

sented to the House on the 19th March, 1957."

Mr. Speaker: Motion moved.

"That this House agrees with the Forty-eighth Report of the Business Advisory Committee presented to the House on the 19th March, 1957."

Shri S. V. Ramaswamy (Salem): In view of the 'At Home' at the Rashtrapati Bhavan at 5 p.m., may I submit that the House may sit only up to 4-30?

Mr. Speaker: It is not an amendment to this Report.

Shri Kamath (Hoshangabad): May I know whether a firm and final decision has been taken to bring this lame duck session to a close on Thursday, the 28th March, so that Members may be in a position to draw up their future programmes.

Shri Satya Narayan Sinha: Yes.

Mr. Speaker: Yes; the session will conclude on the 28th. The question is:

"That this House agrees with the Forty-eighth Report of the Business Advisory Committee presented to the House on the 19th March, 1957."

The motion was adopted.

MOTION ON THE ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT—concl'd.

Mr. Speaker: The House will now take up further consideration of the following motion moved by Shri V. B. Gandhi and seconded by Shrimati Tarkeshwari Sinha on the 20th March, 1957:

"That the Members of Lok Sabha assembled in this Session are deeply grateful to the President for the Address which he has been pleased to deliver to both the Houses of Parliament assembled together on the 18th March, 1957."

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs and Defence (Shri

Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, Sir, the President's Address which this House has been discussing deals with a period of about one year. But, perhaps, in a sense, we are discussing this address that is before us as covering even a longer period, i.e. the period of the life of this present Parliament, this being the last occasion when this Parliament will consider such an address, so that, a longer perspective is opened out to us, and perhaps even a longer period than five years, i.e. the period since we became independent.

It is right that hon. Members should scrutinise, criticise or condemn if they like, any particular aspect of our domestic or international policy or any event happening now or anything. But, at the same time, perhaps it is more important that we should have an over-all view of this period to see how the main forces at work have been functioning shaping this country's destiny, whether in the political field, the economic or the social. It has been the high purpose and destiny of this House to lay the foundation and to start this new chapter in India's history to build democracy on a firm basis, to work and to labour for the advancement of the Indian people towards what we call socialism, anyhow to increase their standards of living in the near future as much as we can and step by step go towards the ideal we have placed before us. So, I would appeal on this occasion for this larger view to be taken, not because I want the smaller view to be put aside, but still even a small part of a picture is understood more if we have this broad and perspective view of the larger picture.

It is not my intention to go through the history of the last 10 years or five years at this stage of the debate. Merely I wish to draw the attention of the House to this larger view. We are apt often to lose ourselves; in the trees we forget the wood. In doing so, again, and in considering our policy domestic or external, it is per-

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haps profitable to look round the world and see what has happened elsewhere, how the world has shaped itself during this tremendous period of history since the last war ended, what has happened not only in the world at large, but in individual countries, what has happened in Asia, which, since the war, has shown a tremendous vitality and a tremendous ferment, what has happened in our neighbouring countries or the other countries of Asia. Because, then perhaps, we will have a better yard measure to see what we have achieved or we have failed to achieve.

It is easy, and perhaps right, for all of us to be impatient, to want to go faster, to be impatient of the many evils that surround us, to be impatient of the inertia, to be impatient of inefficiency and all that. It is right that we should be impatient all the time. We should never be complacent. And yet, to balance that impatience, one should see this larger picture and see what has happened in other countries round about. Because, by and large similar problems are faced by other countries; not entirely; each country has its own problems, its roots and its objectives. But, the world becomes more and more knit together and has to face the same problems and the same diseases overwhelming the world.

