

[Shri S. N. Chaturvedi.]

holes and root out complacency. I welcome the assurance of the Prime Minister that this will be done.

We have to learn lessons from our failures, for history has repeated itself. This is not for the first time that we have suffered reverses not for want of bravery or valour of our soldiers but because of the superior technique and weapons of the enemy.

The hordes of Central Asia are again on the march and we are confronted with the organised might of a dictatorship based on terror and reeking with blood. "Virtuous motives trammelled by inertia and timidity", writes Mr. Churchill, "are no match for armed and resolute wickedness". Eternal vigilance and full preparedness is the price of liberty and vigilance is as much needed on the diplomatic as on the battle front.

Sir, it has been suggested by some hon. Members that we should at this juncture try to conciliate Pakistan. I see no good coming out of it except humiliation or increased tension. Let us not commit the same mistake in regard to Pakistan that we have committed in regard to China.

Others have questioned the wisdom of our policy of non-alignment. I think it has stood the test of time and is now understood and appreciated. By seeking aid and support from all countries with which we had friendly relations we have put their friendship to test, and are getting to know who are with us and who are not.

Non-alignment is not neutrality. Our leader has taught us to align ourselves with justice and right against partisan might and that is today our fountain of strength. To this noble and high-minded policy there has been one exception, and that is Tibet. We not only acquiesced in the rape of Tibet but failed even to raise our voice in the United Nations against the violation of human

rights and cultural genocide perpetrated there by the Chinese Communists. It seems as if our present travail is a retribution for that sin.

Even so, the invasion has done us one great service. It has united the nation as it had never been united before. This is a source of great strength and augurs well for the future. We have only to discipline and properly channelise this emotional upsurge of the people. We have to harness and conserve the energies of the nation for a protracted war and not let them be wasted in angry and loud denunciations and burning of effigies and tall talk. The soldiers have consecrated by blood their loyalty and devotion to their motherland. It is now for us who are in seats of power to give a good account of ourselves and prove worthy of the heroism and sacrifice of our jawans and the abounding and spontaneous support of our people. Let us dedicate ourselves to our tasks in the faith and confidence that our cause is righteous and it shall triumph.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, Defence and Atomic Energy (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr.

Speaker, Sir, since I had the honour of moving this resolution we have had a long debate in this House, almost perhaps a record debate in this House and perhaps in other parliaments also. I do not quite know how many Members have spoken.

Mr. Speaker: 165.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: 165 Members have spoken. While it may have been said that perhaps a very large number of speeches rather take away from the pointedness of the question before the House and our minds wander into details, yet I am glad that so many Members have spoken because the point that stands out is this, not that they have not made various suggestions, various criticisms, but that fundamentally and basically every person who has spoken in this House

has spoken in the same refrain more or less, and that our Members have reflected the mood of the country.

I have put forward a longish resolution before this House, and it is clear from the speeches made that the resolution as it is is welcome to this House and will be accepted as it is. But I have almost felt that it would have been, shall I say, suitable to add a small paragraph to the resolution thanking the Chinese Government for taking some action against us—which of course, we have resented—which has suddenly lifted a veil from the face of India. During the last three weeks or a little more we have had a glimpse of the strength of the serene face of India, strong and yet calm and determined, that face, an ancient face which is ever young and vibrant. We have not had seen her face, but rather this House saw a million faces representing that face of India or Bharat Mata

That has been an experience worth having for all of us and it has been our high privilege to share in that emotion and experience. Whatever the future may bring, I do not think we shall ever forget this powerful emotional upheaval that India has had in which we have all shared—I repeat, all of us whatever party or group we may belong to. Any person who gives thought to these matters will realise and, I hope, other countries also realise—I hope that even the Chinese Government realises that—what this signifies, because it seems to me obvious that no country which evokes that feeling in a moment of crisis can ever be suppressed or defeated. In fact, many countries of the West and, I hope, many countries of the East also realise that today. They are surprised that such an amazing upheaval should have taken place among our feelings that all our petty controversies which seemed so big to us suddenly become of no moment and are swept aside before the one thing before us, that is how to meet this crisis and emergency, how to face this

invasion and to repel it. That is the major issue.

