

COUNCIL OF STATE DEBATES

Monday, 8th April, 1946

Vol. I—No. 15

OFFICIAL REPORT



PARLIAMENT
ACC. NO.
Date

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PUBLISHED BY THE MANAGER OF PUBLICATIONS, DELHI
PRINTED BY THE MANAGER GOVERNMENT OF INDIA PRESS, NEW DELHI
1946

Price Annas Five or 6d.

Copies of the Debates of the Legislative Assembly and of the Council of State are obtainable on sale from the Manager of Publications, Civil Lines, Delhi

COUNCIL OF STATE

Monday, 8th April, 1946

The Council met in the Council Chamber of the Council House at Eleven of the Clock, the Hon. the President in the Chair.

MEMBERS SWORN

The Hon. Mr. Vyakarana Narahari Rao (Nominated Official).

The Hon. Mr. Kuthur Vidyanaatha Kalyan Sundaram (Nominated Official).

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

DETENTION OF INDIANS IN BANGKOK

249. THE HON. MR. M. THIRUMALA ROW: (a) Is it a fact that a number of Indians are under detention in Bangkok ?

(b) If so, do Government propose to investigate the disabilities which the Indians in Bangkok are suffering and to redress them ?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN: (a) Some ten Indians are reported to have been arrested by the Siamese authorities about the end of 1945. Their case was taken up by the British authorities on the spot and His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok has been asked for a telegraphic report on the present position of the case. His reply is awaited.

(b) On the Government of India's instructions Mr. M. S. Aney visited Bangkok last January to inquire into the condition of Indians in Siam. It was found that the Indian community normally resident in Siam suffers from no special disabilities. Some thousands of Indian labourers who had been imported from Malaya to work on the Burma-Siam railway were, however, in urgent need of relief. Adequate measures have been taken by the Allied authorities in Siam for the care of those people, and their repatriation to Malaya is now proceeding.

THE HON. MR. M. THIRUMALA ROW: Have Government taken any steps to safeguard the properties that have been left by some of the Indians in Siam ?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN: I must ask for notice, Sir.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: Did the Hon. Member say that all the labourers who were awaiting repatriation to Malaya from Siam had been sent back to Malaya ?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN: What I said was "Some thousands of Indian labourers who had been imported from Malaya to work on the Burma-Siam railway were, however, in urgent need of relief. Adequate measures have been taken by the Allied authorities in Siam for the care of those people, and their repatriation to Malaya is now proceeding."

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: Can the Hon. Member give us any details of the measures taken by the Siamese Government to give relief to these people ?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN: I must ask for notice.

MESSES. A. H. WHEELER AND Co., PROPRIETORS OF RAILWAY BOOKSTALLS.

250. THE HON. MR. SURPUT SINGH: Will Government state:

(a) Since when the firm of M/s A. H. Wheeler & Co. is enjoying the monopoly of selling books, newspapers, periodicals, etc., on the station premises of the E. I., B. B. & C. I., G. I. P. and B. N. Railways ?

(b) Is there any contract between these Railway Administrations and the above mentioned firm on this subject ?

(c) If so, what are the terms of those contracts? What amount is annually charged from the firm and on what dates the present contracts will terminate?

(d) Before entering into contract with the said firm have the Railway Administrations concerned invited public tenders? If so, what were the names of these tenderers and the reasons for rejecting their offers?

(e) Will Government consider the advisability of inviting public tenders by publishing necessary advertisements to this effect in all important newspapers of the country before deciding in future the question of giving these contracts?

(f) Are Government aware that there is a large number of complaints about the manner in which the present licencees are working and that there is dissatisfaction among the travelling public about the unsatisfactory arrangements at several book-stalls to meet their requirements?

THE HON. SIR ERIC CONRAN-SMITH : (a) Messrs. A. H. Wheeler & Co. hold the bookstall contracts on the E. I., B. B. & C. I., G. I. P. and B. N. Railways as follows :—

<i>E. I. Railway</i>	Since 1886
<i>B. B. & C. I. Railway</i>	Since 1923
<i>G. I. P. Railway</i>	Since 1889
<i>B. N. Railway</i>	Since 1891

(b) Yes.

(c) Yes, the terms of the contract provide for Messrs. A. H. Wheeler & Co. paying to the Railway Administrations as follows :—

<i>E. I. Railway</i>	Rs. 7,650 per annum.
<i>B. B. & C. I. Railway</i>	3½ per cent. annual royalty on the gross sales.
<i>G. I. P. Railway</i>	Rs. 15,000 per annum.
<i>B. N. Railway</i>	2½ per cent. annual royalty on the gross turn-over.

The present contracts will terminate on the following dates :—

<i>E. I. Railway</i>	31-3-1947
<i>B. B. & C. I. Railway</i>	31-12-1946
<i>G. I. P. Railway</i>	31-12-1946
<i>B. N. Railway</i>	31-3-1947

(d) *E. I. Railway*—No.

B. B. & C. I. Railway—No.

G. I. P. Railway—Yes. The names of the tenderers were Messrs. A. H. Wheeler & Co., The Imperial Publishing Co., Lahore, and the Indian Press, Ltd., Allahabad. The licence fee offered by Messrs. A. H. Wheeler & Co. was higher than that offered by the other two whose tenders were rejected.

B. N. Railway—No.

(e) Yes.

(f) No.

THE HON. MR. M. THIRUMALA ROW : With regard to (b), is there any specific period for which these contracts are renewed?

THE HON. SIR ERIC CONRAN-SMITH : The period is specified in the contract with the individual railway. The period varies.

THE HON. MR. M. THIRUMALA ROW : Is there any railway which gives a contract for more than ten years at a stretch?

THE HON. SIR ERIC CONRAN-SMITH : Not for more than ten years but the contracts are renewable after a certain period of years.

SALE OR EXCHANGE OF SOVEREIGNS

251. THE HON. MR. SURPUT SINGH: Will Government state :

(a) Whether they sold or exchanged gold sovereigns to the public during the years of war ?

(b) If the answer is in affirmative, the number of such sovereigns sold in the years 1940-41, 1941-42, 1942-43, 1943-44, 1944-45 and 1945-46 ?

(c) Whether that was done in exchange of (i) gold only, (ii) gold and cash, or (iii) only cash ?

(d) If exchanged for gold and cash, the quantity of gold charged for each sovereign with cash in addition ?

THE HON. MR. V. NARAHARI RAO: (a) to (d). No sales or exchange of sovereigns were made by Government during the war. Exchange of sovereigns against gold was, however, made by the Reserve Bank of India but it will not be in the public interests to disclose the figure.

SALE OF GOLD

252. THE HON. MR. SURPUT SINGH: Will Government state :

(a) Whether the South African and the American Governments (U.S.A.) were allowed to sell gold in India between the years 1940-41 to 1945-46 ?

(b) If so, the quantity and value of gold the above Governments sold in each year ?

THE HON. MR. V. NARAHARI RAO: (a) No sales were made on account of the South African Government, but sales were made on account of the Government of the United States of America during the period from the 8th August 1943 to the 17th August 1945.

(b) Amount sold each year cannot be calculated but subject to adjustments some of which may be substantial, total sales made on American account during the period amounted to 2,955,993 ounces of the value of Rs. 56,48,00,000.

RATIONING OF PETROL

253. THE HON. RAI BAHADUR S. K. DAS: Will Government state :

(a) Whether rationing of petrol was adopted as a war measure ?

(b) If the answer is in affirmative, whether after the cessation of hostilities such restriction on the use of petrol is still considered necessary ?

THE HON. SIR ERIC CONRAN-SMITH: (a) Rationing was introduced as a result of the war.

(b) Yes. The reasons why petrol rationing cannot at present be further relaxed or withdrawn have been fully explained in the press communique issued in the first week of January 1946.

PROTECTION OF INDIAN INDUSTRIES AGAINST FOREIGN COMPETITION

254. FLIGHT-LIEUT. THE HON. RUP CHAND: Will Government state :

(a) What action they have taken to protect Indian industries against foreign competition in the post-war period, especially such industries as were started in India during the war but are now on the verge of disruption ?

(b) Whether Government have taken care that in granting licences for imports of foreign goods into India no facilities are given for importing such goods as would place Indian-manufactured goods at a disadvantage ?

(c) Do Government propose to clarify their policy in this matter ?

THE HON. MR. Y. N. SUKTHANKAR: (a) Pending the formulation of a long-term tariff policy, Government have, as a short term measure, set up an interim Tariff Board to investigate the claims of industries started or developed during the war, to assistance or protection against foreign competition during the transition

period. I lay on the table a copy of the Commerce Department Resolution dated the 3rd November 1945 setting up the Board. With a view to ensuring speedy action on the recommendations of the Board Government have also introduced the Protective Duties Bill which is now before the Legislature.

(b) and (c). In the application of Import Trade Control due regard is paid to the legitimate interests of Indian industries during the difficult period of transition from war-time to peace-time economy.

LOSS OF FOODGRAINS

255. FLIGHT-LIEUT. THE HON. RUP CHAND : Will Government state :

(a) The approximate losses of foodgrains in India by lack of adequate and satisfactory storage facilities during the last five years separately ?

(b) Whether it is a fact that no substantial improvements in the storage facilities have been made during the last few years and consequently the wastage of foodgrains on this account continues at more or less the same proportion from year to year ?

(c) The reasons why substantial improvements in storage facilities have not been made in India so far ?

THE HON. SIR JWALA PRASAD SRIVASTAVA : (a) I regret it is not possible to calculate the loss of foodgrains in India due to lack of adequate and satisfactory storage facilities during the last five years separately. One rough guess is that the annual loss during storage due to various causes is of the order of three million tons.

(b) and (c). The Central Government have, during the last two years, constructed storage for 91,500 tons. In addition, they have subsidized the construction of storage for 89,250 tons in the Punjab, Sind, Orissa and Central Provinces. Provincial Governments themselves are constructing storage for more than 6.5 lakh tons. The provision of pucca godowns, to prevent storage losses, is being steadily planned for.

THE HON. SIR SHANTIDAS ASKURAN : Have we got enough space to store all the food which has been allotted to us by the United Nations and which is going to come here within the next six months ? And are you going to allot it to the different provinces immediately after arrival so that it will be properly distributed, or have you got storage facilities in certain ports ?

THE HON. SIR JWALA PRASAD SRIVASTAVA : It will be distributed straightaway to the different provinces. It is being allotted now.

THE HON. SIR SHANTIDAS ASKURAN : Have the railways got all the facilities for that ? As you know, there is coal shortage. Sometimes there is coal shortage ; sometimes there is wagon shortage. There is some difficulty or others. Have you ascertained whether the Railways are going to make all the preparations necessary for distribution ?

THE HON. SIR JWALA PRASAD SRIVASTAVA : This question does not arise out of the question on the Order Paper, but I would like to inform the House that we have already laid on rail transport to meet the requirements of these imported foodgrains, and we have a branch now in the Food Department working at this.

REDUCTION OF LICENCE FEES ON CHEMICALS AND DRUGS

256. FLIGHT-LIEUT. THE HON. RUP CHAND : Will Government state whether they propose to reduce the licence fees for importers, wholesale and retail dealers in chemicals and drugs now that about 9 months have passed since the war ended ; if not the reasons therefor ?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN (on behalf of Industries and Supplies Department) : The licence fees under the Drugs Control Order for all types of licences have already been reduced by half in respect of the licensing year commenced on 1st April, 1946 by a notification published in the Gazette of India on the 2nd March 1946. No further reduction is being considered.

BRITISH AND INDIAN OFFICERS HOLDING PERMANENT COMMISSIONS

257. **THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU** : Will Government state the number of permanently commissioned Indian and British officers, respectively, with service ranging from (i) 1—5 years, (ii) 5—10 years, (iii) 10—15 years, (iv) 15—20 years, and (v) 20—30 years ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : I lay a statement on the table.

Distribution of Indian and British officers holding permanent Commissions in the three Indian Services by years of commissioned service as on the 1st January 1946.

Years of commissioned service	British	Indian
1—5	30	44
5—10	674	388
10—15	449	141
15—20	316	59
20—30	897	27

POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED IN OFFICERING THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY, INDIAN ARMY AND THE ROYAL INDIAN AIR FORCE

258. **THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU** : With reference to the Press 'communique, dated the 22nd October 1945, regarding " the policy to be followed in the future officering of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army and the Royal Indian Air Force " will Government state why it was considered necessary to offer 40 regular Commissions to European officers of the R. I. N. Reserves ? If European officers were required, why were they not obtained by secondment or attachment from the Royal Navy ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : 1. These 40 commissions were offered to European officers to fill an existing need for experienced officers in the intermediate grades of the officer cadre of the R. I. N.

2. The reasons for deciding to give these 40 commissions to Europeans in the case of the Navy alone of the three Services were the greater difficulty of obtaining seconded officers in required numbers from the Royal Navy than from the other British services and the fact that there are not sufficient Indian officers of the experience required who are suitable and have the particular qualifications.

Naval officers are required to specialise to a very considerable extent, and this measure was meant to tide over the gap until the period when a steady flow of trained and qualified Indian officers in all branches is available.

3. Up to date only 9 European Reserve officers have been selected for permanent commissions and I am now re-examining the position to see if we can manage with less than the original 40 by obtaining more by secondment or some other means.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Was any effort made to obtain officers by secondment or attachment before deciding on the grant of regular commissions to 40 European officers of the R. I. N. R. ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : One method of obtaining officers by secondment is to apply to the British Admiralty, and if officers volunteer and are suitable, we take them. The other method, of course, is to get Indian officers commissioned in the Royal Navy. We are trying to get them by all means in our power. But those officers will take time to train, and these British officers are meant to fill the intermediate grade until such time as Indian officers can be fully trained.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : How is the position in the R. I. N. different from that in the Indian Army, where also the seconded or attached officers will occupy positions for which Indian officers are not ready yet ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : The difference, as I have tried to explain, is that the Naval officer, generally speaking, is more specialized than the Army officer. When this proposal was put to me, I went into the question myself, and it was because I was convinced that it was a necessary measure that I agreed to it in order to tide over the gap until fully trained Indian officers were available.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Was the Admiralty approached in this connection before the decision referred to in my question was taken ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : Certainly.

WELFARE OFFICERS IN MALAYA

259. THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : (a) Is it a fact that both the Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director, Army Welfare Service, attached to the Malaya Command are British officers ?

(b) What is the total number of British and Indian Welfare Officers, respectively, under the Malaya Command ? Are the majority of the officers British ?

(c) Are 75 per cent. of the troops under the Malaya Command Indian ? If so, why are both the Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director, Army Welfare Service, and the majority of the Welfare Officers British ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : (a) It is a fact that both the Assistant Director and the Deputy Assistant Director, Army Welfare Service at Headquarters Malaya Command are British officers. The welfare staff, however, is part of the administrative staff and, in Malaya, comes under an Indian Colonel.