I put this thought before hon. Members of this House because, speaking with all modesty, and looking at this broad picture, I do feel that the achievements of this Parliament during the last five years, and the preceding Parliament too, that is, during the last ten years, the achievements of India and the people of India have been not only very considerable, but rather striking. I do not, for an instant, forget the lack of achievement during this period. But, I think it would not be right for us to lay stress on the lack of achievement or to lay stress only on the achievement. One must see both sides of the pic-

ture. Looking at both sides of the picture, I think it may be said with justice that we have advanced on the political plane, on the economic plane and on the social plane. Because, I do believe that a country today cannot really go far unless it advances on all these fronts together.

Most of us here, whether on the other side of the House or on this side of the House, were engaged for long years in the struggle for India's freedom. We were engaged in the Indian revolution and it was, as the world recognises, a major revolution even though it was a peaceful one. Even though it took another shape and its methods were different, we were engaged in a revolution. A certain political aspect of it having been concluded, we did not, I am glad to say, imagine that the work of the revolution had ended. We always thought of the revolution extending to the economic and the social sphere. Maybe our approaches were different; maybe our line of thinking did not agree. Broadly speaking, we did all agree and I believe we did carry on this old political revolution to the economic and social field. Most of us, not all, were conditioned by these past events as the country was conditioned. When we pledged ourselves to our present tasks, however lacking in worth we might be, we had this basis of a revolutionary or semi-revolutionary background in the country. I am saying this merely to point out something that the people seem to forget—people not so much in India perhaps but people outside,—that we in this country are still the children of revolution. We have been conditioned by it largely. We may forget it; we may become weak and falter or slip. That is another matter. There is some difference between a country which has gained its freedom by some revolutionary process, peaceful or not, and a country which has by chance, you might say, attained a certain objective, because the revolutionary process conditions the people, their character, their ability to resist, to go ahead, their capacity for sacrifice and

all that. It is true that after every outburst of revolution, one has so often seen that very revolution sometimes eating up the people who made the revolution, sometimes going back upon it, action and reaction. Anyhow, these are major conditioning factors. We have gone through that. When other countries judge us let them remember this that we are children of the Indian revolution and not merely persons who, by some automatic occurrence, gained freedom and who can be dealt with in a casual way as other countries sometimes are dealt with, because they gained their Independence if I may say so, rather accidentally and as a result of India's struggle for Independence.

There is this major difference which governs not only the past, but the present and the future for which we work. Because, we want changes. We work hard for them. Our attention, by and large, is concentrated on the economic and social changes that we want, on the growth and building up of a new India. Everything else is secondary to us. Everything else really comes in in so far as it affects the primary purpose of ours. We cannot cut ourselves off from the innumerable foreign developments because they have a most intimate connection with what we do. We cannot be isolated. Nevertheless, our main object is to carry on this process of building India socially and economically as rapidly and as quickly as possible, knowing full well that this requires hard work, labour, sacrifice and time. It cannot be done by a stroke of the wand.

It would be interesting to look at other countries with whom we are friends and to whom we wish well. We started building democracy. We aimed at socialism, We aimed at higher standards. We aimed at a welfare State. How far have we succeeded in preserving the democratic structure and yet gone on ahead fairly fast, not so fast as some hon. Members think was desirable, nevertheless as fast as any country that I know of, in the circumstances? Look at even the countries that claim to be democratic.

How many of them have even the trappings of democracy, leave out the inner content of it. They are not many in the world. Certainly not many in Asia; they are very limited in number. Our neighbour with whom we have tried to be friends in spite of it, Pakistan, finds it very difficult to carry on with any democratic process.

12 hrs.

Only this morning's news is that the whole Constitution of West Pakistan has been suspended by the President. It has been suspended under Section 193 and there is not Constitution functioning in the whole of West Pakistan. It is the rule under Section 193. Now, I sympathise; I am not criticising it. I sympathise with the people of Pakistan and the Government of West Pakistan. I am merely pointing out the difficulties they have experienced in maintaining even the trappings of democracy. I am not going into the inner content which is a much more difficult thing to have.