We may—I am going into that a little more later—have failed here and there. We might not have been quite prepared to meet this invasion. Our mentality may be built towards peace. Although we prepared for any such emergency, nevertheless it is true that the mind of the people and of the Government while preparing sought peace all the time. I am not sorry for that. I think, it was a right urge and it is that right urge that has led to this enormous upheaval in the Indian mind

Much has been said about our unpreparedness. In some degrees many hon. Members have referred to it. I shall deal with that matter presently. I do not seek to justify any error that we might have committed, but I do think that many hon. Members have done an injustice, not to any Minister of others, but to our Armed Forces as a whole in making various charges. I hope to disabuse their minds by stating some facts. The one real fact, as I said, is that our whole mentality has been governed by an approach to peace. That does not mean that we did not think of war or of defending our country. That, of course, we had always in mind. But there is such a thing as being conditioned in a certain way and, I am afraid, even now we are conditioned somewhat in that way.

Shri Anthony said—I am not quite sure of his words, but he said something to the effect that now we must . . .

An Hon. Member: Brutalise.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I had an idea that he used the word 'blood-thirsty'—I am not sure. Anyway, he said that our nation must be brutalised; that Jawaharlal Nehru must be brutalised. I hope that our nation, much less my humble self, will never be brutalised because that is a strange idea that one can only be strong by being brutal. I reject that idea com-

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pletely. Our strength lies in other factors. Brutality is a thing which we have associated with certain movements which we have objected to or rejected. By becoming brutal and thinking in those brutal ways we lose our souls and that is a tremendous loss. I hope that India which is essentially a gentle and peace-loving country will retain that mind even though it may have to carry on war with all its consequences to the utmost.

There is a definite distinction between being strong and being brutalised. I need not mention an instance which has lent prestige to our history—the instance of the long period when Gandhiji was controlling the destinies of our movement for freedom. No man can say that Gandhiji was brutal. He was the essence of humility and of peace. No man can say that Gandhiji was weak. He was the strongest man that India or any country has produced. It was that peculiar mixture of strength with sacrifice to the uttermost, yet a certain humility in utterance and a certain friendly approach even to our opponents and enemies, that made him what he was. Those of us who were privileged to serve with him and under him do not claim of course, to be much better than we are. We are humble folk who cannot be compared with the truly great, but something of the lesson that he taught came down upon us and we learnt it in a small measure. In the measure we learnt it we also became strong though, I hope, not brutal. So, I would like to stress that I do not want to become brutal; I do not want that aspect of the cold war and the hot war which leads to hatred and dislike of a whole people and looking upon them is something below normal.

Some of us who are old remember the First World War and the tremendous propaganda in it against the Germans. I do not hold any brief for the Germans—I think, they were wrong in the First World War and,

I think, they were wrong in the Second World War—but the type of propaganda against the Huns and all that, against the whole people, not against an individual, was shocking. I have no doubt that the same type of propaganda was being carried on in Germany against the Western allies.

Wars are terrible and millions of people die; much destruction is caused. Yet, after all, death comes to all of us and if it comes a little earlier than otherwise in the great cause, it is not to be sorrowed for. We have to face it as men. Death in a good cause is not a thing to regret, even though we may regret the parting with of our colleagues and comrades. But brutality is something which degrades a person. Death does not degrade a person. Brutality and hatred and the offspring of these things do degrade a nation and the people. So, I should like to say right at the beginning that, I hope, no such emotion will rise in our country and, if it does rise, it will be discouraged. We have nothing against the Chinese people. We regret many things that their Government has done. We think that their Government has acted infamously towards us. We regret many things that their Government has done in their country. We cannot help them. Anyhow, we must always distinguish between the people of any country—much more so of a great country, great in size, great in history—and its government and not transfer somehow our anger and bitterness at what has been done by the Government, to the people.