(b) No exact information is available, but the majority of welfare officers in Malaya are British.

(c) More than 75 per cent of the troops in the Malaya Command are Indian. The appointment of Assistant Director, Deputy Assistant Director, and of Welfare Officers are made by Commander-in-Chief, ALFSEA.

The reason why both these appointments are at present filled by British officers is because they are the most suitable officers available at the moment. It is a fact that it is extremely difficult to find Indian officers of the requisite seniority and experience to fill the senior welfare staff appointments. We have relatively few senior Indian officers and these are nearly all employed in command of units or in senior staff appointments. I believe about 30 per cent of the junior welfare staff appointments in ALFSEA are held by Indian officers but I have not got exact figures as these appointments are made by Commander-in-Chief, ALFSEA.

I am fully alive to this problem and am continually trying to find suitable Indian officers for welfare work.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Are the Indian troops in Malaya still under ALFSEA or are they now under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : No, Sir, they are still under the Supreme Allied Commander, and under the Commander-in-Chief, ALFSEA.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Will the Government of India make representations to the Supreme Allied Commander asking that one of the Superior officers should be an Indian so that the welfare of Indians might be properly looked after.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : I am continually trying to find suitable Indian officers for the Welfare Service but we cannot find them. If I had the choice I would prefer a fully trained European to an untrained Indian. Otherwise the troops will suffer.

INDIAN TROOPS IN MALAYA

260. THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : (a) Are Government aware that there is dissatisfaction among Indian troops in Malaya owing to the inadequate supply of literature, wireless sets, gramophones, records, etc. ?

(b) Is it a fact that the arrangements for their entertainment are inadequate and that new Indian films are not available ?

(c) What steps do Government propose to take to remove the above mentioned grievances of the Indian troops ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : (a), (b) and (c). I lay a statement on the table.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : No statement is required for part (a). What is the reply to part (a) of the question ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : The statement contains a lot of information bearing on the question. It will be a waste of time to try and give details here.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : What I ask in part (a) is : " Are Government aware that there is dissatisfaction among Indian troops in Malaya owing to the inadequate supply of literature, wireless sets, gramophones, records, etc.?"

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : I have nothing to add Sir.

(a) Government are aware that there was some dissatisfaction among Indian Troops in Malaya at the time of the Hon. Pt. Kunzru's visit on the grounds that the supply of literature, wireless sets, gramophones and records was inadequate. The Director of Welfare, G. H. Q. India, was on a visit to Malaya at about the same time as Pt. Kunzru, to examine the welfare conditions of Indian Troops. As a result of his report steps have been taken to improve conditions for I. T. in Malaya. One of the main causes of inadequate supply was shortage of shipping which resulted in a hold up of welfare consignments in India.

(b) It is a fact that there has been some difficulty in getting Indian concert parties to Malaya due to shortage of shipping but the position is now better. Four Indian Concert Parties (provided by the Welfare Organization in the Welfare General's Branch) known as the Fauji Dilkhush Sabha have been sent to Malaya in the last two months. Four more are now on the point of departure from India. The intention is to have at least four concert parties in Malaya at a time.

The following new Indian films were released by D. S. K. for circulation within South East Asia Command, from October to December 1945 :—

<i>Title</i>	<i>Bombay Released Date</i>
PAHLE AP	June 1945.
SAWAN	May 1945.
BHAJAN	September 1945.
LAILA MAJNU	May 1945.
SUBEH SHAM	October 1945.
CHAMIYA	August 1945.
RATTAN	April 1945.
PREET	June 1945.
RAMA YANI	July 1945.
MANASAMRAKSHANAM (Tamil Film)	February 1945.
NAL DAMAYANTI	June 1945.
PANNA	May 1945.
ISMAT	February 1945.
SHIRIN FARHAD	May 1945.
HUMAYUN	May 1945.
CHANDTARA	September 1945.
ANBAN	Being released.

During the month of January 1946, the following new subjects have been released :—

<i>Title</i>	<i>Bombay Released Date</i>
YES PLEASE	July 1945.
MAHARATHI KARNA	September 1945.
SANYASI	Being released.
PIYA MILAN	September 1945.
MUMTAZ MAHAL	October 1945.
BACHPAN	Being released by trade.
TARAMATI	September 1945.
VILLAGE GIRL	September 1945.
MUN KI JEET	January 1946.
PANNA DAI	May 1945.
PRABHU KI GHAR	Being released by trade.

(c) With the improvement in shipping facilities the situation has already improved. The distribution of welfare and amenity facilities within the large areas, including Malaya, which comprise South East Asia Command is the responsibility of H. Q. ALFSEA. H.E. the C.-in-C. has discussed these matters personally with the G.O.C. in-C. ALFSEA and all possible steps to improve the situation that can be taken, are being taken.

6,200 wireless sets have been sent to ALFSEA from India; 2,496 in the last two months. A further one thousand sets are now being shipped.

2,828 gramophones have been despatched of which 2,259 were sent to ALFSEA in February and March 1946. Records are being provided at the scale of 50 records per 100 men.

As regards literature, 1,20,000 books in various Indian vernaculars have recently been sent out for free issue to Indian Troops in ALFSEA. This is in addition to literature bought from the Unit's per capita grant for literature of Re. 1. In addition copies of the Indian Service Daily 'Jawan' and the Indian Service illustrated Weekly 'Fauji Akhbar' in both English and Roman Urdu and in the vernaculars are distributed on a generous scale.

QUALITY OF RATIONS ISSUED TO INDIAN AIRMEN

261. THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: (a) Are Government aware that there is dissatisfaction among Indian airmen with the quality of their rations, particularly with the curry powder and the flour which is said to be from six months to a year old and to contain grit:

(b) Are they further aware of complaints regarding discrimination between Indian and British airmen in regard to the supply of vegetables by the R. I. A. S. C. which is accused of not supplying vegetables like cauliflower, tomatoes, cabbage and peas to Indian airmen but reserving them for British airmen?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: (a) Only isolated instances have been reported of dissatisfaction among Indian airmen in regard to the quality of their rations. Where complaints have justified it, necessary action has been taken. Of the items specifically mentioned—

(i) Curry powder is not a ration issue and units are now authorised to buy locally the requisite condiment powders to suit their requirements.

(ii) There have been no recent complaints in regard to flour and possibly the question refers to atta, complaints about which have been received in the past. The present milling and distribution arrangements, however, preclude any accumulation of stocks and none but fresh milled and properly inspected supplies are issued.

(b) No complaints of discrimination in the issue of vegetables have been received.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: With regard to part (b), have Government made any inquiries?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: No, Sir; there is no need. These matters are reported to me as a matter of routine and I know what is going on in the Services. I am satisfied from what I have seen that the supply of vegetables is adequate for all the Indian airmen.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: May I say that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief may be certain that I would not have put this question if I had not been somewhat sure of my facts.

(No answer.)

INDIANS IN THE LANDS BRANCH OF THE CANTONMENTS DEPARTMENT

262. THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: (a) Will Government state whether it is a fact that the sanctioned strength of the Lands Branch, Cantonments Department, is 30 and that only 3 of the officers employed in it are Indians? If so, why has the Service been made almost exclusively British?

(b) What steps do Government propose to take to bring about a substantial increase in the number of Indians in it ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : (a) and (b). The sanctioned strength of the Lands Branch of the Cantonments Department is 29, not 30. In 1937, when, consequent on reorganisation of the Department, the Lands Branch was constituted as a permanent measure, three Indian Executive Officers were appointed to that Branch. Four more Indian Officers have since been appointed to officiate as Military Estates Officers in the Lands Branch ; and action has also been initiated to recruit certain Indian Commissioned Officers to that Branch.

All appointments to permanent posts in future will be Indians.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : When more Indian officers are appointed to this Service, will its status, financially and in other respects, remain as it is or will it be lowered ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : I want notice of that, Sir.

OFFICERS EMPLOYED UNDER THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

263. THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : (a) What is the total number of officers employed under the Directorate of Public Relations, G. H. Q., in Delhi and elsewhere ?

(b) What is it estimated to cost in the current year and the next year ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : (a) 53 in Delhi and 43 elsewhere.

(b) The total cost of the Public Relations Directorate for the year 1945-46 was Rs. 57,67,309 and the estimated cost for the year 1946-47 is Rs. 21,19,400.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Will His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief tell us whether any decision has been arrived at with regard to the future of this Directorate ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : The plan of 1947-48 onwards is to retain a skeleton staff only sufficient to publicize the peace-time activities of the Service and to provide for expansion at the time of war, probably a small staff in G.H.Q. and a Press Officer with a photographer and a clerk or two in each Command. At the moment, the responsibilities of the Public Relations Directorate have not decreased to an extent which would allow of more reduction this year but this matter will be very closely watched.

THE "STILWELL ROAD"

264. THE HON. RAJA YUVERAJ DUTTA SINGH : Will Government state whether any expenditure was incurred ; if so, how much, out of the Indian Exchequer on the building and maintenance of what is called "Stilwell Road" in Burma, which is now going to be abandoned ?

THE HON. MR. V. NARAHARI RAO : No part of the expenditure incurred in connexion with the construction or maintenance of the road referred to has been borne by Indian revenues.

DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS AMERICAN EQUIPMENT

265. THE HON. RAJA YUVERAJ DUTTA SINGH : (a) Will Government state whether the American motor vehicles, such as "Jeeps" are going to be disposed of on account of the U. S. A. ; if so, will they be made available to the general public ?

(b) Will Government state the method of disposing of the surplus stock of American equipment in India ? Will they be advertised in the papers ?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN (on behalf of Industries and Supplies Department) : (a) The Government of India have agreed to purchase all U. S. Government surplus property located in India, including motor vehicles. This property will be handled by the Director General (Disposals) in accordance with the

general disposals policy of the Government of India concerning all war surpluses. Surplus assets will be made available to the general public if they are not required by Central Government Departments and other priority indentors (e.g. Provincial and States Governments, quasi-Government Institutions and Public Utilities).

(b) Priority purchasers are required to select their requirements from catalogues published by the Director General, Disposals within a period of 31 days. If firm indents are not received, the Director General is at liberty to proceed to disposal elsewhere at the end of that period.

It is intended to give as wide publicity as possible by issuing catalogues of surplus stores, and by advertisements in the Press. Show rooms will also be opened in principal cities where catalogues and goods can be inspected, and sales to the public conducted.

ACCEPTANCE OF MONEY ORDERS WRITTEN IN HINDI

266. THE HON. RAJA YUVERAJ DUTTA SINGH : (a) Has the attention of Government been drawn to a letter from Thakar Dass Sud, Secretary, Matri Bhasha Prachar Mandal, Lahore, published in the *Daily Herald* of Lahore, dated the 11th March, 1946 in which it is stated that the Postal Department does not accept money orders and other articles addressed in Hindi language for onward transmission to their destination ; but they are returned with instructions that these should be written in Urdu or English ?

(b) Is it a fact that this sort of difficulty is experienced at Moghalpura and Shalamar Road Post Offices ?

(c) Is it a fact that on the 4th March, 1946, two money order forms addressed in Hindi language were presented at G. P. O., Mall Road, Lahore, for onward transmission to Bawarna, Kangra District ; but these were refused with verbal remarks that they can only be accepted if written in Urdu or English ?

(d) Do Government propose to make an enquiry into the above, and also communicate with the writer of the letter referred to in (a) above, and to take necessary steps to see that money orders and other Postal articles addressed in Hindi are not refused transmission ?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN : (a) Government have seen the article.

(b) No.

(c) The three officials who were working at the money order counter of the Lahore G.P.O. on the 4th March, 1946 deny that any such money-orders were either presented or refused on that date.

(d) In view of the replies to parts (a) and (b) of the question, it is not proposed to make further enquiries ; Government are satisfied that adequate arrangements do exist for the acceptance of money orders and other articles written in Hindi script.

EXPORT OF DAL

267. THE HON. RAJA YUVERAJ DUTTA SINGH : (a) Has the attention of Government been drawn to the following statement which appeared in the *Pioneer*, dated the 16th March, 1946 (second dak edition) in the editorial column, in which it is stated that the Manager of an Indian Shipping Company said that in the very first voyage of his Company's new ship to a foreign country (14th February, 1946), "she carried an export cargo of 2,951 bags of *moong dal*" ; and also the following statement :—

"Last month also the steamers, "Begum" and "Jalajoyti" have carried about 35,000 bags of pulses of *lang dal*, 3,011 bags of *tur gal*, and 1,612 bags of *moong* were exported in "Begum". I further understand that about the same quantity is exported every month within the knowledge of the authorities" ?

(b) Have Government made an enquiry into this ? Will they state the full facts, indicating why exports of food grains still continues, in spite of official assurances to the contrary ?

THE HON. SIR JWALA PRASAD SRIVASTAVA : (a) Yes.

(b) Yes. The exports referred to were of pulses and were made to Ceylon. The position is that while exports of foodgrains were stopped some time ago, the exports of certain quantities of pulses were allowed till recently on a quota basis, as India was generally surplus in pulses. These exports have also been stopped now. The orders cancelling the Ceylon quotas issued on the 26th February 1946 : the exports referred to took place before the issue of those orders. It is not a fact that foodgrains are still being exported.

MILITARY VEHICLES SUITABLE FOR PASSENGER TRAFFIC

268. THE HON. MR. G. S. MOTILAL : (a) What is the total number of military vehicles in India suitable for passenger traffic ?

(b) How many of them are not required for military use ? .

(c) How many of them can be spared for diversion to civilian traffic ?

(d) Whether Government have decided to allocate some vehicles for road traffic for civilians ; if so, how many in each province and each city ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : I assume the Hon. Member means vehicles actually fitted for carrying passengers at present. On this assumption, the replies are as follows :—

(a) (i) Staff cars of capacity varying between 3 and 5 seats.....1,741

(ii) Station wagons... ..3,642

(iii) 3-ton lorries. This vehicle is basically a normal General Service lorry adapted as a passenger carrier by the fitting of seats to accommodate 32 fully equipped troops 67.

(b), (c) and (d). All are required for military purposes at present. It is however anticipated that about 1,800 station wagons will become surplus to the requirements of the Army in India gradually during the next 12 months. No decision has so far been taken regarding the disposal of these vehicles if they do become surplus.

The method of disposal is not an army responsibility ; the army declare surpluses to the Disposals Directorate of the Industries and Supplies Department who take all further action.

INDIANS IN THE BRITISH ARMY, ROYAL AIR FORCE AND ROYAL NAVY

269. FLIGHT-LIEUT. THE HON. RUP CHAND : Will Government state :

(a) The number of Indians who joined the three services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in England during the war period ?

(b) The number of such Indians who joined the services and have not yet been demobilized ?

(c) When do Government propose to demobilize them ?

(d) Whether Government of India have formulated any plans to absorb such Indians in superior services after they are demobilized in view of their distinguished record of service, their high qualifications and the fact that they have spent valuable years in His Majesty's service, if not, the reasons therefor ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : (a) 347 approximately.

