

Thursday, 18th March, 1937


THE  
COUNCIL OF STATE DEBATES

VOLUME I, 1937

*(16th February to 8th April, 1937)*

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FIRST SESSION  
OF THE  
FOURTH COUNCIL OF STATE, 1937



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# COUNCIL OF STATE.

Thursday, 18th March, 1937.

The Council met in the Council Chamber of the Council House at Eleven of the Clock, the Honourable the President in the Chair.

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

### PERCENTAGE FOR RECRUITMENT OF INDIANS IN THE INDIAN ARMY.

79. THE HONOURABLE RAJA YUVERAJ DATTA SINGH: Will Government be pleased to state whether there is any fixed percentage for the recruitment of Indians in the Indian Army? If so, what, and why?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: No. The Indian Army, as the Honourable Member should be aware, is composed mainly of Indians.

### NUMBER OF RAJPUTS IN THE COMBATANT FORCE OF THE INDIAN ARMY IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES.

80. THE HONOURABLE RAJA YUVERAJ DATTA SINGH: (a) Will Government be pleased to state the number of Rajputs in the combatant force of the Indian Army in the various provinces.

(b) Will Government be pleased to state whether there is any prohibition for the recruitment of Rajputs in the Indian Army in any province? If so, since when, and why?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: (a) I lay on the table a statement containing the required information.

(b) The recruitment of Rajputs of the Eastern United Provinces was discontinued in 1925 but the question of re-opening their recruitment is again under consideration.

*Statement showing the number of Rajputs from various provinces serving as combatants in the Indian Army on 1st January, 1936.*

Punjab	1,130
United Provinces	2,356
Central Provinces	4
Rajputana	2,376
Central India	20
Other places	81

### CENTRAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR THE INDIAN TERRITORIAL FORCE.

81. THE HONOURABLE PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: (a) Have Government appointed a Central Advisory Committee for the Indian Territorial Force?

(b) If so, who are its members?

(c) How many meetings did it hold last year and what were the questions considered by it?

**HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF :** (a), (b) and (c). A Central Advisory Committee was appointed (as required by the Act) in 1929 and consisted of the Army Secretary as President with one Member of the Council of State, two Members of the Assembly and two military officers as members. It held two meetings in 1929. As the Governor General in Council has referred no matters to it since that date and there has been no demand for its revival, the Committee has become obsolete and would require to be reconstituted before it could meet again. If it is the wish of the House that this should be done, I will see that it is done.

**THE HONOURABLE PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU :** Is it a fact that the statute requires the Government of India to appoint a Central Advisory Committee ?

**HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF :** That is what I have said, Sir.

**THE HONOURABLE PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU :** If it is a statutory duty, how is it that the Government of India have not appointed any Central Advisory Committee since the new Legislature came into existence ?

**HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF :** I take it that what the Honourable Member means is that he would like me to reconstitute this Committee. I have said that I will do so.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT :** His Excellency cannot answer for a period when he was not the Commander-in-Chief and say why it was not done.

**THE HONOURABLE PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU :** We are concerned with the Government of India and not with any individual Commander-in-Chief.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT :** Then you must give notice of the question.

**THE HONOURABLE PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU :** There it is. My question gives it. The Government of India know what their duty is and I am not expected to say in a question what is their duty and what is not.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. P. N. SAPRU :** Is the Council of State Member on the Central Advisory Committee an elected Member, Sir ? Has he to be elected by the Council of State or nominated by the Government ?

**HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF :** I should like notice of this question, Sir.

#### RESOLUTION *RE* ISSUE OF TACCAVI LOANS TO RELIEVE INDEBTEDNESS.

\***THE HONOURABLE MR. KUMARSANKAR RAY CHAUDHURY** (East Bengal : Non-Muhammadan) : Sir, I beg to move :

"That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council to take steps to relieve the general indebtedness of the people by the issue of taccavi loans in areas most affected by the lowness of prices of agricultural produce".

India, Sir, is mainly an agricultural country and a large majority of its population live on agriculture as the main source of their living and as such have been severely affected by the lowness of price of agricultural products, so much so that, as Mr. Darling says, the people in the Punjab are born in debt, live in debt and die in debt. There is probably hardly a district where more than a third are free of debt and in some the percentage is less than ten. The indebtedness of the Bombay ryot, as the Famine Commission Report, as early as 1901 states, had for many years been engaging the earnest attention of the Supreme and Provincial Governments. The Report says that the indebtedness was aggravated by the agrarian system introduced by the Survey Settlement and more especially by the unrestricted right of the cultivators to transfer their holdings which the Survey Settlement recognised. Thus things were left to take their own course and the result was, as invariably happens, when an ignorant and improvident peasantry can dispose without restriction a valuable right in land the cultivators sank deeper into debt and that their property began to pass out of their hands. It should be admitted that the conditions on which under the revenue system the cultivators held their lands helped to bring this result about. The rigidity of the revenue system forced them into debt, while the valuable property which they held made it easy to borrow. So ultimately various Acts had to be passed restricting the power of the cultivators to alienate their lands in the Deccan, Sind, Chota Nagpur, the Punjab and other places. The condition of the ryots in other provinces were somewhat different due perhaps to greater fertility of the soil, intervention of less powerful landlords between the ryots and the all-powerful Government and restrictions upon the free power of alienation. But while more and more restrictions on the power of alienation had been sought to be introduced in some provinces as mentioned before, greater facilities of such transfers have been afforded to the ryots in these provinces and the result has been a general indebtedness of the peasantry throughout the length and breadth of India, and money-lenders, as the Agricultural Commission Report states at page 422, have been steadily adding to their landed possessions in most provinces. This has further been greatly aggravated by the continued lowness of the price of all agricultural products so that all attempts for redress so far adopted by way of the introduction of co-operative credit societies and a few land mortgage banks have proved unavailing and Government has been forced to adopt stringent legislation relating to indebtedness preventing the creditors from charging exorbitant interest and compelling them to obtain their dues by easy instalments stretched over long periods after ascertaining its amount by forced composition and by the introduction of simpler procedure of rural insolvency and prefers to wait to see how these laws function in practice. The Agricultural Commission point to a failure of legislative measures in relieving indebtedness. Meanwhile the condition of the ryots, I submit, is coming to such a pass that no composition of their debts and provision of easy instalments will be of any avail to them unless some money is made available to them to make these payments that fall due immediately and for the default of which their holdings will be liable to sale and pass entirely out of their hands.

Sir, when the Agriculturists Loans Act of 1884 was introduced the Member in charge of the Bill said :

" The real justification lies in the position of Government as the great landlord of the country and the direct bearing which the welfare of the cultivator has on its revenues. But a wider view may be taken of the responsibilities of the Government, and its interest in the cultivator as a citizen, no less than as a contributor to its revenues, justifies it in promoting his industry. The policy of the Taccavi Acts should not be regarded as productive merely but also as protective and it is upon the protective aspects specially that we would insist,

[Mr. Kumarsankar Ray Chaudhury.]

And dictated by such a policy this Act has been freely used in times of famine and scarcity in India and as the Agricultural Commission Report states at page 429 is a potent weapon in the hands of any Local Government called upon to deal with a sudden emergency which requires the immediate issue of capital for current needs . . . . . The rate of interest charged is as low as the cost of the service permits and while there is little or no profit to the State from the difference between the rate at which it raises the funds required and that at which it lends them, unless there is a succession of bad years there is usually little loss through failure to recover loans”.

A mere policy of wait and see adopted by the Government after the introduction of harsh and compulsory methods of reduction and avoidance of debt will not only create bad blood between the debtor and the creditor but be the harbinger of Bolshevik principles in the country. Similar measures have been adopted by several Indian princes in their States to the great relief of their subjects and I fail to see why the Government which profess to be the *ma-bap* of the poor tenants should refrain from doing the same.

THE HONOURABLE KUNWAR SIR JAGDISH PRASAD (Education, Health and Lands Member) : Sir, my Honourable friend the Mover of the Resolution has warned Government that unless action is taken Bolshevik principles may soon invade this country. He need not fear that I as an agriculturist and having to deal with agriculturists am unaware of the hardships which the agriculturists have undergone owing to the slump in prices. But I should like the House to consider the terms of the Resolution. The Honourable Member wants that taccavi loans should be given for the purpose of relieving indebtedness. May I inform the House and the Honourable Member that three Local Governments have already modified the Taccavi Act known as the Agriculturists Loans Act of 1894. Section 4 of that Act has been modified, Sir, so as to enable Local Governments to give advances for the purpose of relieving indebtedness. It is open, therefore, to any Local Government which considers that this is the best method of dealing with this problem to amend its Act. It is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Local Government to decide whether they would or would not utilise the method of taccavi loans for the purpose of relieving indebtedness. The three Governments which have so far taken this action are the Governments of the United Provinces, Madras and Coorg. If my Honourable friend finds that in Bengal the situation is such that the Act there should be amended on the same lines as that of Madras or the United Provinces or Coorg, I suggest to him that he should bring pressure on the Ministry in Bengal and apply those methods which are most effective in bringing political pressure on Ministers responsible to the people. I do not see in what way the Government of India are to be blamed or can intervene. There is the Act. It is possible for a local Legislature to amend it in such a way as to utilise taccavi loans for the purpose of relieving indebtedness and there is nothing more to be said about it. I do not quite see why the Government of India should bear the full force of my Honourable friend's diatribes. I think the question really—I hope the House will agree—is one which should be raised in each local Legislature and it will be there for the Ministry concerned to decide what would be the most effective way of dealing with the debt problem in the particular province. It is impossible for the Government of India to accept this Resolution. All that I can do—if it will be of any use to the Honourable Member—is to forward a copy of this debate to the Provincial Government. But I suggest to him that a better method would be that the question should be raised in the Bengal Assembly. I hope in view of what I have said he will not press the Resolution to a division.

THE HONOURABLE MR. V. RAMADAS PANTULU (Madras: Non-Muhammadian): Sir, it is perfectly true that the question of distributing taccavi loans is primarily a matter for the Provincial Governments; but there are one or two things which I would like to know from the Honourable Member for the Government. The Government of India were responsible for the appointment of an important Commission and an important Committee—I mean the Royal Commission on Agriculture, and the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee. Both these bodies went very carefully into the question of taccavi loans and made certain very useful recommendations. What I want to know is, whether the Government of India who were primarily responsible for the appointment of these bodies have taken any action and, if so, what action on these recommendations?

Sir, with regard to taccavi loans, evidence was put before both those bodies in respect of certain grave defects in the distribution of these loans. There was for instance a large volume of evidence about the delay in the disposal of loan applications. It has been a universal complaint from every province and pointed attention was drawn to that matter by both the bodies I referred to. The way in which the taccavi loans are administered in some areas is very curious. Those who have any personal knowledge of the way in which these loans are distributed must confess that the method is very far from being satisfactory. In my own district of Kistna of which I have personal knowledge, I know three or four years ago the Government of Madras sanctioned Rs. 5,000 for distribution to agriculturists of that district. Rs. 2,000 was allotted to the District Collector who can disburse loans up to Rs. 2,000. Rs. 2,000 was given to the Deputy Collector who can disburse loans up to Rs. 1,000. And another Rs. 1,000 was given to the tehsildar who can give loans up to Rs. 500. So Rs. 5,000 was given to these three officers and each of them received numerous applications for assistance numbering 30 or 40. And they went into them carefully, investigated the status of the applicants and looked into their pedigrees, examined all the questions of title and when the time came for taking action, the Board of Revenue passed an order saying that the Bellary district was more in need of funds and therefore they had transferred the Rs. 5,000 allotted to the Kistna district to the Bellary district. Therefore, all the investigations led to nothing, and the Rs. 5,000 was transferred to Bellary. I do not know what happened to the Rs. 5,000 after it had been transferred to Bellary. The universal complaint is that where applications are made to the officers for taccavi loans, the needs of the agriculturist are long over before the applications are dealt with. So, the system of taccavi is not serving much useful purpose. Another complaint that was made to both these Committees was that the illegal gratification paid to the officers who distribute these loans swallowed a good portion of the loan. An agriculturist cannot ordinarily get a loan without at least 25 per cent.—sometimes more—of the loan being swallowed up in the illegal gratification given to the various officers, through whose hands the loan had to percolate to the agriculturist. There has been a very loud and insistent complaint about this, and witnesses before both these Committees, some of whom were officials, were not inclined to discredit the complaint as being baseless. Then, Sir, the instalments of the loans were inconveniently fixed. The loans given for purchase of cattle, for payment of kist, and so on, can only be repaid in convenient instalments. The time for repayment in some cases was not fixed in such a way as to allow the agriculturist time to sell his produce and realise the money to repay the loan. Also, there have been no adequate suspensions and remissions in cases of hardship. When crops entirely failed, sometimes extension of time was not given for the repayment of these loans. In the case of joint bonds executed by two or three borrowers, the way in which the liability was

[Mr. V. Ramadas Pantulu.]

enforced against the sureties also led to hardship. I know the working of these two Acts of 1883 and 1884 very intimately, and there are very many complaints against the administration of these Acts. The Government of India should examine the recommendations of the Royal Commission and of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee on these matters. Both these Committees discussed the evidences tendered before them at great length and made very definite recommendations to remove the abuses, and I think it is the duty of the Government of India to examine those recommendations and give some lead to the provinces, and also to make enquiries as to what steps have been taken by the Provincial Governments to remedy the grievances that were brought to light during the examination of this question.

If some of these things are done, and the Government of India give a lead from the centre, I think things will improve. The Government of India cannot altogether disown their responsibility for some of these subjects. They are no doubt provincial essentially, but as a co-ordinating agency and as at least a guiding if not a controlling agency, the Government of India can do a great deal to alleviate the condition of the agriculturists by ensuring the proper administration of these Acts to the provinces. I would like to have from the Honourable Member some information as to what steps have been taken by the Government of India to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture and the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee.

THE HONOURABLE MR. HOSSAIN IMAM (Bihar and Orissa : Muhammadan) : Mr. President, the Resolution which the Honourable Mr. Kumar-sankar Ray Chaudhury has moved refers to a subject which has been discussed in this House many times before. There is no difference between the Government of India and the public about the necessity of giving relief to the agriculturists. There is no difference between us and them, that the best authority to disburse this is the Provincial Government. But there is a great deal of difference between us and the Treasury Benches about the attitude which the Government of India should adopt. The Government of India think that this being a provincial subject, they have absolutely no responsibility in the matter, and that they have to sit tight and do nothing. We, on the other hand, wish that the Government of India, in the interests of the financial well-being of the country as well as in the interests of their own sources of revenue, should take the initiative and should be the driving force. Let us consider the conditions in the money market. There is such a glut of funds that the Honourable the Finance Secretary is able to obtain his treasury bills at less than 1 per cent. per annum. There is such a huge fund available in the business centres that he could take long-term credit at 2½ per cent. So much money was coming to the Government of India that by successive stages they have reduced the interest on the Postal Cash Certificates from 5 per cent. to 2½ per cent. They have similarly reduced the interest on Savings Bank deposits and the interest on Provident Fund deposits. They had so much money coming in that they did not know what to do and they started reducing the interest so that more money need not come to them. This is their condition. But what is the condition in the country? We cannot get any money. Even 18 per cent. does not help the zemindars to get money, even for productive purposes. Agriculture is a provincial subject, and the Government has very rightly, according to the recommendations of the Linlithgow Commission, established an Imperial Council of Agricultural Research. Similarly, Sir, it is their duty to set up some machinery—either at the Government of India or at the Reserve Bank—to facilitate the work of agricultural credit.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT:** You mean to tell the House that now, when the provinces have got autonomy, the Government of India should still take measures ?