Perhaps, if I understand, many Members, sometimes, listen to broadcasts from Peking. I have not done so at any time. They have told me of the constant appeals that Peking broadcast makes to the Indian people. It distinguishes the Indian people from the Indian Government or the Indian Parliament. It carries on propaganda that the present Govern-

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of October, it was not realised by the people at large what dangers possibly might confront us. They thought of frontier incidents. Hon. Members in this House criticised us for not taking steps in Ladakh to drive them out, not realising that it is not such an easy matter. Perhaps they realise it a little more now that these things are not so easy matters, that they require not only the strength of a nation, but properly utilised, properly directed, enormous field of preparation and consideration of military factors. Where these factors are against us, naturally we suffer a reverse, it does not matter what your strength is. Our jawans were very strong.

I might mention just for the information of the House that it was not today, but some years back—by some years, I mean a couple of years back—that is, after the Chinese started nibbling at our territory in Ladakh, that we had before us the question of N.E.F.A. We considered it, what we should do if they attacked. We hoped that they would not attack there. Certainly we hoped, we expected that they would not attack in such large numbers as to bring about a regular invasion with several divisions, which they did. Nevertheless, we had to consider if they did, what should be done. The advice that we received then was that it will be disadvantageous for us to try to hold to the exact frontier line, the McMahon line, but that we should delay them, we should harass them, we should fight them a little but the real defence line should be lower down wherever a strong defence line could be made. Partly because to the last moment we did not expect this invasion in overwhelming numbers, partly from the fact that we disliked it—I frankly tell you that we disliked the idea of our walking back in our own territory, whatever it was—we faced the Chinese there under very disadvantageous circumstances from a military point of view. In addition to that, enormous numbers came over. It is no criticism at all of our officers or

men that they were somewhat overwhelmed by this deluge and they had to retire to more defensive positions.

Shri Frank Anthony, I think, said that we have been enabled to put up some kind of line of defence, because we have received arms from abroad. Now, we are very grateful for the arms and material and equipment that has come from abroad, but that was not correct then; no arms which were brought had reached our troops by then; they are gradually dribbling in and going there, but by that time when we achieved the present position, these arms which were brought had not been given and had not reached them. It was with the existing equipment that they brought the Chinese advance to a standstill.

So, the real reason, the basic reason for our reverses in the early days of this campaign was the very large forces the Chinese threw in; in a restricted sphere or field, they outnumbered our forces, by many many times. Even the question of better arms did not arise. They had slightly better arms, but that question did not arise so much. They had better mortars to hit at some distance. They still have them, but they had stopped. That was the main reason, and there was nothing that we could do about it, because the geography of the place, the military appraisal of the place was against us in that particular area. The only fault we made, it may be, if it is a fault, was even to stick out where the military situation was not very favourable. It was not that we told them to stick out; it is folly for any politician to say so. But our soldiers themselves have a reluctance to go back, and they stuck on at considerable cost to them.

I referred to the great unity in the country, which is a wonderful factor. It is not unity of parties so much as the unity of hearts and minds. We can see that in the thousands of faces. When I talked about the face of India, I really should have talked about the

million faces of India, because they all bear the same impress today, whatever community or party he or she may belong to.

And I should like to say something even about the Communists. Now, the Communist Party's manifesto as a manifesto was, I think, as good as it has been drafted by any non-communist. People may think or say that it does not represent their real views, but because of pressure from outside they did it. Let us suppose that it did not represent some of their views, some, no doubt. Some there are in the Communist Party who even objected to this manifesto, and were overruled. Even so, the fact that conditions in the country were such that they decided to issue that manifesto is a factor of some importance. It shows how these conditions mould people's minds in India, all of us, to whatever party we may belong to, even to a party which for reasons known to Members was inclined in the past to favour somewhat the Chinese, because they are also Communists. Even then, they stood out, and stood up four square against this attack as any hundred per cent nationalist would do. That is a good thing. Why should we not take full advantage of it instead of deriding it and seeking causes why they did it? After all, there are some leaders among the Communists, and they sometimes quarrel amongst each other about ideologies, theses and what not, but the large number of ordinary workers or others who may belong to the Communist Party are simple folk. They are attracted by something in it, and those simple folk are affected just as they are affected by the situation which affects every Indian; they have also been affected by this manifesto of the Communist Party, that is, the ordinary communist members. And that is a great gain. They should be affected in this way. Why should we lessen the effect of that by telling them that it is a wrong manifesto? So, I welcome that manifesto, and we should take full advantage of it in