(b) I regret I cannot say with certainty how many still remain to be demobilized, as no differentiation between Indians and other British subjects is made in the British Army and the R.A.F. It is however known that 168 of them are no longer serving.

(c) They will come under the normal Age Service Group Release Scheme in U.K., except in so far as they participate in such special concessions as may be granted to overseas volunteers in the British forces.

(d) They will be eligible, as other Indians with war service to their credit, to compete for the superior posts which have been reserved by the Government of India and Provincial Governments for war service candidates, provided they are domiciled in India. For details regarding resettlement plans, I would invite the attention of the Hon'ble Member to the pamphlet entitled "Release and Resettlement", a copy of which has been placed in the Library of the House.

ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE W.A.C. (I.)

270. THE HON. MR. SURPUT SING : Will Government state :

(a) Whether reports have come to their knowledge of the allegations against their own organisation by a number of members belonging to W.A.C. (I.)?

(b) Whether such allegations have also been made in the Press and the platform from time to time, recently ?

(c) Whether any enquiry into the allegations has been undertaken ; if so what is the result ; if not, do Government propose to appoint a representative Committee of officials and non-officials to enquire into the allegations ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : I would invite the attention of the Hon. Member to the reply given to the Hon. Raja Yuveraj Dutta Singh's question No. 190 on the 20th March 1946.

ACQUISITION OF LAND IN BOMBAY BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES

271. THE HON. MR. M. N. DALAL : (a) Are Government aware that the villages of Madh, Yerengal, Aksa and Marve which are situated in the most salubrious part of Bombay are sought to be acquired by the military authorities ?

(b) Are they also aware that the citizens of Bombay, the ex-Sheriff of Bombay and the Bombay Municipality have protested against these lands being acquired by the military authorities for a permanent training centre ?

(c) Do Government propose to prevail upon the military authorities to refrain from permanently acquiring these lands ?

(d) Are Government aware that thousands of fishermen and villagers are entitled to foreshore rights on the sea coast encircling the villages of Madh, Yerengal, Aksa and Marve and that large numbers of them have been deprived of their rights ?

(e) Do Government propose to take steps to hand back possession of these lands to their rightful proprietors ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : (a), (b) and (c). There was such a proposal, Sir, but it is not now proposed to acquire these lands as a permanent training centre. It will, however, be necessary to retain a portion of the present area while an alternative site for the Combined Operation Training Centre is in course of selection and construction.

(d) Yes, Sir. For that reason it is proposed to open the whole extent of the foreshore immediately to fishermen except two short stretches which are actually included in the enclosures of military and naval camps. These will be cleared as soon as the new centres are ready, which will be in about two years.

During this period however it will be necessary to close certain areas for short periods from time to time, in order to carry out certain firing practices.

(e) The proprietors of land not actually in military possession will be able to cultivate such land as soon as it becomes vacant.

STATEMENTS ETC., LAID ON THE TABLE

THE HON. SIR JOGENDRA SINGH (Education, Health and Agriculture Member) : Sir, I lay on the table copies* of the Constitution and related papers of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

*Not printed. Copies placed in the Library of the House.

INFORMATION PROMISED IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS LAID ON THE TABLE

THE HON. DR. N. B. KHARE (Commonwealth Relations Member): Sir, I lay on the table the information promised in reply to question No. 366, asked on the 12th April 1945.

DISABILITIES OF INDIANS IN CANADA

From enquiries made it is understood that Indians, excepting those who had served in the last two world Wars are not eligible to practise the medical profession or to be registered as pharmaceutical chemists in British Columbia.

BILLS PASSED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY LAID ON THE TABLE

SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL: Sir, in pursuance of rule 25 of the Indian Legislative Rules, I lay on the table copies of the following Bills which were passed by the Legislative Assembly at its meetings held on the 3rd, 4th and 5th April, 1946, namely :—

A Bill further to amend the Income-tax Act, 1922.

A Bill to provide for the creation of a fund to be expended by a Committee especially constituted for the improvement and development of the cultivation and marketing of oilseeds and of the production, manufacture and marketing of oilseeds products.

A Bill further to amend the Factories Act, 1934.

A Bill further to amend the Provident Funds Act, 1925.

A Bill further to amend the Trade Marks Act, 1940.

A Bill further to amend the Indian Companies Act, 1913.

A Bill to provide for the substitution of the Governor General in Council for certain Railway Companies in certain civil proceedings.

A Bill further to amend the Indian Coconut Committee Act, 1944.

A Bill to extend the date up to which duties characterised as protective in the First Schedule to the Indian Tariff Act, 1934, shall have effect, and further to amend the Sugar Industry (Protection) Act, 1932.

STANDING COMMITTEE FOR THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT

THE HON. SIR JOGENDRA SINGH (Education, Health and Agriculture Member): Sir, I move :—

“That this Council do proceed to elect, in such manner as the Hon. the President may direct, five non-official members to serve on the Standing Committee to advise on the subject dealt with in the Department of Health for the financial year 1946-47.”

The Motion was adopted.

STANDING COMMITTEE FOR THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN (Leader of the House): Sir, I move :—

“That this Council do proceed to elect, in such manner as the Hon. the President may direct, five non-official members to serve on the Standing Committee to advise the External Affairs Department on subjects pertaining to British Baluchistan, the Tribal Areas and India's membership of the United Nations Organization for the financial year 1946-47.”

THE HON. MR. M. THIRUMALA ROW (Madras : Non-Muhammadian): On a point of information, Sir, with regard to this Motion. I want to know if India is still a member of the League of Nations, and if that is so, which Department covers the League of Nations? Is it included in the Committee for the External Affairs Department?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN : I do not think that has anything to do with this Motion at all. If the Hon. Member will put a short notice question, I shall try and get the information.

The Motion was adopted.

STANDING COMMITTEE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

THE HON. DR. N. B. KHARE (Commonwealth Relations Member): Sir, I move :—

“ That this Council do proceed to elect, in such manner as the Hon. the President may direct one more non-official member to serve on the Standing Committee for the Commonwealth Relations Department during the financial year 1946-47, and another non-official member to serve on the same Committee *vice* the Hon. Sardar Bahadur Sir Sobha Singh resigned.”

The Motion was adopted.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : With reference to the Motions which have just been adopted by the Council, I have to announce that nominations to the Committee will be received by the Secretary up to 11 A.M. on Thursday, the 11th April, 1946 and the date of election, if necessary will be announced later.

RESOLUTION *RE* NATIONALISATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU (United Provinces Northern Non-Muhammadan): Mr. President, I beg to move that—

“ This Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that a time limit should be laid down for the nationalisation of the Indian Army so that the psychological atmosphere essential to the rapid formation of a national army may be created and the maximum effort may be made to achieve the purpose in view. This Council further recommends that—

- (a) the appointment of British officers in the grade of lieutenant or captain in the Indian Army should be stopped ;
- (b) the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers should be retained for the present ;
- (c) deserving Indian Officers should be given accelerated promotion to increase the number of Indian Officers required to fill the higher grades ; and
- (d) the methods followed by other independent countries to create a national army in a few years should be adopted with suitable modifications, with a view to the nationalization of the Indian Army in ten years.”

Sir, before dealing with the Resolution, I should like to refer to a few considerations which might be supposed to stand in the way of a discussion of this Resolution. It may be said, in the first place that there is a general expectation that a National Government may soon be established in India : negotiations are being carried on by the Cabinet Delegation with the leaders of the country for that purpose and that in view of this it would be more desirable to leave the policy which is to be followed in regard to the nationalisation of the Army to be settled by a future Indian Government than to consider it at the present time. We all hope, Sir, that the constitutional question will soon be settled and that a National Government will soon come into existence, but the military question is not the only question that such a Government will have to take into consideration when it is brought into being. It will have many other questions also to consider : for instance, those relating to the expansion and development of education, agriculture, industry, and so on, but we cannot cease for that reason to think about these important questions. Why should we then be expected to stop all thinking with regard to military problems simply because we all hope that the efforts of the Cabinet Delegation will soon be crowned with success and that a National Government will be set up at a very early date ? Indeed, Sir, if a National Government is to be established soon, it would to no small extent have to depend for the formation of its policies on the material that might be available today as a result of the public discussion of important questions and I think that we shall be rendering a service to any future Indian Government that may be brought into existence if we take into consideration those main questions on which the existence of a genuinely Indian Government depends.

Another objection, Sir, that might be raised to the discussion of this Resolution is that we are yet unaware of the future size of the Indian Army. This is undoubtedly a handicap and I gave my earnest consideration to this matter before giving notice of the Resolution. What I felt was that if the principles that ought to govern the officering of the present Indian Army were satisfactorily settled then whatever the size of the future Indian Army might be its nationalization would cease to be as difficult and complex a matter as it seems to be at the present time. The main question that we have to tackle at present is the nationalization of the Officer cadre of the Indian Army. If we are to devise suitable methods for that purpose, we must divest ourselves of preconceptions and past prejudices and look at the problems created by the changing times from a new standpoint, it will be much easier for us than to consider the problem of finding officers for the future Indian Army than it would be if things were allowed to remain in a state of flux as they are at present and the main question of policy in the matter were left unsettled.

There is one other disadvantage, Sir, that we suffer from in considering the Resolution before the House and that is that we are not yet aware of the details of the British Government's scheme for the replacement of British by Indian officers. In the communique that was issued by the War Department in October last, we were told that the question of the duration of the periods of secondment and attachment would be considered by the Government of India and His Majesty's Government and that the details would be settled later. Besides, His Excellency during the Budget debate dealing with certain questions that I had ventured to raise said that it was his idea to grant short-term Commissions I believe, to Indian officers so that the present difficulties might be tided over and we might feel sure of the *bona fides* of the military authorities. I do not quite understand what the purpose of granting these short-term Commissions is and what is the place that they are meant to occupy in the scheme for the nationalisation of the Army. I hope that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be able to throw light on these two questions when he participates later in the debate.

And, now Sir, I shall turn to the subject matter of my Resolution. I have asked that we should prescribe a period during which the Indian Army should be nationalised and I have based my demand on two grounds. One is that an atmosphere conducive to the rapid formation of a national army should be created and the other that we should be stimulated to put forth our utmost efforts in order to achieve this purpose.

Now, Sir, these two questions though they may seem to be of a theoretical nature appear to me to be of fundamental importance. They go to the root of the matter. We know how difficult it has been in the past for the military authorities to get officers of the right type. A part of the difficulty was unquestionably due to the political atmosphere prevailing in the country and to the uncertainty regarding the position of Indian officers in the Indian Army. If, as I ask, Government make, it clear that they will for their part do the utmost that they can to Indianize the whole army in a short period, there is no doubt that a new enthusiasm will be created in the country. If we can, in addition, have a National Government, we shall have two of the most powerful factors in human nature operating in favour of us—the factors of joy and freedom, which are great uplifting and creative forces in all human affairs. We cannot underrate the importance of these factors; they are among the most effective weapons that any army can fight with. If these factors are absent, then, whatever the armament and equipment of the army might be, we can never feel certain that it would be capable of meeting the strain of a first class war. There is also the question of the military authorities making the utmost effort to achieve the desired result. This means that the questions that face us should be looked at from a new angle, and the most important thing in this connection is, if His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will pardon me for saying so, that a new spirit should be breathed into the G.H.Q. My short experience of it unfortunately makes me feel that it is a body with somewhat antiquated ideas; I am even tempted to say that it is mentally fossilized. It is necessary to vitalize it if anything great is to be achieved in the military

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sphere. But its vitalization I must frankly confess, seems to me to be a more difficult problem than that of the paucity of candidates to which His Excellency referred.

Now, Sir, I shall deal with the operative parts of my Resolution. My first suggestion is that the appointment of British officers in the grade of Lieutenant or Captain in the Indian Army should be stopped. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, speaking during the Budget debate, approved of this idea and said that its realisation requires that the necessary number of junior officers must be forthcoming in India. He told us that for about 300 cadetships in the Indian Military Academy only 195 applications had been received and that he feared that only 25 candidates would be found suitable. If what I have said with regard to the need for creating a new psychological atmosphere in the country has any substance in it, then I for one have no doubt that if the suggestions that I am making are complied with, the situation will be far more favourable than it is today. Young men with suitable qualifications will be much more willing than to accept a military career than they are at the present time. This is not a fanciful hope. I think the military authorities recognise that during the war they were unable to obtain as many first-class candidates as they desired, not because young men with the requisite qualifications were not available, but because they were not prepared to join the army in the existing circumstances. The availability of suitable candidates for such commissions as have been offered from time to time has been recognised since the days of the Skeen Committee. But what has been wanting is the adoption of suitable methods in order to attract the available material to the army.

In this connection, I should like to draw the attention of the military authorities to the recommendations of the Auxiliary and Territorial Forces Committee of 1925. That Committee recommended that the University Training Corps should be regarded as "the foundation stone of the future national army" and that the questions of education in citizenship and physical training ought to be attended to in schools. Have Government paid the slightest attention to these recommendations? I acknowledge with great pleasure the interest taken by the present Commander-in-Chief in the development of the University Officer's Training Corps, as it is now called because of him. We all know that it is now being given training of a higher order than before and that efforts are being made in various directions in order to make the youths of the country studying in the universities more military-minded. But a great deal still remains to be done in this connection, and I venture to hope that if the military authorities take up the matter in right earnest, then, in spite of fact that a great deal of valuable time has been lost, we shall be able to do far more than we imagine; we shall be able to make tremendous progress during the next ten years. Let me add, Sir, before I pass on to another point, that these are matters to which considerable attention has been paid in England. The Junior Officers' Training Corps that were formed in connection with a number of schools before the war had for their purpose the familiarization of the youth of the country with the idea of military service and making them mentally and physically fit to discharge the duties which a military officer is required to fulfil. These questions never having been sympathetically considered in this country, there is no wonder that owing to the backwardness of our educational system, the candidates who now offer themselves for commissions are rejected in large number by the Interview and Selection Boards. I admit that in theory the more efficient the method of selection the better should be the result. But, after all, the methods of selection which we adopt must have some relation to the circumstances of the country and particularly to its educational system. If this is recognised, then, in my opinion, the military authorities should be concerned more with the devising of proper arrangements for the training of the cadets after their selection than with the rejection of a large number of candidates for fear they should prove unsuitable afterwards. In my opinion, in the present educational circumstances of the country, this risk has to be taken and we cannot adopt theoretically the most efficient methods of selection simply because they have been adopted in England.