**THE HONOURABLE KUNWAR SIR JAGDISH PRASAD:** I do not wish to interrupt my Honourable friend, but I would like him to confine himself to the Resolution, because, otherwise, we shall go on the whole day. This Resolution is about taccavi loans and he has to confine himself definitely to taccavi loans.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. HOSSAIN IMAM:** Taccavi loans technically means loans given to agriculturists when they are in need of money, and this is what I have been discussing all this time.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT:** Your Ministers can borrow money now under the new Act from the Reserve Bank and issue taccavi loans.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. HOSSAIN IMAM:** But, Sir, what is the position of the Government of India ? Are they going to close down all those bodies which they have created to co-ordinate provincial work like agriculture ? If they take up that attitude—

**THE HONOURABLE KUNWAR SIR JAGDISH PRASAD:** No, no, we will not.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. HOSSAIN IMAM:** There you will be interfering in a provincial subject for which Ministers are responsible. Take his own Department. He has got the D. G., I. M. S. He also interferes in a transferred subject. The provinces are independent and autonomous but still he must have control over the Indian Medical Service. When the Government want to have control they can find excuse, but when we want that they should come to our rescue, and give some sort of help either by advice or by means of actual money, they are not willing to do so and they trot out before us this provincial autonomy. Even under provincial autonomy the powers of the Governor are very wide. You will remember, Sir, the important speech which His Excellency the Viceroy made at your banquet. It was reported in the papers, and in today's *Hindustan Times* it is the subject matter of a cartoon. And there His Excellency very rightly said that the interests of those who have not succeeded at the elections has also a claim on the attention of Government. The zemindars, as is well known to the Honourable Leader of the House, have not very much sympathy with the Congress. The Congress has not been able to capture many of the zemindar constituency seats.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. RAMADAS PANTULU:** We have in Madras.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. HOSSAIN IMAM:** In Madras you have made an advance, but in Bihar they did not capture those seats formerly nor have they done so in this election. So we have little hope of help from the Ministry that will function and therefore I appeal to the Honourable Leader to give effect to the words which His Excellency gave utterance to at that memorable banquet.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. J. C. NIXON (Finance Secretary):** There are just a few words I would like to add to the debate if I may in reply to the last speaker. The Honourable Mr. Hossain Imam asks if the Government of India has played any part, at any rate in recent years, in helping the provinces

[Mr. J. C. Nixon.]

to give aid to the agricultural classes, and I confine myself to this subject of taccavi loans. As he knows as well as I do, most of the provinces have in the last 15 years obtained their loan requirements from the Government of India and used the Government of India's credit for that purpose, and that credit has been and is at the disposal of provinces up to 31st March of this year. I know of no occasion where a Provincial Government has asked to borrow money from the Government of India for the purpose of granting taccavi loans to its agricultural classes which has been refused by the Government of India. Certainly loans have been granted even during the current year for that purpose and one province has taken a loan from the Government of India during the present year, a short-term loan I may say, on specially favourable terms, namely, 1½ per cent. interest. (*Honourable Mr. Hossain Imam* : "Which" ?) I prefer not to name the Government at the moment. However, another Government, I think probably a Government better advised, instead of borrowing short-term money from the Government of India at a low rate of interest like that, felt disposed to go into the local market itself and borrow long-term money at as low a rate of interest as possible, and I have no doubt that a part of the money so borrowed from the market at 3 per cent. was intended for taccavi loans. The only point I want to press home is that the Government of India have for this particular purpose in the past at any rate placed their credit at the disposal of the Provincial Governments.

THE HONOURABLE MR. KUMARSANKAR RAY CHAUDHURY : I have brought this Resolution before this House as indebtedness is widespread throughout India and a co-ordinated policy is necessary and as the Government have still got some minor provinces under their control they might show some example by granting such loans to those provinces so that other provinces might follow.

THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT : Do you wish to press your Resolution ?

THE HONOURABLE MR. KUMARSANKAR RAY CHAUDHURY : No, Sir.

The Resolution was, by leave of the Council, withdrawn.

#### RESOLUTION RE REPLACEMENT OF BRITISH TROOPS BY INDIAN TROOPS IN THE ARMY IN INDIA.

THE HONOURABLE PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU (United Provinces Northern : Non-Muhammadan) : Mr. President, I beg to move :

"That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council to move the higher authorities to take steps to replace British troops continuously by Indian troops in the Army in India".

Sir, the increased interest taken by Indians in questions relating to the army of their country is an inevitable result of the political awakening that has taken place in the country. Indians are no longer satisfied with reforms by slow stages. The country is not asking today for instalments of reforms. It is fighting to gain the power to manage its affairs in accordance with the best interests of its people. As self-defence is the life breath of self-government, it is inevitable that Indians should concentrate on this question and should bring forward questions relating to it repeatedly before Government.

What is, Sir, the position today so far as the composition of our army is concerned? We have an army of I think between 210 and 220 thousand soldiers. But all these soldiers are not Indian. While about 145,000 are Indians, excluding the Air Force, about 55,000 are British. Now, if to these British soldiers is added the number of officers in the British section of the Army in India, I think it would be correct to say that the British element numbers about 60,000. We have thus 60,000 British soldiers as against 145,000 Indian soldiers. It gives a ratio of 1 British to 2.5 Indian soldiers. Now, Sir, the declaration of 1917 for the first time recognized our right not merely to a series of isolated reforms but to progress towards complete self-government and the Central Legislature, which came into existence after the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, immediately turned its attention to the position of Indians in the army of their own country. In March, 1921 the House passed a series of Resolutions in connection with the Report of the Escher Committee. One of them is of particular interest to us today. This Resolution asked the Government "to carry out a gradual and prudent reduction of the ratio of the British to Indian troops". It was accepted on behalf of Government by the Commander-in-Chief of the day, the late Lord Rawlinson, who took part in the debate. Lord Rawlinson explained the grounds on which the strength of the British Army had been fixed, pointed out the proportion of Indian and British soldiers in the three sections in which the army is divided, the covering troops, the field army and the internal security troops and in the end accepted the Resolution, the terms of which I have just read out. Unfortunately, Sir, although the Commander-in-Chief accepted the Resolution, it was not given effect to. We have not been told why Government did not see their way to carry out the Resolution accepted by themselves, but I think I shall be on safe ground when I say that in all probability His Majesty's Government stood in their way. We all know that the Government of India accepted the Resolution relating to the establishment of a first grade Military College in this country in 1921. But it was turned down by His Majesty's Government and the Military College that we demanded in 1921 could be established only in the year 1932. I suppose that in this case too a similar reason has prevented the fulfilment of what I may call the promise given by the Government of India in 1921.

It is obvious, Sir, that Indians could not be satisfied with the decision of His Majesty's Government. The question was discussed in London in connection with the Round Table Conference. The Defence Sub-Committee of the first Round Table Conference devoted a good deal of attention to questions relating to the improvement of the position of Indians in their own army. That Committee considered not merely the question of Indianisation, that is, of the appointment of Indians to commissioned ranks, but also of the replacement of British by Indian troops. When the latter question was raised, Mr. Thomas, who presided over the Defence Sub-Committee said, "you cannot talk of Indianisation without keeping in mind that it presupposes a reduction in British troops; that is obviously a part of it". The Defence Sub-Committee passed a Resolution asking that the question of the strength of the British troops in India should be examined by an expert committee, which should bear in mind the great importance attached to this question by Indian public opinion. The conclusions at which this Committee arrived were published three or four years ago. Unfortunately the Committee took the view that considering all things it could not recommend any reduction in the existing number of British soldiers.

Now, Sir, it is necessary for us to consider why it is that such a large British element is maintained in the Army in India, why it is that the Indian

[Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru.]

Army cannot do without the presence of a large British force. We have been hearing for a long time that the Indian Army owes its value as a fighting machine at the present time entirely to the lead given to Indian soldiers by their British officers. But we had not heard till a few years ago that the British soldier was also needed in order to stimulate the Indian soldier and to get the best out of him. Lord Rawlinson made such a statement in this House in 1921. I believe the statement was repeated by Sir Philip Chetwode. The army, Sir, showed a little enterprise a few years ago and carried on a little propaganda to convince the people of India that its present strength and expenditure were absolutely necessary in the best interests of the country and it brought out a pamphlet dealing with the various branches of the army. It is stated in this pamphlet that :

“ actual experience in the Great War proved conclusively that gallant as was the behaviour of Indian troops on countless occasions, their value was greatly increased when fighting with British troops, and if this was the case when Indian troops were themselves led by British officers, it is no less likely to be so when they will be officered entirely by men of their own race ”.

Now, this statement improves on any statement ever made in this House by any Commander-in-Chief. This pamphlet says not merely that British soldiers are necessary at the present time or that they will continue to be necessary for a few years more, but that they will be even more necessary than they are now when Indian soldiers are led by men of their own race. In other words, it suggests that it will be necessary to retain the British force here permanently. I am sure that these things can be said with impunity, only because the Indian soldier is not educated and cannot resent the libels contained in such statements on his capacity and valour. If he were educated, if he could understand what was being said about him, I am sure that the statements that are now made with regard to the need of his being stimulated to do his best by the presence of British soldiers would not be made as often as they are now.

When the army authorities say that British soldiers are needed in order to enable the Indian soldiers to put forth their best, they give no facts in support of their contention. We have no means therefore of knowing whether what they say is based on reliable data or is the result entirely of their prejudices. Sir, the policy of granting Dominion Status to India having been accepted, it is too late in the day for any military officer, or for the matter of that even for His Majesty's Government, to say that for so long as they can see the retention of a large British force will be necessary in this country. If they make such an assertion, they will be following the best method of creating the strongest distrust in their own promises and making the people feel that the British Government cannot be held to its promises, except when it finds that it will be perilous to the British Empire to go back on them. I am sure, Sir, that the British authorities wish to create no such impression. The policy which they ought to follow then should be to have more trust in the people and to make honest attempts in order to create a wholly national army in this country. They are responsible for the low position that we occupy in the army of our country. The policies that they have followed during the last three-quarters of a century have emasculated the people and deprived them of those opportunities of developing their manhood and gaining military experience as officers which they formerly enjoyed. It is up to them then to undo a part of the wrong that they have done to us and instead of continually dinning into our ears that the British soldier is superior to the Indian

soldier and that the latter can act only in dependence on his British comrade, should take resolute steps to make the Indian Army really Indian in every respect.

There is another argument, Sir, that is frequently used to justify the presence of a large British force in this country. It is said that if the internal situation in this country were better than it is today, if there was no communal feeling, if the various sections of the people trusted one another, the task of the Government would be much easier than it is today. I know, Sir, that it has been pointed out several times in this House that in times of religious trouble and internal disorder, the Local Governments ask the Government of India to supply them with British troops who would be regarded as impartial by both Hindus and Mussalmans. Now, before I deal with this argument, Sir, I should like to draw the attention of this House to one very important point. I have already stated that the Army in India is divided into three sections. Lord Rawlinson explained in 1921 that in the covering troops there was 1 British soldier to 6·7 Indian soldier. In the field army the proportion was as 1 to 2·7 or more than double that in the covering troops. But it was higher still in the internal security troops. There were 4 British to 3 Indian soldiers in these troops. There is an interesting passage in Lord Rawlinson's biography on this subject. Dealing with the question of the reduction of 3 British cavalry regiments in accordance with the recommendations of the Military Requirements Committee, he wrote as follows in his diary :

" This is rather faster than I had intended to go in the first instance but I could not resist the pressure when it came to considering the fact that we had 28 British and only 21 Indian battalions allotted for internal security. It was impossible to defend this proportion which dates from the post-Mutiny days. Now that we have decided to trust the Indians and lead them to self-government, we cannot justify an army of occupation " .

And what is the proportion, Sir, at the present day when the policy of Dominion Status has been accepted for this country ? The Simon Commission dealing with the proportion of British to Indian soldiers in internal security troops said :

" In the troops earmarked for internal security the proportion is about 8 British to 7 Indian soldiers " .

It is thus clear that even after three Round Table Conferences and the acceptance of new constitutional measures by His Majesty's Government, which are supposed to lead us to full self-government, the old policy of racial distrust and domination is being maintained and what Lord Rawlinson could not defend in 1921 continues in full force even at the present time.

Sir, I should not like to go into past history. Things have changed greatly since 1857. But since we are always asked to believe that the number of British troops in this country is based entirely on the experience actually gained in various wars, I am compelled to refer to one or two Commissions which have considered the question of the ratio of British to Indian soldiers in the past. This question, Sir, was first considered by the Peel Commission in the year 1859. Now, that Commission after taking a great deal of evidence said :

" it was of the opinion that the amount of native forces should not under present circumstances bear a greater proportion to the European in cavalry and infantry than 2 to 1 for Bengal and 3 to 1 for Madras and Bombay respectively " .

It further recommended that the artillery should be kept entirely in British hands. Twenty years later, another Commission, known as the Eden

[Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru.]

Commission, considered this matter and referring to the recommendations of the Peel Commission it said :

"The lessons taught by the Mutiny have thus led to the maintenance of the two great principles of retaining in the country an irresistible force of British troops and of keeping the artillery in the hands of Europeans".

Then with regard to the basis of its own recommendations it said :

"In working out the details of our proposed composition of the army, our main object has been to define the territorial formation of the Army of India with due regard to the great principle of *divide et impera*".

We see, Sir, what two authoritative Commissions have had to say on the subject. They have told us frankly what are the reasons which lie at the bottom of the maintenance of 60,000 soldiers in this country. They are needed to overawe Indian soldiers and keep the people down.

Again, Lord Rawlinson explained to us in 1921 that when the army was organised in 1921 one consolidated ratio was adopted for the whole army and that was one British soldier to 2.5 Indian soldiers. This gave the same result as the separate ratios recommended by the Peel Commission for the three presidential armies. I might have been prepared to give some credence to the reasons given by the military authorities for having a large British Army in this country but for the glaring fact that the ratio has remained unaltered for the last 75 years. There was no such reason in 1859 as that now given by the military authorities for fixing the ratio of 1 British soldier to 2.5 Indian soldiers, in 1859. The ratio was much lower in the battles in which Indian and British soldiers had fought together till 1857. It cannot therefore be due to actual military experience that this ratio continues unaltered up to the present time although the military authorities may try to justify it on this ground. I think, Sir, that any one who considers the situation impartially will come to the conclusion that notwithstanding the grant of two instalments of constitutional reforms and several declarations of policy by His Majesty's Government, the distrust of Indians in the military sphere and the desire to keep India in subjection continue unchanged.