forging the unity against aggression that we have in fact forged.

Then, I do not wish to go into the hundred and more minor criticisms and suggestions made in this House. All suggestions made by hon. Members will be carefully examined. Some, as I said, were made because of not knowing that the thing had been done; some perhaps we cannot adopt; others we may adopt.

I should like rather to lay stress now on the general question of our preparedness, because hon. Members seem to think, some Members, that we sent our soldiers bare-foot and without proper clothing, to fight in the NEFA mountains. It is really extraordinary to say that they were almost unarmed, and bare-footed.

Some soldiers there were stationed there. Others were sent rather in a hurry in September. Our time for issuing winter clothes is September, about the middle of September. When they were sent, they went there, of course at that time in full uniform, full warm uniform, woollen uniform, and every man had two boots, good boots. As they were going, they were given three blankets apiece. Later on, it was made into four blankets; now, they have been issuing four thick army blankets. But these blankets took up so much room, and as they were going by air, the people decided, that is, the officer in charge, and the men themselves said 'They take so much room, and, therefore, send them later on to us'. It was not so very cold then. So, they took, each one of them, one blanket, and left the others to be sent later on. That was a little unfortunate, because sending them later, as we did, meant air-dropping them. And air-dropping was a hazardous business in those days. Apart from the fact that the Chinese then could fire at them, air-dropping in those very precipitous areas in the mountains could not be accurately carried out. Often, they went into the *khad*, into the deep ravine below, and it was difficult to recover them. So, we lost a good

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deal of our supplies, many of these blankets and other things.

Then, we even went further. We provide for high mountain altitudes snow-boots; they had good boots, they had two boots apiece; they had snow boots; these boots had been provided to these soldiers of ours who were permanently located there. The others that were sent were all in Assam; they were not here; but they were in Gauhati and other places. But, again, the difficulty arose of sending them by air.

Broadly speaking, I would say that all our Army in NEFA was well-clad, and well-booted, but towards the end, that is, towards the end of September, realising that the Chinese forces were increasing very rapidly, we decided to send more troops quickly. These troops were sent in a hurry. And sometimes, it so happened that troops that were being sent somewhere else were diverted to NEFA, and these troops certainly had not the full complement of winter clothing then. Of course, it was decided to send them later. Except for these troops that went later and which did not have the full complement—and subsequently it was supplied to them—all others had the full Army complement, and many of them had snow-boots also. In any event, everyone had good stout Army boots.

Some people have heard stories of frost-bite. All the cases of frost-bite occur naturally due to the cold and due also to the high altitude. I do not quite remember the number, but I have an idea that out of a large number of people,—I do not quite know,—about two or three thousand, the total number of frost-bite cases was only a handful. Even the cases of bronchitis, pneumonia etc., were only about forty, which is a very small percentage considering the conditions there. Of these too, we may say that more than half was due just to the altitude and not to lack of foot-covering. This occurred not to our

but most of this occurred to people when on the 20th October when this fierce onslaught of the Chinese came, our forces in that particular place—one or two places there—were dispersed. They could not return to the base of their army. They dispersed and for some days, they wandered about the mountains and ultimately returned. That was also the reason perhaps for people saying that the casualties were very heavy. Of course, large numbers of our forces had not returned in order; they were wandering about the mountains, returning a few days later. I think these persons who returned a few days later were over 1,600. During these few days, these persons, naturally, were not well-protected. When they were wandering, they did not have the facilities of the army. blankets and other things they would at the base camp. They were not carrying them. They were wandering in high altitudes and they suffered a great deal. That was where the frost-bite cases chiefly occurred, along with lack of other comforts. When they came back, they were put in hospital, and they are doing fairly well.