Two years ago, or was it three years ago, there was a great election in East Pakistan with a very big majority of one party and then within two or three months of the election, the Constitution was suspended. That may have been justified or not it is not for me to say. I am merely pointing out how difficult it has been for this neighbour country of ours to function in a democratic way, even in a most elementary sense. Indeed, it is stated there that they want what is called a controlled democracy, whatever that might be, something different from normal democracy. Look at other countries round about good countries, good people, struggling against fissiparous and disruptive tendencies, struggling inside the country; various groups wasting their energies in fighting each other; and some countries receiving a good deal of foreign aid—military and other—but in spite of that aid not shall I say finding roots in democracy or in free government. [We talk about the free world. How many countries which presume to belong to the free world

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have the trappings of democracy or freedom in them? We all see this, and if you look at India, in spite of all these failings, I do submit that the democratic process has worked—not worked perfectly, because there is no perfection in this world, but worked nevertheless with remarkable success, and at the same time the progress on economic and social lines has been very considerable. I am not for the moment going into the amount of progress that we have achieved. The House knows and the House can have different opinions, but I do submit that any comparison made, that any consideration of India, should, not only bear India in mind, but these major forces at work in the world and how they have functioned in various countries which have had to face more or less similar problems. That comparison is, I feel a revealing one in so far as our achievements both in democracy and in economic and social achievements are concerned. I add 'social' specially because it is no easy matter for a country like India to advance far in the social field by the democratic process. The laws that this Parliament approved of in regard to Hindu Law Reform were I think among the more remarkable things that this House has done, remarkable in the sense that a subject like that touches people intimately. It brings out all the inertia of a people who have lived long in an inert stage, socially speaking in an inert condition. It is difficult to get over that inertia.

People talk here about opposition and the like. The real opposition in India is not the opposition of hon. Members sitting opposite; that, of course, is there, but it is the opposition of all kinds of disruptive tendencies, fissiparous tendencies, inertia reaction, which in a great country like this is there, which we have to fight—all of us. So that, I would beg this House to have this broad picture of these last ten years, to see what we have achieved and also what we have failed to achieve, because we must learn, we must always be prepared to learn by

our own experience, errors of omission or commission.

Now, in this picture foreign affairs plays a considerable part, though not the most important part. It was understood that it would be better to deal with the foreign affairs aspect during a later debate. I shall not say much about it, but some hon. Members referred to it at some length and I should like, therefore to say a few words and to correct a few misapprehensions which have arisen.

One of the major points for consideration and for discussion has been the question of Kashmir. I do not wish to say much. We have said enough about it and so far as the Government is concerned, it has stated its policy with clarity.

An Hon. Member—I think Shrimati Renu Chakravartty—referred in this connection to Lord Mountbatten, and I think her words were something to the effect that he had delayed or that he had come in the way of sending our forces to Kashmir when this trouble arose. May I inform her and this House that that is not a true statement? I speak, naturally, with personal experience of those difficult days.

Lord Mountbatten, as I have said elsewhere, far from delaying,—he didn't—functioned completely as a constitutional Governor-General. In matters of defence and other matters we often sought his advice because he was a very experienced man. In fact, I may say something which is not perhaps wholly relevant. In the days of Partition trouble here, that is immediately after the Partition, when we had to face, and Pakistan had to face on the other side a fantastic situation and a horrible situation, Lord Mountbatten's experience was very helpful to us. We had formed a Committee, a kind of Superior Staff, which met every morning—some Ministers of the Cabinet, some of the heads of Departments, some of the Heads of the Army, the Police etc.—and it met every morning as if it was conducting

