

[Mr. Deputy-Speaker]

The question is:

"That this House agrees with the Sixty-eighth Report of the Business Advisory Committee presented to the House on the 13th March, 1962."

The motion was adopted.

Shri Satya Narayan Sinha: May I request you to announce the time of voting so far as the first Bill is concerned, because there is a special voting?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: One hour we have allotted to this.

Shri Satya Narayan Sinha: The Speaker had agreed that at 12:50 we should start the voting so that the whole thing might be over by 1:05 or 1:10.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Ten minutes to One, is that all right? Yes. In one hour we have to finish and the voting will begin at 12:50.

12:02 hrs.

CONSTITUTION (TWELFTH AMENDMENT) BILL

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, I beg to move:

"That the Bill further to amend the Constitution of India, be taken into consideration."

This Bill, as the House well knows, relates to Goa, Daman and Diu, and it is a very short Bill, a simple Bill, and I take it, a completely non-controversial Bill.

Although it is short and simple, it is a Bill of considerable importance, and in placing this before this House, the whole history of 400—451, to be accurate—years comes up before me, and I suppose before many Members of this House, the whole history which started when Vasco da Gama landed

in India in 1498, I think. Subsequently, the fierce inquisition that took place there and subsequently so many other things that have happened in Goa during these years—I am not going to take up the time of the House in regard to that, but the House will remember that repeatedly during these 450 years there have been revolts against Portuguese rule in Goa, suppressed in a rather bloody manner. This rule came in later when the Moghul Empire was gradually disintegrating and there was no strong central authority in India to take steps against any foreign incursion. Later, the British came here and occupied India, a very large part of India. That process itself was a fairly lengthy one, and the Portuguese remained in India, parts of India, under the cover of British rule, because the British authorities thought it fit to allow them to remain. They did not remain there because of their own strength but under the shadow of British rule they remained there.

12:07 hrs.

[Mr. Speaker in the Chair]

When we long, long ago started our movement for independence, obviously we thought that independence meant the independence of the whole of India, including the enclaves that were possessed at that time by the French and the Portuguese, but the enclaves were so small that our main movement for independence was directed against British rule, and we took it for granted that when British rule ceased in India, the other enclaves would also be freed. We never thought that there would be any difficulty about that. And so, when independence came, our thoughts went to these enclaves, French and Portuguese.

We had repeated discussions with the French, and it took a few years to settle this question with them. There were discussions based on our own Constitution, legal matters and the

rest, but there were discussions as between two different countries. Ultimately they agreed and the physical possession of the French territories in India was made over to the Union Government.

I said just now that there were discussions as between two Governments. We agreed with something, we did not agree with something, we discussed them. With the Portuguese we tried to do the same thing. We appointed a special Minister in Lisbon to discuss these matters and sent them a note, but they refused to take the note. Subsequently we made various attempts to raise this question before them and they did not even discuss the question. Ultimately we had to withdraw our Minister in Lisbon.

That had been the situation for the last so many years. But in India there was naturally very great frustration and disappointment at this, what shall I say, difficulty of moving onwards in regard to Goa. In Goa itself there was trouble, and though there had been numerous revolts against the Portuguese Government in the past, there was no such revolt now because conditions were different and people in India and in Goa naturally thought in terms of some kind of non-violent or peaceful approach, accustomed as they were to our own methods in achieving our independence. This was attempted unofficially by large numbers of people, and this was suppressed in a very cruel manner by the Portuguese, and many people were killed. Now, this went on, and all of us in India felt that our independence was not complete till Goa was free.

Now, during this period, that is, since the independence of India, the Portuguese decided to declare that Goa was one of the overseas provinces of Portugal, that Goa was Portugal in fact, which was an extraordinary proposition, and certainly we could not accept it, nor could anyone else, although, unfortunately, in the course of the last few years, 1849 (A) LSD—3.

some countries did give some approval to that position. Now, at any rate, that is absolutely clear because the United Nations last year declared that Goa was a colony, which it was.

Then came recent events, and among the recent events were not only those that happened in Goa, but also what was happening in other Portuguese colonies like Angola. Although Angola has nothing to do with India, a great deal of feeling was roused in India—and it still exists—about Angola; first of all, about colonialism in general and, secondly, more especially, about Angola and the way the Portuguese were suppressing that movement in an extraordinarily cruel manner.

I mention all this—although it has nothing to do with Goa—because it did affect people's minds in India very much—all our minds.

Then, about 7 months back, I ventured to state in this House, I think, that we could not rule out any other measures, any sterner measures, even military measures in regard to Goa. I gave them notice; I gave them and other countries notice. And even so, as I stated then, we hoped to settle this matter peacefully.

There is another unfortunate aspect of this question which encouraged Portugal to hold on to Goa and to refuse to talk to us even. That was the active or passive approval by certain powers, allies of Portugal, to the then existing position in Goa. I feel—I cannot say I feel sure—it might have been easier to settle this peacefully if those other powers had exerted their efforts to this end.