So I would submit to the House that it is not correct to say that our people were not sufficiently clad or sufficiently booted. It was an unfortunate thing that this was the time for changeover from summer clothing to winter clothing. Suddenly a small number of our army which was in summer clothing at that time was diverted to the east without coming back to their base, and the winter clothes took a little time to reach them. As regards boots, they had very good boots. Even snow boots were supplied. Some people do not have them. We do not supply snow boots to large numbers, to everybody. We do supply them to people in these high altitudes.

Apart from clothes and boots which were I do think excellent, normally

our army is not clad for the winter. They were clad, for instance, in the special clothes, but normally our army is not clad for the severe winter. They have got all kinds of winter things, but not for these very high altitudes and the cold winter there.

It might interest hon. Members to know that in Ladakh, round about the Chushul area, the temperature at present is 30 degrees below zero. Such is the ferocity of that climate. Ordinarily, it does not matter how many clothes you may have in a temperature 30 degrees below zero at an altitude of over 14,000 ft., unless you are used to it. Now, learning from experience, we have provided, in addition to all the other winter materials that our soldiers have, thick cotton padded coats and trousers. They are very warm. They may not look so smart as with the other clothes, but they are there. We started providing them these within a few days of the 20th, as soon as we felt that they ought to have these and it became colder there. We have been sending these cotton padded coats and trousers at the rate first of 500 a day and later at the rate of nearly 1000 a day.

The other charge made is about weapons, that they did not have proper weapons. Now the soldiers, jawans, who went there were supplied with all the normal equipment, that is, .303 rifles and the normal complement of automatic weapons such as light machine guns and medium machine guns. They did not have semi-automatic rifles because our army does not possess them. I might point out that many up-to-date armies in the west do not possess them yet. Even in England, the changeover to semi-automatic rifles has just fully taken place. It has just been completed; it took about four or five years; it has just been completed, this year, a few months ago. It is a lengthy process. And the British Army is relatively smaller than ours.

For about four years now, we have been considering and discussing this

matter. Various difficulties arose. Points of views were different. The easiest way is always to order something—ready-made article. But the easy way is not always a good way. Apart from the continuing difficulty we have to face, that is, lack of foreign exchange etc., it is not the way to build up the strength of a nation. If we get something today, we have to get ammunition for that all the time and we are completely in the hands of some other country. And specially if we have to deal with private suppliers in other countries, the House knows that the arms racket is the worst racket of all; because you need something, they make you pay through the nose.

So we were very much against getting it from private suppliers outside and we thought that we should build up our own arms industry to manufacture semi-automatic rifles. These arguments, specially in peace time, take a long period to determine. Of course, if we had this crisis before this, we would have functioned better. But it took about two to three years to determine what type to have. Ultimately, we started the first processes of manufacture and we have just arrived at a stage when within about three weeks or four weeks—in fact, some prototypes have been prepared—they will begin to come in in larger numbers and will increase in numbers in another month, two months and three months to a substantial quantity.

It is not a question merely of semi-automatic rifles. As I have said, we had automatic machine guns, LMGs and MMGs—light machine guns and medium machine guns. Every regiment had its complement of these. Certainly, they did not have semi-automatic rifles for the reasons I have given, namely, we wanted to manufacture them ourselves and this changeover to automatic rifles has been relatively a modern development. As I said, even in England, it is a recent thing. But this outlook of ours, about manufacturing things ourselves rather than buying them, covered our whole

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approach to this question. We are manufacturing a great many things in arms today which we did not previously. I shall give you some figures. The first pressure upon us is always that of finance, that is, foreign exchange. We could not really afford it. Do not compare that situation two or three years ago with the situation today when we have to meet a crisis. When we meet a crisis like this, it just does not matter what happens. We have to face it. We have to buy it here and there; we have to get it from wherever we can. That is a different matter. But normally, the whole approach was to make them ourselves.