a kind of military operation all over India, with maps and charts and everything—what the situation was—the internal situation, Pakistan situation, with regard to that problem—huge convoys coming, of hundreds of thousands on foot, etc. It was an amazing situation. We could not deal with it in the normal way of Government and so we dealt with it in a way a war is conducted—with a rapidity of decisions and action—and we found that Lord Mountbatten with his experience was of extraordinary help during those very, very difficult days and things went through which may have taken weeks and months. Every morning we met for two or three hours and every person had to report after twenty-four hours that the thing had been done. Somebody was made responsible. So, it is quite incorrect to say that Lord Mountbatten delayed. In fact, there was no delay. It was quite extraordinary, in fact it is quite a feat which our Air Force which was in a very incipient stage then could be legitimately proud. I think 48 hours elapsed since our knowledge of the first trouble in Kashmir, the first invasion of Kashmir. We were much upset by it, we did not know what to do. We tried to get some information. We sent some people there and they came back. Ultimately on the evening of the second day we had to come to a decision as to what to do. We sat in our Defence Committee for several hours because it was a very difficult decision, difficult from many points of view including the practical point of view because it is extremely difficult for us to reach there, and at 6 P.M. that day—I forget the exact date, whether it is the 24th, 25th or 26th October but round about that in 1947—we came to the decision that we must take every risk to save Kashmir from falling into the hands of those raiders who had killed and massacred and looted and committed rapine. We decided at 6 P.M. as I said. Before that we had no intimation of this. An entirely and absolutely false charge is made on the Pakistan side that this kind of thing had been long prepared. We had not enough aircraft,

we had to stop our civil air line planes coming that evening commandeered them, and in the morning we just managed to raise about 250 or 260 men to send by these civil air-line planes, and these people reached the air field of Srinagar, the *kutch* air field, when the raiders were within seven or eight miles of it. It may be if they had reached three or four hours later, the air field would have been in the possession of the raiders. So, it was a remarkable feat. Having decided late in the evening, at 5 O'clock in the morning these people went off. There was no question of delay. The moment we came to a decision there was no delay, and the decision was taken as rapidly as possible, as far as I remember within 48 hours of our first knowledge of any trouble in Kashmir, that is invasion. I shall not say anything about Kashmir.

We have made it clear that the basic issues in regard to Kashmir are accession and aggression and everything has to be considered on that basis. These are the basic facts, nevertheless it is a very important thing what happens to Kashmir, apart from law, apart from Constitution important as they are, because we are concerned not only with Jammu and Kashmir State as a part of India, as a constituent unit-State of India, but apart from that we are concerned with the welfare of the people of Kashmir, of that State. Any impartial observer, any observer partial or impartial I say, who goes and looks at the State and sees how the people are there and has a look, if he has a chance, at the people on the other side of the cease-fire line, will realise the enormous difference between the two. I have been convinced that any upset of this would bring, apart from other major consequences, ruin to the people of Kashmir. That becomes a major factor too. It would bring many other major consequences too, but we see what has happened to the people on the other side of the cease-fire line, we see what is happening in

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regard to the functioning of Government etc., in the whole of Pakistan. Governments come and go rapidly, the democratic process goes and all that.

Then there is talk of our having in Kashmir done something against the decision of the Security Council. May I deal first with the criticism made very often that we were wrong in taking this matter to the Security Council? Whether we were right or wrong I do not think it does much good referring to it again and again ten years afterwards. If that is the sole argument, it does not help us in the present stage. But I do not think we were wrong because the alternative at that time for us was war with Pakistan. Well, deliberately we did not want war with Pakistan if we could avoid it and we did this. Apart from that, it is not a question of our going or not going. Others can go there too. So long as we belong to the United Nations we have to function as a member of the United Nations. So long as we believe in the processes of the Charter of the United Nations, we have to function that way. We cannot say that when it affects us we shall ignore the United Nations and when it affects somebody else we will believe in the United Nations. Surely that is not a legitimate position or consistent position to take up.

And we went there. Why did we go there? We did not ask the United Nations to decide on accession etc. That was a fact that had been done, we did not want anybody's authority to tell us accession is there or not. We went there to ask the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to withdraw, to take away its forces from Indian Union territory. That was the main object.