There is just one more point I should like to urge in this connection. A great deal of the unpopularity of service in the army is due to the complaints made in the

past, and still being made, of the discrimination to which the Indian officers were subjected. I do not want to go into the details of this question because we have discussed the matter repeatedly in the past in this House. I refer to it on the present occasion it is to represent strongly to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that the paucity of candidates is due to no small extent to this great handicap from which the Indian Army suffers. I do not accuse him personally of being actuated by racial considerations. In fact, I do not think that there has been any Commander-in-Chief in India since 1857 who has tried as much as he has to infuse a spirit of equality and brotherliness in the Army. But the old system has been too strong even for him and unless he and the G.H.Q. make determined and concerted efforts to deal with this problem, service in the army will not appeal as much to young men of this country as it does to British youths.

Sir, I shall now refer to the question of the selection of officers for permanent Commissions out of the Emergency Commissioned officers who have applied for them. I was informed by the War Department in December last that by the 1st December, 1945, 1,035 candidates had been examined and that of them, 399 had been found suitable for being granted Commissions. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief told us during the Budget debate that out of about 1,800 candidates who had been interviewed, 500 candidates had been granted or were being granted Commissions. I take it that the figures given by the War Department and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief are both correct. If so, they point to a very significant fact to which I must draw the attention of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. About 400 candidates were selected out of a total of about 1,000 that were interviewed, by the 1st December, but out of about 700 more candidates examined since then, only 100 have been approved for permanent Commissions. Surely there must be something wrong with the present method of selection if by the 1st December, 40 per cent. of the candidates interviewed had been selected for permanent Commissions while after that, only about 15 per cent. of those interviewed were so selected. I think this is a fit matter for His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to inquire into. If this is how the present efficient method of selection works, then the sooner it is modified the better, I understand that the officers who have applied for permanent Commissions are officers with 1 to 5 years' service to their credit. I should have thought that the work that they had done during the war and the testimony of their superior officers would be considered to be of more value than any theoretical method of selection. But I understand that many candidates, who to all seeming had proved efficient and would have made good permanent officers, have been rejected.

Sir, if the matters to which I have drawn attention are attended to and if in particular the Indian youth are made to feel that the future Army is going to be theirs and that it will be an Army at the disposal of a free National Government to maintain the freedom of the country, I have no doubt whatsoever in my own mind that the supply of candidates would increase beyond any figure that we can think of now.

Now, Sir, I shall turn to the second question that I have raised, namely, that the Viceroy's Commissioned Officer should be retained at present. We had in the pre-war Indian Army about 3,000 commissioned officers. We have at the present time about 2,400 British officers and a little over 500 Indian officers. If the strength of the officer cadre is not increased, the problem of nationalisation is limited to the finding of 2,400 suitable Indian officers. But if the V.C.Os. are going to be replaced by Indian Commissioned Officers, then the problem will become much bigger. On the eve of the war there were 4,000 Viceroy's Commissioned Officers. We see therefore how greatly will the question of nationalisation be complicated if it is decided to replace the V.C.O. by the Indian Commissioned Officer. Assuming, Sir, that there is no place in the Army of the future for the V.C.O., the question has still to be considered whether the V.C.Os. are to be replaced by better educated and better trained officers immediately or after Indianisation has been completed. I am emphatically, Sir, for the latter course.

Now, a word about accelerated promotion to which I attach a great deal of importance. The Joint War Secretary said the other day in the Legislative Assembly that there were 3 Indian Brigadiers at present and that there were

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not more than 30 British officers above them. But the House would like to know, Sir, what has been our achievement in connection with the production of Indian officers during the last 20 or 25 years. During this period, Sir, Russia has produced a first class army. It has defended itself successfully against a first class enemy and its army is the admiration of the whole world. But during the same period the highest achievement to our credit is that we have produced 43 Indian Officers of the substantive rank of Major. Now, what is this due to? Under the rules in force, that is, peace-time promotion rules, it takes an officer about 26 years to be considered for selection to the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel. But in the other Branches of the Defence Forces in India, the length of service required for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel is not the same as in the Army. In the Air Force I understand that it takes only 14 years for an officer to become a Wing Commander, whose status is equal to that of a Lieutenant-Colonel. I do not know what the position is in the Navy, but there too an officer can acquire the rank of Major in about—

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: I may point out that the period of 26 years was the maximum period after which an officer would be promoted Lieutenant-Colonel before the war. Very many officers become Lieutenant-Colonels before they reach 26 years.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: I am very glad to hear that. It means that the Commander-in-Chief is in principle with me when I ask for accelerated promotion. This makes my task, Sir, much easier. I venture to think that the Indian Army will never be nationalised if we stick to the peace-time rules of promotion. They are suitable when applied to an established service. But they are not suitable when you are trying to create a National Army; they are a positive hindrance then. If such rules had been observed by Russia it would still be depending on the British, French and American officers for the command of the higher formations. We are told, Sir, that for some time it would be to our own interest if we have British officers of the requisite seniority in the Indian Army. But the British Army before the war was a small one. How are you going then to find an adequate number of British officers of the requisite seniority to occupy the higher posts in the future Indian Army? Either you will have to give accelerated promotion to the British officers or you will have to retain officers who will retire under the peace-time rules. I do not know what the number of such officers is. But there is a limit to the extent to which officers who are about to retire can be retained. Whether therefore you depend on British or Indian officers, you will have to resort to the principle of accelerated promotion. I do not ask that the British officers in the Indian Army should be turned out. But I take it that a large number of those who are now in the Army will retire in due course. Besides, I am in favour of giving them accelerated promotion too, so that the end I have in view may be achieved quickly.

Sir, these were the main considerations that I wanted to urge in support of my Resolution. If I were asked to give a concrete illustration to show how the higher ranks of the Army can be immediately filled up in some measure by Indian officers, I would draw the attention of the House to the information supplied by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief today with regard to the number of officers of varying periods of service. He has told us that about 47 officers have put in between 20 and 30 years' service. Surely, Sir, if these officers are worth anything, some of them can be appointed to be Major-Generals of whom we have about 20 in our Army. Similarly, Sir, we have about 59 officers between 15 and 20 years. They find such officers as are not chosen for being appointed as Major-Generals will be available for filling up the positions of Colonels, and Lieutenant-Colonel of whom in all, I understand, there were about 325 in the pre-war army. These examples show that what I am suggesting is to a fair extent practicable now and that it will become much more practicable at the end of the period to which I have referred. Sir, other countries which had greater problems to face have achieved the objective which I have ventured to place before the House and the Government in a short time. I have referred to Russia already. Russia had to create not merely a new army but a new defence system, and it had to build up industries which would supply the army with the weapons and the equipment that it wanted. It had to overhaul the educational system so that educated young men might be available for the commissioned ranks. It has achieved all this and at the same time created a first class army

Again, Sir, the Indian Army officers who were tested in battle showed themselves, I understand, to be thoroughly efficient. Those of them who occupied high positions in the Indian National Army proved themselves equal to their responsibilities. I do not agree with the policy that inspired them, but I cannot help referring to their military competence in connection with the question that we are considering.

Sir, I have placed the main considerations that actuated me in moving my Resolution. I hope that neither I or the House will feel that the Resolution has been brought forward in a light spirit or that I am taking advantage of the present occasion to make extravagant demands in order to force the hands of the Government. I have, Sir, been giving some attention to military problems for more than 20 years. I cannot say that I even know one-tenth of what a Subaltern does. Nevertheless, I think I may say without any self-complacency that I am in a position to appreciate the main principles that ought to underlie military policy and that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief may therefore feel certain that the Resolution has been brought forward not in a light-hearted manner but with the serious object of suggesting suitable ways of nationalising the army without impairing their efficiency within a reasonable short period.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : I do not think it is necessary to read the Resolution again. To save time I will not read it. I will say therefore that the Resolution is moved. His Excellency may wish to speak immediately.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : Mr. President, I am always glad to receive the advice of the Hon. the Mover of the Resolution and I welcome his suggestions in the spirit in which they are given because I know it is a constructive spirit and also because we have one and the same object. Well, let me state that object as I see it. It is, Sir, to create a completely national army, that is an army officered and manned throughout by Indians in the shortest possible space of time without lowering the very high standard of efficiency which obtains in the Indian Army today. That, Sir, I conceive to be our object. The Hon. Member mentions that other countries have built up a defence organisation quickly and I suppose the inference is that India can do the same. Well, Sir, India is fortunate in that she has already an efficient army and as the House is well aware the rank and file of that army today is for all practical purposes 100 per cent. Indian. It is the nationalisation of the officer cadre of that army which constitutes the problems before us today. Sir, it is the declared policy of the Government of India that the British officer element of the Indian Army shall be replaced by Indian officers as soon as possible, compatible with the maintenance of the efficiency of the army as a whole. There is, therefore, I submit, Sir, no ground for controversy on this point. What we are concerned with today is how quickly this declared policy of Government can be put fully into effect. I can see that to be the main theme of the Resolution. As regards other countries and their methods, I rather doubt myself whether we can profit a great deal from their experience. Each country has its own separate and distinct problems of defence and each country must use its own methods suitable to its own circumstances to solve those problems. I suggest, Sir, that our problem is a special one, peculiar to India, and that we should solve it in the way that suits us best. I am very ready to give all my experience and knowledge such as it is to help towards a speedy and efficient solution of this problem.

Personally, I have no doubt that India can eventually produce sufficient Indians of the right type to provide all the officers likely to be needed to lead the armed forces of India in the future.

The deeds and prowess in the late war of that small band of Indian regular officers, not more than 500 to 600 all told which existed prior to 1939, has, in my opinion, proved this beyond reasonable doubt, so far as powers of leadership and technical qualifications are concerned.

Before I go further, Sir, I wish to make one point, which I believe to be of fundamental importance and it is this. In civilian circles it is widely believed that because an officer has proved himself a good junior leader in war—on the battlefield—that, therefore, he must of necessity make a good officer in peace, and the Hon. the Mover of the Resolution referred to this very point. Well, Sir, my experience

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goes to prove that this is a complete and dangerous fallacy. I will not enlarge here on my reasons for this opinion, but I would ask the House to believe me when I tell you that it is much harder to be a good officer in peace than it is in war. Every country that has an army worthy of the name demands a much higher standard from its regular officers, who have the task of building up the efficiency of the army in peace, than it does from the temporary officers it has to create to help to lead the army in war, and I do not think, Sir, you will find any officer of proved experience who will deny this. At least I have still to meet one.

If, therefore, Sir, we are to maintain that essential minimum of efficiency in peace to enable our army to expand to the requisite size of war, we must have the very best regular officers and we must keep our standard of selection at the highest possible level.

Sir, yet another point to which I would like to call attention. In war there is a great deal to be said for young leaders possessing fire and dash, and the enthusiasm of youth and there is no doubt that in battle these qualities mean a great deal. In peace, however, they require to be balanced by knowledge—not only technical knowledge which can be acquired fairly quickly perhaps by some people but by a deeper knowledge of men and things which can only come from long experience and contact with men. Without this knowledge, from which springs the power to judge men and events soberly and in the right proportion, very few of us can become really good officers in peace or war, certainly not in the higher ranks of the army. That is my considered opinion and I beg the House to give full weight to it.

Now, Sir, the House may be interested to have a few figures. According to my present estimate which is necessarily only tentative for obvious reasons, it looks as if we shall need about 9,000 regular officers in the Indian Army of the future. That is in the nature of an estimate. Well, Sir, we hope to get 1,000 Indian regular officers from the 3,000 or so Indian Emergency Commissioned officers who have applied for regular commissions. There will be about 3,000 pre-war regular officers, British and Indian, left in the Army. Sir, these are round figures.

We are about to set up a special class of officer recruited from Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and Indian warrant and non-commissioned officers of long service, to fill certain specialised appointments in units, appointments such as Quartermaster, Transport Officer, Signal Officer. We expect that the total number of officers—and they will be all Indians of course—in this class will be about 1,000 in the whole army. We hope to get by April next year about 100 young regular Indian officers from the new post-war courses now in progress at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun which started in January. These assets give us a total of about 5,100 officers of all ranks, British and Indian, against our estimated future needs of over 9,000.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : How is that estimate arrived at ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : We arrived at this figure by calculating and planning. We had to make some calculation; for instance, that the army has so many units and each unit will require so many officers and so much will be our total requirements. We arrived at this figure after a very considerable amount of examination. Unless we lower the standard of selection to a point which I am quite sure it would be wrong to accept, we shall get no more officers from the Indian Emergency Commissioned officers who came forward in such numbers in the late war. These officers cannot be compelled to apply for regular commissions if they do not wish to make the army their career. As I have said we have taken about one-third of those officers who have applied, which is a higher percentage. And incidentally and quite fortuitously, it is about the same percentage as has been accepted by the British Army, using the same methods and standard as ourselves.

To make up this deficit we must depend mainly, in future, on Indian candidates who volunteer for regular cadetships at our Military Academy—that will be the main source of supply of officers, as it is, I think, in most countries. Even if sufficient candidates with the requisite qualifications came forward now we could not

accept them all at once because this would completely upset the age and service balance of the officer cadre which has to be most carefully regulated not only in the interests of efficiency but also in the interests of the officer himself, because if it is not so regulated, you will find many officers who will not be able to secure a reasonable career in the army. Moreover, it would be quite impossible to produce the facilities to train such a large number of cadets simultaneously. We are, however, doing all we possibly can to induce youths of the right stamp to come forward; and I must stress that it is in my opinion essential that we should insist that they are of the right stamp, and I do not think there is any difference of opinion on that point. Those who are accepted will enter the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun, which has just restarted to train Indian officers for the regular army. For the first course at Dehra Dun, which started in January or February last, we offered 300 vacancies; we had 1,236 applicants, of whom 126 were found suitable. The figures for the second course, which is scheduled to begin, I think, in August, are: we want 300, and so far 900 have applied. I think there is yet another six weeks in which applications can be sent in; so we expect to get some more. The House will agree that these figures are not too encouraging, but all the same I am optimistic myself and I regard the present shortage of suitable candidates as temporary only. I hope I am right. When the new National War Academy gets into its stride, we hope it will produce 500 or 600 officers annually for all the three services, namely, the Navy, the Army and the Air Force; and of these, the army will get the major share, because it is the largest of the three services. But this production cannot be reached for some years to come, because the Academy is yet to be built.

Meanwhile, we must have recourse to temporary expedients. The first of these is the secondment of British officers from the British Army to fill the gap until there are enough Indian officers sufficiently trained and experienced to take over from them. I think the House is already fully aware of this proposal, and also of the fact that no more British officers are to be appointed permanently to the Indian Army; they will in future be attached only for a short specified tour of service. This does not, of course, refer to the existing regular British officers of the Indian Army, who belong to it permanently.

The second expedient is the retention in the service of Emergency Commissioned Officers, British and Indian, who though they do not wish to apply for regular commissions, may be willing to extend their service for a year or two. There are a certain number of such officers who are prepared to defer their release.

The third expedient is the granting of a number of Short Service Commissions to Indians already serving in one rank or another. This includes cadets at the Officer's Training School. These commissions would be for five or three years according to the age of the applicant. We hope we may get some 2,000 short service officers—that is merely our guess; that is our estimate—by this means, which will help to tide over the period until the National War Academy gets into its full stride.

