its inception has ever been done to find out how far it has achieved the aims for which it was set up. The Committee feel that it would be worthwhile to have the working of the DDA assessed by an expert Committee which could besides reviewing the overall functioning of the DDA also suggest further measures for the development of Delhi and its suburbs. In this connection the Committee would particularly like a review of the policy in regard to fixation of price of land disposed of by the D.D.A.

3.22. The Committee were informed during evidence that on verification it had been found that no further amount was recoverable from any of the 10 societies referred to in the Audit paragraph. The Committee feel that if this verification had been done well in time at least when the draft Audit paragraph was sent by Audit, the inclusion of the Audit paragraph in the Audit Report could have been avoided with considerable saving of time and labour at all ends.

NEW DELHI ;
February 23, 1973.
 Phalgun 3, 1894(S)

ERA SEZHI YAN,
 Chairman,
 Public Accounts Committee

APPENDIX I

(See Para I-II)

Areas of Persistent Transmission

In the country there are about 105 unit areas in Attack phase, out of which about 39 unit areas had spray operations for 12 to 15 years or more. These units are distributed over states/Union Territories and spread over 99 unit areas. After the realistic re-phrasing, the attention has been focused on these areas for the first time. The names of units in different States are as under:—

S. No.	Name of the State/Unit	Strength in attack.	S. No.	Name of the State and unit.	Strength in attack.
1	2	3	1	2	3
<hr/>					
A. Andhra Pradesh			D. Assam		
1. Adilabad	.	0.41	1. Ajjal	.	0.75
2. Arrakuvalley	.	0.56	2. Dibrugarh	.	0.13
3. Bummagudem	.	0.50	3. Diphu	.	0.75
4. Vijayawada	.	0.20	4. Gauhati	.	0.20
5. Warangal	.	0.01	5. Jorhat	.	0.20
6. Bobbili	.	0.15	6. Karimganj	.	0.15
7. Khammam	.	0.09	7. Kokrajhar	.	0.20
8. Kurnool	.	0.07	8. Nowgong	.	0.50
9. Reverkonda	.	0.05	9. Shillong	.	0.09
10. Guntur	.	0.06	10. Shilchar	.	0.25
		2.10	11. Tezpur	.	0.05
			12. Tura	.	0.80
<hr/>					
B. Bihar					4.07
1. Chakardharpur	.	0.687			
2. Girdih	.	0.10			
3. Gumla	.	0.15			
4. Jamshedpur	.	0.054			
5. Ranchi	.	0.05			
6. Shikarpur.	.	0.085			
		1.126			
<hr/>					
C. Madhya Pradesh			E. Gujarat		
1. Balikunthpur	.	0.49	1. Baroda (Chota Udepur)	.	0.08
2. Belaghat	.	0.35	2. Junagadh	.	1.00
3. Barwani	.	0.04	3. Kutch	.	0.50
4. Bilaspur.	.	0.55	4. Surat I	.	0.20
5. Dhar	.	1.00	5. Surat II (Bulsar)	.	0.20
6. Dharanajaigarh	.	1.00	6. Amreli	.	1.00
7. Gwalior	.	0.05	7. Rajkot	.	0.19
8. Jagdaipur	.	0.75	8. Mehsana II (Palan)	.	0.19
9. Mandsaur	.	0.50	9. Jamnagar	.	1.00
10. Janjgir	.	0.25			4.36
11. Kanker	.	0.75			
12. Raipur	.	0.82			
13. Ranihandaon	.	0.30			
14. Shahdol	.	0.25			
15. Shivpuri	.	75			
16. Morena	.	50			
		8.25			
<hr/>					
F. Maharashtra					
1. Chanda. I	.	.	1. Chanda. I	.	0.62
2. Chanda II	.	.	2. Chanda II	.	0.44
3. Kolabepen	.	.	3. Kolabepen	.	0.25
4. Bhullia (W. Khandesh)	.	.	4. Bhullia (W. Khandesh)	.	0.11
5. Thana. II	.	.	5. Thana. II	.	0.21
6. Dhullia. II	.	.	6. Dhullia. II	.	0.04
					1.67
<hr/>					

APPENDIX II.