Sir, the situation is difficult as it is already, but it is bound to become more difficult in future. We have often been told in

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this House that the Local Governments ask for British troops and that it is the duty of the Government of India to act in accordance with their demands. Whatever might have been the case in the past, Local Governments in the future will be of a different complexion from those that have existed hitherto. Indians, I hope, will soon bear the responsibility of managing the affairs of their provinces. Need we think that, should any internal troubles arise in future, the Indian Ministers will as readily ask for foreign troops as Governments controlled by British elements have been prone to do so far? I think we may take it for granted that the Local Governments of the future will adopt a far different attitude from that of the present Local Governments in this respect. But there is a more serious aspect of the question to which I should like to draw the attention of this House and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. What is the army needed for when its help is requisitioned by the civil authorities? It is required to support the policies laid down by the Local Governments and to enable the administrators in charge of the work of day-to-day administration to assert their authority when it is challenged. Hitherto the Provincial Governments and the Imperial Services have been dominated by Britishers but this will not continue long. The character of the Local Governments will soon change

radically. (*An Honourable Member* : " Question ? ") In personnel, certainly it will. As regards the Services too, the number of Indians is rising. Are we to take it that the British Government would be willing to place their soldiers at the disposal of Indian Governments and Indian administrators as readily as they have been willing to do in the past ? Is it conceivable that His Majesty's Government will allow British troops to be used in furtherance of policies which they might not approve of but which are insisted on by Provincial Governments composed of Indians ? I do not think, Sir, that the British Government will for long allow such a position to continue. Friction will inevitably arise between the Ministers and the Central Government. Such a problem arose in the past in the Dominions, and His Majesty's Government solved it by withdrawing their forces from the Dominions concerned and asking them to raise their own troops. Unless steps of the same kind are taken in this country also, a situation will arise which will be productive of the greatest friction and ill-feeling. It behoves the British Government to look ahead and to begin to take steps from now which will be in the ultimate interests of this country and will improve the strained relations now existing between Indians and Englishmen.

Now, Sir, I do not ask that the entire British troops should be immediately withdrawn. I have only asked that British troops should be continuously replaced by Indian troops. What does that mean ? There are at present 5 British cavalry regiments in India, and the tour of service of a British cavalry regiment in this country is about 5 years. We may then say that one cavalry regiment leaves India every year. Now, take the British infantry of which there are 43 battalions in this country. About 3 battalions leave this country every year. If we just follow this process, we can thoroughly Indianise the lower personnel of the army in about 15 years. That certainly is not a short period. I am not asking that an Indian soldier should be given a less exacting training than the British soldier has received. If the British soldier is trained for 12 months, let the Indian soldier be trained for 18 months or even two years. But, for Heaven's sake, make a beginning with the process of replacing British by Indian soldiers.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT :** Your time limit has long ago expired.

**THE HONOURABLE PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU :** Very well, Sir. I am unfortunate. I have a great deal more to say but I will bring my remarks to a close. Whenever we raise this question, we are told that the British Army has been reduced by 20,000 soldiers since 1922. This is true, but the Indian Army too has been substantially reduced since 1922, and, in any case, the net result of the reduction is that there is still 1 British to 2·5 Indian soldiers. The reduction that was made in accordance with the recommendations of the Inchcape Committee can therefore have no bearing on the question that I have raised today.

Sir, I have not gone into the question of cost, nor is it necessary for me to do so. The House knows how costly the British soldier is. He costs three times as much as an Indian soldier. We can get the finest fighting material in this country on the admission of the military authorities themselves. Nearly 900,000 combatants were recruited in connection with the Great War by the end of 1919. If then we replace British by Indian soldiers we shall not merely raise a national army in this country but give to its revenues the relief that it sadly stands in need of. We can reduce the heavy burden of military expenditure by doing justice to Indian aspirations. Apart from this, Sir, I understand from questions put in the House of Commons two days

[Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru.]

ago that the present system of supplying British troops to India is not working well. It appears that the Cardwell system is breaking down. It was suggested therefore that the Dominions should be asked to supply troops for service in India. I am sorry to say that His Majesty's Government stated that the question was already engaging their attention. Sir, this is a serious matter. I earnestly hope that no such step will be taken by the British authorities. The recruitment of soldiers in the Dominions for garrisoning India would be an intolerable insult to the dignity of this country. Our weakness may tempt His Majesty's Government to try this experiment, but though we are weak let them remember the famous words, "Arms remain to the plundered". Let them be wise and not goad India into further discontent. Weak though we may be, we are not prepared to tolerate the insult contemplated in the reply given by His Majesty's Government the other day in the House of Commons. Sir, the national sentiment is growing apace in this country. The situation today can be satisfactorily met only by recognizing the just demands of the people of India and taking adequate steps to enable them to see that their highest aspirations can be realized with the British Empire and within a measurable distance of time. If, however, other policies are allowed to prevail the British Government must hold themselves responsible for such consequences as may ensue. We for our part are determined to continue in the path that we have chosen for ourselves. We want to be in our country what other people are in theirs, and in order to achieve our purpose it will be our constant endeavour to compel the authorities to nationalise the Indian Army from top to bottom.

**THE HONOURABLE RAI BAHADUR SRI NARAIN MAHTHA (Bihar : Non-Muhammadan) :** Mr. President, the task of the supporters of the Resolution has been rendered very much easier by the able manner in which the Honourable Mr. Kunzru has moved his Resolution. He marshalled both facts and arguments so lucidly as to leave little room for addition or improvement. But, considering the great importance of the subject, I hope the House will bear with me a few minutes while I make a few observations. I shall start by quoting a few lines from that much criticised document, the Report of the Simon Commission, to which the Government of India attach much reliance and importance. The Report says :

"A self governing India must be in a position to provide herself with armed forces fit to undertake the task which armed forces in India have to discharge".

The necessity of providing national defence is such a basic principle of self-government and national progress that I need not have searched for an authority like the Simon Commission to state it, but for the obvious advantage of a safe assumption, from the point of view of Government, to base my arguments on. If the Government will allow me to assume, as I hope they will, that they are sincere in their desire to see India self-governed as early as possible, then they will be forced to concede the corollary that India cannot be allowed to be governed principally in the interest of England or the British Empire and that the composition of the Indian Army cannot be allowed to reflect a policy of racial supremacy or mistrust of the Indian. The Honourable Leader of the House did yesterday in very laudable and forceful terms speak out how conscious the Indian was in this respect and how much he resented any show of racial supremacy. The Honourable Mover of the Resolution has stated what a large proportion of the army is made up of the British element—I British to 2·5 Indians, and how expensive the British soldiers are, and what a drain, wholly unproductive and unnecessary, this expenditure is

and how it affects the general morale of the nation. He has also shown that difficulties in the way of replacement of British by Indian soldiers are absolutely imaginary and hollow. In addition, I submit, that the replacement is also necessary from the point of view of more effective and more efficient defence, apart from the question of economic and the moral elevation of the people of this country. Whenever the question of the Indianisation of the military ranks is raised the arguments advanced against it are our racial differences, diverse languages, British trusteeship, etc. These, please let me tell you, are so stale and so thoroughly exploded that their exponents too are now a little shy in advancing them. Lord Curzon in his book, *The Indian Corps in France*, puts the matter quite clearly and truthfully. He says :

“ The Indian Army in fact has always possessed a triple function—the preservation of internal peace in India itself, the defence of Indian frontiers and the preparedness to embark at a moment's notice for imperial service in other parts of the globe. And in this third aspect India has for a long time been one of the most important units in the scheme of British Imperial defence, providing, the British Government with a striking force, always ready and of admirable efficiency and assured valour ”.

I venture, therefore, to say that the British contingent of the Indian Army exists not for the benefit of India but to serve imperial interests. The Indian exchequer is being exploited to serve the interests of England, to keep off all fear of endangering British domination in this country, and for the purpose of helping England to fight her imperial battles. The British contingent of the Indian Army exists in order to overawe and keep the Indians subdued at the point of the bayonet, to quell the Indian Army in the event of a rising, to watch the armies of Indian States, to keep safe British interests, to enable England to utilise India and her resources for the training of British soldiers without entailing any cost to England, and finally, to swell England's military reserve at India's cost for imperial purposes. While this is the true picture of the situation, while these are the true reasons for maintaining a large army of British troops in India, India helplessly continues to suffer both humiliation and loss. The policy of the Government clearly shows mistrust. They have also taken care to include in the Indian element of the Army in India a large number of Afridis, Waziris, Baluchis, etc., to the exclusion of Indians. Yet all this happens not because Indians are scarce or wanting in efficiency as soldiers. Meredith Townsend, who lived in India and made a life-long study of Indian conditions, in his book *Asia in Europe* says :

“ The fighting people of India, whose males are as big as ours and more regardless of death than ourselves, number at least 120 millions. If the Persian conscription were applied in India we should have 2½ millions of soldiers actually in the barracks and 8 lakhs recruits coming every year ”.

—a force, I contend, Sir, with which not only Asia but the whole world might be subdued. The Mover of the Resolution was unduly moderate and humble in stating the comparative utility of the British and the Indian soldier. Without meaning any disparagement to the British soldier, I would make bold to say that the Indian soldier, especially in Indian conditions and climate, is far more efficient. Even today the Indian soldier, compared to the British soldier, is certainly ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-armed, ill-paid and ill-trained, but still the Indian soldier in actual service compares favourably with his British comrade. In scouting, in reconnaissance of patrolling work, in rifle fire and competitions, in tracking a country, in field work in the hills and mountains, in grenade work, in the use of automatic weapons, and last but not the least in hardihood and physical resistance, he stands second to none in the world. As far as health and physique go, we cannot find a more authoritative report than that of the best British medical men from England, brought

[ Rai Bahadur Sri Narain Mahtha. ]

to India to look after and guard the health of the British soldier in India. Surgeon-General Gordon, Principal Medical Officer of British Forces, Madras, says :

" A large portion of young lads, such as now arrive in India are physically unequal to the strain of active service and consequently while they continue so, are not only useless but receive pay for work that they do not and cannot perform "

I would invite the Honourable Members to look into some of the charts showing the incidence of diseases amongst British and Indian soldiers and they will find the percentage varying between 12 to 23 per 1,000 in the case of Indian soldiers and between 67 to 78 in the case of British soldiers. This shows the comparative military inefficiency of the British soldier. Besides, the amount of money required to maintain British soldiers in India is so prohibitively large and so clearly beyond the means of this country that if for nothing else at least on account of the financial inability of this country, we must dispense with the British troops. It is a matter of serious regret that Government should starve all the nation-building departments and persist in spending crores and crores of rupees over the maintenance of British soldiers who are not only not required for the defence of this country but really only hamper both defence and the general advance of this country.

THE HONOURABLE MR. P. N. SAPRU (United Provinces Southern : Non-Muhammadian) : Mr. President, the Honourable Mr. Kunzru has dealt very exhaustively with the subject-matter of this Resolution and therefore it is not necessary to say many words in support of the proposition embodied in the Resolution before the House. There are just one or two things, however, that I should like to stress. What is the total number of British troops in India today ? When the question was under discussion in this House two years ago the figure given from this side was 60,000, but I believe that Sir Philip Chetwode said that the figure was in the neighbourhood of 55 and 60 thousand. We should like to know what the exact figure of British troops in the country is. Then the second question on which we should like to be enlightened is this. In 1923 on the recommendation of the Inchcape Committee there was a certain reduction effected in the number of British troops in the country. Has there been any further reduction since 1923 in the number of British troops in this country ? We have a period of 14 years, 1923 to 1937, and I am not wrong in saying that during this period of 14 years there has been no reduction of British troops at all. Why has there been no reduction in the number of British troops during this period of 14 years ? At the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference, it was recognised by British delegates that Indian opinion attached great importance to the question of reduction of British troops. It has also been authoritatively stated that India cannot have control over her defence until such time as there is a British element in the army. Therefore, if we want Indian freedom, if we want Indian Dominion Status, we have to press for a reduction of British troops. We cannot be free in this country until British troops are removed from this country. The Honourable Mr. Kunzru does not say that British troops should be immediately withdrawn from the country. That is not his proposition. (*An Honourable Member* : " That is what he should do ".) That is what he should do and that is what we should do. But that is not what the Resolution says Government should do today. What the Resolution says is that there should be a policy of continuous reduction of British troops in this country. Your policy is progressive Indianisation ; your policy is progressive realisation of responsible government. If your policy is progressive realisation of responsible government, then it follows that your policy ought

to be progressive reduction of British troops also. Therefore we should like His Excellency to indicate to us the steps which Government are taking to accelerate the pace at which India will advance towards Dominion Status. His Excellency will recognise himself that India cannot be said to be advancing towards Dominion Status if the British garrison is retained at its present high number. The present ratio was fixed in 1850 after the Mutiny or what we patriotic Indians prefer to call the Indian War of Independence. The ratio before the Mutiny of British to Indian troops was 5 to 1. After the Mutiny, the ratio was fixed at 2 to 1. After the Mutiny you were suffering from the Mutiny complex, but now you say that you have no complexes at all. You say that you want India to be free, that your one desire is to help India to achieve freedom. Well, then, is it not your duty then to see that India is enabled to be free? Is it not your duty then to do all that you can to smooth the path of India's progress towards freedom and Dominion Status? Therefore the question of ratio is of fundamental importance. You cannot say that there is something sacred about this ratio. You fixed this ratio—this will be quite evident to anyone who goes through the Reports of the Peel Commission and other Commissions that were appointed about that time, in 1870 or thereabouts—and you cannot say that this ratio was fixed because of considerations of military efficiency. This ratio was fixed because you had no confidence in the Indian soldier. This ratio was fixed because you had no trust in the Indian people. The policy was based upon a mistrust of the Indian people. It was recognised in evidence before those Committees that the Indian Army was a gallant army but it was stressed in evidence before those Committees—I am referring to the Committees which were appointed in the seventies—it was pointed out that the ratio could not be reduced because the Indian soldier could not be trusted. Well, you have had experience of the Indian soldier during the last 50 or 60 years and you trusted him during the war and he gave a very good account of himself. He was sent to Mesopotamia and he did exceedingly well. He was sent to other theatres of war and he did exceedingly well. Why cannot you trust the Indian soldier, and where is the fear if your policy is responsible government? Why should you not trust the Indian soldier if you really mean India to be free? That is really the issue which is raised by this Resolution and I think, so far as that issue is concerned, there has been no answer from the Government so far. We have had this Resolution on previous occasions before this House and I do not remember to have had an answer to this question from the official Benches.

Then, Sir, we have also to approach this question from the financial point of view. The British soldier costs Rs. 850 per annum. That was the figure given to us by Sir Philip Chetwode. The Indian soldier costs Rs. 285 per annum. That is to say, the British soldier is three times more expensive than the Indian soldier, and we have to bear this cost because you won't trust us. We have to pay for our army three times as much as we should have normally paid for it because you do not trust us and because you want to retain your hold over India. Well, if you want to retain your hold over India, if you don't want to trust us, then you must bear the expenses of this garrison. Why should you make the Indian taxpayer bear the burden of this expenditure? You cannot have an Empire without paying for it and that is really what you want. You want to have an Empire but you don't want to pay for that Empire. Well, I say, Sir, that is not really playing the game. If you want to have this vast Indian Empire, then pay for this vast Indian Empire. But don't bleed us, and that is what in plain straightforward language you are doing. By maintaining the army at its present high cost you are denying to the provinces the chance of development on sound lines.

[Mr. P. N. Sapru.]

You are denying to the country certain essential social services which the country needs.

Sir, I have often said in this House before that I am a confirmed pacifist. I would altogether abolish all arms and in my Utopia there would be no place for the soldier at all. But I know, Sir, that I have to live in a very imperfect world and I am surrounded by Dictators and by countries which do not believe in my philosophy of life. And therefore as a realist I have to compromise with my ideals. But I feel, Sir, that even from the point of view of those who think that armies are necessary it is possible to effect reductions in army expenditure without impairing the efficiency of the Indian Army. It is no use your saying that the Army in India is for the purposes of India's external and internal defence. The army is here also for certain imperial purposes. If there is no imperial purpose behind the army, then why is Britain making any contribution towards the cost of the Indian Army? Why even pay Rs. 2 crores towards the cost of the Indian Army? You have by contributing Rs. 2 crores to the cost of the Indian Army admitted impliedly that there is an imperial purpose behind the Indian Army. Well, if there is an imperial purpose behind the Indian Army, why not pay for that imperial purpose yourself? Why should you make us pay for that imperial purpose?