Ultimately, and rather suddenly, if I may say so, although our minds had been prepared for all this, our hands were forced by what took place in and just outside Goa. There was, the House will remember, some firing on Indian shipping carrying on in the normal way, not entering Goa, and some actual incursions from outside, the Goanese territory, into India proper. That made it difficult for us not

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to take any steps to prevent this kind of thing happening. And, we, thereafter, took steps and sent some military forces there. The fact is that these military forces functioned—they hardly functioned in a military manner there—and within a few hours—it may be called 24 hours or 36 hours; it depends upon the measure of time—the whole thing was over. We could not have done so if there had been any real resistance; it could not have been done so if the people of Goa themselves were opposed to it. In fact, the people of Goa welcomed the Indian forces to come there.

Ever since we took possession of Goa, it was our advice—we consulted our legal advisers—that under article 1 of the Constitution Goa became part of the Indian Union and all that was necessary for us was to declare, in Schedule I, I think, that Goa is part of the Union. It was decided to do so by making Goa one of the Union Territories. I think that is the right thing because within that Union territory any amount of economy or self-government can be given. It does not come in the way of autonomy.

There has been, recently, a proposal that Goa should be a separate State, in the normal sense that States are. We have been unable to agree to that. But, quite apart from that fact, it would be quite impossible to constitute it as a State at the present moment because things are not wholly settled. We would require all kinds of State apparatus there. At present there is military governorship functioning with the civil laws to help it. And, the second Bill that I hope to place before this House a little later refers to our accepting the legal system there, not changing the laws except what we want to. We feel that this is the simplest way of changing the Constitution and giving a certain authority and permanence to what has happened.

The Bill, as placed before the House, is a very very simple Bill. It simply

says that in Schedule I, Goa, Diu and Daman be added to the other places there. That is all.

That gives us plenty of opportunity to think and put before this House, ultimately, the exact measures to be taken within Goa to grant it an autonomous position. We have made it clear that we want Goa to maintain its separate identity, separate individuality, call it what you will, because in the course of more than 400 years Goa has had a separate identity and the course of history had imparted it some. We have no intention of changing that or suppressing that identity. In fact, some people have advised us to make another change in the Constitution and to recognise the Konkani language as one of the official languages of India.

There are many languages in India which we recognise for purposes of administration, education etc. which are not mentioned in the Schedule about languages attached to the Constitution. But, in any event, I want to make it clear that we want to give full place to the Konkani language in Goa and not to ignore it or to suppress it in any way. That is the main language of Goa. Maybe, there are very few persons who know the Portuguese language, a number of people know Marathi and a smaller number, probably, know Kannaḍa. But Konkani is the principal language and we propose to give it full recognition in that matter.

So, the position is that this principle will apply to Goa and Daman and Diu—Daman and Diu are slightly different. But, broadly this principle will apply to them; they will be Union territories and they will have a good deal of autonomy; their individuality, their language and their customs etc. will be completely preserved.

Therefore, I place this Bill before this House. Although, as I said, it is a small Bill, a simple one, it does mean the end of an epoch and the

beginning of another for Goa and for India. Therefore, to some extent, this Bill has something of history attached to it and I feel that for this House, which has thought so much and thought so much passionately about Goa in these many years, it is a matter of great satisfaction that this question has been settled; this anachronism, can I call it of history, has been removed and the independence of India has become complete.

I feel proud to be able to place this matter before this House and I must say the House will appreciate that this simple Bill ends a part of history which is not pleasant for us to remember and starts a new historical epoch in India.

I beg to move.

Mr. Speaker: Motion moved:

"That the Bill further to amend the Constitution of India, be taken into consideration."

One hour has been allotted for all the stages of this Bill. It is quite a simple Bill. I will allow the leaders of groups to speak; and I shall call upon the hon. Prime Minister to reply at about 10 minutes to 1, so that we may dispose of the Bill.....

Sardar Hukam Singh (Bhatinda): We had fixed 12:50 p.m. for voting.

Mr. Speaker: The special majority and other things have to be gone through, which will take some time. We shall finish it by one o'clock.

Shri H. N. Mukerjee (Calcutta—Central): Mr. Speaker, Sir, we welcome the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Bill which the Prime Minister has now put forward because the whole country rejoices that Goa, long suffering Goa, has at last been liberated. The last colonial pimples on India's fair face have been eliminated by the short and swift and almost entirely bloodless campaign which has been conducted by our forces. The European free booters

who were the first to arrive on Indian soil and are now the last to leave—the Portuguese imperialists—are no longer to soil our country. Our prestige has risen in Asia and Africa and wherever colonialism is regarded to be the pest that it is, and all India, over this operation, has felt a new glow of consolidation.

I feel like saying that it is good, that the Prime Minister succeeded in brushing aside certain obstacles which were put in his way. I cannot help remembering that as late as late October, one of his senior colleagues in the Ministry, the Finance Minister, had said something in the Delhi Seminar on Portuguese colonialism which suggested that there might not be any operation against Goa. Hypocritical and mischievous talks have taken place in regard to India's peaceful and non-violent approaches being in danger by the operation against Goa, and all kinds of things have been said in certain quarters about the Prime Minister spoiling his own image before the people's of the world. But we know that all that is abracadabra and our country has applauded the action which has led to the liberation of Goa.