(See Para 1.16)

Year	Requirement of insecticides in terms of DDT 75% in tons.	Stock brought forward	Indigenous	Imported	Total	Stock available including procurement & stock B/F. up to June	Consumed	Received after June B/F for next year	Shortfall	Remarks
		State	Head quarter							
1968-69	13148	1550	1476	3587	*2125	14738	11678	***10128	3060	1470 Due to late receipt.
1969-70	15900	1550	3060	4570	8535 (includes 3000 tons DDT Tech.)	17715	12129	9806	5586	3771 **Due to non-formulation of 2850 tons DDT Tech.
1970-71	14806	2323	1786	5407 (includes 750 tons DDT Tech.)	18323	13008	10739	5315	1798 Due to non formulation of DDT Tech. & due to late receipt from HIL.	
1971-72	14170	2269	1128 +4187	4426	7000	19010	13618	10160	5392	552 Due to late receipt.

*Includes 375 tons of DDT 75% given by WHO as gift.

**Into equivalent of 3800 tons of DDT 75% (approx.)

***Entire unit area could not be covered with the available insecticide. Even in areas where insecticide was available for two rounds of spray, due to refusals and locked houses some quantity of insecticide was left out and it was not possible then, to divert to other areas where there was no insecticides at all, due to practical transport difficulties encountered during Monsoon.

APPENDIX III

(See para 1.22)

A. B. MALIK,
JOINT SECRETARY

D.O No. F. 8-192|70-C&CD-I
Government of India

MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING
(Department of Health)

New Delhi, October 6, 1972.

Please refer to your D.O. letter No. A&I-39(9)|72, dated 20th August, 1972 and Shri Grover's subsequent D.O. No. A&I-28(4)|66, dated the 15th September, 1972.

2. In accordance with the discussions held in the Planning Commission on the 7th August, 1971 to consider the proposal for augmentation of the production capacity of DDT at HIL we had already sent in October, 1971 a paper to the Planning Commission giving full details of the targets as well as achievements made during the past 13 years when the Control Programme was switched over to the Eradication Programme in 1958 and also stating whether the strategy in future would be to restrict the programme to containment or control of the disease or to the eradication of malaria. The requirements of DDT during the years 1975-76 to 1981-82 have subsequently been reassessed and the necessary details as regards phasing as also the requirements of DDT, Malathion etc. are indicated in the attached statement.

3. The requirements indicated in the attached statement may vary in case it is decided to change the dosage of insecticide or in case Government decides to adopt non-chemical methods like genetic control or biological control for dealing with the problem during the next few years.

4. It is our view that the HIL can increase its capacity for producing DDT on the forecast of internal as well as external require-

ment of DDT in order that the country becomes self sufficient for this insecticide.

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(A. B. MALIK)

Shri N. K. Sreenivasan,
Joint Secretary,
Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals,
Shastri Bhavan,
New Delhi.

(i) Commitment in respect of DDT requirements for National Malaria Eradication Programme beyond 1975-76 for a period of about 7 years, the basis of estimates and the areas where it is likely to be used.

Year	Total qty. required in terms of DDT 75 % w.d.p:	Total quantity proposed to be procured through BHC & Maharashtra equivalent to DDT 75 % w.d.p.	Balance DDT 75 % wdp required to be procured in terms of DDT 75%
1975-76	8,700 tons	2,000 tons	6,700 tons
1976-77	7,600 ,,	2,000 ,,	5,600 ,,
1977-78	7,100 ,,	2,000 ,,	5,100 ,,
1978-79	6,000 ,,	2,000 ,,	4,000 ,,
1979-80	4,400 ,,	1,500 ,,	2,900 ,,
1980-81	4,400 ,,	1,500 ,,	2,900 ,,
1981-82	4,400 ,,	1,500 ,,	2,900 ,,

The anticipated phasing on the basis of which by the above requirements have been worked out is as under:—

Year	Attack phase	Consolidation phase	Maintenance Phase	Total
1975-76	50.00	98.25	245.00	393.25
1976-77	40.00	93.25	260.00	393.25
1977-78	35.00	78.25	280.00	393.25
1978-79	25.00	68.25	300.00	393.25
1979-80	15.00	48.25	330.00	393.25
1980-81	15.00	28.25	350.00	393.25
1981-82	15.00	8.25	370.00	393.25

The calculations have been done on the basis of 110 tons for two-rounds of spray in Attack phase units and providing for extra rounds in 26 units which are problem units and 5 tons each in Consolidation and Maintenance phase units. Ultimately 15 units bordering other countries are expected to be continued for DDT spray from 1979-80 onwards.