Now, Sir, I have stated our problems as briefly and clearly as I can, and I think the House will agree that it is not a simple one, assuming, as I do, that they are determined to maintain a high standard of efficiency in the officer cadre when it is fully nationalised.

Sir, the Hon. the Mover has asked that the appointment of British officers in the grade of captain or lieutenant be stopped. I have said that no more British officers are to be appointed permanently to the Indian Army. It is my intention that the grades of captain and lieutenant shall be filled by Indians as soon as a sufficient number of suitable candidates are forthcoming. The achievement of this object depends entirely on the coming forward of suitable Indian candidates for regular or short service commissions. At present, as I have explained, there is a definite lack of suitable candidates, and I hope this may be rectified before very long. Meanwhile, Sir, I should be quite wrong to say that no more British captains and lieutenants will be attached to the Indian Army, as, in present conditions—and I emphasise, "in present conditions"—any such restriction would be liable seriously to affect the efficiency of the army. But I would again stress that as soon as a sufficient number of suitable Indian candidates are forthcoming, those grades will be filled by Indian officers. That is the intention.

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The Hon. Mover then suggests that the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers be retained for the present. I may say at once that this is the intention of Government. If we had to replace all the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers by regularly commissioned lieutenants, our total requirements would rise, according to my calculation, from 9,000 to 11,000. All other considerations apart, I think it will be obvious from what I have already said that we cannot face, for the time being, a commitment of this size. It is therefore proposed to retain the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers for the present.

Then, Sir, the Hon. Mover asks that deserving Indian officers should be given accelerated promotion to increase the numbers of Indian officers required to fill the higher grades in the army. This is already being done, as will, I think; be apparent from a study of the number of Indian officers holding high grade appointments today compared with the figures of, say, three years ago, and I can furnish these figures to the House, if desired. I can do that now.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: We shall be very glad if His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief gives us the figures now.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: I have taken January, 1943, and April, 1946—or, anyway, the first quarter of this year, because the figures change from day to day—and in January, 1943, the number of Indian officers holding lieutenant-colonel's command—that is, the command of big units—was 9; in January of this year it was 54. As regards staff appointments, in 1943 there were no Brigadiers at all; there are now 4. Colonels in first grade staff appointments in 1943, there were two, and today, there are 31. The Hon. Mover of the Resolution quoted the figures which I gave him this morning to say that there are 59 officers with commissioned service of between 15 and 20 years, and 47 officers with commissioned service of between 20 and 30 years. I have added these quickly, and it comes to 106. If you add the 54 officers in charge of big units and the 31 staff officers, it comes to 85, which, I submit, out of 106 senior officers, is not a bad proportion.

I would, however, once again ask the Hon. Mover and this House to remember the need for knowledge and mature experience in officers holding high appointments in the Army in peace, and I beg that the pace may not be unduly hurried. I say *unduly* and I mean it as I am quite sure that *undue* haste in this matter is likely eventually to retard rather than to accelerate progress. Sir, I say this in all good faith and with no intent to hinder progress. I would like to add that this matter is constantly, almost daily, under my close personal supervision.

Finally, Sir, the Hon. Mover suggests that the Indian Army should be nationalised in ten years from now, by which I am sure he means that by that time all British officers from the highest to the lowest shall be replaced by Indian officers.

Well, Sir, it might be possible—I do not know, but it might be possible—that in some branches of the army this target could be achieved but I think it would be highly dangerous and most undesirable to make a categorical declaration to this effect and it would be even more dangerous and unreal, I think, taking everything into consideration—and there are very many things that will have to be taken into consideration as I am sure the House will realise—to apply such a declaration to the whole army especially in the more technical branches, the Artillery and Signal Corps.

I have tried, Sir, in the course of my short speech to set out the various factors which affect the solution of the problem, and I trust I have made it clear that there are many imponderable and unknown elements in these factors which, in my considered opinion, make it impossible to specify an exact period for the achievement of the complete nationalisation of the officer cadre of the Indian Army.

I claim, Sir, that no one has the present and future interests of that army more closely at heart than I have. I have pledged myself to give effect to the policy of complete nationalisation as rapidly as may be possible without impairing efficiency, and I say once more that I am applying myself to this task with no mental reservations whatsoever. I shall continue to do this for so long as I hold my present appointment.

I am quite sure in my own mind, however, that having regard to all the factors involved, it would be wrong and unwise for me to accept the Hon. Member's proposal for complete nationalisation in ten years' time, because I have no certainty that it would be possible to carry it out in the conditions explained by me.

I would, therefore, ask the Hon. Mover of the Resolution to trust me to carry out my pledge to the very best of my ability and withdraw that part of his Resolution which refers to the setting of a period for the completion of nationalisation.

I would also ask him and all Hon. Members of this House to do all they can to ensure an adequate flow of suitable Indian candidates for regular commissions in all three of India's Fighting Services—not only for the Army but for the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force as well.

In conclusion, Sir, I would venture with all due respect to remind Hon. Members that before long this very heavy and complicated responsibility for the upkeep, welfare and efficiency of the armed forces of India may pass to them, and that it is perhaps unwise to do anything now which may make the task more difficult in the future. (Applause.)

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : Do I understand you to say that you wish the Mover to withdraw the first part of his Resolution ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : The portion relating to 10 years.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : I want to know what exactly His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's suggestion amounts to ? What are the words that he would like me to drop ? Can he propose an amendment in order to make clear what exactly he has in his mind ?

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : It is rather difficult but what I would like the Hon. Mover to withdraw, if he would, would be his suggestion that the Government should agree to a declaration that the nationalisation of the Indian Army should be accomplished in 10 years.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : That was part of the Hon. Member's speech. The Resolution is worded differently.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : It is stated in the last part of the Resolution.

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN (Leader of the House) : His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would like to have some time. He would give his suggestion later on.

BRIGADIER THE HON. SIR HISSAMUDDIN BAHADUR : (Nominated Non-Official) : Sir, I rise to give my heartiest support to part (b) of the Resolution regarding the retention of the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers. As His Excellency has explained everything, I need not go into the details of the other things. But with permission of the the House, I would like to say something about the retention of the V. C. Os.

Having been one myself I am convinced that V. C. Os. form the backbone of the Indian Army and when Indianisation comes into full force, this fact will become even more apparent.

Early marriage is an age old custom among Indians. Let us be frank with ourselves and consider the implications of this fact. In peace time, officers will probably live at a considerable distance from the lines and will not take such paternal interest in their men as they would, if away from their families. The importance then of the V. C. O. who lives in the lines is surely apparent, for it is he alone who will establish that essential link between the officer and the men. Would any officer with long experience of the I. A. deny that the subedar major of a regiment or battalion is the C. O.'s right hand man ? Assuredly not. If the V. C. O. is done away with there will be no one to take his place. It is equally ridiculous to imagine that a warrant officer could replace a V. C. O. for the simple reason that the former will never command the same respect as the V. C. O.

The V. C. O. is a proved asset — he has done wonders in the past and in a country where we have "clear recruitment" it is vitally important to have such an element and to leave the officers to do the responsible duties which require thought, training and

[Sir Hissamuddin Bahadur]

education. I am of the definite opinion that the V.C.O. should not be abolished as owing to the short service system in the army and abolition of the V.C.Os., the soldiers do not consider the army their home and real source of their livelihood, keeping the tradition of their regiment and be proud of their being in possession of medals. They just work and serve to get pay, there being no scope whatsoever for promotion to the rank of jamaradar or subedar or subedar major, etc.

Also, in his own regiment, the V. C. O. is the only person who knows whether the recruits coming to his unit are of the right type or not.

Again, if the V. C. O. is done away with, the effect upon recruiting will be very considerable. There is in my opinion no doubt that the large majority of recruits have a Viceroy's Commission as their goal. This attitude is ascribed not so much to thought of pecuniary gain as to the attainment of izzat on retirement, by which I mean the privilege of "Kursi Nashin" among civilians. If you take away the V. C. O. there will be no one in the villages to take part—again we must face facts—in the eternal wrangle that goes on between civilians and demobilised soldiers in villages and ensure fair play for all.

One last point. It is rarely that the highly educated turn out to be the best leaders in battle. It is only when the acid test comes that a C. O. discovers his real leaders. I know heaps of cases in which men who could not pass their third class certificate of education turned out to be the best leaders in war. It must always be possible to promote such men to higher rank than havildar or warrant officer so that full advantages may be given to the high powers of leadership they have shown. Is it not a fact that in Gurkha regiments almost entirely uneducated C. O.s. are often put in command of companies while inexperienced B. O.s. serve under them? Are Gurkha Officers so very much superior to our present day V. C. O.s.? Certainly not.

In conclusion, Sir, taking all the above points into consideration, I am convinced that with the future efficiency of the Indian Army in view, it would be the greatest mistake in the world to do away with the V.C.O.

THE HON. MR. M. THIRUMALA ROW (Madras : Non-Muhammadan) : Mr. President, it seems to be a happy augury of coming events that the Opposition and the Government Benches have been so near agreement today with regard to a very vital question that affects the future of this country. The Cabinet Mission is here, Sir, and the background of the Resolution has been touched upon by the Mover of the Resolution; and the spirit in which the Government has responded to the call of the popular representatives is welcome and I welcome that spirit, Sir, on behalf of my Party also. We are very much indebted for the figures that have been supplied by the Commander-in-Chief that we require about 9,000 officers in the near future if the higher ranks of the Army are to be Indianised. He has also said, Sir, that the Government accept the principle of nationalisation of the officer cadre of the Indian Army. The force of circumstances and the stress of the recent war have created a situation in this country that has brought out the best of the martial spirit among every section and community in this country. If you see the history of the army in India, it is one of sorry story. Now the Commander-in-Chief himself assures that he is one of the best guardians of the interests of the defence of nationalist India, I mean India as a whole. But I am not very much convinced about his disagreement to the time limit which was reasonably proposed by my Hon. friend Pandit Kunzru. Here the Cabinet Mission comes with a proposal that they are going to quit India, that they are going to negotiate a Treaty on perfectly equal terms. The British Prime Minister Mr. Attlee makes a statement that the question of independence and self-determination have been decided in principle. If the question of complete independence to this country is decided in principle, it remains how that independence is to be achieved or how that power is to be handed over into the hands of the representatives of the people. Independence is an old proposition it is not a new proposition; it includes the defence of the country as a whole. When you concede that India is completely equal in status to Great Britain, it is completely outside the trammels of the British Empire, and it is perfectly equal in political status with every other country in the world, it is also just that India should have an Army and Defence of its own, uninfluenced by any considerations of British connection. The new Government that comes into existence must decide what form of relationship should exist between high military authorities in England and the military authorities in India. You have been able to create a cadre of officers in India that has won

laurels on every battle-field outside the shores of India and has saved you, the Empire as it is today. In African deserts, in the Libyan deserts, in the Far East and in the Middle East, it was the cream of the Indian Army that has come to the rescue of British and Allied Nations and saved them on many critical occasions. You have created a vast number of officers who have proved efficient and equal to the task that has been imposed upon them by one of the ruthless enemies that history has ever known. On my left is sitting Flight-Lieutenant Rup Chand, coming from a very high family, who has risked his life in support of the British Government. He was found quite fit and suitable to be an officer in the Indian Air Force. There are several others who have also risen to the highest rank and fame in the discharge of their duties on the battle-fields; and if we are to have an army of our own, we should not, I think, be prevented from bringing experts from Russia, even from Germany, and also from the United Kingdom. The moment India attains a status of complete independence, the present Commander-in-Chief will be the adviser to India's National Government for the defence of the country. He will be on a footing of an employee of the new Indian Government. I am not convinced of the argument that it requires more than 10 years to have the 9,000 officers. According to the figures that the Commander-in-Chief has given, they have got 5,100 officers already. He has not given us the proportion of the foreign element in these 5,100 officers. I should be obliged if he could give me that information now. There are a certain number of European officers among the 5,100 and if you subtract that number that has also to be made good by Indian officers. The number that has to be made in the next 10 or more years will be more than 5,000 officers, if the total number of 9,000 officers was to be reached. But what I feel is that there are estimates of others who think that within the next 5 years the whole of the Indian Army, Army, Navy and Air Force, can be completely manned and equipped by Indians alone. This is a Resolution which is tabled under the present constitution, though it envisages a situation when the present state of affairs is bound to change completely beyond recognition. From that point of view, Sir, while supporting the Resolution, I want to make it clear that a National Government for India will be eager to Indianise the whole of the officer ranks as soon as it is possible. Being a layman, I cannot quite understand the difficulties of war-time officer-ship and peace-time officer-ship. To some extent I accept the expert advice of the Commander-in-Chief. But still we do not stop there and take the advice of British Army experts only. The nations of the world have produced many army experts and many ways of developing a national army. Russia within a short period of 3 or 4 years was able to put in the field thousands of officers and millions of men to fight the German menace. So also India, Sir, the 8th Army and the 14th Army have made history and they have warded off the danger both in the East and the West. From the figures that have been recently supplied by Mr. Mason, the War Secretary, we see the present strength of Indians in the Army is as follows. Out of 63 Major-Generals in the Army, Indians Nil; out of 120 Brigadiers, there are 4 Indians; out of 214 Colonels, there are 23 Indians; and out of 1,868 Lieut. Cols., there are 240 Indians.

Sir, I do not want to take the time of the House much but even during the second World War the accepted principles of British Imperialism have not been forgotten. The composition of the Indian Army has been based on the superiority complex of the Britisher. I will just quote two sentences of Lord Roberts, who was a stout opponent of granting commissions to Indians :—

“It is this consciousness of the inherent superiority of the European which has won for us India. However well-educated and clever a native may be, and however brave he may have proved himself, I believe that no rank that we could bestow upon him would cause him to be considered as an equal by the British officer or looked up to by the last joined British subaltern.”

It is the principle of that spirit of superiority complex that has permeated the British Generals of the Indian Army even in the World War No. 2 because the figures that I have just quoted given by Mr. Mason as late as March, 6th, 1946, bear ample testimony that Indians have not been allowed to occupy important positions of responsibility and leadership in the Indian Army even when there was dire necessity for such a step. Therefore, Sir, what I want to urge upon them is that time has come when a completely nationalized Indian Army, manned and controlled and led by Indians, should be immediately formed in consultation with a Government that is responsible for the defence and protection of this country, and if all the British professions prove true, we hope that a day will come soon—sooner than most expect—when we can fulfil those cherished ideals which this Resolution envisages.

[Mr. M. Thirumala Row]

With these words, Sir, I have pleasure in supporting the Resolution.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : (to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief) : I think we can adjourn at this stage till after lunch. This will enable Your Excellency to place amendments before the Mover of the Resolution who, after considering them, can tell me whether I should put the Motion to vote formally.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : I have not been able to hear you, Sir. What have you suggested ?