Now we are told, sometimes we are criticised that we have done something, we have ignored the resolutions of the Security Council, that we have violated them,—I must confess that after the deepest study I do not

knew what this means, and I have asked people to tell me, and nobody has been able to point it out—more particularly the last resolution of, I think, the 24th January which was passed apparently under some misapprehension, though why any one should misapprehend the situation I do not know—it was adequately explained to them by our representative. There was some misapprehension that something was going to happen on the 26th January. Nothing was going to happen except the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State.

Much is made about what is called the annexation of Jammu, and Kashmir State. I do not know what the word "annexation" means. Anyhow, if it means accession, Jammu and Kashmir State had acceded to us 9½ years earlier. You cannot annex something that is already with you. But there is another important aspect of it. Nobody talks, I would not say nobody, but the people who accuse us seem to ignore completely the fact that nearly half of Jammu and Kashmir State territory has been practically annexed by Pakistan. Whatever rights or wrongs there may be in regard to India being there,—we think we are completely right—nobody has even remotely suggested that Pakistan has the slightest right to be there, under what right it is there. It is patent it has no right, and yet for nine years it has been occupying that territory.

So, our position in regard to these matters is quite clear, but it being clear, in regard to the wider approach to various problems, world problems, we have always put forward the peaceful approach, the approach of peaceful settlement. We cannot adopt a different approach in Kashmir or, if I may say so, in Goa without violating that major approach of ours. Well, that has been both our strength and our weakness. I admit

that. But, in the final analysis, one cannot ride two horses or follow two contradictory policies. We had to do that. Of course, if we are attacked, it is a different matter. Some friends have thought this is a weakness of our policy; it was weakness only that we insisted on following a policy of peace, always thinking not of the immediate moment but of the future also, because we have to come to live in peace with our neighbours and with the world.

But, look at the broader picture of the world. In this world, we live on the verge of disaster with atomic and nuclear weapons constantly being produced, experimental explosions taking place and suddenly crisis arising which bring the world to the verge of war. No one can forget this major fact. And remember one thing also, if I may venture to say so, that for the first time in the world's history we are faced by a new possibility and a new contingency. There have been wars in the past, there have been disasters in the past, terrible disasters, they occurred either in one part of the world or another, a great part of the world, but even where they occurred something survived: some civilisation, some culture, some history, the accumulation of human experience survived. And after the war was over, it grew again from that thing that has survived.

Today, we have to face a contingency that all history and all human experience might be wiped off leaving nothing behind to survive. Now, that is the first time that such a contingency has arisen. And this has arisen because of these terrible weapons of mass destruction, and weapons of mass destruction which not only destroy outwardly and suddenly, but which are something infinitely worse, gradually destroying our bones, your marrow, and everything, due to radiation going in. It is not immediately obvious. It may take weeks, it may take months, it may take years. That is the major thing that you have to face today. And all your problems, and all the hard work that

you put in in solving your problems, and all the conflicts that you may have of ideologies and everything pales into insignificance before this major fact that if somehow we go on over this brink, then all history and all past experience of humanity might be wiped off.

I repeat this, and I seek the indulgence of the House to do so because I myself feel that people do not realise it. They talk about the atomic bomb as a joke, and they talk about nuclear weapons and all that, and radiation. They do not realise the extreme danger that faces the world. And I confess that the prospect depresses me, because ultimately this danger can only be held back by the character of human beings and nothing else by the peaceful approach, by the compassionate approach. You may make terms with each other, but if you are full of hatred and violence, I have not a shadow of doubt that this danger will break out and submerge everybody.

Therefore, I think that the approach, the cold war approach, if I may say so, is an exceedingly bad approach. I say so with all respect. And I am not moralising. Who am I to tell anybody else? I do not think that we in India are in any sense better than other people in other countries. I do not boost up my own people. I like my people, I love my people, because I am one of them, but I do not boost them up and say they are better more spiritual, more moral. I do not believe that. Every country has a spirituality, a morality. Every country has its periods of growth and decay. I do value what India has, I think it is something wonderful. May be, I am partial to India; maybe, all of us are partial to our country. But let us not forget this, let us not assume a superior pose about it.