(iii) Continued use of DDT under National Malaria Eradication Programme.

The question of ban on use of DDT in India, has been discussed in detail by a Committee of Experts and it has been agreed that use of DDT should be continued for public health purposes in India for the time being. The WHO has also advised the developing countries to continue the use of DDT till some suitable substitute, equally effective and economical, is available. The question of genetic and biological methods of controlling mosquitoes is also under consideration.

APPENDIX IV

Summary of main Conclusion/recommendations

S. No.	Para No. of the Report	Ministry/Dept. concerned	Conclusions/Recommendations
1	2	3	4
1	I.26	Health & F. P.	<p>The Committee are deeply disturbed over the successive setbacks suffered by the National Malaria Eradication Programme. The scheme which was started in 1958-59 initially expected to be completed by 1968-69 and rephased for completion by 1974-75 is now nowhere near completion. The scheme was reviewed by the Committee in 1969-70 and they were informed in January, 1971 that the programme was scheduled for completion by 1975-76. The Committee expressed a hope that there would be no further setback. The Committee are taken aback to learn after just a year that the programme has suffered yet another major setback. The Committee can not too strongly emphasise that the organisation should be geared up fully to meet this serious situation so as to successfully implement the programme in the field not later than 1980-81.</p>
2	I.27	-do-	<p>Since the starting of the programme in 1958 Government have invested Rs. 219 crores upto the end of 1971-72. The estimated total requirement of funds for the years 1972-73 to 1980-81 is stated to be Rs. 145 crores. In view of a substantial outlay of the order</p>

of about Rs. 364 crores Government have a vital stake in the successful implementation of this programme.

3. 1.28 -do- Till 1963-64 the programme progressed well. To what extent it suffered badly subsequently is seen from the fact that the number of malaria cases reported which was 0.87 lakh in 1963 trebled upto 2.79 lakhs in 1967 and further went upto 4.72 lakhs in 1970. Out of 393.25 malaria eradication units, still 98 are in attack phase and 66 in consolidation phase as per the phasing in 1972. In respect of 9 per cent of population eradication has not been achieved so far. Nearly 39 units throughout the country except in Mysore, Tamil Nadu and Kerala are stated to be in the persistent attack phase. The Committee trust that the Directorate of Malaria Eradication Programme will intensify the measures in these areas.

4 1.29 -do- The Committee would like to refer to some important aspects of the programme requiring urgent attention. First, the problem of border areas should be tackled in concert with the countries concerned—Nepal, Pakistan, Bangla Desh, Burma—and a comprehensive co-operative programme chalked out for implementation. Secondly, there should be a close co-ordination between the rural and urban eradication programmes as at present the latter is not within the purview of the NMEP and the local bodies are stated to be unable to carry out anti-larval operations.

5 1.30 -do- Thirdly, a solution to the increasing phenomenon of resistance to the insecticides should be found soon by extending the research

1	2	3	4
			efforts. Finally, administrative inadequacy and inefficiency should be attended to promptly.
6.	1.31	Health & F. P.	Although the setback started in 1964-65 when there was problem of getting insecticides in time no effective steps seem to have been taken to rectify the position soon. The Committee find that even during the period 1968-69 to 1971-72 there was significant shortfall in the availability of insecticides and the actual consumption was considerably less than the availability. The consumption was only to the extent of 77 per cent, 62 per cent, 73 per cent and 72 per cent of the requirement during these years. It is no wonder that incidence of malaria increased by "leap and bounds". It needs, therefore, hardly any emphasis that there should be neither any further gap between requirement and availability nor any shortfall in consumption.
7.	1.32	-Do-	The shortfall in availability of insecticides during 1969-70 was about a fourth of the requirement. This was due to import of DDT Tech. and the delay in its formulation indigenously. The Committee have dealt with this in some detail in the succeeding section of this Report.
8	1.33	-Do-	Incidentally the Committee would like to emphasise the need for stepping up indigenous production of insecticides in order to attain self-sufficiency. The representative of Ministry of Petroleum and