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : I have said that I will adjourn the House now and we shall await amendments from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. He will place the amendments before you and after considering the matter you can tell me whether I shall put the Motion before the House formally. Do you agree to that ?

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Yes, Sir.

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN : I think, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is prepared to speak now.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : I am prepared to reply now Sir.

THE HON. MR. V. V. KALIKAR : I thought that you were going to adjourn the House now and that we would be meeting after lunch at half past two.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : Do you want to speak before His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief ?

THE HON. MR. V. V. KALIKAR : Yes, Sir.

THE HON. MR. V. V. KALIKAR (Central Provinces : General) : Sir, the Resolution of my Hon. friend Pandit Kunzru is a very modest one and the speech he delivered this morning was in the most moderate language. Sir, we have been told by the British statesmen that we are getting a National Government very soon. If we are really having a National Government soon we shall have to consider seriously about the maintenance of the independence of India and therefore we must have a National Army as early as possible. My Hon. friend Pandit Kunzru has fixed a period of ten years to which His Excellency does not agree. I may bring to the notice of the House the report of the Shea Committee which was appointed by Lord Rawlinson.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : May I just correct you a little ? His Excellency said that though some branches of the Army could be nationalised in ten years he did not think the whole Army could be nationalised within that period.

THE HON. MR. V. V. KALIKAR : I am coming to that. I am just citing an instance to show that the period even now can be curtailed. We can have a national Army even within a period of five years and that statement I am making on the basis of a report of experts in the year 1922. The Committee then appointed declared that the Indianization of the officer rank of the Army could be completed within a period of 30 years. That was in the year 1922. Sir, if we count and estimate the period we come to this conclusion that we can Indianize the whole Army in the year 1952. But, Sir, times have changed. According to that report, Sir, the whole officer rank itself could be Indianized in 1952 but what I submit is that times have changed and our young men have proved their valour, courage and tenacity in the last World War. I refuse to believe even now, Sir, that suitable candidates are not available in India. This theory—that a large number of suitable candidates are not available in India—has been argued and argued so many times and I have been listening to that theory since 1933. In 1933, the then Commander-in-Chief, Sir Phillip Chetwode, stated in reply to my Resolution which demanded an increase of 60 more cadets for the Dehra Dun Military Academy that he was not able to find 120 suitable cadets in India who would be able to man the Indian Army. Now, Sir, in this war we found so many Indian youths of the right type who shed their blood and who have won victories not only for India but also for England too. So, Sir, I do not subscribe for a moment to the view that the efficiency of the Army would be impaired in any way. There must be some distinction between the standard of efficiency observed in England and the standard of efficiency observed here. Here in India the examinations that the Selection Boards take do not appeal to the Indian youth. Apart from the political

reasons why a large number of candidates did not turn up during the war time apart from the considerations that the Indian youths felt that they were not treated properly by their British superiors, the recent system of selecting candidates does not appeal to many of the youths. My own view is that some change is necessary in the system of selection, and if that change is introduced, there will be a very large number of candidates appearing before the selection board; and I can assure His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that he will find in India a very large number of suitable candidates who will be able to man the defence services in India. From the answer to a question asked by my Hon. friend this morning, I find that on the 1st January, 1946, there were 2,366 British officers and 679 Indian officers.

I submit, Sir, that the policy of Britain of not placing confidence in Indians and of not allowing Indians to man their defence services is responsible to a very great extent for the paucity of suitable candidates. Since the Act of 1919 was passed various resolutions were moved in the other House, and in this House too, and committees were formed like the Skeen Committee and the Sandhurst Committee, but real fillip was not given to Indian recruitment to the defence services. The Indian youths were not told definitely that they had to defend India. They were always told that the defence of India was to a very large extent the concern of the British officers. That policy is responsible to a very, very great extent for suitable candidates not coming forward in large numbers to join the Indian army. Now the position has changed. You have declared in unequivocal terms that you are granting self-government to us in a very short time. If that is the case, then you have to make provision for maintaining that independence by evolving a defence scheme. All the defence services should be nationalised within a limited period. According to me, the defence services can be nationalised in five years' time. If you mean to do that, you will succeed in your attempt. But if you mean to prolong the stay of British officers in India for a longer period, your department can find a hundred and one excuses for that policy. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as I have stated on the floor of the House on so many occasions, takes very great interest in this matter. But he is not a free master in this matter. I personally think that if he brings pressure on the authorities who do not allow him to go the whole hog, if he convinces them that suitable Indian youths can be found in India in very large numbers to man the defence services, I should think there would be no difficulty in nationalising the officer ranks of the defence services in five years' time. However, as my Hon. friend the Mover has fixed a period of ten years, I have absolutely no objection. But I should like that period to be curtailed and that Indian youth should man the defence services of India within five years.

THE HON. SIR N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR: Sir, the suggestion made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief raises issues which are of more than ordinary importance at the present juncture. If Sir, you will let us adjourn at this stage and come back, we shall have thought out in what way we can meet the wishes of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief without really surrendering the position which has to be taken on behalf of the country as a whole. I suggest, Sir, that you give us this Lunch interval for the purpose of considering this matter, and after the Lunch interval, if you permit me, I shall proceed to state my remarks. My suggestion is that the point about his not being able to accede to a time limit is so important in connection with what is going to happen almost immediately, that it would be difficult for us to agree to the position taken up by the Commander-in-Chief. But we shall put our heads together and see whether we can arrive at a formula which will satisfy us as well as satisfy His Excellency.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT: Does the Hon. Member want to know the proposal of His Excellency?

THE HON. SIR N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR: Not exactly. We shall be able to make a suggestion after Lunch.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: If we knew His Excellency's suggestion now, we could give thought to it during the adjournment.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT: There are other Hon. Members wishing to speak also. How can I press His Excellency to speak now?

THE HON. MR. G.S. MOTILAL : Can we have some idea as to what His Excellency proposes should be done, so that we may apply our minds to it during the interval?

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : I have no objection, if His Excellency so wishes. His Excellency will of course have the right of final reply, and the Hon. the Mover also will have the right of final reply.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : Sir, the main portion of the Resolution as I see it, is the setting of a period of ten years for the nationalisation of the Indian Army. I find some difficulty in asking the Hon. the Mover to withdraw his Resolution, because there are certain parts with which I agree. But my only course is to ask him to withdraw the whole Resolution.

The Council then adjourned for Lunch till a Quarter to Three of the Clock.

The Council re-assembled after Lunch at a Quarter to Three of the Clock, the Hon. the President in the Chair.

THE HON. SIR N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR : (Madras : Non-Muhamadan) : Sir, the Resolution before the House has for its object the achievement of the nationalisation of the Indian Army at the earliest possible moment. With regard to this word "nationalization" I should like to say a word or two. There is first of all nationalization in the sense of the Indian Army being under the entire control of a National Government in this country. The other sense in which we can use the word "nationalization" is what in the previous literature on this subject has been described as the Indianisation of the Indian Army. Now, Sir, so far as the first of these two senses is concerned, we have got to reckon with the fact that a National Government might come into existence very soon. We have a Cabinet Mission at work here, trying to discover ways of transferring British power to Indian hands at the earliest possible moment and nobody, whether on the side of Britain or on the side of India, is really contemplating any interval like 10 years for this transfer being completely effected. Therefore, Sir, we have got to reckon with the fact that a National Government will come into existence much sooner than 10 years. There is to be an interim Government also. During the period that the interim Government will be in office a permanent constitution is proposed to be framed and we all expect that the permanent constitution will come into being, say, in the course of the next two or three years. Even during the period that an interim Government may be in office I think it is in the contemplation of everybody who has given thought to it that that Government may be a National Government in the full sense of the word, that is to say, power in regard to all aspects of administration will be entirely in its hands. So, I take it, Sir, that so far as the first sense in which one could understand nationalization, that is to come into being almost at once. So far as the Army is concerned, it is, I think, contemplated that even in the interim Government there will be a Civilian Member of Council who will hold charge of the Defence portfolio and I think it would be only in consonance with that state of things that whoever happens to be the Commander-in-Chief in this country will work under that National Government with a Civilian Member in charge of Defence so that the entire policy as regards recruitment, transfer, promotion and everything connected with the administration of the Army at the higher administrative levels, not technical levels, will come under the purview of this National Government. Now, it is quite possible to take the view that if we visualize the coming into existence of such a National Government at so near a future, we might well leave it to that National Government to decide how this process of Indianization of the officer ranks of the Indian Army should be accelerated.

So far as the problem of Indianization is concerned, it has already been pointed out by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that the rank and file of the Army is entirely Indian at the present moment. The problem is really one of Indianising the officer ranks of the Army. So far as that is concerned, I see that British officers serving with the Indian Army all under two classes. One set of officers are known as the attached officers. They are not really members of the Indian Army. They are officers lent to the Indian Army for a particular period. There are however

also regular members of the Indian Army who are Britishers. The problem really relates to the Indianisation of this portion of British officers serving in the Indian Army, because, so far as the attached officers are concerned, they come into the Indian Army for the time being. They come under conditions which are settled between the Government of India and the War Office. With regard to what you might call the British element in the Indian Army the question has been simplified by the acceptance by Government of the policy that there will be no direct recruitment of Britishers to regular Commissions in the Indian Army in the future. That disposes of the question of the coming, at the foot of the cadre of Army service in this country of Britishers. The real question, therefore, narrows itself down to what we are to do with those British officers who are already holding Regular Commissions in the Indian Army. So far as that is concerned, I wish to lay before the House one consideration. If we are going to have a National Government and if that Government is to build itself on the support which a National Army could give it, it is for that Government to say how soon the Army should be thoroughly Indianised. It is unlikely that they would themselves agree to anything like a period of 10 years before the officer cadres of the Indian Army are thoroughly Indianised. There is of course all the technical objection that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has been placing before us; but I do not think, Sir, that really affects the question. We have got to have an Indianised Army and it is for us to say how many of the officers of the future Army, after a National Government comes into power, shall be Britisher and how many of them shall be Indians; and if that entails a reduction of the British strength in the officer ranks of the Army, that reduction has to be effected. It is possible, Sir, that there would be two difficulties which will face us when such a decision is taken. One is that we may not have Indian officers of sufficient seniority to man the higher ranks of the Indian Army. For that, Sir, my Hon. friend has proposed that accelerated promotions should be given and it is possible—I only mention this for His Excellency's consideration—it is possible that when such accelerated promotions are given the interests of British officers in the Indian Army might be prejudicially affected. We have to be prepared for that sort of thing. Like all Governments which do such things, we should be prepared to give adequate compensation to all people already in service whose interests are affected in that way. It will not be impossible to devise a scheme of compensations which would be considered adequate by British members of the Indian Army who might be prejudicially affected. The other question is, Sir, whether we should really want that every Britisher who holds a regular commission in the Indian Army in the higher ranks should be replaced by an Indian at once. I do not think that the coming National Government would be acting so foolishly as to get rid of every Britisher as soon as it comes into office. It will not be to its interests to do so; it will be to its interest to retain as many of them and take advantage of all the training and experience they have had in the Army. Even when they retain a considerable number of Britishers, so long as those Britishers act up to the advice which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I find, gave them the other day namely that they should loyally serve the new Government of India in the same way as their Indian brethren served the present Government of India in the past, so long as they follow that advice and are under the entire control of the National Government, I would still consider the Indian Army in those circumstances a National Army. It does not matter that a number of Britishers actually hold office on that Army so long as they are under the National Government's control and so long as it is understood that they should give place to Indians as soon as they are available in sufficient numbers and of adequate capacity. I consider that that Army becomes nationalised as soon as the new Government comes into power.

I do not wish really to pursue this question of time limit in this Resolution. I can quite understand the difficulty of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in agreeing to a time limit as is suggested in this Resolution. No doubt, Sir, time limits were proposed in the past, recommended by Committees, but none of them has really been effectuated; and that experience, Sir, is responsible for my Hon. friend Pandit Kunzru asking that this nationalisation should be brought about at least within the space of 10 years. I do not think that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, representing the present Government can really give us a guarantee as to any time limit in this matter. Things are going to change very

[Sir. N. Gopalswami Ayyangar]
 rapidly. Personally, Sir, what I would suggest is that we should have a Resolution somewhat in these terms, if consideration could be given to it :—

“ This Council recommends to the Governor General in Council that the nationalisation of the Indian Army should be accomplished without avoidable delay and that for this purpose during the interval between now and the New Government coming into office the following steps be taken—

(a) the appointment of British officers in the grade of lieutenant or captain in the Indian Army should be stopped ;

(b) the Viceroy's Commissioned Officer should be retained ;

(c) deserving Indian officers should be given accelerated promotion to increase rapidly the number of Indian Officers required to fill the higher grades.”

I would stop there. If it is acceptable to the Hon. Mover and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, we may all agree.

THE HON. MR. G.S. MOTILAL (Bombay Non-Muhammadan): Sir, I rise to support the Resolution which was moved this morning by my Hon. friend, Dr. Kunzru. I am in agreement with the spirit of the Resolution. Sir, it is our common experience that whenever a change is sought to be introduced in the *status quo*, ready acceptance is difficult to find. I know that the Commander-in-Chief is one of those bold and courageous people who do not fight shy of the changes but even a bold and a brave soldier that he is it is not he alone who has got to make a decision in this matter. If the decision were entirely left to his sole discretion I am confident he would have gathered sufficient courage to accept it, but there are many things which have got to be considered and I can well understand the reluctance of the Commander-in-Chief to accept the Resolution. Changes in the military organisation have been suggested by the representative of the people in either Chamber of the Indian Legislature and every time difficulties which the Government felt were brought forward, coupled with the sympathy which they expressed for such demands. Until 1918, in spite of all the previous demands, there were very few Indian officers in the Indian Army. The Indian Army is composed of two sections : the British Army which has been described as an Army of Occupation and the Indian Army which is composed of Indian soldiers. The British Army is composed purely of the British soldiers. But the pressure which has been brought by the popular representatives from time to time has yielded some results, results, not very satisfactory but still a beginning was made and at the end of the war we found that out of 3,200 officers—the figure has been changing from time to time—and when we refer to the reports we find that in some reports the figure given is somewhat different from that given in others. These changes are inevitable but the fact remains that the number of Indian officers was about 400 to 500 at the beginning of the war and this war proceeded a great experiment. The Government had apprehended before the war that they might take Indian officers but the real test would come when they went through a war and when the second war came no less than 9,000 Indian officers were taken and given Emergency Commissions. They were shy of taking 1,000, or 1,200, or 1,500 or 3,000 officers before the war but this stress of the war compelled them to take no less than 9,000 officers. The officers have gone through the test of the crucible of the war. No one can now say of these officers who had no previous experience but stood the test and acquitted themselves in a manner which has drawn the highest encomiums from all the authorities concerned, that the new officers were not be of a suitable type.