While Indian opinion as well as opinion in Afro-Asian countries has rejoiced over the liberation of Goa and while countries like the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have given their support to Indian action, there has been consternation and bitter criticism in what is euphemistically called the free world, notably the United States of America and Britain. I say this because it will not be easy to forget the sanctimonious sermons which were delivered by Mr. Adlai Stevenson in the United Nations. It will not be easy to forget the United States effort to get the Security Council to stop India liberating a part of our own territory. It was seen also in the United Nations as to who were our friends and who were our enemies when the Soviet veto thwarted the Anglo-American move in support of their faithful ally, Portugal. So,

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whether at the United Nations or in speeches made in India by accredited United States emissaries like Professor Schlesinger, pillorying of India and of the Prime Minister, in particular, has gone on systematically, and in the North Bombay election, the anti-Nehru elements shamelessly took up the cry. However, in spite of the dog barking, the caravan has happily gone on, and Portuguese colonialism is today a thing of the bad old past in our country.

I do not wish to sound anything like a discordant note but I would like the Prime Minister to take note of the fact that very responsible people like those who conduct the internationally well-known journal, the *Economic Weekly* of Bombay, have pointed out how, when Goa was liberated, the Indian embassy people got cold feet and the propaganda material put out by the Indian embassy was very late in coming and was very inadequate.

In the annual number of the *Economic Weekly* which came out in February, 1962, there is a special article under the caption, "The Indian Embassy gets cold feet." I wish to tell the Prime Minister very humbly that many of the representatives of this country who are abroad do not understand the spiritual pre-suppositions of the Indian struggle for freedom, and that is why they do not come forward in time and adequately to justify India's action and that is why I am very unhappy to have to say this: even our ambassador in Washington did not come out in time strongly enough with that kind of statement which would have put our case in such a light that people outside who make the profession of being hostile to us would not have got an advantage over this question of Goa.

I do not wish to refer in detail to this particular article in the *Economic Weekly*, but I do think it is a very important matter to which the attention of the Prime Minister has got to be drawn. We are very happy that at

long last Portugal has been pushed out of our country and we do desire that democracy is maximised in these ex-Portuguese territories and that is why I say that when the next Bill comes up for discussion, we shall have to point out how we feel that there are some lacunae in the Government action—that merely to declare Goa, Daman and Diu to be centrally administered Union territories and to provide those little things which have been mentioned in the Bill that is coming up next, is not enough. We would like the maximisation of democratic processes in Goa. It is a good thing and we all agree that the identity of Goa, in so far as it did develop a certain cultural entity, will be preserved and ought to be developed, but, at the same time, the desire of the people of Goa, Daman and Diu,—the real and genuine participation in the democratic processes envisaged in the Constitution,—ought to be satisfied.

So, when the next Bill comes before us, I shall have a greater opportunity to go into the details and suggest certain measures for the consideration of the Government. Meanwhile, I welcome the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Bill, and I express the happiness of the country that at long last the Portuguese blight has been eliminated from the soil of India.

Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur): Mr. Speaker, Sir, by having this Bill in this House, we are trying to put the constitutional seal on something to which the whole nation has already expressed its approval. We welcome this Bill and, as the Prime Minister has said, this marks the culmination of a process that was begun centuries ago. The Indian army culminated the task which was left incomplete by the heroic sons of Goa. The last army rebellion in Goa took place in 1930, and the Portuguese, in their vendetta and their vengeance, saw to it that not a single male member of the Rana family which had the courage to raise the flag of freedom was left alive. Such of them who

could cross the border in Goa and come to India only survived. We, therefore, rejoice at it, and I think this is the best amendment that this House has seen, the bringing into the fold of mother India that small part which continued to shriek under the yoke of foreign imperialism.

Having expressed our joy and also having accorded the full support to the measure, may I now draw the Prime Minister's attention to certain other factors which arise? We shall have another occasion to go into the detailed picture of Goa when we take up the second Bill. But here, the Prime Minister said that had those other powers exerted themselves properly, perhaps this issue could have been settled more amicably. I fully agree. But the matter does not rest there. We have our share of blame, and I should like to raise it even on an occasion like this when we have a matter for rejoicing. Speaking in this House on the 7th December, I had opportunity to elicit from the Prime Minister, whether on his very triumphal visit to the Soviet Union and the United States he had allowed himself opportunities of meeting the leaders of these two nations as to their position regarding Goa. Unfortunately, to my poignant question, he preferred to remain silent.

I may cite what I said then. I said:

"I would also like to ask what was discussed with Mr. Kennedy. Was it only d'sarmament? Was it only some other issue with which we are concerned but not directly? Or, did he take up with Mr. Mc-Millan and Mr. Kennedy the issue about Goa and their attitude towards it?"