How did we make them? The usual thing was that we bought some with the proviso attached that the persons we bought it from would give us the licence and the blueprints to manufacture it here. So we bought some to begin with, and then started with the blueprints and the licence we had got to manufacture it, and supply it with everything, whether it is tanks or other things.

Also, it is all very well to build a factory here and there, but really you want to have a strong industrial background. You cannot, out of a relatively agricultural background, suddenly put up a highly sophisticated factory. All this time the work we have done, not in the Defence Ministry, but all over the country, in our First Five Year Plan, the Second and the Third, has been meant to strengthen the nation by making it more modernised, more industrialised and build up this base out of which you can produce the things you require. Perhaps some hon. Members will no doubt realise this, some may not. You have to have a strong base, industrial base. You have to have indeed not only a strong base, you have to have a literate people. People may think for the time being that education can be stopped. Education is essential for a real war effort. It is essential because you want every soldier today to be a better mechanic; he has to be educated as

much as possible. So, it all goes together. The whole basis of our Five Year Plan was to better our people, to raise their level and all that, but it was essential to make India stronger to face any trouble that arose, whether it was invasion or anything. And we are in a much better position today to face this trouble than we were ten or twelve years ago, there is no doubt, because of the growth of our industrial base in the public sector and the private sector, both. If we had to face this business ten or twelve years ago, our army was the same as today, a very brave army, but it had no industrial background, and it would have been very difficult for it. We had to develop that industrial background as fast as we could. Now we have at least a base to develop, and I hope, therefore, that no conflict will arise in any person's mind whether we should go ahead with the Third Five Year Plan or devote ourselves to the war effort. That is part of the war effort—I do not say everything in the Third Plan; some things may be avoided, slowed down, even dropped if you like. But take agriculture. It is the base of all industry. It is only on a strong agricultural base you can build up industry. The industrial base is the foundation of any war effort. So, the two are connected, intimately connected.

Education again. We want today, we shall want, not only a widely educated mass of people, but vast numbers of technically trained people. That comes in. Power is essential for industry, and so on. So, really, all the major things that we want were in the Five Year Plans, and are required today.

But the point I wish to lay stress on is this, that all our thinking in the past even from the point of view of the army has been concentrated on industrialisation, on making things ourselves.

Today we are getting large numbers of arms and equipment from other

countries, and we are very grateful to the United States, to the United Kingdom especially, and other countries. But please remember that this kind of thing, and this kind of response, could not have occurred in peace time. Obviously, it is when danger threatens us, just as we feel in a particular way, others feel too, and they think, as they rightly think, that this is not a mere matter of India being invaded by China, but it raises issues of vast importance to the world, to Asia, and realising that they do it, they help us; that is, they feel this involves many issues in which they themselves are intensely interested. This could not have happened in peace time.

(Some one asked us: we could have bought some of the things at a very heavy price. Today I hope we get them on very special terms whatever the terms are, they are being worked out, but it is understood special terms, not to put any heavy burden on us today. That kind of thing could not have taken place then. We would have bought these things, or even one-tenth of what we are buying, at a heavy cost, which would have made our Finance Minister shiver. But apart from that, in any long-term view, it was a wrong thing. The thing is to make them ourselves.

What has China done? The main difference—there are many differences between China and India, but one difference is that first of all they started about 20 years before the success of the revolution there, they were fighting all the time. They had a heavily trained army fighting in the mountains. They are especially good at mountain warfare; lightly clad with a bag of rice and a bag of tea in their pockets, they march on, with no questions of supplies or anything for days, with cotton-padded coats and trousers. They were highly trained in that warfare. But what I am saying is this, that they concentrated right from the beginning, apart from other developments in the country, on the development of armaments manufacture. They

got a good deal of help from the Soviet Union; vast numbers, thousands of people set up their armament industries. We, although we did go on with our armament industries, did not concentrate on that, certainly not. We thought: better build up the whole industrial complex of India, and out of that other things would also be built up. Nevertheless, we did build up, I think fairly adequately, our armament industry, not as much as we would have liked. It was being progressed.