Sir, India is a very large country. The population of this country is ten times larger than that of England. What we fail to understand is that a population ten times more should be unable to supply the officers required for her own Armies. There is some thing which is very much enigmatic about it. We also know that small countries like Persia, Afghanistan and a large country like China on the other hand—leave alone Japan and other countries—have all supplied their officers for their Armies. They perhaps employed for short intervals experts, who were not retained after they had trained the officers of such countries. There are difficulties as has been pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief. I was reading the communique which was issued by him on 22nd October, 1945. It forms an Appendix to the

Sapru Committee Report and this is what His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief said in that communique :

"The scheme he had in mind would work somewhat as follows: As many Indian cadets as offered themselves and were found suitable would be accepted. If to begin with there were not sufficient young Indian officers from among the Second Lieutenants and Lieutenants, he would ask the War Office to produce the required number of British officers until a sufficient number of Indians were available. These British officers would be attached for, say, three years. After that they would revert to their British regiments or units, with which they would have to remain for a year or two. Thereafter they would be allowed to come back to India, if needed.

The point was that they would have no permanent lien on the service in India."

This was the statement made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Resolution also asks that this should be done, with this proviso that the British officers should not be recruited now in the Indian Army. I do realise that it is an important change but a right and necessary change if we wish to succeed to Indianise the officer ranks of the Indian Army as rapidly as possible. The time required for complete Indianisation was estimated by different people and committees so differently. But we have now got to remember this very salient fact that if during the seven years of war period India could supply 9,000 emergency officers, how could one believe that these 9,000 officers cannot now be supplied by India. Is it a question of education? It has been said that the present system of education is not satisfactory. But this did not stand in the way of the recruitment of the emergency officers. The system of education which prepared them was no better. There is nothing to prevent the system of education being improved. We would welcome it. I visited the Dehra Dun Academy in the year 1940. The Commandant was very courteous and polite. He took me round the Academy and showed me every department of it and asked me to put some questions to the boys there. I did put a few questions to our boys, and I could see that they were not able to understand the questions very fully. Then I asked them some questions in Hindustani, I found that they could follow the questions better.

Sir, there may be another reason, and I am aware of that; that reason is that as long as you have not got a National Government at the Centre here, the people of India are not all agreed that they should serve in the army. I asked some boys very near and dear to me, and advised them to enter the army. Those who had a liking for it, adventurous youths, were not so very willing to enter the army which is not controlled by a National Government. Now changes are inevitable, and that will make a lot of difference. If a National Government is established at the top, I think the plea which is now available to the Government will disappear; they will find that there are no two opinions in the country with regard to the desirability of entering the defence services, and we shall get plenty of good material—material which should satisfy every impartial judge.

Sir, for these reason, I give my support to the Resolution. Only one point there is to which I have got to refer, and it is this. What seems at present to trouble His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is the time-limit of 10 years. Our experience in the past of the phraseology of as soon "as possible" and so on has not been very happy.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : Here is a fixed term.

THE HON. MR. G. S. MOTILAL: A fixed term true it is; it will make the authorities tackle the problem in right earnest. If it is left to me or to you or to anybody else to say that the term of this Council shall be as long as may be possible, it might even be 20 years or more. But when it is fixed for three years, it comes to an end at the end of that period. In the same sense if we fix 10 years now, we do so because we visualise that in 10 years it will be possible to evolve a completely national army.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : Your successors may disagree with you and may say it should be 12 years.

THE HON. MR. G. S. MOTILAL : If they disagree they will have to convince us and the country, or they will have to give place to those who insist that they would have a national army within ten years or a shorter time than that.

[Mr. G. S. Motilal]

Sir, changes are imperative in the composition of the army. The men who are serving in the army know the difference between being ordered by men of their own country and being ordered by men who are not their own countrymen. It is for the Englishmen to order their own men in their country. Let them come here as technicians. We are prepared to take them. We need not go to other countries unless and until we find that England is unable to give us the technicians that we may require. At the same time there is nothing wrong in our going and taking the help and advice of other countries. Did we not in war time see the High Commands of various countries meet and discuss plans? That is the usual thing to do, and I do not expect that there will be any difficulty from our friends in England if we take some help and assistance from other countries. They will probably like that the Indian army should be as efficient as possible. The Indian army will also be a source of strength to them. But let it be a national army. This has been the demand of the country. This is the heartfelt desire of every Indian. We all realise how unreal self-government is if it does not control the armed forces of the country—control them in the sense that they are commanded by officers who are the nationals of the country.

Sir, the Resolution is one which is deserving of the fullest sympathy at the hands of the Government at a time when these changes are in their mind, when England has made up her mind, as it has been declared from the housetops, to hand over power to Indians. Only the other day Sir Stafford Cripps, answering a question, said that if the British Army was here, it would be inconsistent with independence. If there were a large number of British officers, that also would be inconsistent with having an independent India. What we are now asking is that when India is in a position to supply officers of her own, no more officers should be brought from England. This is our demand, and if any change in the language of the Resolution is required which will meet the spirit of this demand, then it is open to the Government to suggest it and for us to consider it. What I feel is that we are today very much nearer our objective than we were a few years ago, let us now have some thing, and let us tell the people that they are going to get independence which is real and substantial, and not independence which is something on paper and some thing different in reality.

Sir, I support this Resolution.

FLT.-LIEUT. THE HON. RUP CHAND (Punjab: Non-Muhammadan) Sir, India has well reached the stage when she should have complete control of defence and her army should be completely nationalised. Self-government, in any form cannot be effective unless the Indian people have an army entirely their own and possess the final authority over the military forces without reservations of any kind.

Perhaps in no other sphere of Government has there been such bitter and prolonged conflict between Indian demands and the unyielding policy of the British Government as in defence matters. Now, Sir, despite consistent agitation in India the progress of Indianisation of the officer ranks of the Indian Army has been extremely slow. At the present rate of progress, it might take indefinite number of years for the complete Indianisation of the army. We have many Committees and Commissions. The stage has now come when only a bold Nationalisation policy would satisfy the perfectly legitimate aspirations of the new vigorous India which is being born.

We are not asking that all British troops must quit India right now; our demand is merely that the pace of nationalisation should be substantially speeded up and a time-limit should now be fixed for this process to be completed. When India is a free country, it is probable that we would agree, of our own accord, to the retention of a certain number of British Officers for purposes of training and guidance. But that matter should be the subject of a bilateral agreement between India and Britain, on the lines of the treaty enacted between Egypt and Britain under which the presence of British troops on Egyptian soil was regulated by mutual agreement.

The International situation unfortunately is still full of dangerous possibilities and the world has not yet settled down to an era of peace. We admit that at this moment India if left solely to itself may not be in a position to defend the country from foreign aggression. Personally I am quite conscious of our limitations in this respect. But our great effort is that we want to be in a position to defend ourselves as soon as possible. Sir, I hardly need say that we fought this war for freedom and democracy and the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms had influenced not only you and me. Sir, but have also penetrated down to the rank and file. Sir in order to keep the high morale of future Indian Army, I mean the Indians oldiers it is very important and imperative that the nationalisation of officer ranks should be speeded up.

Sir, I would urge that the measures recommended in Hon. Pt. Kunzru's resolution should be given practical shape without delay. We need not wait till a new constitution for India is drafted. The nationalisation of army is long over due and delay in this all-important matter is not in keeping with the spirit of the times. There might be differences among some of us as to the type of constitution which India should have and such political differences will, I hope soon be settled by the Cabinet Mission. I am sure there exists no difference of opinion as regards the rapid nationalisation of the army.

THE HON. RAJA YUVERAJ DUTTA SINGH (United Provinces Central ; Non-Muhammadan) : Sir I rise to support this Resolution. The Resolution is so reasonable, and national, if I may say so, that it does not require many words to commend it to the House. Moreover, my Hon. friend, Pandit Kunzru has dealt with it so exhaustively in his speech that it becomes superfluous to add many arguments in its support. Now that India is on the threshold of independence, to borrow the significant expression used by His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, in his recent broadcast, it would be extremely incongruous and insincere if any one were to stand up, and plead for the retention of the foreign element in the National Army of India. It would be a negation of independence if India were made to look upon a foreign army for offensive and defensive purposes ; and hence our long-standing demand that a time limit should be laid down for the nationalisation of the Indian Army. If this basic principle is unreservedly accepted, it follows as a matter of logical corollary that the appointment of British or foreign officers in the grade of lieutenant or captain, should be forth-with stopped, that deserving Indian Officers should be given accelerated promotion to increase the number of Indian Officers required to fill the higher grades ; and that the methods followed by other independent countries to create a national army as speedily as possible, should be adopted with suitable modifications, with a view to the nationalisation of the Indian Army within a period of ten years. Sir, it may be argued on the other side that it is inexpedient to fix a time-limit, and that a period of ten years is too short for the training of Indian Officers to take up the higher ranks in the Indian Army. This argument, if advanced, constitutes the greatest slur upon British rule in this country. British rule has existed in India for more than a century and a half ; and during this long and depressing period, the Indians have not been given proper training to man the higher and highest ranks in the Indian Army. Can any confession be more self-condemnatory? If India had been ruled with the sole and honest desire to fit her for self-government, proper methods must undoubtedly have been adopted for the training of Indian Officers in the Army. Look what Japan was able to achieve in the brief period of only 50 years, under her own National Government. But in India the secret and sinister desire was to try to hold this country in bondage for as long as possible ; and racial discrimination of the worst type was unblushingly adopted to achieve the object in view. Sir, the Indianisation of the Indian Army, in all its branches, should be the normal course of things ; and non-Indians should be appointed only in extremely exceptional cases.

Sir, I thank His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for the handsome tribute paid by him from time to time to the achievements of the Indian Army in the recent war ; and also for the noble sentiments of advice, which he has addressed to the Army in his recent broad cast when India is on the eve of coming into her own after a long period of foreign domination. Let our relations be friendly and cordial. India may still need the assistance of foreign experts and technicians ; but an honest

[Raja Yuveraj Datta Singh]

effort must be made in the immediate present, to let her stand on her own legs, and occupy her rightful place in the comity of free nations, for the peace and progress of the world. Liberty of the country, with a standing battalion of foreign troops to guard her, is a contradiction in terms. I heartily wish God-speed to the Cabinet Mission, which is earnestly at work at the present moment and I conclude my observations on a note of confident hope that the Government will find it possible to accept the Resolution, as an earnest of their desire to see India free and independent. Sir, I thank His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for his very conciliatory speech, which we fully appreciate.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: Mr. President, we have all listened with the greatest interest to what has fallen from the lips of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I find that he is in favour of parts (a) and (b) of the Resolution. He has told us that he does not like the idea of British officers being appointed as lieutenants or captains if Indian candidates of the requisite qualifications are available in sufficient numbers; and as regards the Viceroy's Commissioned Officer, he has informed us that the Government are proceeding on the basis that he will be retained. I am personally very glad to hear that the Viceroy's Commissioned Officer is not going to be dispensed with at the present time. But his announcement that we shall have to find 9,000 officers for the Indian Army as it will be in the future must have come as a surprise to all of us. We have at present about 3,000 officers in an army of roughly 150,000 men. If the future officer establishment is not to be on a higher scale than at present, the announcement of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief means that the strength of the Army will be trebled. In other words, it means that the strength of the Army will be about half a million in future. I shall say nothing, Sir, with regard to the size of the army at present though it is a very important matter. It will have to be considered when the Government place their conclusions before the Legislature and the public. But I may say at once that while we all expected an increase, a substantial increase in the strength of the Army, I do not think that anyone was prepared for so large an increase, so tremendous an increase, which would throw a staggering burden on the Indian revenues. The Indian Army of the future, if it is to be three times its present size will cost much more than three times the cost of the pre-war Army; and if we are to maintain a due balance between the safety of the country and its economic development, I do not see how the money which the War Department will ask for will be forthcoming. However, I am at the present time concerned not with the size of the future Indian Army but with the Indianisation of the officer cadre.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief objects to a time-limit on the ground that no one can predict with certainty that the necessary number of qualified Indian candidates would be forthcoming and that it would be a dangerous fallacy to say that because an officer had proved his worth as a junior officer he was bound to prove successful as a senior officer. Now, Sir, nobody can speak with absolute certainty regarding the number of Indian young men, who will be willing to offer themselves for commissions in the Army. We all hope and the examples of other countries reinforce our hope—that if a National Army is being created and that there will soon be a free India, the enthusiasm that will thus be generated will be such as to persuade young men to offer themselves in as large numbers for a military career as they do at present for civil careers. If, however, this hope is falsified, nobody will blame His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for not being able to Indianise the Army within a period of 10 years. When we ask him to accept a period within which the maximum effort should be made, we are not asking that he should turn out every British officer and see that he is replaced by an Indian, good, bad or indifferent; or that he should leave the vacancies created by the retirement of British officers unfilled simply because Indians are not available. That is not of course the meaning of the Resolution and I am sure His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief understands this very well. All that I am asking for is that conditions should be created in which there will be a maximum inducement to Indian

young men to join the Army and that when these conditions have been created the utmost effort should be made to Indianise the Army within a definite time. We have experience, Sir, of the recommendations of Committees to which no time limit was attached. There is the Report of the Auxiliary and Territorial forces Committee to which I have already referred. Have Government paid the slightest heed to it? Have they till now shown any real desire to spread the idea of military service throughout the population by giving education in citizenship to boys in Indian schools and by introducing military drill in these schools as recommended by the Committee? Then there is the Report of the Shea Committee which my Hon. friend Mr. Kalikar referred to. It framed a scheme for the Indianisation of the officer ranks in 30 years. That scheme was not accepted. A predecessor of the present Commander-in-Chief, gave the same reasons for not agreeing to a time-limit for the nationalisation of the Army, as those given by him. The result is that less than one-fifth of the regular officers of the Indian Army are at present Indian. Take again the Report of the Skeen Committee. The Committee was presided over by a distinguished British military officer who was the Chief of the General Staff here in his time. His report proposed that the British Government should undertake to increase Indian recruitment progressively so as to ensure that half the number of regular officers in the Indian Army would be Indian in the course of 25 years. That report too, Sir, has been given the go by and the reasons given for rejecting the recommendations of the Skeen Committee are those that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has given now for not agreeing to a time-limit. He will pardon us, Sir, in these circumstances if, in spite of his great personality and his obvious sincerity, we are unable to leave things to the discretion of the authorities and have to insist that a time-limit should be prescribed in order to ensure that the Government will not follow a policy of *laissez faire*, so to say, but undertake to stimulate recruitment to the officer ranks of the Army to the best of its ability. We are asking, Sir, for similar targets in the case of other Departments too. We are not satisfied with the general schemes of development in connection with, say, agriculture or industries. The factors involved in their development are not less complicated than those involved in the nationalisation of the Indian Army. Yet in order that we may have definite schemes and that an effort should be made to realise them within a measurable period of time we urge that triennial or quinquennial plans should be prepared so that our efforts may not be wasted in preparing vague schemes which nobody knows how to carry out. I am therefore bound to say, Sir, that in spite of all that His Excellency has said I am unable to change my view with regard to the importance of laying down a time limit within which Government should make all the effort which they are capable of to replace British officers by Indian officers.