I think we had naturally expected from the Prime Minister that with his good offices and his tremendous, almost unparalleled prestige among the world politicians, he would try to bolster up India's legitimate claims. We, therefore, were taken a bit by surprise, not so much by the hostile tone of a section of the British and the American

press, to whose hostility we have been accustomed very well by now. We do not expect that these people will forgive us for wanting to be free, nor do we expect Lord Beaverbrook's paper to see that India will be ever right. According to a section of the British papers, India can never be right, and there is a show of this kind of attitude in the United States. We had assured the Prime Minister that he need not in any action he proposed to take regarding the liberation of Goa, allow himself to be deterred by any consideration of hostility. But what disturbed us was this—in respect of the meeting with the President of the United States,—namely, the Prime Minister of India during his sojourn there, on very official and important duties, had never even mentioned the issue of Goa. I do not suggest that we need the consent of the President of the United States of America or the Prime Minister of Britain to do what we think right. But certainly I think we spoil a very good case that has almost been a good development in this country, to spoil India's case—whether it be Kashmir or be it Goa. Here was an occasion, when we owe it to this country and to the world, when we could tell them that this is what we propose to do. It is not enough to say that there was some firing. I do not think anybody is interested in this argument that we in the end did in Goa what we did because there was firing. No; it was our legitimate right to liberate the remaining part of Indian territory from foreign occupation. We did not require any provocation from any quarter and the justification does not lie in the fact that some bullets were fired at Indian mercantile shipping, but in the fact that we regarded Portugal's continued presence on our soil as an act of aggression.

The second point on which we would like to be assured is this. I seldom agree with Prof. Mukerjee, but here I have to agree that our embassies abroad, even on legitimate issues, do not serve this country properly. I had personal experience on Goa issue. We were going from country to country

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trying to present India's case. That was during the satyagraha of 1955. Since we refrain in this House from mentioning individuals, I shall not mention the name, but we were taken aghast when a very high-ranking embassy spokesman told us, "We do not know what is happening. We do what the Government of India instructs us." At the same time, the Portuguese Embassy was doing some subtle piece of propaganda telling the Roman Catholic countries in Europe that Goa is a Catholic country, a European country and though geographically Goa is part of India, ethnically and culturally it is a part of Portugal, and big giant India wants to commit aggression. There was no reply. I brought this matter to the notice of the Prime Minister after we were elected to this House early in 1958. It was at this stage that a pamphlet was prepared telling the people of the world how Goans are as much Indians as the Indian Prime Minister or any hon. Member of this House.

Our legitimate case in regard to Goa was never properly represented. It was not enough to say that in December, 1961 we have a right and we are going to exercise it. Certainly this country is trying to teach other nations as to how international disputes should be solved. I fully endorse what we did. Actually my complaint is that we were a little late in taking the action we took. We do not need to apologise to anybody in defending Indian territory. Let others criticise us; about their criticism, I have clarified our position. But what disturbs us a little is—I would like to know from the Prime Minister whether there is any truth in this charge—that free people were kept in the dark, who had a right to expect to know, but not get their consent, of course. I refute the right of the President of the United States of America to advise our Prime Minister in regard to what he does in furthering or defending or protecting India's interests. But I definitely think that people in the world ought to have been told in the interest of our own case that we mean to act. The Prime Minister was

there on the eve of the action. Then there comes this charge. I am not going to defend this charge; I refute it. But I would like to know why it was not done, because we had raised it in this House also. Then, we would like to know whether this bungling by the embassies continues. I am very wary of attacking ambassadors, who can never appear in this House. It is unfair and I shall not press this point.

Having said this, may I express at this stage our appreciation of the gallant manner in which the members of the Indian armed forces conducted themselves? It was a brilliant stroke. We are very proud that they maintained the best traditions of the Armed Forces of this country, that it almost looked like a satyagraha by the Armed Forces. The action was so peaceful, so polite, so gentle on their part that it seemed to me at least, who was near the border, a continuation of the incomplete satyagraha of 1955. So gallantly the Armed Forces of India behaved.

I have something serious to say regarding the civil administration that is now going on. But at this stage, I welcome the Bill and shall reserve my further comment when we take up the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Bill.

Shri Frank Anthony (Nominated—Anglo-Indians): Mr. Speaker, Sir, as the Leader of the House has pointed out, this is a simple Bill and yet it has a certain special significance for the people generally and for the Goans in particular. I am glad that the Prime Minister has reaffirmed his assurance that the individuality of Goa and certain special characteristics of the Goans will be recognised and respected. And, I say this, of course, for a very special reason.

In 1955, I had the privilege of presiding over an All-party Conference on Goa in Bombay. The Congress Party was a member of that confe-

rence. In that capacity, I had occasion to meet Goans and ascertain all shades of opinion. I think I can say that they were unanimous in recognising that this anachronism had to disappear. The only score on which they expressed some anxiety was that their individuality, their special attributes if you like—social and even cultural—should be recognised. Because of that, I am very glad that the Prime Minister has given them that assurance. I do not think we ought to be chary of recognising the fact that after 450 years of Portuguese rule, a certain special matrix, specially social, cultural and religious has perhaps inevitably emerged.

So far as the Goan people are concerned there may be a certain dichotomy on the part of some of them. That is understandable. I understand it, because in the case of the community which I have the privilege to represent, there was a certain dichotomy. But the Goan people in a way are more advantageously placed than we were. We were under certain special disabilities. We were regarded perhaps as the standard bearers of British imperialism and yet, we were accepted, and accepted with generosity, into the Indian polity. So far as the Goan people are concerned, I have no doubt that they will recognise the fact that finest opportunities will occur to them. Apart from any guarantee that the Prime Minister and the Government may give them, they will share with the other sections of the people of India certain fundamental guarantees. For instance, we have given to all sections of our people the right to conserve their language, their script and their culture. We have given a further fundamental right to the people to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. I feel certain that the Goan people will play their part fully in the context of much fuller opportunities that they will get in India today.