I shall just read out to you some figures of our ordnance factories production. In 1956-57, the issues to the army from the ordnance factories amounted to—I cannot tell you the details, it is not right for me to tell you, I am only telling you how much they cost.

Some Hon. Members: No, no.

Shri Ranga (Chittoor): We know the results anyhow. We do not want all that, it will only help the enemy.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It has grown about 500 per cent. I do not mind telling you, I am not going to give you what they are making, but the issues to the army in 1956-57 were Rs. 8.64 crores; civil orders Rs. 3.52 crores; Air Force and Navy Rs. 1.93 crores. In 1957-58, issues to the army Rs. 12.78 crores; civil orders Rs. 3.27 crores; Air Force and Navy Rs. 2 crores. Then the figure for the army goes up to Rs. 12, Rs. 14, Rs. 19, Rs. 24 and in 1961-62 to Rs. 33½ crores, and at the present moment it is estimated at Rs. 60 crores.

Much has been said about civil orders, that we make thermos flasks and the like in ordnance factories. It is very unkind, that kind of criticism, without knowing anything. Most of the civil orders are for railways and the Government. A few things are made, some things like thermos flasks, simply because in the process of manufacturing other things, some things are manufactured which can easily be converted into thermos flasks etc., and

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there was surplus labour about. You will see that civil orders have not progressed much. They have become, from Rs. 3½ to Rs. 6 crores in these eight years, while the issues to the army rose from Rs. 8 to Rs. 60 crores. It has advanced much more, again with the difficulty of trying not to import machinery as much as possible. We did import some. Again, foreign exchange, that awful thing stares us in the face. And the result was that much of the machinery used was re-vamped, reconditioned machinery, which we got from old stocks; and our engineers are good men, they made it suit their purposes. Of courses, it is far better to get new machinery. We are trying to get new machinery. But it is remarkable what they did with the material they had before them and I should like to pay a tribute to the men in charge of our ordnance factories, not only because they are thoroughly competent but, what is more, they are filled with a certain enthusiasm. They are patriotic and they want to show results. They work night and day and at the present moment they are working 24 hours a day in the factories.

17 hrs.

I should like to mention how pressure of circumstances makes one a hard realist. The food we supply to our army, though good, is complicated and not easy to throw about or be supplied from above. In the last two or three weeks both our Armed Forces food department and Defence Science Organisation as also the Food and Agriculture Ministry have been experimenting with foods which could be concentrated foods and which could be carried about easily in your pocket also and which should be enough for several days. Only this morning I was looking at an exhibition, demonstration rather, in the Defence Ministry of these foods, quite a large number, very attractive and very palatable. They looked palatable. I did not eat them. There are all kinds of preparations of gur and nuts. They

are excellent preparations, I may also tell the House that gur is a good thing for high altitudes. We are making very good progress. We have in fact sent these things to the front to find out the reaction of the soldiers to that.

Some hon. Member asked a question about the newspaper item about our soldiers getting notices from courts or some such thing. I do not know that. Anyhow, we have immediately taken action to stop any such thing happening and every such thing will have to be postponed for the duration of this emergency.