I say this with all humility that this business of cold war which is based essentially on violence and hatred—the essence of it was hatred.

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headed against the other party—is a thing which is bad and is a thing, which, if it is not controlled, will lead to all manner of disaster.

Take again this fact. As a result of this cold war, armaments go on and go on; experimental explosions of nuclear weapons take place. The other day, there was an explosion. I think, somewhere in the Soviet Union. Soon, there is going to be an explosion in the Christmas Islands in the Pacific. We have received pathetic complaints from organisations and people in Japan about these explosions. They have had experience of them. And they dread a repetition of that experience. But what can we do about it? But it does seem to me tragic, a tragic circumstance, that these experimental explosions should take place, when even according to scientific advice, each explosion adds to the vitiation, making the atmosphere more vitiated and more dangerous. Nobody can say to what extent that poison spreads from each explosion. But every scientist knows that poison is there. Some people say that the poison is not so great as to kill you or to affect you very much, it is only in a small quantity, but others say it may affect you a little more. Nobody knows, because we are on the verge of the unknown. And suppose there is doubt about it. Even apart from certainty, suppose there is doubt about it. Then, certainly there is one aspect that it may be very dangerous to the human race. In view of that, that experiments should still be carried seems to be tragic in the extreme.

Why is this done? We come back to the cold war. We come back to this policy of believing in arms and latest armaments, in military alliances and the like. The other day, someone said, speaking about S.E.A.T.O.—I hope I am correct. I think it was something to this effect—that S.E.A.T.O. will preserve peace in South-East Asia for a thousand years.

Dr. Rama Rao (Kakinada): with a few atom bombs.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: But, whether it is a thousand years or a hundred years, that meant, I suppose, the continuation of cold war for a thousand years, or whatever the period may be. With all that, it also reminded me of something rather unpleasant. Hitler had said that Nazism would last a thousand years, the Nazi regime in Germany.

So, this whole approach of cold war and military alliances, if persisted in sometime or other, I suppose, will lead to that final catastrophe. Now, I do not venture to offer advice. Who am I to offer advice to any country? I know that many things that we would like to do in this country we cannot do, for fear of having our country weak and unprotected. We dare not take that risk, and if I dare not take that risk, I cannot ask other countries to take that risk, obviously. At the same time, it is equally obvious that this race in armament and this continuation of cold war is an even greater risk than anything else.

I would very respectfully suggest to the great countries who have to shoulder these heavy responsibilities that the time has come—the time is always there, in fact—for some kind of a step in another direction to be taken. I realise that you cannot suddenly reverse big policies; you cannot, as I said, take steps which make you face risks which you are not prepared to face. But even if the step be small, it should be in the right direction, and no step should be taken which adds to this cold war business.

I think—I have often said so—some people do not like our criticising these pacts. So far as we are concerned, whether it is the Warsaw Pact or S.E.A.T.O. or the Baghdad Pact, they are all, I think, dangerous things in the modern world which add to hatred, fear and apprehension. Somehow each one thinks that because of the other, he has to keep going, just as many countries say that they will stop nuclear explosions provided

everybody else stops them. Everybody says so and nobody stops, and so they go on.

We have seen recently how the Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O were dragged in in regard to the Kashmir issue. You see how one affects another and how a wrong step leads to innumerable other wrong steps. The other day the Prime Minister of Pakistan, describing the Baghdad Pact, used rather striking language—I would not dare to do so. He said—zero plus zero plus zero plus zero equals zero. His point was that unless some powerful country like the United Kingdom or the United States was in the Baghdad Pact with its big defence apparatus, all the other members of it, from the point of view of armament, were relatively zero. That means that there is another aspect to it. When a country considering itself zero attaches itself to some figure, it is the figure that counts, not the zero; obviously, it is the other figure that must count because the zero does not count. So not only policy but everything is determined by the other factor, not by this.