I would like to say something about the larger emotional significance. As my friend, Shri Mukerjee, whom I res-

pect as an individual, but not as a communist, has said, this action has sent some kind of an inexpressible glow through the heart of every Indian. One cannot rationalise it; one cannot say that it was a military operation. Perhaps the only obstacles were offered by the terrain. And yet, it is something which the people perhaps in the West have not understood. This Goan action seemed to strike, evoke some kind of a basic chord in the Indian thinking, probably a chord which represents the mystique not only of India, but of Asia and perhaps even of Africa; i.e. this kind of resistance to any semblance of European colonialism. My friend has inveighed against the western democracies. We in India perhaps do not react to colonialism practised by Europeans against Europeans. For instance, we do not react as instantly and unanimously to the colonialism practised by Russia against her eastern satellites, but we do react instantly and unanimously against any semblance of colonialism practised by Europeans against coloured people. That was the sort of chord that was struck in the mind of India by this liberation of Goa.

There was a reference to some criticism in the Beaverbrook Press—I think it was my friend, Shri Nath Pai who referred to it. I do not think we need worry much about that. In all democracies perhaps inevitably we have lunatic fringe to the Press, not excluding our own press, and perhaps India—baiting and a certain latent colonial fellow-feeling are their common bonds.

But I was a little distressed by the fact that in the so-called liberal quarters there was criticism, misconceived criticism, dangerously misconceived, because it was unaware of this basic psychology of Asian and African thinking. Here again, if the Prime Minister's image was supposed to have been broken, I do not think the Prime Minister need bother very much. Perhaps, certain people were taken aback by the fact that a person who was re-

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garded as some kind of an implacable apostle of international peace should have lent himself to this kind of action. The question I would ask is whether even apostles of peace are supposed to accept peace at any price. And if I have any criticism to offer, I have to offer the criticism that perhaps the Prime Minister was a little too long suffering. In 1955 the All Parties Conference in Bombay had resolved unanimously that one last opportunity should be given to Portugal to negotiate, failing which police action should be taken. If anything, that police action was inordinately delayed.

I want as a lawyer to end on this note. I am unable to understand this kind of ambivalence in international affairs. My hon. friend, Shri A. K. Sen, is looking at me and perhaps he will agree with me about this ambivalence of international standards. I am not pointing my finger at anyone in particular. But we have been criticised in America, and yet the Americans have their own Monroe Doctrine and in pursuance of that doctrine they are prepared to resist even unfriendly ideological infiltration into the sovereign countries of South America. There is no secret about the fact that America under-wrote the invasion of Cuba and may even under-write a further invasion in pursuance of that doctrine. The British have their own unwritten Monroe Doctrine—you know the British convention of having things unwritten—and in pursuance of that unwritten Monroe Doctrine, in defence of their security, as they thought, they went as far afield as Suez to make an attack there and yet we are pilloried internationally for doing what the whole country wanted to remove this not only last relic of European colonialism on Indian soil but something which in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, would be a potentially ready enemy base in case of a national emergency. So, I welcome these Bills and in welcoming both these measures we express generally not only the feelings

of the people in the country but perhaps also particularly the feelings of the people of Goa.

Shri Joachim Alva (Kanara): When in August last year the hon. Prime Minister moved the Dadra and Nagar Haveli Bill, we were frankly pessimistic about Goa. Some of us did not participate in the discussion on that Bill on the ground that we were taking back only a small portion of our territory and the larger slice was still far off from us.

The hon. Prime Minister has frankly and vividly described the developments of the past years and referred to the culminating point of the visit of the African leaders. The moral pressure of the African leaders' visit was indeed heartening and inspiring unto us. They had a canker in their body in the shape of Angola with which Africa could not put up and unless Goa was eliminated from the body politic of India, Africa could not get a panacea for her ills. Africa, renaissance Africa, which is going to be the country of this century, could not get push on, could not get moved on. In that way, the hon. Prime Minister's move was inspired by the visit of the African leaders which was a necessary visit, which was a very welcome visit unto us. Even then we remained calm until history knocked at the door of India in the shape of the firing on Scindias steamer, Sabarmati and the death of one of our brave fishermen Kochrekar from my constituency in North Kanara. Then events moved so fast until we had Goa in our lip.

One of the opposition leaders, Shri Frank Anthony, has nobly stated that the hon. Prime Minister as an apostle of peace could not for long carry on peace at any price, peace with insults, peace of a bonded slave. The United States of America should appreciate that when they are stern about Cuba which is 90 miles away from her shores in regard to the real and ideological warfare that they have waged against

Cuba—this is a point over which we have nothing to do; this is a matter for settlement between America and Cuba—when they had that kind of heavy soreness about Cuba around their neck, as they would say, what about the deep sore of Goa in our own body politic? In our own belly? How long can we carry on like that?