Now, Sir, a word with regard to the question of accelerated promotions. The principle, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has told us, had not merely been accepted but been acted on and that at present there are 54 Indian Lieut.-Colonels and, I think, 31 Colonels. Well, this is welcome news so far as it goes, but accelerated promotion has so far been given under the stress of the war. I do not know what will be the future of the officers who have been given accelerated promotion during the war: whether they will retain their present ranks or whether they will be asked to go back to their substantive ranks when things become normal.

Again, Sir, we do not know whether the principle of giving accelerated promotions will be accepted in connection with the new Army. The military authorities may always have it within their power to choose any person for specially rapid promotion but my point is that unless it is borne in mind that the periods now laid down for promotion from one rank to another—

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: I should like to say that these are maximum periods. They are not minimum at all.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: But it is these periods that have been laid down for promotion—

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: It is misleading to say that without having served the maximum period laid down for promotion an officer cannot get accelerated promotion.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: I did not hear what His Excellency said.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: It does not prevent an officer being promoted before he has completed the period laid down, that is the maximum period. After completing that period he will be promoted. That is the point.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: I am afraid I am unable to follow His Excellency. I have no doubt that the military authorities can promote a man even though he may not have been for a specified period of time in a particular rank, but so far we find that the periods now laid down for promotion from one rank to another have been observed in practice. Because of the war they have had to be departed from. I should therefore like to know whether the principle of accelerated promotions would be accepted not merely in theory and acted upon only occasionally but be given effect in a fairly large number of cases, so that the nationalisation of the Army within the period laid down by me should become a practicable proposition.

Sir, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief says that he expects that about 1,000 Emergency Commissioned officers will be granted permanent Commissions. Now it is quite possible that among these there may be people who are fit to be given accelerated promotion. It is also possible that among the regular Indian officers who have not received accelerated promotion, there may be some whose cases deserve to be considered favourably and so on. My proposal regarding accelerated promotion, therefore, has a wider object in view than His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief seemed to have when he spoke on this subject.

Sir, I do not wish to take the time of the House any more but I cannot help referring once more to the announcement made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the number of Commissioned officers that we shall require in the future. Not knowing, Sir, what the size of the future Army would be I had naturally to confine the discussion to an Army of the present size. Should the principles that I have laid down be accepted now, I do not think that there will be any difficulty in their application to the new Army.

Again, Sir, if a National Government comes soon into existence it will have to take the War Department's proposals into consideration. It may not accept them or may suggest modifications in order to have a completely nationalised Indian Army in a few years.

Sir, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would like to withdraw the Resolution. I have no doubt that His Excellency is serious in saying that he wants that the Indian Army should be commanded by Indian officers as soon as possible. Nevertheless, I am afraid that I cannot withdraw my Resolution. My point of view being what it is, I think that my purpose would not be gained unless a high aim was set before young men which would create enthusiasm in them and make the country feel that the entire system was going to be changed and that their sons were going to be in an army whose business it would be to defend the national interests.

As regards the retention of a few British officers, nobody would demur to it. Even after the expiration of the period of ten years. When we ask for the Indianization of the civil services, we do not mean that every British officer in those services shall be turned out and replaced by an Indian officer. It will be in the power of the National Government to keep a certain number of specially capable British officers on, provided they are loyal to the policy laid down by it. I have no doubt that such a policy would be followed in future. When I asked for the nationalization of the army within a certain period, all that I meant was that we should not proceed in accordance with the existing rules of promotion always or usually, and that we should make the greatest effort of which we are capable at the present time to Indianize the army within the shortest possible period. I think, in the light of the material at my disposal, that ten years is not an unreasonable limit to prescribe.

In view, Sir, of what I have said, I regret that I am unable to withdraw the Resolution.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: Sir, I have very little to add to what I said before so far as the principles governing the solution of this problem are concerned or in regard to the policy which I am following. I think I made myself quite clear that the object of the Hon. Mover and my object are one and the same. I do not want to harp on that. It is simply as regards the methods by which our object is to be achieved that we differ—and we do not differ very much on that too. But I would ask the House to grant me indulgence to mention one or two points which came out during the course of the debate.

The first is the question of adhering to the rules of promotion. I am sorry I did not make myself clear that these time limits for promotion have been introduced in order to safeguard the officer in the event of promotion being slow. After a certain number of years in each rank—the officer is entitled to be promoted to the next rank, provided he has done good service. But there is nothing whatever to prevent an officer being promoted before that time limit expires if there is a vacancy in the next senior rank. Rules of promotion do not really come into it.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU: May I interrupt His Excellency? Was accelerated promotion given to a single Indian officer before the war? We were always told that no Indian officer could be made Lieutenant-Colonel because he was not of the requisite seniority, that is to say, had not put in 26 years' service. We have been told this by successive Commanders-in-Chief.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: I am not concerned with what former Commanders-in-Chief did in the past. I am concerned with the position as it is now. As a matter of fact, the rules apply to British and Indian officers alike. I hope I have made that point clear. It is not a limiting factor in the promotion of an otherwise deserving officer.

The next point I would like to mention is that there has been a certain amount of criticism there is nothing new about it I am accustomed to it—regarding the “unsuitable” methods of recruiting. Well, Sir, all I can say is that it is a point on which my conscience is very clear. I have taken every possible advice from every possible authority as regards how to improve the methods of getting officers—in the Defence Consultative Committee, from Vice-Chancellors of Universities, people up and down the country. And if any one has any more advice to give, I welcome it, because I want more officers, and I can assure you I will take advice that is given. Indian regular officers have been consulted. The Army has been consulted constantly—not only the Army, but the Air Force as well.

Then the point arose about the figure of 9,000 which I gave. I am perfectly willing to explain the details as to how I arrived at that figure. In fact, I will put them before the Defence Consultative Committee. But it does not mean that these figures are final. We are not planning for an army very much bigger than the army before the war: there will be many more technical mechanized units, and the army generally being more complicated needs more officers. The organisation will be much more complicated than before the war. I am afraid I cannot take you through all these details. I am prepared to listen to any suggestion that may be made on the subject.

University training corps were referred to, and I would like to tell the House that we have now practically finished draft proposals for the future organisation and syllabus of University Training Corps and Junior Officers Training Corps. That will also come before the Defence Consultative Committee, I hope, before long; it is well advanced.

[Commander-in-Chief]

The Russian Army came in for a good deal of mention. I would like to point out that the Russian Army was not formed during the war; it existed long before the war. However, I do not know much about the Russian Army, and so I would not like to say anything more on the subject. I think the Russian army derives its power mostly from the enormous number of men it has, and from the disregard of casualties which the Russian Army evinces; that, of course, gives them great power, and it did effect great things.

Two Hon. Members mentioned that I am not a free agent, that I am under the domination of some mysterious influence. I do not know where that influence is, but I can assure the House that, having decided the right principles on which to work, nobody will deflect me from those principles. If the powers that be, that is, those superior to me, decide that my principles are wrong, then I go. But I do not break my principles, and I am not under the domination of any mysterious influence either in England or in India. I would like to make that quite clear.

The next point is with regard to the British officer, and I am very glad indeed that the Hon. Mover and also the Hon. Sir Gopulaswami Ayyangar mentioned the British officer, because I as Commander-in-Chief, have a responsibility not only to the Indian soldier and the Indian officer, but to the British officer who is part of the Indian Army. I would like to remind the House—I do not think they need reminding—that the magnificent army which we have today in India, composed entirely of Indians so far as the rank and file is concerned, had been built up in the past by a very small band of British officers the great majority of whom devoted themselves absolutely selflessly to their duty and to India. It may be that in the near future these officers will disappear. But so long as they are in the army, I have a duty towards them; as Commander-in-Chief, I must consider them as well as the Indian soldier and the Indian officer. I am quite sure that no Hon. Member disputes that. I am very glad indeed that I heard that that point is recognised, because if it had not been for the British officer, you would not have had the army which you have today. It does not matter under what Government or under what system of Government he served. He was a soldier, and he did his duty, and I think we owe him a debt of gratitude.

I am very glad indeed to hear that in the opinion of the Honourable Mover and of a many Hon. Members the advent of a nation and Government will improve the recruitment of candidates for the officer cadre of the Indian Army. I have done my best to get more suitable candidates, and the results have not been very satisfactory. It may well be, as has been suggested, that that is due to political reasons. Well, if it is due to political reasons, perhaps with a change of government, with a change in the constitution, we shall get candidates that we require. And nobody wants them more than I do; I can assure you of that. I hope that will be the case. The whole of this question of the nationalization of the Indian army hinges on that and on the methods of selection, and I would like to say that if you are prepared to lower your standard, you can have 90,000—not 9,000—Indian officers tomorrow. What I would like to say is, I am not prepared to lower the standard. I do not know whether you are or not. I hope not for the good of India in the future. But I can say this that as long as I am here, I do not propose to lower the standard, and in that I have 100 per cent. of the regular Indian officers of the Army behind me. They do not desire a lowering of the standard and I do not desire it because it would be betraying the men in the ranks, the men who have got to be led in battle by these officers. This is a point on which I feel very deeply. Our methods of selection have been criticised, are being criticised and will continue to be criticised. But I personally think they are the best we can evolve for the selection of officers. They have been accepted by the British Army and they have

been accepted by the American Army too. They have also been accepted by the Home Department in India and I would like to point out that these Selection Boards are not exclusively composed of British officers. There is a very large proportion of Indian officers and it is increasing as I find suitable Indian officers. There is one Board entirely composed of Indian officers. But I say again that if you wish to lower the standard, there is no limit to the number of officers you can get. But you would be erecting a facade which has a white-washed front, but nothing behind it. I do not think you want that. I hope not.

Well, Sir, this Resolution is a curious one because the Hon. Mover and myself are really in complete agreement except on one point and that is, the laying down of a definite period by which nationalisation of the officer cadre of the Indian Army shall be completed. I have given you the reason why I could not accept that and I am afraid I cannot alter that reason because I think I am right. I am at present engaged in working out—an actuarial calculation really—and trying to arrive at a reasonable period within which this nationalisation can be completed and I have arrived at certain conclusions. But I cannot tell you, for the reason is that I cannot accept, a definite period within which this can be done. I would ask the house. So not to press me to lay down a period for the completion of nationalisation.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : As there is no agreement between the Parties it is my duty to put the Resolution.

THE HON. MR. M. THIRUMALA ROW : Can the Resolution be split up in parts ?

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : I think there is no opposition regarding the Resolution. Even His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has agreed on the clauses. The only difference seems to be about the last few words. In fact, the Hon. Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar's amendment was very reasonable in which he said "with the least possible delay" and if the Hon. Mover would accept that, it would save all trouble.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : I cannot accept that vague assurance.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : Resolution moved.

"This Council recommends to the Governor-General-in-Council that a time limit should be laid down for the nationalisation of the Indian Army so that the psychological atmosphere essential to the rapid formation of a national army may be created and the maximum effort may be made to achieve the purpose in view. This Council further recommends that—

(a) the appointment of British officers in the grade of lieutenant or captain in the Indian Army should be stopped ;

(b) the Viceroy's Commissioned Officer should be retained for the present ;

(c) deserving Indian Officers should be given accelerated promotion to increase the number of Indian Officers required to fill the higher grades ; and

(d) the method followed by other independent countries to create a national army in a few years should be adopted with suitable modifications, with a view to the nationalization of the Indian Army in ten years."

THE HON. SIB N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR : May I propose that you put clause (d) separately ?

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN (Leader of the House) : I do not see any advantage. You have now read the Resolution.

THE HON. THE PRESIDENT : I do not see the advantage of it. It would make no difference. If it did, I would do that.

Question put : the Council divided :

AYES—12

Buta Singh, Hon. Sir.
Das, Hon. Mr. N. K.
Das, Hon. Rai Bahadur Satyendra Kumar.
Kalikar, Hon. Mr. V. V.
Kunzru, Hon. Pandit Hirday Nath.
Mahtha, Hon. Rai Bahadur Sri Narain.

Motilal, Hon. Mr. G. S.
Row, Hon. Mr. Thirumala.
Roy Chowdhury, Hon. Mr. Susil Kumar.
Rup Chand, Flt.-Lieut. the Hon.
Surput Singh, Hon. Mr.
Yuveraj Datta Singh, Hon. Raja.

NOES—21

Assadulla Khan Raisani, Hon. Sardar
Bahadur Nawab.
Charanjit Singh, Hon. Raja.
Commander-in-Chief, His Excellency the.
Conran-Smith, Hon. Sir Eric.
Das, Hon. Mr. M. L.
Ghosal, Hon. Sir Josna.
Gibbons, Hon. Mr. J. M. B.
Hissamuddin Bahadur, Brig. the Hon. Sir.
Huttan, Lt.-Genl. Hon. Sir Thomas.
Khare, Hon. Dr. . . .

Khurshid Ali Khan, Hon. Nawabzada.
Mahomed Usman, Hon. Sir.
Menon, Hon. Sir Ramunni.
Mukherjee, Hon. Sir Satya Charan.
Porter, Hon. Mr. A. E.
Prior, Hon. Mr. H. C.
Rao, Hon. Mr. V. Narahari.
Sobha Singh, Hon. Sardar Bahadur, Sir.
Sundaram, Hon. Mr. K. V. K.
Sukthankar Hon. Mr. Y. N.
Townend, Hon. Mr. H. D.

The Motion was negatived.

HINDU MARRIED WOMEN'S RIGHT TO SEPARATE RESIDENCE AND MAINTENANCE BILL, 1946

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU (United Provinces Northern : Non-Muhammadan) : Sir, I move :

" That the Bill to give Hindu married women a right to separate residence and maintenance under certain circumstances, as passed by the Legislative Assembly, be taken into consideration "

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN (Leader of the House) : The Hon. Member has made the Motion now. He can make a speech on Thursday. We can not finish it before 5 P.M. today. It is much better to take it on Thursday.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : May I suggest that Government should give us a date after the 12th for the consideration of this Bill ? Government can give time for this along with some other official Bills.

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN : We are meeting on the 11th, and after finishing Government business, this might be taken up.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Will there be any Government business after the 12th when it can be taken up ? I shall not be free on the 11th and 12th.

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN : We are having those official Bills on Thursday the 11th. If there is time we will take up this Bill ; otherwise we will meet again on Friday.

THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU : Friday morning is an impossible time for me.

THE HON. SIR MAHOMED USMAN : We hope to finish this Bill, along with other Bills, on Thursday. We shall put this business down for Thursday. If it is not finished, we will have some other day. I am bound to provide a day for this

The Council then adjourned till Eleven of the Clock on Thursday, the 11th April 1946.