**THE HONOURABLE MR. HOSSAIN IMAM:** Even that does not come from the Imperial Exchequer.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. P. N. SAPRU:** Well, Sir, my Honourable friend, Mr. Hossain Imam, is a great authority on finance and understands figures much better than I do—I confess I am rather like Lord Randolph Churchill and therefore I will not talk about figures at all. The point that I was making is that the present organisation of the Indian Army is determined by the Imperial Committee of Defence and the Imperial Committee of Defence looks at questions not from the Indian point of view but from the point of view of the Empire as a whole. So far as we are concerned, we have no control over our army policy, over our foreign policy. It is the British Government which is controlling our defence and our foreign policy, therefore I think, Sir, the British Government ought to pay for it.

Now, Sir, another point that I should like to emphasise is that there is no part of the Empire which pays capitation charges and we have to pay passage money for these soldiers, we have to provide pensions for these British officers and we cannot tax those pensions. There is no income-tax on these pensions. And when the British soldier leaves the country the experience that he has gained is lost to us. All this constitutes a drain on our resources. You can without reducing the strength of your army replace British soldiers by Indian soldiers. We do not ask you to reduce the strength of the army. What we are asking you to do is to replace continually, progressively, British troops by Indian troops. That, I would say with all the earnestness at my command, is not an extreme proposition, is not an unreasonable proposition. We wish to be free in our country. We wish to be in our country what South Africans are in their country, what Australians are in their country, what New Zealanders are in their country, and we have a right to expect, having regard to the pledges that you have given, that you will help us to achieve that freedom for which the youth of this country is yearning. We cannot be free unless we control our defence and foreign policy. Responsibility at the centre can never be a genuine commodity, a genuine article, without control of

the defence. You have yourself said that we cannot have complete responsibility at the centre until such time as there is a British element in the army. That was the view that the Simon Commission took, and I think that is the view which British statesmen generally accept. That is the argument which is advanced against complete responsibility at the centre. As we want complete responsibility at the centre, we attach great importance to this question of reduction of British troops, and it is for us a test question. It is for us a question by which we shall test Britain's *bona fides* in regard to Dominion Status.

With these words, Sir, I desire to give my full and wholehearted support to the Resolution so ably and so eloquently moved by my respected friend and leader, Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT:** Your Excellency, I think if you speak at this stage, it will probably shorten the debate.

**HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:** Sir, to begin with, I should like to compliment the Mover of this Resolution, if I may, on the able and moderate way in which he presented his case. He has obviously studied the literature on the subject most carefully, and, although I may not agree entirely with his presentation of the facts and figures, this in itself does not materially weaken his case or strengthen mine. In fact, I should say that, *on paper* (if I may so express it), he has made out as strong a case as could be made out. He will forgive me if I go on to say that, where he failed to convince me was with regard to the actual realities of the case; and I propose to develop this side of it in my reply. I think the two main aspects of this controversy that naturally appeal most to Honourable Members opposite are the financial and sentimental aspects—and, when I refer to sentiment, I mean sentiment in the best sense of the word, the sentiment of patriotism and national honour.

Now, Sir, so far as the financial aspect is concerned, no one can deny that the substitution of Indian for British troops in this country *would* produce a saving—indeed, a large saving. No arguments are required to convince me of that. What the exact figure would be it is difficult to say, nor do I think that it matters very much. Our own estimate, made a few years ago, is something in the neighbourhood of Rs. 8 crores—excluding the cost of pensions, which naturally must go on for many years, and also excluding the cost of the capitation payments which have been referred to. What Honourable Members are apt to forget is that the capitation payments are now more than covered by the contribution of Rs. 2 crores paid by His Majesty's Government towards the cost of Indian defence. That contribution—

(At this stage the Honourable Rai Bahadur Lala Ram Saran Das rose to interrupt.)

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT:** Order, order. I would request Honourable Members not to interrupt His Excellency. He has very patiently heard all of you and never interrupted your speeches and it is only fair that you should allow him an opportunity of addressing the House.

**HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:** That contribution may not be specifically related to the cost of British troops in India, but I cannot imagine that it would be continued—at any rate, at anything like the present figure—if all British troops were removed from this country. Some Honourable Members, I know, think that the present contribution ought to be increased. All I can do today is to refer them to my speech on this subject in reply to the Honourable Mr. Kalikar's Motion last Simla session. So much.

[ His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.]

for the financial aspect. I agree that British soldiers are comparatively expensive, but that does not alter the fact that I consider them necessary.

I shall return to that point in a moment, but first let me say a few words about what I have called the sentimental aspect of this question. I do not want to say too much, and I only wish that Honourable Members would read, or read again, what is said on this subject in Chapter VI of this pamphlet of Facts and Figures, which was supplied to them a year or two ago and of which there are copies in the Library. I think it will repay study. But let me say this at once. The Government of India—and myself—are fully conscious of the natural and laudable desire of Indians to defend their own country. We have recognised this desire, so far as we have been able to do so, by the scheme of Indianisation that is now in process of being worked out. That scheme in itself does involve the gradual substitution of a considerable number of Indian for British officers, and for a measure of substitution of Indian for British troops in such arms as the artillery, signals, and administrative services. I am, of course, aware, that, as a start, this does not amount to anything enormous, but it is a start and it does amount to something quite considerable. The point I wish to make—and I hope I shall not be misunderstood when I make it—is that even national sentiment however much we may applaud it cannot be the finally decisive factor in a vital matter of this kind. We have got to consider certain hard facts, which I now propose to deal with.

*Firstly.*—I am most diffident to draw attention to myself but it is a fact that I am the person who is ultimately responsible to the Government of India, and, indeed, to every single Indian in this country, for ensuring, so far as I can, the peace and tranquillity of India. It is I who will have to shoulder the blame if things go wrong, and if, when the moment comes, our defence forces are found to be unequal to the tasks imposed upon them. I beg the House to remember that, and to recognise that it is by no means a light responsibility.

*Secondly.*—The forces on which my predecessors and I have hitherto relied have been British soldiers led by British officers, and Indian soldiers led by British officers. That is the organisation which has successfully preserved the peace of India for many years—and that is the organisation in which I am now asked to make radical and sweeping alterations. Believe me, Sir, I have served in the Indian Army all my life, and I yield to none in my admiration for that army and the sepoy and Indian officers who constitute its foundations. But there is no getting away from the fact that it is an army which has been trained and led for years by British officers, and we have had no real experience yet of an army led and trained by Indian officers. I do not mean to say for a moment that it cannot be ever led and trained by Indian officers. I hope that one day it will. If I had not hoped so, I could not have agreed to the measure of Indianisation that is now in progress. But, Sir, it must take time. You cannot completely change the organisation of any army in the world in a day. Meanwhile, while this measure is going on and the whole international situation is so uncertain, it is not, in my opinion, the moment to make drastic reductions in the strength of the British Army in India.

After all, Sir, the present combination of British and Indian troops has given us an army of which we may well be proud, and which is, I venture to claim, the admiration of countries outside India. To my mind, this happy combination is due to the fact that there are qualities in the British and Indian soldier which are complementary to each other, and produce a standard of efficiency which it behoves us to take into very careful consideration before it is disturbed.

Ap[ro]pos of this point, we have heard a great deal today about the ratio between British and Indian troops. There is evidently some misunderstanding on this point, and I should like to take this opportunity of making the situation clear once and for all. Whatever may have been the case in the past, I can assure the House that today there is no ratio laid down simply for the purpose of maintaining a mathematical proportion between the numbers of British and Indian troops in India. We have got past all that long ago. When we go to war, our brigades are made up in the proportion of three Indian units to one British unit. For internal security purposes, it is true the number of British troops, as compared with Indian troops, is higher. And the result of all this is that the ratio of British to Indian soldiers in the Army in India as a whole happens to work out at present at one to something between two and three. But these proportions are based on practical experience of what has been found to give the best results, and on what is considered necessary from time to time to carry out the role of the Defence Forces as a whole. They are definitely not based on any preconceived notion that the number of Indian troops must not exceed the number of British troops by any particular figure. I hope I have made the point clear.

Now, in this connection as already mentioned by others this morning I may remind the House that the number of British troops in India has been reduced by some 20,000 since the war. In addition, as I have already explained, a measure of substitution of Indian for British troops is already in progress. Apart from this, I can see no early prospect of any further substitution of Indian for British troops in India, and I should be wrong to encourage false hopes in that respect. It is, however, possible that a certain reduction in the number of British troops may result from changes of organisation which may be carried out in the future, as more modern weapons are taken into use and mechanisation increases. It is also a fact, as just explained by the Secretary of State for War in the House of Commons, that the recruiting difficulties at home are going to cause fluctuations in the strength of British units overseas, including India, which will involve temporary shortages in establishments without reducing the actual number of units.

*Thirdly and lastly.*—It may be suggested that I am merely giving my own personal opinions, unsupported by those of other responsible authorities in India. That is very far from being the case. For instance, if I wish to move a single company of British troops from a single station anywhere in India, I am immediately faced with the most vehement opposition from the Local Government concerned. That is a hard fact, and there is no getting away from it. Honourable Members may suggest as indeed they have that the explanation is to be found in the composition of the present Local Governments. I do not agree, but anyhow that is beside the point. In not many days from now, elected Indian ministers will assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order throughout India. In discharging that responsibility they will have the full support of the army behind them, just as the present Governments have it today. I do not claim to be a prophet, Sir, but it may well be that Indian ministers of the future, to whatever political party they may belong, will be very glad to feel that they have behind them the imperishable and cheerful British soldier, on whom in the last resort they will be able to rely for assistance. At any rate, I would seriously ask this House whether it would agree to deprive the ministers of the future, in advance, of the bulwark on which the Local Governments of today place such implicit trust. Let us at least wait and see, and let us not by any vote that the House may take today spread abroad the impression that the Provincial Governments of

[His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.]

the future are going to be weakened in any way in discharging the onerous duties that lie before them.

To conclude, Sir. From what I have said, I hope it is clear to the House that the main difference between the Honourable the Mover of the Resolution and myself lies in the words "continuous reduction", as used in the text of his Resolution. I have shown that the Government of India, since the war, have been working on a policy of "gradual and prudent reduction" as regards strengths of British troops in India. They are still working on this policy, but it must be left to *them* to decide the rate of progress as and when they are entirely satisfied that all circumstances are favourable. It follows, therefore, that Government cannot commit themselves to a "continuous reduction", regardless of what those circumstances may be. I regret, therefore, that I must oppose the Resolution. (Applause.)

THE HONOURABLE LIEUT.-COL. SIR HISSAM-UD-DIN BAHADUR (North-

West Frontier Province : Nominated Non-Official) : Sir, I

1 P. M.

think His Excellency cleared up the whole matter, but I would like to say a few words in brief.

Though I am an old soldier with experience of 32 years in the army and on deputations abroad still I am a recruit in this Honourable House. I am sure the Honourable Members will accord me their indulgence now that I am speaking on the Resolution under discussion.

Sir, I should like to assure the Honourable Members opposite that I am an Indian first and an Indian always and whatever I will say is for the good of my country. I wish from the bottom of my heart for the prosperity and betterment of every Indian soul in every walk of life. But I also think it is justifiable to say that we are grateful to the nation which has brought India to the present stage of development. We should not I suggest attempt to deny this.

Sir, in the short space of time I have sat in the House, I have noticed a tendency on the part of my Honourable friends opposite—and I say this with due respect—to lay down for Government a definite course of action as regards the army and as regards the North-West Frontier, without having sufficient knowledge of these matters which are vital to India. On these questions my 32 years' experience justifies me in speaking with some authority.

Sir, I turn now to the question of Indianisation and replacement of British troops by Indians. To take Indianisation first. As a soldier I am strongly of opinion that keeping in view efficiency and safety, the pace of Indianisation must be accelerated. We should not however attempt to run before we can walk firmly. We must remember that quality is more essential than quantity in the army. The officers coming out from the Indian Military Academy, whom I have had an opportunity of meeting are I agree mostly efficient and of the right type. It would not be out of the place, Sir, if I mention here that the present rate of pay to officers from Dehra Dun is not sufficient to maintain the same status, position, prestige and discipline in the eyes of the soldiers as is maintained by other King's commissioned officers. Some steps must urgently be taken to remedy this, because it might have dangerous effect on active service if the troops have not the same regard for them, as for officers of the King's commission. Indianisation is a question which has already been sufficiently discussed in this House. I have touched one or two important points only and I need not pursue this matter further.

Sir, now as regards the British troops. Ever since the inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms this has been a subject of heated discussion. Government has often been accused of feeding their own countrymen and have persistently been asked to reduce the number of British troops in India. Sir, my fundamental opinion is that British troops are the Arch of Peace in India and should not be reduced at present. I support this by the following reasons.

*Firstly.*—On account of the vast number of languages and religions in this country, there is always—much as we may regret it—the possibility of communal tension. An impartial force must remain in order to secure peace and tranquillity of the country until the possibility of communal tension disappears.

*Secondly.*—When expeditionary forces are sent to the frontier or to any other front, their ratio is fixed at 1 to 3, i.e., an infantry brigade consists of 1 British and 3 Indian battalions. This mixed force has proved very successful in the past and therefore it is desirable for the welfare of the country that Indian and the British forces should be kept together in this order. Sir, I narrate an action to which I have been an eye witness. During the Terah Expedition 1897-98 at Bazar Valley the 25th Punjab Regiment were withdrawing their piquets when they were heavily attacked by an Afridi lashkar. The heavy covering fire of the Seaforth Highlanders checked the Afridi lashkar and it was due to the firm stand of this British Regiment that the Punjabis succeeded in withdrawing without suffering heavy loss. This the Seaforths achieved in spite of the fact that they themselves suffered heavily losing two officers and many British other ranks. They did not however leave the position till the Indian unit withdrew safely.

Sir, I should like to say emphatically that there exists very friendly relations between British and the Indian troops during peace and war. Among them, both feel that the other is complementary.

Sir, taking into consideration the misery and suffering of the people during the last Mutiny—which we should remember was only in the lifetime of our fathers—I will appeal to the Honourable House not to urge the replacement of British troops by Indians at present. A great responsibility lies on India to provide for the safety of the families of domiciled Europeans, Anglo-Indians and other Christians in India who require protection. It is a responsibility which we should consider very carefully at this stage in our political development. Nothing could more completely damn us in the eyes of the world, or retard our national aspirations, than that we should fail in this task. I ask Honourable Members opposite to give proper and solemn consideration to this point. We should not dismiss this matter lightly and for these reasons I ask the House to reject this Resolution.

*“ Ramuz-i-Sallanat-i-khesk khusravan danand.”*

THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient stage to adjourn the House.

The Council then adjourned for Lunch till Half Past Two of the Clock.

The Council re-assembled after Lunch at Half Past Two of the Clock, the Honourable the President in the Chair.

THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT: I may inform Honourable Members that I propose to sit only till 5 P.M. this evening and I have requested

[Mr. President.]

the Leader of the House to kindly give an extra day only for the Resolutions which will remain over today including the Resolutions which have been carried over from yesterday, and he has very kindly promised to do so.