500 years ago, Albuquerque with 23 ships and 2,000 men came and occupied a slice of our territory which has been physically and culturally, politically and morally a portion of our land, and it has now been restored unto us. On the Republic Day I was the first Indian M.P. to go to Goa even though I was very busy with the election campaign. And the moment I set my foot there I realised how dangerous was the alliance between the Church of Rome and the Portuguese State. I never thought that the alliance between the Church of Rome and the Portuguese State could be so dangerous to the intellectual life, to the moral life and to the freedom of Goa as I found there. Rs. 6 lakhs of subsidy was annually given by the Portuguese State. Perhaps a slice of it went to the Hindu temples but the larger slice went to the Catholic Church, and what happened. I am a practising Roman Catholic and still in the first elections of 1936 I lost in Bombay in a communal electorate on account of the Goan vote. A Goan priest declared from the pulpit: "Satan is at the door". Now I suppose I have washed away my defilement by kissing the hands of two great Popes. Now, many priests in Bombay come from Goa and the ideological transformation that takes place in them is the off-shoot of their cultural bondage under the Portuguese. The Salazar regime laid down "we shall not have Marathi at any cost" and they did not even allow the people to talk in Konkani language. I am glad that the hon. Prime Minister has said that Konkani will have a pride of place there. We have, on one side, one extreme and there is the other extreme. When in Goa, I met a leading businessman of Goa,

who has earned enormous sums of money with Japanese collaboration—I shall not mention his name but I can hand it over happily. When I talked to his children in Konkani, he said "We shall not talk the Konkani language". I was shocked and I asked him again. He said "yes, my children shall not talk the Konkani language, they shall talk only Marathi!" I turned round and asked him "you are earning enormous sums of money from Goa; you were born in Goa; why put an iron curtain round the necks of your children?" Here was the Salazar regime who laid down that the Goans shall not talk the Marathi language, and here is another gentleman, born, bred up in Goa and had made a lot of money in Goa who said "My children shall not learn the Konkani language and they will talk only Marathi!" Now, Goa can go and embrace either Maharashtra, Mysore or any State she likes, but this iron curtain which this mentality will create and the new transformation that may take place are dangerous for the children of Goa. Konkani is the language spoken in Ratnagiri, Savantwadi, North Kanara, South Kanara and in a few other places. There may be some rich men, who make a lot of money and who become the darlings of every regime and who would like to have their views imposed on the State. I would say that the raising an iron curtain against the minds of children in Goa is a danger which we have to guard against.

We are indeed indebted to the United States of America under the Presidentship of Mr. Kennedy. Even though Mr. Stevenson made a hostile speech, on the whole the United States has not blocked our progress in Goa. Above all, I should be failing in my duty if I did not pay my tributes and praise the Soviet Union. Their power of veto stopped the UN observers from coming into my constituency of Kanara, immediately next to Goa. But for the Soviet veto the UN observers would have come and landed in Goa and instead of this victory, U.N. observers would have been

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running about in jeeps around Kanara and other districts like those who have been running in Kashmir. So, let us not forget, to use a vulgar expression, for which I may be pardoned, that not one dog barked, so far as the western camp was concerned, in favour of Goa being restored unto India. Let us not forget it. When once a former Prime Minister of Canada came here, he made a declaration that Goa did not fall within the ambit of the NATO. By the time he returned to Canada, he said that what he said here was not the correct position. So, when we obtain unasked, unsolicited support from friends, neighbours and others, we must express our gratitude to them for that expression. What about Britain? Britain sent out a frigate to Goa because it had a dozen British citizens in Goa. At the same time, in Delhi at the International Trade Exhibition they trumpeted the idea of "Indo-British partnership in business!" What kind of partnership is this if they send out a frigate the moment our troops enter Goa. That is really a very astounding affair.

Here I would also like to pay my tribute to our defence forces. The hon. Prime Minister had, from the beginning, the worst conflict in his mind in taking action and at last he took it, and took it firmly and never resiled. I must indeed pay my tribute of praise to our leader for having taken action in Goa in his own life time so that Goa became a part of our country. The Defence Minister, the Defence Ministry and the Defence forces have done an extraordinarily good job to mount 30,000 men or more into Goa, to send down 200 trains into Goa on one day when all the train services were suspended, and above all to send an army to crawl on their bellies, to run on their hands and legs and surmount destroyed bridges. There may have been half a dozen cases of molestation. But to make a mountain of them is not worthy of either patriots, gentlemen or journals. Yet, certain jour-

nals have placarded that our army wants whisky in Goa! This is a serious thing. We have to protect our army against attacks made on it. When the people are roused by wrong kind of propaganda that the army needs whisky, it is time that we protected the defence forces against these slanders and whispers by which the morale of the army might be shaken. Stray instances should not be placarded in this way to damage the morale of the army.

Goa has had 4,000 laws which have to be scrapped, modified or reenacted. The Government have sent a Military Governor and a Civil Administrator. I do not want to raise any controversial issues here. But I wish to say that the original administration which was set up should have been continued and should not have been broken by the first Civil Administrator leaving his post. We understand that six textile mills can be erected in Goa. Goan manufacturers should have easy access to our land. Goa need not be accorded any special privileges. But our countrymen should not go in overwhelming numbers there and forthwith disturb the economy of Goa. We should also see that coconuts are not sold for eight annas each in Goa so that they may be exported to India.