Chemicals informed the Committee that from the production point of view if sustained off-take of DDT could be ensured there could be no objection to go in for expansion of the Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. The Ministry of Health have already given the necessary indications in this regard. As it has been stated that it will take two years to expand production the Committee desire that the matter should be processed in consultation with the Planning Commission so as to come to a quick decision. In this connection the Committee would also like Government to take into account the warnings given by some scientists against the excessive use of DDT as it constitutes a hazard to human health.

I. 34

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The Committee note that the high power Central Administrative Working Committee on National Malaria Eradication Programme was constituted on 22nd April, 1958 with the Health Secretary as its Chairman, Financial Adviser, Director General, Health Services, Deputy Director General (Development) and Director, National Institute of Communicable Diseases as members and Director, N.M.E.P. as the member-Secretary. This Committee was expected to lay down policies and give decision on points that may crop up from time to time in order to facilitate implementation of the programme. However, it is disappointing to learn that the Committee had only 6 meetings in all since 1958. The fifth meeting was in 1959 and the sixth and the last one was in 1968. The Committee feel strongly that this high powered Committee should have been active enough to find timely solutions to the problems that beset this pro-

gramme. They hope that at least in future this Committee will assume an effective role in decision-making and co-ordination.

10. 1.51

Health & F.P.

The Committee regret to find that without actually verifying the capacity for the indigenous formulation, 3755 tonnes of DDT Tech. were imported against the requirements of insecticides for the National Malaria Eradication Programme for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71. The delay in formulation resulted in short supply of insecticides during these years and consequent prolongation of the malaria eradication programme. Although D.G.T.D. had indicated a capacity for formulation of 1400 tonnes in the organised sector units, no orders were placed in the first instance on any of such units. A capacity of 1400 tonnes with the Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Corporation was assumed on the basis of the assurance given by the Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries, which proved to be unreliable. The Committee have been informed that the Ministry have since decided that no more D.D.T. Tech. should be imported. However, in view of the seriousness of the consequences that ensued, the Committee hope that the Department would come to an independent assessment of the position before taking such decisions in future.

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11. 1.52

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In the first instance orders for formulating 1000 tonnes were placed in June, 1969—900 tonnes on the Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Corporation and 100 tonnes of ESSO. Although formu-

lation was to be completed by July, 1969, only 641 tonnes were formulated upto July, 1971. The balance was got formulated by other firms at an extra cost of Rs. 2.08 lakhs. This extra cost could not be recovered from the defaulting concerns as the agreements had not been signed by an officer duly authorised to do so. The lapse on the part of the officer concerned in not realising his limitations which put Government to a considerable loss, should be suitably dealt with.

12 1.53 Health & F.P. Although 3000 tonnes of DDT Tech. were imported by May, 1969 and 755 tonnes in July, 1970, major quantity was issued for formulation only during February, 1971 to September, 1971. The delay in doing so requires to be gone into. Incidentally, the Committee find that The Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. which quoted a rate of about Rs. 2300 per tonne for formulation initially in 1968, subsequently quoted Rs. 1699 only. In view of the high rate quoted initially, no orders could be placed on them. The Committee feel that Government should have decided in detail in advance about the public sector or private sector undertakings which were to formulate them, the rate to be paid and the time to be taken by them for formulation and supply. It should have been possible for Government to have the formulation done on urgent basis from Hindustan Insecticides Ltd., a Government undertaking.