THE HONOURABLE RAI BAHADUR LALA RAM SARAN DAS (Punjab : Non-Muhammadian) : Sir, I support the Resolution which has been so ably and impressively moved by my Honourable friend Mr. Kunzru. He has dealt with the subject so exhaustively that he has not left much for me to say. Sir, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has told us today that for some time to come there is no prospect of a reduction in the British Army in India. Sir, I wish to draw the attention of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to his own report which was presented to us this session in which we find the reduction in the British ranks in 1937 as compared with 1936 was 1,903, because in 1936 their number was 59,230 and in 1937 their number was 57,327. Sir, if we look at the figures of Indian and other ranks for the same period, we find that in 1936 their total number was 143,715, but in 1937, it dwindled down to 140,586, which means a reduction of 3,129. Sir, as regards the Indian officers, that is, officers holding Viceroy's commissions, in 1936 their number was 4,426 as compared with 4,230 in 1937, which means a reduction of 196. Then, Sir, if we come to the British King's commissioned officers, we find that their number in 1937 was 7,192 as compared with 7,272 in 1936. Sir, these figures go to prove that there has been some reduction in the British Army in India and there has been also a reduction in the ranks and file of the Indian Army in India.

Sir, the reasons which His Excellency has put forward for the retention of the British Army in India have been heard by us with great attention. Sir, no where in the other dominions under the British Crown is any charge made for the British Army which is kept in those countries as an army of occupation. I request His Excellency to let us know what is the reason why the cost of the army of occupation in India is being exacted from India. Sir, no where in the world is such a big standing army being maintained by any country. In India we are maintaining a huge army the parallel of which we do not find anywhere in the world. Sir, the arguments put forward by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief lead one to infer that the Indian Army has always been led by the British officers. That is a fact, since the last few years a few Indian officers were added every year but later addition of King's commissioned Indian officers ceased when the policy of racial discrimination was introduced into the recruitment of officers for the Indian Army. Sir, it pains me to say that the racial discrimination was introduced or rather enforced notwithstanding the proclamation of Queen Victoria and other Kings who ruled over India. Sir, by discrimination between the King's commissioned officers and the Indian commissioned officers a stigma of inferiority has ever been attached to Indians.

With regard to His Excellency's observations about the Indian Army being led by British officers, I might say, Sir, that the armies from India consisting of Imperial Service troops manned entirely by Indians and commanded by Indians proved a great success in the Great War and received well-merited praise in despatches from the officers in command. I might mention that even the Viceroy's commissioned officers who rose to a high position have been very successful in commanding the units which were placed under their command. I feel proud to say, Sir, that our esteemed and gallant colleague, Lt.-Col. Sir Hissam-ud-din Khan, commanded successfully for six years a unit

of the Frontier Force in India. General Vir Vikram Singh of Nahar also successfully commanded the State Artillery in the Great War and his name stands famous for the laurels which he had won. And so is the name of Major-General Maharana Partab Singh of Jodhpur and Idar. Sir, as it has now been laid down that an Indian commissioned officer, even though he may be senior to his British colleague, cannot be put in command over British officers there should be no anxiety and suspicion whatsoever in the mind of the Government that these Indian units in time of need will shirk duty. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has himself paid a tribute to the Indian Army and he has said that in future, in practically all the Indian arms, except in a few arms which have been so-called Indianised, the Britishers will be in command. There seems no imperative need therefore of maintaining such a big British Army. Sir, before the war, our defence expenditure did not exceed Rs. 29 crores. In 1922, it rose to Rs. 66 crores, and now it has been brought down this year to Rs. 44 crores odd. Sir, we see no reason for huge increase in the army or defence expenditure. The situation on the frontiers and the British relations with the adjoining countries have not since the war gone bad or worse. So, this doubling or trebling of the military expenditure is beyond the means of India, particularly at a time when we have grave economic trouble. Sir, I concur with the view of my Honourable and Gallant friend, Col. Sir Hissam-ud-din when he talked of communal tension. But that communal tension is unfortunately being encouraged in India by the communal award and other similar rulings of the Government. The British Government who have increased this friction and have nurtured this communal tension should be held responsible for it and in case that is one of the main reasons why the British Army is needed in India, its cost must be met by the British Exchequer. Sir, Col. Sir Hissam-ud-din has also observed that a British element is necessary whenever there is communal tension. What is the case in England and Ireland, Sir? There are tensions of a similar nature there. Are any Indians or Africans or foreigners being imported to suppress unrest there? Sir, in the present economic condition of India the expenditure for the maintenance of the British Army in case it is necessary to retain should be borne by the British Exchequer. It pains us to find that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief says that for some time to come he does not foresee any reduction in the British Army in India except that under some reorganisation scheme there may be a little reduction in their numbers. This is very discouraging. I would urge upon the Government to bring down this expenditure by making the British Exchequer or the British War Office pay for the British army of occupation in India.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. HOSSAIN IMAM** (Bihar and Orissa : Muhammadan) : Sir, I had no intention of intervening in this debate, but the slender hope that His Excellency has given of the possibility of reducing the personnel due to reorganisation has given me some hope that perhaps, even through this, we may be able to reduce the burden of the army expenditure. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief knows, and none knows better than he, how our fighting machine at present is lagging behind the armament of the big powers. Our equipment, Sir, is very short. The universal development of the air force required that in India too the *Indian Air Force* which has just been created should be further strengthened, and the strengthening of the Air Force means the replacement of a goodly number of the army. At least, a good part of the army which is maintained in the Trans-Indus area could be dispensed with if the Indian Air Force had been sufficiently developed and expanded. Another item which I wish to bring to the notice of the House is the difference in the number of units as maintained in England and in India.

[Mr. Hossain Inam.]

Here, Sir, an infantry of the line has a strength of 865 men per regiment, whereas in England the number is 791 other ranks, a difference of about 100 men in the strength of each battalion. If you multiply this number by the number of units in India, you will get a reduction of 5,000 men without in any way impairing the efficiency of the army, for I do not think it will be suggested that the Army in England is maintained at a less efficient strength than in India. But there is one thing, the Army in England is better equipped. I admit that, and I suggest that we should also equip ourselves better, so that we may be able to dispense with the men. If the army is better equipped, the nature of the personnel, whether European or Indian, would not make so much difference. Secondly, I wish to draw attention to the fact that the strength of the army has to be kept at a higher limit because of certain concessions given to soldiers, like leave and other concessions, which were given during the days when we had more money to spend. The leave rules, etc., are being revised in the civil departments. We do not know whether the army is following suit or not? The reorganisation will give us good results if it is carried on in the spirit in which we want it. The reorganisation is not required simply to make a more efficient machine, but also to make it a cheaper machine. We know that in commercial concerns, both considerations are taken into account. We not only want to have a better factory in order to turn out more, but we also want that the cost should be reduced. I wish that the army would look at the question from this standpoint. We would all give our support to the army authorities in India for the better equipment, provided the cost also is *pari passu* reduced and brought to the level of our income. The arguments which the Honourable Mover brought forward in favour of it were very cogent. The constitutional development is dependent on this and the better you equip the army, the nearer will be the day when the Indian Army will be able to shoulder the burden.

With these words, Sir, I support the Motion.

THE HONOURABLE MR. V. V. KALIKAR (Central Provinces : General) : I had no mind to take part in this debate, but some of the remarks of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief have encouraged me to state my views on this subject. His Excellency has stated frankly before this House that there are no further prospects of reducing the British troops in this country. If I take that proposition to be correct, are we to understand that the tall talk of Indianisation not only emanating from the public of India but encouraged by the British statesmen is over? During the Round Table Conferences we were given to understand that the defence of India ought to be the increasing concern of Indians. We do not make this demand for Indianisation of the army only on sentimental grounds. Nor do we make it only on financial grounds. But we deem it our birthright to take part in the defence of our country. We know that the Britishers after coming to India and after the great Mutiny practically emasculated the martial spirit of the people of India. But I submit we do not commit a crime if we say that we have become capable, that we are suitable and that we desire to take part in the defence of our country. The financial argument made out by my Honourable friend Mr. Kunzru is as sound and appears to be more sound to me because his argument is supported by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency told us this morning that according to his calculation, if the British troops are replaced by Indian troops there would be a saving of Rs. 8 crores. That is not a small sum, but my Honourable friend in his Resolution does not suggest that the British troops should be immediately replaced. He wants a continuous process of Indianisation of the army. If it is to be a settled fact.

that no further attempts should be made by us in this direction, I am sorry I cannot agree with His Excellency. We shall agitate and agitate on this point, and as we think that our claims are just, it is our duty to ask not only the Government of India but the British Government to consider the promises they have given us in the past and to deliberate over the reports which their own Committees have produced on this point, and meet our demand to some extent. In these days of depression when the Government of India cannot balance their budget, if there is some reduction in the expenditure on the army by the substitution of Indian for British personnel, that will go a great way to lessen the burden on the poor Indian taxpayer. So, I am very glad to find from the financial point of view that His Excellency agrees to the proposal made by my Honourable friend Mr. Kunzru.

Another point that has been trotted out several times in this House and was advanced again today is that the British element is necessary in this land on account of communal troubles, and it deserves serious consideration. As my Honourable Leader just now stated, communal troubles are created to some extent by the British Government in India. The communal award and communal representation in the services are the things created by the British Government. (*An Honourable Member* : "Why did you not come to a mutual agreement?") Well, Sir, they did not allow us to come to a mutual agreement. We do desire to come to an agreement but they do not allow us. (*An Honourable Member* : "You could have agreed in England".) I know we could have agreed in the Round Table Conference, but if we had done so then they would have been no where. But it goes back much further than the Round Table Conference, because long ago Lord Minto received that representation about communal representation in the Councils, etc. Sir, it is a very bitter question, but one has to solve it and one has to face the question squarely and fairly. What I was stating is, can His Excellency cite me a single instance where during these communal troubles the Indian Army was found not to be amenable to discipline under its commander? I submit that remarks of this nature are likely to create lack of discipline and bad feeling in the army itself. To my knowledge I have not been able to find a single instance where the army, that is the Indian element in the army, have disobeyed the commands of their commanders when they have had to tackle communal trouble. The duty of soldiers is to obey the orders of their commander, and nobody has challenged the fidelity and discipline of the Indian troops till now. So, according to me the bogey of communal trouble in India is not a very good argument advanced to maintain the British troops in India. Then my Honourable friend

3 P.M.

Sir Hissam-ud-din stated today that because there are British traders or Europeans resident in India therefore the British element is necessary. If I have understood him rightly, I think there is no force in his argument, because he himself having led an army, being a major for 6 years as we have just now heard, would not, and would never have entered into these obligations; these thoughts would never have entered his mind that he has to support an Indian, that is to protect the Indian and not the Britisher. Once in the army his duty is to protect everybody, whether he is an Indian or Britisher. So, Sir, I at least cannot bring myself to understand his argument which he advanced today. Sir, the question before the House is whether there is a desire on the part of the British Government to take Indians into their confidence, whether there is a real desire on the part of the British Government to allow Indians to take part in the defence of their country. If there is a desire, ways and means can be found out to bring that intention into practice. If there is no desire, to take Indians into confidence, and they think that they can maintain

[Mr. V. V. Kalikar.]

peace and tranquillity in India by keeping only the British element, I think they should be disillusioned soon. During the war they required our help. We supplied a very large number of Indian troops and for the gallantry of those troops we have gained certificates from British statesmen and British commanders. So it is no use telling this House that there are no prospects for eliminating the British element and replacing it by the Indian element. If you think that the Indian element is suitable, then I think it is your duty to replace gradually the British element and substitute it by the Indian element. I know that the speech of His Excellency was very frank and I congratulate His Excellency on making a frank statement today, but we on our part cannot, and do not, desire to lessen our efforts in making a demand of this kind. I therefore very heartily support the Resolution moved by my Honourable friend.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. V. RAMADAS PANTULU** (Madras : Non-Muhammadan) : Sir, if formal compliments and the usual assurances are eliminated from His Excellency's speech, the rest of it amounts to an emphatic 'No' to the demand contained in the Resolution, which is so modest in its scope. His Excellency is good enough to realise the force of the financial argument and also the force of sentiment in India used in its broadest and the best sense including feelings of national honour. But His Excellency says that all these very good considerations are to give way to what he calls the actual realities of the case and therefore says that in the immediate future we cannot expect any more Indianisation in the British soldiers numbers in the army of India. My Honourable friend Pandit Kunzru was asking for a continuous displacement of British troops by Indian troops and in his speech he stated that he expected it to be done in about 15 years' time. I was just turning over the proceedings of the Round Table Conference to see what transpired at those meetings in regard to this demand of India. I found that the British Indian Delegation made a more modest request by asking complete Indianisation of the troops in India in the course of about 25 years, that is they gave 10 years more than my Honourable friend is prepared to give here. I find that a Committee called the Joint Committee on Indianisation was set up at the Round Table Conference and that Committee going into the British Indian Delegation's Memorandum stated that this request could not possibly be conceded and no provision could be made in the constitution fixing any time-limit for Indianisation of the British troops.

The Joint Committee refer to the suggestion put forward in the British Indian Memorandum that there should be a definite programme of Indianisation with reference to a time-limit of 20 or 25 years, and that one of the primary duties of an Indian Army counsellor should be the provision and training of Indian officers for the programme of Indianisation. The Joint Committee thought that it was impossible to include in the Constitution Act or in any other statute a provision for the complete Indianisation of the army within a specified period of time.

There was thus a complete answer to a demand which was much more moderate. Therefore I do not expect Government to accept now a demand more extreme than that made at the Round Table Conference. The people of India pay for the armed forces that the Government of India maintain in this country and those forces are Indian only in one sense, that the cost thereof is borne by the people of India. Of the Rs. 80 and odd crores of tax revenue which the people of India pay to the Central Government Rs. 50 crores or somewhere near that, are spent over the army maintained by the Government

of India. If the people of India knew, if Indian tax payers knew, that 60 or 65 per cent. of the revenue paid to the Central Government by them by taxes, are utilised on the defence services of this country manned by costly British troops and if they really make a demand that the money should be spent on a really Indian army, I think that demand will become irresistible. I do not think any useful purpose will be served, as I have often said in this House, to base our claim on the promised Dominion Status that is going to come in the march of events by a progressive realisation of responsible government in this country. It will never come that way. Government know what they are doing and I do not think our arguments are unknown to them. The position seems to be that the Indian Army as maintained here is really an army of occupation. It is asked: Why should India pay for it? The answer is simple. No country ever pays for an army of occupation maintained in the country which she has conquered, and therefore Great Britain says she has the right not only to maintain an army of occupation but also to make India pay for it as she was conquered by her. That is a simple constitutional answer to give to India. Therefore it is no use our asking such questions. And if we really want Indianisation of the army we must get a constitution which provides for it. This constitution does not provide for it and until we replace it by a constitution which provides for the Indianisation of the army in a specified time, it is impossible to achieve it, and any number of assurances given to us will be of no avail. The present policy of so-called Indianisation of the Indian Army is such that there is no evidence in it of any intention to Indianise the army at any time however distant. I have been reading a book written in 1935, in which the writer summarises the characteristics of the Indian Army and details 8 important features of it:—

“(1) It is not controlled by Indians; (2) it is recruited from certain parts of India only (more than half the personnel being furnished by the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province with parts of Kashmir, and about a quarter by the hilly tracts of Garhwal, Kumaon and Nepal); (3) even within the areas from which the army is normally recruited there is a strict regulation of the quotas to be furnished by each district, tribe, caste or sect; (4) not only is the Indian Army recruited from a limited number of carefully selected classes, but its whole internal organisation is based on a rigid caste system and these groups are so arranged that they retain their tribal or communal loyalties; (5) Indians in the army lead an insulated life breeding mutual suspicion between the soldiers and the civil population; (6) the Army in India is partly constituted of units of the British Army, and till quite recently (under the Indian Military College scheme of 1931) Indians were not employed in all its arms, making it impracticable for Indians in the army to fight a campaign by themselves; (7) in spite of recent moves towards Indianisation, the leadership of the army is to all intents and purposes purely British; and (8) the function of the army, as Lord Curzon pointed out long ago, is largely imperial and not merely national”.