I am glad that the Government of India have taken right measures in regard to Goa's economy. We should not allow black-marketeers to go there and raise the prices of essentials. The Prime Minister has said many many times that Goa's individuality should be respected. There is a school of opinion in Goa that it should be a separate State. Let me humbly recall what happened to the Nizam of Hyderabad with all his enormous powers. They have been liquidated right in our life-time. It is correct that Goa is being added to the First Schedule. We shall see that the economic life of Goa is not disturbed, that all the gold and silver that flows within the five year plans will water down into Goa, that many

sons and daughters of Goa shall not go to Bombay as cooks and waiters, butlers and tailors. The day will come when Goans will stay in Goa, shall not emigrate and Indian will go and help them there.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Sir, I have little to answer. Some criticisms have been made not on this Bill, but rather on events preceding this Bill, of our embassies not having properly informed the people of the countries to which they are accredited on the Goan situation. I am not going to deal with that matter. To some extent perhaps the criticism may be justified. But, on the other hand, I do not think that hon. Members who have criticised our embassies knew all the facts and perhaps could not know all the facts.

Normally ambassadors do not deliver public speeches. There is an exception in the case of the United States where apparently they do; all of them do. But in other countries they do not publicly do what might be called some kind of publicity or propaganda. They make diplomatic approaches and of course circulate some publications which explain their countries' attitude.

In regard to United States especially, it was said that the Indian Embassy got cold feet. I should say that there have been few better statements on the Goan case than that put out by our Ambassador in Washington. It was at a speech he delivered after the Goan action, certainly a little after, but at some public gathering—I forgot what it was. It was a very clear, emphatic and convincing case. The difficulty has been that people often criticise our lack of propaganda. I do not know what kind of propaganda hon. Members expect us to do. All the propaganda in the world does not affect a closed mind, or a mind that is made up.

In Delhi there are a large number of foreign correspondents. What they say from Delhi has a greater

effect than what our embassies might say, because our embassies are supposed to repeat official propaganda. Delhi is not a place cut off from the rest of the world. There are plenty of foreign correspondents who send their own opinions and views about conditions here.

Apart from this, Goa was viewed in the West from the point of view of the cold war, because Portugal was an ally of certain powers and they did not wish to say anything against Portugal. In fact they often said something which was in favour of Portugal. The result was that there was a closed mind to it. They would not accept the things we said. It is quite possible that something more could have been done on our behalf, but to say that nothing was done is not correct. A great deal was done in the course of fourteen years—it was not done continuously.

Then again Mr. Nath Pai referred in his speech that I should have said something to Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Macmillan and President Kennedy. He specially referred to President Kennedy. It is true that I did not discuss Goa with him, but I spoke to him about it, that is to say, I referred to Goa. I must confess that I am rather hesitant, or I have too much of conceit to appeal to people. I put across an idea. It is up to them to accept it or not. I do not go on my knees to anybody, whoever he may be.

The day I arrived in New York, that very day, there was a big television interview. At the television interview I was asked a question if the masses of India felt excited about the Berlin situation. I said, "Certainly not". I said, "the masses of India do not know anything about it, or very little; of course, many of us, so-called politicians and people interested in public affairs know about it and do think it is highly important, it may lead to war; but to say that the masses of India feel excited is not correct".

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Then I added; "but the masses of India do feel terribly excited about the Goan situation, about Goa". I said, "I know that the Berlin situation is far more important than the Goan situation from the point of view of the world, war and peace and all that; but, nevertheless, to the average Indian, Goa is a much more important issue than even Berlin, important as that is".

I thought that that way of putting it by me might help in the American public realising the importance that we attached to Goa. And when I spoke to President Kennedy I referred to this television interview of mine, to say how much importance we attached to Goa. I did not, I confess, go any further to discuss it with him. But I told him how much importance we attached to it. I thought it was up to him to consider this aspect of the case. At that time, I should like to add, we had not taken any decision about taking any action in Goa. I was in the United States in November, in the early part of November. This decision was taken in December, sometime after I came back. And it was rather speeded up by the events have happened round about Goa, the firing on our steamers and all that. These things by themselves were not of high importance; but coming at a critical moment, coming when we were highly worked up on this question of Goa they had that effect. Immediately we thought that if they fired at our ordinary ocean-going liners and we cannot protect our passengers and crew, it is a bad thing, we must protect them. We decided to protect them.

That led to other questions: if we protect them, what will be the next step? Are we going to remain just protecting them on the sea when somebody is firing from the coast? And, step by step, logically we came to the conclusion that we cannot pro-

tect them from the sea without taking action on land.

All this occurred in December. I had no notion—although vaguely I had said previously that we might have to take other measures—I had no notion that we would take this action when I was in America. I say this because some people in America said, "Why didn't you say so here?" Well, previously I had no notion of that.

Secondly, when we had decided to take this action we felt, and our military advisers felt strongly that this action should not be broadcast to the world before it took place. Because, it might lead to complications. One does not take such action. The whole essence of that action was swift and effective action. If it loses that swiftness and effectiveness by previous declarations we might get entangled. Of course, there is no doubt that we would have won, but we would have won in a different way. We might have got entangled in all manner of things, military and other. So we were not able to say much.

As a matter of fact, the mere fact of the special trains going and others led people to believe that something was going to happen. Rightly, they thought so. And, other countries, including the United States of America asked us about it. Our answer was that we were forced into taking action. We did not mention the date or what kind of action we intended to take but that we were forced to take action. And it was pretty clear that we were going to take action. They knew about it.