Whether it is Kashmir or whether it is some other country, recent events have shown us that one cannot build a country which has no roots in its own past. You cannot ultimately impose anything on a country; it may grow into it. You cannot impose anything and you cannot uproot a country from its nationalist roots. We saw in Central Europe some months back in the case of Hungary how ten or eleven years' attempt did not succeed in imposing something, and the nationalism of Hungary was strong and tried to resist. There are many other factors; I am merely pointing out the major factor, that it was an extraordinary example of how strong nationalism is in a country, for it has deep roots. Nationalism may become socialist, may become communist, may become anything—that is a different matter—as, I believe, in some countries it has. But it cannot be imposed; anything cannot be imposed upon

it, and a country which has not got these nationalist roots in its past life and culture and all that will be a rootless country.

Now I venture to point out that this theory—or call it what you like—the two-nation theory, which was advanced in India some years before independence and about which reference is still made in our neighbour country, is a theory which makes a country rootless. It ignores the real life of the country, the roots of a country in its past, and tries to impose something without those roots, with the result that difficulties come in. We can see these things in recent history. And if I may, in all humility, say to the people and to the leaders of Pakistan, I have sympathised with them in their difficulties; but their major difficulty has been their having uprooted themselves from their own past—I am not talking about India—and tried to develop something in the air on the basis of the two-nation theory. The result is that they cannot get a grip and they have to rely more and more on external force and external aid, because they think in terms of transplanting religion to nationalism and to statehood. That is a medieval conception. In the old, medieval days, it might have succeeded because communications were not there, because many things happened which cannot happen today. But the conception of joining statehood to a religion is so out of place that no amount of repetition of it can make it real; it is unreal, and it becomes still more unreal when it is sought to be applied to, let us say, Kashmir. It is fantastic. It is not there—the two-nation theory—in Kashmir. Our friends, some in Pakistan and more so in some other countries, always talk about it to us.

So we see in this Kashmir issue not only the basic facts to which I have referred but a basic conflict between the modern age and medievalism, a basic conflict between progress and reaction, a basic conflict between the welfare of the people of Kashmir and

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their ruination. Something back, the Prime Minister of Pakistan himself said that he did not believe in the two-nation theory. I was glad to read that because I hoped that from that other things would flow. I still hope that might happen, but, unfortunately, it is not apparently easy even for him to give this new direction. Perhaps gradually it may come. Meanwhile, it is this two-nation theory, again, which has led, in the final analysis, to this tremendous and alarming exodus continuing from East Pakistan. If that theory is there, whether there is exodus or not, there can never be really contentment and satisfaction among those who, inevitably, become some kind of an inferior race.

The House will forgive me if I have not dealt with the various criticisms which have been made in the course of the debate. We deal with them from time to time; we shall, no doubt, deal with them in the future. I would only just like to correct one or two statements that were made. I think more than one hon. Member opposite referred to large sums of money paid by industrialists to the Congress Party; and enormous sums were mentioned, Rs. 25 lakhs, Rs. 50 lakhs and crores. I really do not know where these large sums are. I know certainly that contributions have been made by industrial leaders and others to a political party with a wide platform and we accepted contributions; we have done that. But I can assure this House that the figures mentioned are completely unknown to me.

Shri K. K. Basu (Diamond Harbour): What are the figures?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know; it is not just one chest. But rest assured I do not know because it is not a sort of one chest in which it is kept. But I can tell you that I am quite sure with the knowledge of what has happened in India that the Congress, considering the number of seats it has fought has spent less money per seat than other parties. We

have spent it over all seats. (Interruptions).