So, Sir, the communal trouble about which so much is said in justification of maintaining the British Army here is of the Government's own making. The communal policy is implemented by the composition of the army itself. The Indian Army is so constituted as to maintain a balance between the various creeds and communities, so that they will never agree among themselves on the Indianisation question.

[Mr. V. Ramadas Pan'ulu.]

One other remark which His Excellency was pleased to make was that the Indian soldiers had their own good characteristics and traits of character and the British had their own, and he said the two were really complementary to each other. But if that is so, why not take at least 10 per cent. of Indian soldiers into the British Army in Great Britain? If a certain proportion of the British element is complementary to the Indian element in India it stands to reason that Great Britain should also take a percentage of Indian soldiers to improve their forces. I make the suggestion in all humility to the Commander-in-Chief for consideration.

And then he spoke of the ratio. That is to his mind an imperial question whereas the demand we make is a national one. It is our right to have the whole army manned by Indians. The ratio is fixed in British interests and not in Indian interests be it of £ to the Rupee or British soldiers to Indian soldiers. Therefore it is useless to talk of the ratio under the present constitution. I hope when these moderate demands come at this stage the Government will see the wisdom of accepting them. Turning them down at this stage would only lead to more extreme demands in the future than the very moderate Resolution of my Honourable friend Mr. Kunzru. I hope the Commander-in-Chief, in spite of the difficulties he has mentioned, will accept the Resolution as it does not ask for anything more than continuous replacement of British by Indian troops and the Honourable Mr. Kunzru suggested 15 years in his speech as the time-limit though he has not stated it in his Resolution. There are no words in the Resolution which commit the Commander-in-Chief to a programme which is impracticable. It is a perfectly practical suggestion and the word "continuous" is so elastic that it can be worked out in such manner as the Commander-in-Chief thinks fit to meet the necessities of the case and without jeopardising either British or Indian interests. Therefore, I have very great pleasure in supporting this Resolution.

\*THE HONOURABLE MR. KUMARSANKAR RAY CHAUDHURY (East Bengal : Non-Muhammadan) : Sir, His Excellency dwelt at length on the necessity of looking into the actual facts. I therefore rise to refer to some of the actual facts that happened during the last Great War. India was almost depleted of her army and her coasts were left to the mercy of Japan and the "Ermden". Now that another war is impending on the horizon it is time that we should have an Indian army to defend not only our country but to be sought for by England also, for she, as recently announced, is finding it difficult to get recruits and has to appeal to the Dominions for them.

THE HONOURABLE PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Mr. President, I have listened with no common interest to the speech of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. No one in this House could take exception to the tone of his observations or to a single word used by him in the course of his reply. Indeed, it was a pleasure to notice that he, a life-long soldier, has today revealed himself as an experienced Parliamentarian. It also gave us satisfaction to observe that His Excellency tried seriously to understand the Indian position and to take account of the sentiments, the powerful sentiments that inspire Indians and indeed have inspired all nations that have been able to lead a self-respecting national life.

He admitted, Sir, in full the strength of my arguments, particularly the financial argument. He acknowledged that the British forces in India were

\*Speech not corrected by the Honourable Member.

a severe drain on the revenues of India and that if they were replaced by Indian troops a very large saving would ensue. I naturally therefore waited to find out whether in recognition of this fact His Excellency proposed to take any steps, however small, in furtherance of the Resolution that I have ventured to place before the House. But His Excellency instead of giving us any hope warned us that no immediate substitution of Indian for British troops could be expected at this stage. He told us that if the mechanisation of the army was increased, it might be possible to decrease the number of British soldiers. He also referred to the difficulties in the working of the Cardwell system in Great Britain and said that the British Army might from time to time be short of its authorised strength and in that way we might gain financially, but for the present, he could point out no other way in which our desire could be achieved. And what was the reason that he gave in support of the position that he took up? He told us first that it was wrong to think that the British Government had not moved a step in the direction in which we desired it to move. He said that a gradual and prudent reduction of the British forces in India was going on and that any further reduction must depend entirely on the judgment of the military authorities who alone are in a position to take account of all the relevant factors. In this connection he also seemed to refer to the programme of Indianisation, which is being worked out at the present time.

I will take both these arguments and see what substance there is in them. Let us take first the argument that British forces are being gradually and prudently reduced. I know, Sir, that the Indianisation of a division of all arms will lead to the elimination of a certain number of British soldiers. Two Indian brigades of field artillery are going to be created. I understand that this will in course of time mean the disappearance of about 1,200 British soldiers. Further, the creation of 2 signal units will, I believe, lead to the reduction of the British establishment by about 200 soldiers. When the scheme of Indianisation has been carried out, that is, when these units have been created and they get their full complement of Indian soldiers, about 1,400 British soldiers will have been replaced by a corresponding number of Indian soldiers. But what is the period in which this substitution will take place? The programme of Indianisation has already been going on for a number of years. How long it will be treated as an experiment, I do not know. We may have to wait for 5 or 6 or 10 years more. Does His Excellency seriously wish us to be satisfied with a reduction of about 1,500 British soldiers in the course of 15 or 20 years? Is this the way in which England proposes to prepare us for self-defence? His Excellency may desire to proceed cautiously, but can the rate with which he expects us to be satisfied be justified, even if excessive caution is exercised by the authorities? But, this is not the whole of my case. His Excellency was to a certain extent right, as I have shown, in saying that the British forces were going to be reduced. But the Resolution of the Assembly to which I referred in my opening speech asked for a reduction not merely in the number of British soldiers but also in the ratio of British troops to Indian troops, and so far as I can see, nothing appreciable has been done in that direction. The slow rate at which Indians are being substituted for British soldiers cannot for a long time to come effect the proportion of British to Indian soldiers in this country.

Now, Sir, let us take the programme of Indianisation to which His Excellency referred. This matter has been dealt with also by the expert committee which examined the minimum strength of British forces required in this country. I cannot see any connection between the programme of Indianisation and the demand that we have put forward today. Perhaps what His Excellency and the expert committee meant to tell us was that the programme

[Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru.]

of Indianisation was in the nature of an experiment. The substitution of British by Indian soldiers would be a further experiment. Is it wise that two such important experiments should be carried on at one and the same time? Well, Lord Rawlinson was not a civilian. In his own time he occupied the position that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief occupies today. But when the Assembly in 1921 put forward a demand for a reduction in the ratio of British to Indian troops, it had also put forward a demand for an increase in the recruitment of Indian officers every year. Now, the Resolution relating to the recruitment of Indian officers, which asked that 25 per cent. of the officers annually recruited should be Indian had been accepted by Lord Rawlinson, and it was after the acceptance of that Resolution that on behalf of the Government of India he accepted the other Resolution relating to the reduction in the ratio of British to Indian troops. If there was any risk involved in simultaneously proceeding with Indianisation and the substitution of Indian for British troops, Lord Rawlinson ought to have been fully aware of it. If, however, with a full realisation of his duties as Commander-in-Chief of this country, he could accept both Resolutions at one and the same time, I cannot see what prevents His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief from accepting my Resolution today.

I do not think, Sir, that the reasons that His Excellency has given for not proceeding with what I might call the Indianisation of the lower personnel of the army can be regarded as satisfactory in the least by any one here. He used one more argument in favour of the existing state of things. He said: "How are we to judge whether the present order is good or bad? We can only proceed on the basis of experience. The presence of British troops has enabled us to build up our position in this country and to maintain peace all over the land. We cannot lightly disturb this order". Now, I venture to think that this argument, the implications of which in any case cannot be accepted by us, has not as much substance in it as His Excellency thinks. Let us suppose that the arguments of those who urged in 1859 that the Indian Army should be regarded merely as an auxiliary force had prevailed. The larger part of the army in this country would then have consisted of British soldiers. Had this come about His Excellency, using the argument that he did today, might well have said to us, "I am concerned with the existing state of things. The present number of British soldiers has enabled me to maintain British authority and peace in this country. I cannot lightly make any proposal for disturbing the present arrangements". Sir, 'what is' is not necessarily a guide to 'what ought to be'. India is no more static than other countries. We in common with other countries are trying to move towards higher objectives. If His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's opinion were to be accepted, we might bid good-bye to all constitutional progress in this country. If we have made any progress it is precisely by challenging the existing order and by insisting that it should be radically altered. I cannot certainly place concrete facts before His Excellency to demonstrate mathematically that the replacement of British by Indian soldiers would not lead to a diminution in the value of the army as a fighting machine, but I am morally certain of it. Different races have been gifted by nature with different qualities. It may be that Indian and British soldiers, as he says, are complementary to one another. Well, I suppose it can be said in the same sense that during the Great War the British and French soldiers, because of the possession of different qualities, were complementary to one another and were able to achieve results which the British or the French Army alone would have been able to achieve.

This may be an argument for international co-operation, but it is no justification for keeping a whole nation in a state of complete bondage. If there is any substance in His Excellency's argument, he may be certain that a free India would in its own interests like to take the help of British soldiers in times of danger, just as it has been ready to place its own soldiers at the service of England in the time of her need. Had His Excellency meant nothing more than this, I would have cordially agreed with him. But his argument went much further than that. It was a justification of the maintenance of the present state of things. I am therefore unable to agree with it for a moment. Notwithstanding the high authority of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I venture to maintain that the substitution of Indian for British soldiers cannot be regarded as an experiment. For whatever might have been said in the past with regard to the capacity of Indians for initiative and leadership, not a word has been uttered in derogation of the valour and power of endurance of Indian soldiers. His Excellency tried to assure us that the British forces were not maintained in this country out of distrust of Indians but that for military reasons based on actual war experience. Lord Rawlinson, writing without reserve in his diary, called the British internal security troops "an army of occupation". He would not have called them an army of occupation if the British forces in this country were not maintained for political reasons. The phrase used by Lord Rawlinson shows the real purpose of keeping British troops in this country. Notwithstanding what His Excellency has said, I must frankly state that it is my belief and the firm belief of every Indian that the real reason why a large British army is kept in this country is to hold Indians down and to prevent any possibility of their rising against their foreign masters. Sir, I do not wish to take the time of the House any further. I would now only ask non-official Members, at any rate all elected Members, to give me their full support.

**HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF :** Sir, I have nothing to add to what I have already said in answer to the Resolution itself. I am also satisfied that what I have said sufficiently answers all relevant points which have been raised since. I am glad to note the views of my Honourable friend Mr. Hossain Imam, but I might just remind him that the defence budget has in fact been reduced by some Rs. 10 crores since 1930.

With regard to the Honourable Mr. Kalikar's remarks, I would remind him that what I said as regards future reduction—my words actually were—"I can see no early prospect of further reduction".

There is one point, however, I would like to mention with reference to what the Honourable Mr. Kunzru said this morning regarding the possible employment of Dominion troops in India. I have since seen the reference to this matter in today's papers. All I can say is that this is the very first I have heard of the subject and there has been no correspondence whatsoever about it between ourselves and His Majesty's Government.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT :** Resolution moved :

"That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council to move the higher authorities to take steps to replace British troops continuously by Indian troops in the Army in India".

The Question is :

"That that Resolution be adopted".

The Council divided :

AYES—10.

Govindachari, The Honourable Rao Bahadur K.  
Kalikar, The Honourable Mr. V. V.  
Kunzru, The Honourable Pandit Hirdray Nath.  
Mahapatra, The Honourable Mr. Sitakanta.  
Mahtha, The Honourable Rai Bahadur Sri Narain.

Mitha, The Honourable Sir Suleman Cassum Haji.  
Pantulu, The Honourable Mr. V. Ramadas.  
Ram Saran Das, The Honourable Rai Bahadur Lala.  
Ray Chaudhury, The Honourable Mr. Kumarsankar.  
Sapru, The Honourable Mr. P. N.

NOES—30.

Akram Hussain Bahadur, The Honourable Prince Afsar-ul-Mulk Mirza Muhammad.  
Ataullah Khan, The Honourable Chaudhuri.  
Basu, The Honourable Mr. Bijay Kumar.  
Buta Singh, The Honourable Sardar.  
Charanjit Singh, The Honourable Raja.  
Chinoy, The Honourable Sir Rahimtoola.  
Clow, The Honourable Mr. A. G.  
Commander-in-Chief, His Excellency the.  
Devados, The Honourable Sir David.  
Dow, The Honourable Mr. H.  
Ghosal, The Honourable Sir Josna.  
Glancy, The Honourable Sir Bertrand.  
Haider, The Honourable Khan Bahadur Shams-ud-Din.  
Hissam-ud-Din Bahadur, The Honourable Lt.-Col. Sir.  
Ihtisham Hyder Chaudhury, The Honourable Syed.  
Jagdiah Prasad, The Honourable Kunwar Sir.

Kay, The Honourable Mr. J. R.  
Khurshid Ali Khan, The Honourable Nawabzada.  
Kirke Smith, The Honourable Mr. A.  
Maxwell, The Honourable Mr. R. M.  
Menon, The Honourable Diwan Bahadur Sir Ramunni.  
Nihal Singh, The Honourable Sardar.  
Nixon, The Honourable Mr. J. C.  
Parker, The Honourable Mr. R. H.  
Ray of Dinajpur, The Honourable Maharaja Jagadish Nath.  
Russell, The Honourable Sir Guthrie.  
Siddiqi, The Honourable Khan Bahadur Shaikh Muhammad Beshir.  
Singh, The Honourable Raja Devaki Nandan.  
Todd, The Honourable Mr. A. H. A.  
Williams, The Honourable Mr. A. deC.

The Motion was negatived.

RESOLUTION RE RECRUITMENT OF ORIYAS IN NON-GAZETTED POSTS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

THE HONOURABLE MR. SITAKANTA MAHAPATRA (Orissa : Non-Muhammadan) : Sir, I beg to move :

"That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council to treat Oriyas as a minority community and to take early steps for the recruitment of Oriyas in sufficient numbers in the non-gazetted posts under the different Departments of the Government of India, particularly, the Railways and the Customs".

Sir, the word "community" has always been a great puzzle to me. I have never been able to get at its correct meaning, I mean, in the sense it is being used by the Government. Nobody could tell me if it has been defined by the Government anywhere. Its dictionary meaning is a body of men having religion, profession, etc., in common. Government have divided us in the matter of representation in the sphere of services as the Hindu community, the Muslim community, the Christian community, etc., etc. Up to this the meaning is somewhat intelligible. But when the Christian community is again sub-divided into the Indian Christian community, the Anglo-Indian community and the European community and given separate representation, the Muslims claim that Ahmedyas are not Muslims in the true sense and representation of that class in the services should not be taken to be Muslim

representation and Jains, Parsees, Buddhists, etc., are included in the Hindu community, I am again puzzled. In the sphere of representation in the Legislatures, only 3 communities are recognised, Muhammadan, non-Muhammadan and the Sikh. But then again particular classes from the non-Muhammadans are given separate representation, such as Christians, Europeans and Anglo-Indians. I therefore conclude that the word "community" has no clear-cut meaning so far as the Government is concerned and Government can twist its meaning in any way they like. Now, minority communities are given protection and weightage. Muslims and Christians are treated as minority communities. But this is not all. Burmans are also given protection. Seats in the All-India Services are reserved for Burmans on a territorial basis because men from that province are comparatively backward and cannot find their place in the All-India competitions.