It was not only argued, but our case was put before them, that is before the foreign officers of the countries concerned, as well as some other friendly countries in Asia and elsewhere before.

And then, of course, when we took action, again, it was fully explained.

But I beg of the House to remember that publicity in any country of Europe almost, or America, is not governed by the number of leaflets or pamphlets that one issues. Of course they should be issued. It is not easy for a man even to get an opportunity to speak in public there. That is, there won't be many persons to listen to him. And when he speaks there will be no publicity in the newspapers; they will not publish what he says. I am not complaining about that. That does not apply to us alone, it applies to various other countries too. They will pick and choose what they publish. If they are not interested in a subject they do not publish it. It is often happening. Therefore, it is not so easy as in India to go to the Ramlila Maidan, make a speech and get a fairly good report in the press. You don't get a hall to address; and, if you do, there may be a dozen persons coming and sitting there. Probably the dozen persons are either converts or loafers who want to come and see what is happening!

The main point is, it is very difficult to put across to people in the west the strong feeling on this subject in India. It may be that unlike a neighbour country of ours we do not shout so much about what we feel. We feel it is rather undignified to function in that way. It may be perhaps that that is a very effective way of affecting the west. But, after all, our training and culture has been different. I think ultimately this pays; immediately it might not occasionally.

But the fact is that Goa was to us, if I may use a word which is perhaps not happy, almost a complex, spiritually, ethically linguistically, in every way; it hurt us to see this continuing aggression of Portugal in Goa.

There was another aspect of it, which was the mere fact of a foreign

European foot-hold in India. All our history challenged that, all our nationalism challenged that. We could not tolerate it. It is not a question of somebody possessing a bit of our territory; it was not just a territorial matter. Everything connected with our Independence objected to it strongly. We felt that our struggle for independence will not be over till Goa came to us.

Those people thought of it, apart from this context, this emotional context, spiritual context, they thought of it as just grabbing at a territory, which is quite wrong. It is not a question of grabbing at territory. There was the other aspect that because of this foot-hold and because of Portugal being a part of the NATO alliance, nobody quite knew what part Goa might play if there was trouble, as a part of the NATO alliance. As a matter of fact, this House will remember that the question was raised as to how far the NATO alliance would apply to help being given to Portugal in regard to Goa. And some statements made, which were clear, said that it did not apply, while some other statements made were not so clear.

Apart from the spiritual or the emotional aspect—of course the political aspect comes in here—the fact that we may have to face a bridge-head in India belonging to one of the warring powers was a dangerous situation for us, in a big war. I had no doubt that if any such thing had happened, if a war had occurred, then our very first action in a military sense would have been to drive out the Portuguese. About that we were quite clear—within twenty-four hours of the war, if a war had occurred, we would have had to. We could not possibly tolerate a bridge-head like this in India. Naturally, we wanted to deal with this long before a war occurred; we did not want a war to take place.

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So, all these facts were very difficult to explain adequately; privately it may be done, but publicly to explain to these powers it was difficult; because they are full of their own view of international affairs. It is quite amazing how these great powers, think great as they are not only in power but in ability and other ways—and we admire them and respect them and we want their friendship—but they all think from their own particular view-point. They are unable to put themselves in the position of another party, what that party may think. That, indeed, is the sadness of the cold war attitude. The cold war attitude puts blinkers in our eyes. We can only see one way and not in any other way.

I would like to say just one or two words more. Hon. Members have congratulated our Army. It was, indeed, a very efficient piece of work. What is even more important, their behaviour subsequently and during this operation was very praiseworthy. Some complaints have come in afterwards about their behaviour. I think many of those complaints are exaggerated. Some of them are completely wrong. For instance, complaints came to us that a member of our Forces had misbehaved in regard to some woman. We enquired. On further enquiry we found that the man who had gone, who had apparently tried to molest some woman had gone with a false beard, pretending to be a Sikh. The beard came off actually. He pretended to be a Sikh and he put on a false beard. They reported that some Sikh regiment had come. But, the beard came off subsequently. Also it was reported that a man came and spoke in the Portuguese language to us. None of our Army, at least, of those that were sent, knew a word of Portuguese. On examination we found that many of these complaints were not true. There were one or two cases of misdemeanour which were,

I think, remarkably few considering the circumstances and those people were punished. On the whole, the behaviour of our Army has been extraordinarily good there.

One thing, I should add. Of course, presently, we shall have to make arrangements for representation of Goa, etc. in this Parliament. That will have to be done a little later.

As Shri H. N. Mukerjee said, those people who were the first to come to India are the last to go and I hope and trust that there will be no others, not only in the near future, but even in the distant future, who will come to India and will have to be ejected again.

Mr. Speaker: The question is:

That the Bill further to amend the Constitution of India, be taken into consideration.

(Interruption).

Order, order. I am going to ask that the Lobbies be cleared. You will have two minutes. I shall allow time to Members to be in their proper places. Let the Lobbies be cleared.

Hon. Members will kindly sit in their proper places. Before I call 'Division' let them have their hands on the proper 'Aye' or 'No' button. Both the hands have to be used. Let there be no mistake committed.

The question is:

"That the Bill, further to amend the Constitution of India, be taken into consideration".

The Lok Sabha divided.