Shri Kamath (Hoshangabad): Tatas have paid Rs. 15 or Rs. 20 lakhs, haven't they?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am giving the House my information; I may be wrong. But remember this that every industrialist who has contributed to any party funds—his company funds—must show that money in his accounts.....

Shri Kamath: Exactly. That is how we came to know.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: apart from individual private contributions. But that has to be shown; that cannot be hidden. I honestly tell the House that I really do not know. I would have told the House if I had known. I had some broad idea of it because from time to time I had information of it. It is nowhere known how these large sums

Shri Kamath: May I ask in all humility whether the Prime Minister knows that the Tatas have contributed Rs. 20 lakhs and that is known. It is not secret.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It is not secret. You mentioned the Tatas. I am saying that all these matters are not secret; they will come out in their accounts and there is no secret. But I say I would be very happy at a later stage if some procedure is adopted—speaking for myself—when all party funds are made public.

Shri Kamath: We accept it.

Shri K. K. Basu: We all accept it.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know on whose behalf Shri Kamath is accepting it.

Shri Kamath: I accept it on behalf of the P.S.P. just as you do on behalf of the Congress but of the P.S.P. I can give that assurance.

Shri Gadgil (Poona Central): Why not accept your defeat gracefully?

Shri Kamath: Let the Prime Minister speak.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: There is another very small matter. Hon. Member Shri Sadhan Gupta referred, I am told—I saw his speech which was reported in the Press—that a British gentleman with a recommendation from Lady Mountbatten undertook a trip into the Naga Hills. It was said he was recommended by the Prime Minister and so on and so forth.

Dr. Rama Rao: Our paper has published the contradiction.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: In spite of the contradiction the statement was made. May I state when I saw this, I knew nothing about it and I made enquiries. Although my name was mentioned I did not know anything about the entry of anybody into the Naga Hills. I got the information. My information was confirmed that nobody has gone to the Naga Hills or has gone across the inner line and poor Lady Mountbatten has had nothing to do with this matter.

An Hon. Member: Why poor?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: But I say this. Some years back there was a case which has nothing to do with the Naga Hills, nothing to do with the inner line and nothing to do with the Mountbattens. There was a case of some botanists coming here and going to some parts of Assam and their general behaviour was not considered satisfactory by us and we told them so. It may be that that incident of some years ago has got mixed up with the Naga Hills, inner line and all that. It is quite independent. There have been several odd cases of foreigners coming and sometimes being asked by us to leave rather rapidly.

I must apologize to the House for speaking rather about broad and general subjects in a broad and general way and not trying to reply to the individual criticisms that hon. Members made. But, I thought that on this occasion when this Parliament was considering the President's Address for the last time we might

have this larger perspective and so I have spoken in this way.

Mr. Speaker: Now I will put the amendments to the vote. Does any hon. Member want any particular amendment to be put separately?

Dr. Rama Rao: No, 2, Sir.

Shri Kamath: Amendments Nos. 2 and 12 may be put separately.

Shri V. G. Deshpande (Guna): 13 also, Sir.

Mr. Speaker: Order, please. I take it that the other amendments are not pressed. Amendment No. 1 of Dr. Lanka Sundaram—not pressed.

The amendment was, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Speaker: I will now put amendment No. 2.

The question is:

'That at the end of the motion, the following be added:

"but regret that reorganisation of the States on linguistic basis has not been completed by forming (1) Samyukta Maharashtra, including Bombay City; and (2) Maha Gujarat".

Those in favour will please say 'Aye'.

Some Hon. Members: 'Aye'.

Mr. Speaker: Those against will please say 'No'.

Several Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Speaker: I think the 'Noes' have it. The motion is negatived.

Shri Kamath: The 'Ayes' have it.

Mr. Speaker: I am getting the lobbies cleared.

Shri Nambiar (Mayuram): Let us try this new apparatus.

Mr. Speaker: The apparatus is not yet complete; it will be used in the next session.

The Lok Sabha divided: Ayes; 17, Noes 172.