13 2.28 Health & F.P. Industrial Development Goitre, which is a communicable disease, is endemic in the entire sub-Himalayan belt from Jammu and Kashmir to Arunachal Pradesh extending about 2400 Kms. It has been estimated that about 9 to 10 million people are suffering from this disease and about 45

million are living in the endemic areas and are exposed to the risk. The survey of areas so far conducted shows a variable prevalence rate of about 10 per cent to 50 per cent and the average prevalence rate is about 28 per cent. The incidence of goitre was found to be mostly amongst the children who were suffering from deafness, dumbness and other deformities. The need to fortify salt with iodine to make up deficiency of iodine in the human system and to prevent epidemic goitre chiefly among the children was felt by Government as early as August, 1952. The Goitre Control Programme was launched during the Second Five Year Plan period by the Government of India in collaboration with the UNICEF. As against the total requirement of more than 3 lakh tonnes of iodised salt, the capacity for production so far created is only of the order of about 2 lakh tonnes. The quantities supplied to the affected areas however reached a maximum of 71,000 tonnes only in the year 1971. The Committee are distressed to note the tardy implementation of this vital programme during the past 15 years. They desire that Government should comprehensively review the programme with a view to identifying the deficiencies and devising immediate measures to meet the requirements of iodised salt fully which is necessary to control and eradicate goitre.

assess the impact of the measures taken so far to control the disease have not been undertaken in all the affected areas. They would, therefore, like to know the arrangements made in this regard and the progress achieved.

15 2.30 Industrial Development
Health & F.P.

Out of the total requirement of over 3 lakh tonnes iodised salt, a quantity of 1.90 lakh tonnes is the estimated requirement for the eastern and the north-eastern regions. The Committee note that the requirements of the other affected regions are at present met only to the extent of about 50 per cent. While the reasons for the inadequate supply to the eastern and north-eastern regions have been intimated to the Committee, they do not get any idea as to why the production and consumption of the iodised salt could not be stepped up to the required level in other regions. They accordingly wish that Government should examine this aspect in detail and intimate the action taken to make available iodised salt to the extent of 100 per cent in affected areas, to the Committee within six months.

16 2.31 -do-

The requirements of the eastern and north-eastern regions have been met only to the extent of 5.5 per cent during 1971-72. It is a matter of concern to the Committee that as against estimated annual requirement of 44.5 thousand tonnes for West Bengal, the supplies made during the three years ended 1971-72 were to the extent of only 1.35 thousand tonnes, whereas no supplies were made during this period to Tripura and North Bihar, whose requirements were estimated to be 9.3 thousand tonnes and 12.4 thousand tonnes respectively. The Ministry of Industrial Development have intimated

that Government of Tripura have not issued necessary notification for banning the import of non-iodised salt to that State and that similarly Governments of West Bengal and Bihar also have not as yet issued the necessary notifications for banning the entry of non-iodised salt in the affected districts. The Committee, however, note from the Performance Budget of the Department of Health for the year 1970-71 that the Government of Bihar have already issued necessary notification. The Committee would urge that the Government of India should impress upon the States which have not as yet issued the ban orders, the necessity to do so forthwith in the interest of health and well-being of the people.

17 2.32 -do-

While the installed capacity of the iodisation plant in the western sector has been more or less utilised, the capacity of the plants installed, at Calcutta has been utilised only to the extent of 2.3 per cent, 1.6 per cent and 13 per cent during 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72 respectively. Further, the two plants, which were received in the year 1968, are stated to be still lying in packed condition. The running and maintenance expenditure on the plants that are working at Calcutta have been of the order of Rs. 40,000 to 68,000 per annum. This unsatisfactory performance does not lend any hope about the expansion of the production of the iodised salt and installation of additional plants as envisaged in the Performance Budget of the Department of Health for the year 1972-73. Unless drastic steps are

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taken to create conditions for the increased intake of iodised salt, the Committee are afraid that the gross under-utilisation of the capacity will continue with the attendant increase in the overhead expenses and that condition of the two plans which have not been installed and commissioned for over 4 years now was bound to deteriorate.

18. 2.33 Health & Family Planning The Committee find that a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs has been provided in the Fourth Plan for the purpose of implementation of the Goitre Control Programme. Against this Plan outlay, the amount provided for in the Annual Budgets of the Department of Health for the first 4 years of the Plan totalled upto only Rs. 14.79 lakhs and there is also significant shortfall in spending even the amount allotted. The Committee hope that the shortfall would be made up during the current year as well as during 1973-74.