The story does not end here. In reply to a question in the Assembly in 1934, the Honourable the Home Member said "Oriyas are not recognised as a community for recruitment". If Burmans are recognised as such, the principle is there, and when Oriyas have got a province of their own now where there is no communal jealousy, do now recognise the Oriyas as a community without any distinction of caste or creed.

At page 1919 of the proceedings of the Assembly during its Delhi Session in 1934, the Honourable the Finance Member said: "We have no rules for securing proper representation of inhabitants of particular areas". This he said in spite of special arrangements for Burmans. But on the 1st of August the same year the Honourable the Home Member, in reply to a question regarding Bengal Muslims, contradicted the Finance Member and said: "I will ascertain how many Bengali Muslims are actually employed in the Government of India Secretariat".

Sir, if the Christian community can be divided into Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans, and the Muslim community can be divided in terms of provinces, why not constitute Oriyas into a community? If the Government wants to do it they can do it without any difficulty. In the whole of the Government of India Departments, not only the Secretariate, but Railways, Customs, Archæology, Medical, etc., etc., there is not a single Oriya anywhere. Mr. Hallett, now Sir Maurice Hallett, has got a very faithful Oriya domestic servant and when Mr. Hallett was the Home Secretary here, this servant used to come to the Secretariat sometimes and represent the Oriya community in the Secretariat. I am afraid the Honourable the present Home Secretary has withdrawn this representative even. I think, where the disparagement is so great, some steps should be taken by the Government to undo the injustice.

I wish to make myself clearly understood that I for one stand for Indian nationalism but as the Government have thought it fit to divide Indians into sub-divisions according to religious pursuits and then following up the vicious principle by still further sub-dividing men of one religious faith into groups, may I not request Government to be a little more logical and provide for the proper representation of the various provincial communities in the lower grades of the Government of India Services? I do not want that any special favour should be shown to Oriyas in competitive examinations. They are now trying to find their place there. But there are innumerable subordinate posts, thousands of them in the Railways, Customs, Agriculture, etc., etc., where appointments are made by the appointing authority at his will. Those who get good recommendations get jobs there. An officer with

[Mr. Sitakanta Mahapatra.]

influence puts many of his relations in the Services. A strong guardian is necessary for these appointments and not much qualification. Before a man retires he manages to bring in his sons, sons-in-law and nephews. All that I want is that the Home Department will take an interest in getting employment for some Oriyas under the Government of India excluding the competitive posts. Orissa was, unfortunately for us, tagged on to the tail end of other provinces for too long a time. At long last Government have rectified their mistake and Orissa has been formed into a separate province now. It is one of the causes why Oriyas have not their proper share in the Services. One other cause is that Orissa was one of the last provinces in India to come under British rule. But the most important reason why the Government of India have neglected the Oriyas is that Oriyas have not been agitators and the Oriya young men have never been bomb-throwers. But considering the rate at which unemployment is growing in Orissa, due to the neglect of the Government of India, due to the neglect of Jamshedpur, and due to the neglect of the Bengal Nagpur Railway, it will not take long for them to become bomb-throwers. I pray Government to change their angle of vision.

Sir, Jamshedpur, which is in Orissa proper and which relies for her resources on Orissa States, neglects Oriyas in the same way as the Government of India. But my description would be incomplete if I did not speak a few words about the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company which is the only other source of employment for Oriyas in Orissa. From Howrah up to Balasore, all stations are manned by Bengalis, but from Balasore southwards all stations are staffed by Telegus. There was some agitation for the B. N. R. taking an Oriya in the superior posts. So they took in the brother of a Chief in the Eastern States Agency as a superior officer. I met the Agent, Mr. Jarrad, shortly after that when he told me of this achievement. I told him that the gentleman was never meant for service, his training was never on that line, and not sufficient. Supposing he did not prove up to the mark the Agent should not castigate the whole nation. Two months after the gentleman sent in his resignation and left suddenly. Since then the authorities are so vexed that they do not consider the case of another Oriya.

Sir, all that I want is that the Home Department of the Government of India should be aware of the injustice done to a nation which has a civilisation, culture, literature and history of its own, unrivalled in India, which once controlled an Empire extending from the shores of the Ganges to the shores of the Kristna, i.e., from the place where the Honourable Mr. Basu lives to the place where the Honourable Sir Ramunni Menon lives, and which was independent long long after most other parts of India came under the mighty Moghuls.

All that I want is that the Home Department of the Government of India be pleased to enquire why this injustice is being perpetrated on the Oriyas for such a long time and move sympathetically in the matter so that in a short time Oriya young men may find some employment in the different Departments of the Government of India—particularly Railways and Customs.

THE HONOURABLE MR. R. M. MAXWELL (Home Secretary): Sir, the Honourable Mover credits Government with a great deal of power. He apparently regards it as the function of Government to make and unmake communities, and regards Government as responsible for the existing sub-divisions among the various classes and

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communities of Indians. All I can tell him in that respect is that so far as I know, when the present Government came to this country, they found these various communities and sub-divisions more or less ready made, and they have done as little as they could in the way of contributing to their number. But if it in any way rested with Government to make the Oriyas into a community, I can only assure the Honourable gentleman that they would be delighted to do so. But I do not quite see that that would help the Honourable Member's object. In the first place, we want to know whom he wants us to make into a community. He has not given us any very precise definition of what the Oriya community consists of. I understand in fact that the Hubback Committee found considerable difficulty in finding out what was meant by an Oriya community from the ethnological point of view, and my present information is that the Province of Orissa, as now constituted, consists of 53 lakhs of inhabitants of which about 51 lakhs consist of Hindus. Does the Honourable Member mean that all the Hindu Oriyas are to be regarded as a minority community? When we speak of a community in terms of 50 lakhs, it does not sound very much like a minority community. But in any case the arguments which the Honourable gentleman advanced on the subject of recognising Oriyas as a community do not seem to me to help his Resolution. He does not want us to make Oriyas into a community. He wants us to make them into a minority community and that for a particular purpose. I want to explain to the House what the policy of Government in brief has been as regards recognising minority communities for the purpose of Government appointments. As the House is aware, in their famous Resolution of July, 1934, they prescribed certain reservation of vacancies in Government services under the control of the Central Government. Altogether 33 per cent. of such vacancies were reserved for what they called the minority communities, and in a supplementary order they explained that these minority communities were Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, Sikhs and Parsees. Also, in Bengal, I believe, Buddhists for local recruitment purposes only are recognised as a minority community. But the House will observe that in all the cases recognised as minority communities, the point is that they profess a religion different from Hinduism, which is the religion of the majority community in India. That is the test which we have applied. The principle has never been recognised by Government at any time that within the limits of the same religion, we should have majority and minority communities or that what is a majority community in one place should be made into a minority community in another place merely on territorial, tribal, linguistic or caste sub-divisions. The House will readily see how difficult it would be if Government were to enter into any such thing. Great practical difficulties would be involved. Even in the case of the limited number of communities which have been recognised for the purpose of reservation of posts in Government service, a considerable disadvantage exists in that specified percentages of posts have to be reserved for recruitment independently of one another. The free choice of Government is restricted and generally speaking the principle can only be employed as sparingly as possible for practical reasons. But supposing we went on and divided these existing main communities into minorities according to territorial and other such considerations, there would be no limit practically to the amount of sub-divisions which we might have to resort to. In a debate on this very subject in 1923, Sir Malcolm Hailey explained to the Assembly that there were 2,328 main castes and tribes and 43 races or nationalities in India, limiting the figures to those consisting of more than 10,000 persons. If we are going to proceed on the assumption that any minority community was to have separate representation in Government service, a number of very small percentages would have

[Mr. R. M. Maxwell.]

to be set aside for the various communities and territorial areas and extreme difficulty will be found even in determining these percentages mathematically. I therefore think, Sir, that from the practical point of view we must reject this Proposal entirely. I would remind the Honourable gentleman that as the Province of Orissa has been brought together in deference to a long-standing agitation, it may be hoped that with the opportunities for advancement in education which they will be able to provide for themselves now, they will be able to hold their own against other communities in ordinary competition, and I hope that they will not expect Government to do for this one community what they do not do for any other community and what I have shown would lead to such very serious practical difficulties in recruitment for Government services. I hope, therefore, that the Honourable gentleman would see his way to withdrawing this Resolution.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. SITAKANTA MAHAPATRA :** Sir, I have already said on the floor of the House that the Treasury Benches make it a point to oppose all our Resolutions. I fully stated in my speech that I want that every Oriya inhabiting the land of Jagannath without any distinction of caste and creed should be treated as belonging to the Oriya community. But that was not my point. As the Honourable the Home Secretary has rightly conjectured, I was drawing his sympathetic attention to give a few more jobs to Oriya young men. Even in that respect I have not got a sympathetic reply from the Honourable the Home Secretary. Last year or the year before last a Member from Assam moved a similar Resolution in this House and got a much better reply. If the Honourable the Home Secretary is puzzled about the water-tight divisions that were made in 1934, as he said, that 33 per cent. of the appointments should be given to Muhammadans, he may take in Oriya Muhammadans in numbers—

**THE HONOURABLE MR. R. M. MAXWELL :** I may explain that Oriya Muhammadans are already counted as a minority community for the purpose of recruitment.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. SITAKANTA MAHAPATRA :** I did not say that. I mean, take in more and more Oriya Muslims to make up the 33 per cent., and take in more and more Hindu Oriyas to make up the percentage given to Hindus, and take in more and more Oriya Christians if there be anything left. There are no Sikhs or Parsees in Orissa, so I do not claim anything for them.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT :** Thank you! (Laughter.)

**THE HONOURABLE MR. SITAKANTA MAHAPATRA :** Sir, the Honourable Home Secretary has been pleased to oppose my Resolution and has asked me to withdraw it. I know I cannot carry it against the Government here and so I have no way out but to ask your permission to withdraw the Resolution.

The Resolution was, by leave of the Council, withdrawn.

## RESOLUTION *RE* APPOINTMENT OF AN AGENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDIAN LABOURING CLASSES IN BURMA.

THE HONOURABLE MR. P. N. SAPRU (United Provinces Southern : Non-Muhammadan) : Sir, I rise to move :

" That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that he may, *ca* the separation of Burma from India, be pleased to appoint an Agent for the protection of the Indian labouring classes in Burma "

Sir, the House knows that on the 1st April Burma will be separated from India. In Burma we have a fair number of Indians and my Resolution affects the labouring classes amongst the Indians settled in Burma. Indian emigration to Burma began in the early part of the 19th Century. People used to migrate from Chittagong and Madras for trade or employment, but at first the greater proportion were of the better class. Then we had the second Burmese War and after that war Indians began to emigrate to Burma in increasing numbers and the majority of the new immigrants were drawn from the depressed and agricultural classes. Separate figures for industrial labour are not available, at any rate I have not been able to find them, but taking the 4 or 5 races which supply the Indian population in Burma, the position in 1921 was somewhat like this. Telegus, born in Burma 10,384, born outside Burma 1,00,196, total 1,10,580 ; percentage born outside Burma 94. Tamils born in Burma 22,536, born outside Burma 59,011, total 81,547 ; percentage born outside Burma 72. Hindustanis, born in Burma 12,280, born outside Burma 68,580, total 81,400 ; percentage born outside Burma 84. Oriyas, born in Burma 1,076, born outside Burma 21,826, total 32,902 ; percentage born outside Burma 97.

Now, those are the figures for 1921. It will be noticed that the larger number of the immigrants are those born outside Burma. Now, Indian labour is mostly migratory and this is shown by the fact that during 1911 to 1921, although Indian emigrants numbered 2 millions, the increase in permanent Indian emigration was only 1,42,000. That is to say, the increase in the Indian population in Burma was only 1,42,000, that is, from 7,45,000 to 8,87,000.

Then between 1922 and 1929 there were 3,20,000 immigrants at Rangoon Port which is the port where four-fifths of these immigrants enter. Rangoon is the biggest port in Burma, and the annual average of those leaving the port in the same period was 2,62,000. So far as the sex ratio is concerned, it was 12 men to 1 woman. If complete figures were available, probably they would show an even greater sex disparity.

Now, one-third of these immigrants came from Calcutta, which is the port for Northern India, and one-third came from the Coromandel Coast. Now, the position in regard to immigration is that it is uncontrolled but not entirely unassisted. Employment at rice mills is secured on a system which involves the grant of practically all responsibility for labour to mistries or contractors. The great majority receive no direct assistance from contractors. The Royal Commission on Labour went into this question of Burma and Indian labour and they pointed out that there were certain differences between labour conditions in Burma and India. The first difference that they note is that the bulk of the factory population in Burma is employed in factories working throughout the year. Textile industries employ in India about 7 lakhs, but in Burma they employ only about 700 people, and there are only three textile firms. The most essential industries there are rice

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milling, saw milling and the refinement of petroleum, and these are seasonal. They employ about 1,00,000 people, and nearly two-thirds of these 1,00,000 people are Indians. Coal mining and mica industries are non-existent in Burma. In India they account for four-fifths of our workers in mines. Then, wolfram, tin, lead, and silver industries employ about 20,000 Burmans. Mineral oil is more important than either. In India we know it is on a small scale. In respect of transport we have to remember that water inland transport in Burma plays a great part. As regards plantations, tea plantations are important in India, but in Burma they have rubber plantations, so that, Sir, the conclusion to which the Royal Commission came was that Burman labour questions were not very different from Indian labour questions. The Royal Commission, however, after saying that Burman labour questions were not very different from Indian labour questions, pointed out that Indian labour had certain peculiar difficulties in Burma; and they refer to those difficulties at page 425 of their Report.

"The industries of Burma", they pointed out, "are largely dependent on Indian labour. Accurate and up to date figures are not available for industries generally, but it is safe to say that at least two-thirds of the workers employed in factories, mines and oilfields, railways and plantations are Indians. In nearly every branch of organised industry Indians greatly outnumber Burmans and, indeed, all other races combined. In the unskilled occupations, the proportion of Indians is particularly high. For various reasons the problems of the immigrant Indian find their focus in Rangoon, the only industrial city in Burma, and we deal mainly with conditions in that city. At the 1921 census Indians constituted over 55 per cent. of the total population of Rangoon and over 65 per cent. of the male population. About 70 per cent. of the male persons between 15 and 50 years of age were Hindus and Mussalmans, and of these 95 per cent. were not born in Burma. In Rangoon factories 95 per cent. of the unskilled and 70 per cent. of the skilled labour were reported to be Indian in 1928, and the position does not appear to have changed since then. Until 1930 the Port of Rangoon was worked entirely by Indian labour, and although events in that year brought about some modification of that position, it is still true in the main. India also supplies the bulk of the tramway workers and of the *sampanwallas*, all the rickshaw pullers and handcart pullers, and nearly all the general labour of other kinds. In fact the economic life of Rangoon and the industrial activity of Burma generally are dependent on the labour of Indians".

Therefore they suggested that there should be a Protector of Indian labouring classes appointed by the Government of India. Their specific proposal—and that is the proposal which is embodied in my Resolution—is to be found at page 427 of their Report. After pointing out that apparently no one is responsible for the welfare or protection of immigrants, they go on to say :

"Many immigrants no doubt need protection, and the Protector should be placed in a position to give them effective assistance. For this purpose"—

and that is their recommendation, which I would like the Government and the House to endorse—

"For this purpose we recommend that the Protector should be an officer who, working in co-operation with the Government of Burma but holding no appointment under that Government, should be solely responsible to the Government of India".

They find that the present position under which the Labour Statistics Officer holds among other appointments the appointment of Protector of Immigrants and Emigrants is not satisfactory and therefore they say :

"That the Protector of Immigrants should have access to the Member or Minister responsible for Labour, and that he should furnish the Government of India with an annual report on the conditions of labour during the year and on his own work. He should have sufficient experience and standing to ensure that his advice will deserve and receive full consideration from authorities and employers in Burma".

Sir, that is the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Labour and that is the recommendation which I should like Government and this House to accept and endorse. Sir, the House knows that some years ago—I think about 4 or 5 years ago, I do not remember the exact year—there were some anti-Indian riots in Burma and the Indian labouring classes suffered a great deal during those riots. There is a good deal of anti-Indian feeling in Burma and after the separation of Burma the Government of India will not be in as effective a position to defend Indian interests in Burma as they are now. Therefore it is necessary that we should have an Agent who will look after the interests of our less fortunately situated countrymen in Burma. My Resolution, Sir, is in the interests of the labouring classes and the depressed classes who have migrated to Burma and I hope, Sir, it will have the unanimous support of the House and that it will be accepted by the Government.

With these words, Sir, I move the Resolution which stands against my name.

THE HONOURABLE KUNWAR SIB JAGDISH PRASAD (Education, Health and Lands Member): Sir, my Honourable friend Mr. Sapru has given us copious statistics and voluminous extracts from the Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India to show that it is desirable in the interests of Indian labour in Burma that an Agent should be appointed. He has pointed out that after the separation of Burma the need for protection and for care of the interests of labour will be all the greater. The matter has been under the consideration of the Government of India and I can assure my Honourable friend that it will receive very sympathetic attention. We were waiting for the new order of things to come into existence before taking up this question and also we were trying to get certain additional statistical information as regards the position of immigrants in Burma and the occupations in which they were employed and exactly how many Indian immigrants Burma requires who can be maintained on a reasonable standard throughout the year. As soon as all this material is ready we will very carefully consider the matter of taking up the question of appointing an Agent in Burma. I have, therefore, Sir, much pleasure in accepting my Honourable friend's Resolution.

THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT: Resolution moved:

"That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that he may, on the separation of Burma from India, be pleased to appoint an Agent for the protection of the Indian labouring classes in Burma".

The Question is:

"That that Resolution be adopted".

The Motion was adopted.

## RESOLUTION *RE* CHECKING OF MALARIA BY INDIGENOUS MANUFACTURE OF QUININE.

THE HONOURABLE MR. P. N. SAPRU (United Provinces Southern: Non-Muhammadan): Sir, I rise to move:

"That this Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that he may be pleased to take steps to check malaria, particularly by encouraging the indigenous manufacture of quinine and its distribution at rates within the means of the rural classes".

I hope, Sir, that my Resolution will not be regarded as a controversial one. I should be sorry, Sir, if it gave rise to any controversy at all. Most of us have suffered at one time or another from malaria and most of us know

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from experience what a terrible scourge this malaria is. The incidence, Sir, of this disease is particularly high—my Honourable friend, Pandit Kunzru, says among gluttons—I don't know who the gluttons amongst us are but I am quite sure that Mr. Kunzru is not a glutton—he hardly eats anything and he too has suffered from malaria and been a victim of it. Well, Sir, the incidence of this disease is particularly high in the rural areas. The plains of central and western Bengal, most of Assam, the Dooars, the Terais, the hilly slopes of the Eastern and Western Ghats are, we know, notoriously malarious. Sir, Col. Sifton, the Director of Malaria Survey, has published three very able papers on what malaria costs the nation. They are, Sir, to be found in the records of the Malarial Survey for September and December, 1933. In these papers, Sir, he has dealt very ably with the effects of malaria on our national, social and economic life. Sir, in these papers he describes the effect of malaria upon the natural increase of population, secondly, the health, vitality and physical vigour of the population; and, lastly, social, intellectual and economic progress. He has also dealt with the financial loss which malaria causes directly and indirectly. Lastly, Sir, he has suggested certain anti-malarial measures. Sir, it is a very instructive pamphlet and I am sure Members will find it very interesting and informing. According to Col. Sifton, malaria is responsible for at least one million deaths directly and sometimes when there are epidemics raging, this figure rises to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  millions. The fatal effect of this disease falls mostly on women, children and infants.

Apart from the direct mortality due to malaria, malaria has a marked indirect action inasmuch as it lowers the general vitality and this lower vitality makes us liable to contract other diseases from the effects of which we may die at a later date. Thus directly and indirectly malaria is responsible for 2 million deaths every year in India. Sir, estimates of the number of persons who suffer from malaria vary between 100 and 200 millions. Dr. Cristophers, I think, who was the head of the Research Institute at Kasauli, says that the amount of sickness is 50 to 100 times to one or two million deaths. Col. Chopra estimates that 100 million men suffer each year from malaria. The Malarial Commission of the League of Nations places the world figure at 650 millions or about one-third of the total population of the world. Now the incidence of malaria in India must be well above the average for the whole world. Therefore, Sir, it would not be unreasonable to place the figure at 90 millions for British India and 30 millions for the Indian States. One of the causes of the low expectation of life in India is malaria. Now, Sir, I know that the Government of India have always taken a very keen interest in this question of malaria. And they have done within the limits of their resources what they could to check this disease. But quinine, Sir, as we all know, is one of the most needed drugs in malaria and the high incidence of this disease is a sufficient ground for insisting that the rural population should be supplied with an adequate supply of quinine. There are about a hundred million people in this country who go without any treatment, only one-tenth of the people who suffer from malaria ever receive any treatment. Sir, if we look at the figures we find that the consumption of quinine in India is  $3\frac{1}{2}$  grains per head. The consumption of quinine in Italy is 16 grains per head. The consumption of quinine in Greece is 24 grains per head per annum. And the figures for highly malarious provinces show even a lower consumption. Sir, according to the Report of the Drugs Enquiry Committee the quantity actually required from the public health point of view would be much larger than that which is supplied at present. It would be 5,00,000 lbs. according to the Public Health Commissioner, and according to Sir Patrick Hedger it would be 9,17,000

lbs. Sir, the Royal Commission on Agriculture over which our Viceroy presided was also of opinion that both for the prevention and treatment of malaria a wider distribution of quinine was necessary. Their specific recommendations will be found in para. 411 of their Report. Dr. Charles Bentley, who was Director of Public Health in Bengal, says that Bengal alone would need a hundred thousand pounds of quinine every year. Therefore, Sir, the conclusion that one has to come to is that the annual consumption of quinine is entirely inadequate in India, and the present supplies are, according to the Report of the Drugs Enquiry Committee, hopelessly insufficient. The annual consumption of quinine in India is in the neighbourhood of 2,00,000 lbs. and this annual consumption is derived from two sources. There are two State-owned cinchona plantations with factories for the production of quinine. One of them is situated at Mungpoo in Darjeeling and the other is situated at Naduvattam, near Ootacamund in the Nilgiris. There are plantations in Burma also. Privately-owned plantations in the Nilgiris have dwindled down in recent years. Now, the combined production of these two factories does not exceed 70,000 lbs. annually. Therefore, Sir, large quantities have to be imported. The Drugs Enquiry Committee did not think that the export of large quantities of the bark was at all responsible for the small production. The quantity of bark exported at present is negligible. The reason according to them for the low production of quinine in India is the small area under cinchona cultivation. On page 149 of their Report they say that according to the evidence before them, they feel that much more could be done by Government to produce quinine in India on a much larger scale and to cheapen its price. They point out that there has been little advance in the area under cultivation. I may point out that the Agricultural Commission recommended centralisation of the subject and that the production and distribution of quinine should be the concern of the centre. The country, Sir, they point out, is dependent on foreign sources because of the backward condition of the cinchona plantations. We have to pay very heavily for this foreign domination because the world price of quinine is, as we know, controlled by a foreign syndicate known as the Kina Bureau. This Syndicate has always been able to subjugate rival quinine factories. In 1928, Sir, many quinine dealers tried to break away from the official prices determined by the Kina Bureau but without success. Our Government also entered into an agreement in regard to prices of quinine with this Bureau. The Bureau has been successful in effectively regulating prices by a gradual reduction of cinchona areas. It does not care for what the world without success needs. It only cares to give to the world what it thinks it should need. Now, Sir, no reduction in price is possible unless we break away from this powerful Bureau. The Drugs Enquiry Committee think that India can remain entirely independent of foreign sources of supply. I will just quote from their Report :

“ The Government of India ”, they say, “ is the only quinine-producing organization which can successfully break away from the Bureau if it wants to do so ”.

Therefore, I would say that it is desirable to do something to reduce the price of quinine, and that we can reduce the price of quinine by encouraging the indigenous manufacture of quinine. Sir, in the budget of last year there was a grant of Rs. 10 lakhs given to the Indian Research Fund Association. Part of this grant should be used for giving assistance to growers of cinchona.

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There are other measures which can also be taken and we should try and find out what the substitutes for quinine are. There are certain substitutes which are regarded as effective as quinine itself. Those substitutes have been mentioned and discussed by the Drugs Enquiry Committee. At page 154 they say :

“ Either the price must be reduced by mass production, or research work must be carried out to find out some means of presenting the people of India with quinine, or the total cinchona alkaloids, or the cinchona bark at a cost commensurate with the means at their disposal. The Committee is of opinion that, in the interest of public health and of supply of pure quinine to the people of India, steps should be taken to lower the prices of quinine as much as possible ”.

Then they refer to the argument, which they reject, that the prices cannot be lowered since the lowering of the price may lead to export. They reject this view and say there is no danger of that. They also point out that if a definite authoritative pronouncement were made by the medical authorities calling attention to the value of the other alkaloids of the bark, and the free use of cinchonine and cinchonidine is advocated, the problem of making India self-supporting in the matter of treatment of malaria would be made quite easy to solve in the course of a few years.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT :** I think you have exceeded your time-limit.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. P. N. SAPRU :** I will just quote one more passage and then I shall resume my seat.

“ As medical opinion is now becoming convinced that such alkaloids as cinchonine, cinchonidine and quinidine are just as effective in combating malaria as quinine, there is no reason why their use should not be extended ”.

Finally, Sir, in paragraph 394 they summarise their conclusions. Sir, I base my case on the Report of the Drugs Enquiry Committee and I hope that my Resolution, which is of a non-controversial character, will have the unanimous support of the House and of the Government.

With these words, Sir, I move the Resolution.

**THE HONOURABLE MR. BIJAY KUMAR BASU (Bengal : Nominated Non-Official) :** Coming from Bengal as I do, I think it will not be proper for me merely to give a silent vote on this occasion. Malaria has been a very widespread scourge to the whole of India and especially to Bengal. In Bengal the latest figures of the number of deaths from malaria is about 381,000 a year. And this figure does not include the cases of malaria which are included in that omnibus classification “ Other fevers ”. So it is more than likely that that figure is on a very low estimate. Apart from that, I think one of the causes which has been found by the medical experts of the spread of the disease is, equally with the mosquito, the infiltration of people infected with malaria from one part of India to another. The idea of the experts is that if a mosquito of a particular type sits on a person having malaria that mosquito becomes a carrier of malaria and infects other persons on which it sits. So that with the improvement of means of communication, roads, motor cars and, even aeroplanes for that matter, it is not possible to eradicate malaria simply by taking measures by provinces or in compartments. We have to take measures for the country as a whole, and that is why I think Mr. Sapru is perfectly right when he says that the only way to prevent the spread of this disease is wholesale quininisation. It has been effective in other countries in Italy and in Greece for instance. Why not have quininisation then? At the

present moment it is not possible for 350 millions of people living in India to be quinised because there is not enough quinine. As Mr. Sapru has said, the Government has a plantation in Mungpoo and also has a plantation near Ootacamund. I know that in Mungpoo trees have been planted out on about 3,000 acres, but the whole area of the plantation is larger. Some time back I think there was a proposal for extending the plantation which was considered by the Government of Bengal last year, and although the land was available it was not found possible to extend the plantation to the extent that Government would like because they have not got the finance to support it.

There is one suggestion made by Mr. Sapru however with which I am not in agreement and that is that the prices of quinine should be lowered. I am afraid, although the Drugs Enquiry Committee in its Report has said that prices can be lowered, looking to the composition of the Committee, Sir, I find there was no business man on it and the fact that if the prices were lowered there would be every likelihood of quinine being exported for profiteering was lost sight of. The quinine prices are fixed by the Kina Bureau, the Government of India has an agreement with them to abide by their decision as regards the world price of quinine. It has helped India at least during the time of depression when it kept up the price of quinine. I think the cost at Mungpoo is somewhere near Rs. 7-8-0 per lb. The price of quinine in 1924 I think was about Rs. 24 a lb. It has since been reduced to Rs. 18 per lb. and I think the price prevailing today is Rs. 18. The whole trouble is that there is not enough quinine grown here and that there is no private enterprise for its manufacture. There were some private growers near about Ootacamund before but at present there is hardly any private enterprise engaged in the business. (*An Honourable Member*: "No encouragement?") I do not know the reasons. The encouragement is there, because malaria is very much in evidence and if that is not encouragement enough I do not know what other encouragement is necessary. But apart from that, it is not possible for Government to supply quinine to all and sundry and especially at any figure below the figure prescribed by the Kina Bureau, with which the Government has an agreement and which has helped us to keep all our quinine to ourselves though the supply is very small. Otherwise it would have been frittered away by profiteers exporting it.

Then of course if we go to the root of things, there is a lot to be said as to why we cannot get rid of malaria. It is now known to be a preventible disease and to be amenable to treatment; but what really goes to the root of the matter is the lack of education, the lack of the idea of sanitation and the appalling poverty among the masses at large. End these and you will end malaria.

**THE HONOURABLE KUNWAR SIR JAGDISH PRASAD** (Education, Health and Lands Member): Sir, I would suggest that as I have agreed to give an extra day, in order that we may be able to disperse at 5 o'clock, further discussion on this Motion may be taken on that day.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT**: I have no objection. This Resolution will be further debated on the next non-official day.

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#### STATEMENT OF BUSINESS.

**THE HONOURABLE KUNWAR SIR JAGDISH PRASAD** (Leader of the House): As Honourable Members are aware, the next chief concern of the Council will be the Finance Bill, which it is essential to pass into law before the commencement of the new financial year on April 1st.

So far as can be foreseen, the only two ordinary working days available for disposal of the Bill will be the 30th and 31st March, unless the Council sits on the 29th, which is Easter Monday. The Council might prefer to sit for longer hours on the 30th and 31st in order to avoid sitting on the recognised public holiday on the 29th.

But, in any case, it will be necessary to hold a purely formal meeting of the Council in order to lay the Finance Bill on the table well in advance of its discussion. As at present advised, we do not expect to be able to do this by Saturday next, the 20th. From Sunday the 21st onwards there is a practically continuous series of holidays up to the 29th; and Honourable Members will probably wish to get away from Delhi. As, however, the proposed meeting will be purely formal, will only last a few minutes and will not admit of any debate, I suggest that we call it during the holidays, on or after the 22nd. All that will be required is the necessary quorum. Copies of the Bill will, of course, be sent to Honourable Members at their private addresses.

The actual dates, both of the sitting for laying the Bill on the table, and of the days for disposal of the Bill, would have to be announced to Honourable Members later.

**THE HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT:** Under the circumstances I do not think we have any other alternative but to adopt the suggestion of the Honourable Leader of the House. There is nothing to prevent Honourable Members going home during the holidays, because this Bill will probably be laid on the table on or after the 22nd. Meanwhile I may remind the Honourable Leader to see that the Government Members are present here to form a quorum of 15 on that date.

The Council will now adjourn to a date to be notified by Circular.

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The Council then adjourned to a date to be notified by Circular.