19. 2.34 Industrial Development
Health & Family Planning The Committee have been given to understand that the demand for the iodised salt can be enhanced only if the State Governments impose a ban on the entry of non-iodised salt into the goitre affected areas. In this connection they find that Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 empowers Government of India to prohibit supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in any commodity. They also note that under Section 5 of the Act the power in this regard could be delegated to be exercisable also by State Governments. When even after 15 years of starting this programme of goitre control, a number of State Governments have not as yet

20. 2.35 Industrial Development
Health & Family
Planning

Another difficulty which the programme is stated to have been confronted with is the non-placement of indents regularly by the State Salt nominees on the iodisation plants. Although it has been stated in the Annual Report of the Department of Health for the year 1969-70 that the cost of iodisation is being met by the Government of India and that the iodised salt is made available to the public at the same rate at which ordinary common salt is sold in endemic areas, it has been intimated by the Ministry of Industrial Development that the cost of iodised salt moved by sea and rail is more than the cost of the salt moved by the all-rail route from the West Coast or Rajasthan to the eastern and north-eastern regions. Thus, even though iodisation is done free of charge, there is stated to be reluctance on the part of the dealers to take iodised salt from Calcutta. The Committee do not think that there has been effective co-ordination between the Department of Health and the Ministry

banned the entry of non-iodised salt in the affected areas, the Committee are not able to appreciate why the Government of India did not act on their own under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. They expect Government to examine this aspect forthwith in order to take effective action. Further, any laxity in the enforcement of the orders under the Act should be promptly taken up with the State Governments concerned as such a laxity is stated to have come in the way of effective implementation of the programme.

of Industrial Development and that this aspect of higher cost of iodised salt sold from Calcutta has been considered. The Committee, therefore, wish that the feasibility of subsidising this element of cost also should be carefully considered taking into account the increase in intake that would result thereby which would in turn mean higher production and lower overhead expenses.

-do-

From the foregoing analysis the Committee could not resist an impression that Goitre Control Programme has not been implemented with the requisite vigour and imagination. The implementation machinery is evidently weak and there appears to have been no effective co-ordination between the concerned Ministries of Government of India on the one hand and between the Government of India and the concerned States on the other. This is hardly the way to achieve the aim of an important Plan programme affecting the health of people such as this. The Committee, therefore, expect that a comprehensive review of the programme as suggested by them would be made forthwith and the results thereof as well as the concrete steps taken or proposed to be taken to put matters right intimated to them within six months. A break through in this could serve as an important case study to help effective implementation of allied Plan programmes.

Working & Housing

The Committee note that till date a sum of Rs. 12.31 crores had been credited to the Revolving Fund which was created in June, 1961 for implementing the scheme of large scale acquisition, development and disposal of land in Delhi. As on 31st March, 1972 the

21. 2.35

22. 3.21

1 2 3 4

Fund had a cash and bank balance of Rs. 48.46 lakhs, besides 20,908 acres of land which is valued at Rs. 38.48 crores at cost price. In addition to the Revolving Fund from which funds are made available, the DDA has taken an aggregate amount of Rs. 11.42 crores as loans from various sources such as LIC etc. for executing housing and development schemes. It is seen that apart from the compilation of annual accounts which are also audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India no evaluation of the work done by the DDA since its inception has ever been done to find out how far it has achieved the aims for which it was set up. The Committee feel that it would be worthwhile to have the working of the DDA assessed by an expert Committee which could besides reviewing the overall functioning of the DDA also suggest further measures for the development of Delhi and its suburbs. In this connection the Committee would particularly like a review of the policy in regard to fixation of price of land disposed of by the DDA.

23. 3.22 Works & Housing

The Committee were informed during evidence that on verification it had been found that no further amount was recoverable from any of the 10 societies referred to in the Audit paragraph. The Committee feel that if this verification had been done well in time at least when the draft Audit paragraph was sent by Audit, the inclusion of the Audit paragraph in the Audit Report could have been avoided with considerable saving of time and labour at all ends.