Some people criticised our diplomatic missions abroad for not doing as good a job of work as they ought to in putting our case and countering the Chinese propaganda. My information is that our diplomatic missions abroad, by and large, are doing very good work. But another country's outlook is not determined solely by what we tell them. There may be many factors—maybe, sometimes fear, sometimes other things. I think our missions abroad are doing well and, what is more, their work is being rewarded. The first reaction of many countries, many of these Asian and African countries, was regret and surprise at what had happened here and they hoped that it would be quickly ended by some cease-fire and compromise and all that, because they found themselves in a difficult position. Gradually this surprise is giving way; it has given way in the case of the UAR and even Ghana which took up an attitude to our regret originally and later supported the U.A.R. making some suggestions to the Chinese Government. It was very near to the suggestions we made about the cease-fire business. So, I do not think it will be right to criticise our diplomatic missions abroad. You must remember that these countries have their own diplomats too here who report to them, and most of them have got their newspaper correspondents. There are many ways of getting news about what is happening.

This question comes up in various ways—about Pakistan and Nepal. It is difficult for me to say anything definite. But about Nepal I should like to say that latterly the attitude of Nepal has been relatively much more friendly. Naturally, we have always made it clear—it is unfortunate that they thought that we were creating troubles—we have made it clear right from the beginning that we do not want trouble in Nepal. Apart from the Chinese invasion and the trouble there, they are large y internal. Anyhow, now, I think they believe our word and are very friendly and I hope that our relations will continue to be friendly and cordial.

As for Pakistan, there also, I will not quite be definite, but their newspapers have been peculiarly virulent about this matter against us. But I do not think their newspapers reflect very much the opinion of the people of Pakistan or even of those in authority in Pakistan. Gradually they are realising it; at first, apparently they thought this was a small frontier matter and nothing much. Now, they are realising how far-reaching are the consequences of this and they are making a reappraisal.

I should like to say a few words about the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been, as the House knows, consistently friendly to us all along. It has been put in a very difficult position in this matter, because they have been, and are, allies of China, and hence the embarrassment to them as between a country with which they are friendly and a country which is their ally. We have realised that and we do not expect them to do anything which would definitely mean a breach over there. It is not for us to suggest to any country. But we have had their good-will and good wishes all along, even very recently, and that is a consolation to us and we certainly hope to have that in future.

The Chinese Government has been making a lot of propaganda about our Defence of India Act as if that was specially passed to deal with some Chinese here. It has obviously been passed because of the situation we have to deal with. Everybody who is a mischief-maker, if it be a Chinese who makes a mischief, he comes under its purview; otherwise not. The difficulty with the Chinese is that they have a singularly perverted opinion and perverted view of what happens in the rest of the world. It is an odd characteristic of the Chinese. Being a great nation with a vast territory, it begins to think all outside the limits of its frontiers are subhuman types and not so advanced as they are.

One thing more. There has been some criticism about our offer for a cease-fire. We have said that before we discuss anything, the Chinese forces must go back and restore the position as it existed before the 8th September, that is, a little over two months ago, when they first came over the Thagla pass. They have suggested something different, and something that is apt to delude the people. They say, let us go back to the position of November, 1959. Now, the people who do not know this might well wonder, they are going back three years, not now. But November, 1959 was roughly the date or period when the first claim was made by the Chinese Government, by Mr. Chou En-lai, to these territories according to their maps. Previously, they were included in their maps, but nobody had made any official claim. In fact, officially they have said that their maps are old and not up-to-date, and they will revise them. But in 1959, for the first time, they claimed them, meanwhile, of course, they having gone into a good bit of Ladakh.

In 1959, our counter-measures started taking effect. In 1959-60 and 1961, we went into Ladakh much more and more and established many posts there. Now, we realised, as I think I told this

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

House then, that the object of these posts is to prevent their further advance unless they fight it out. It was difficult for us to have a major armed conflict with them there, because they had great advantages. Their roads came right up there. They could bring all kinds of weapons, tanks, etc., there from Tibet which is near, which is relatively a flat country, while for us, although we made some progress and the road is recently made—at that time even that was not made—it is very difficult; it meant months of effort to get there. Nevertheless, we put up those posts to check their advance and they did check their advance. In fact, we pushed them back a little. In the NEFA area, we had previously put up our posts at the border or just under it, because one cannot have a highridge post. Even in Thagla pass, our post was two or three miles on this side, but not on the pass itself.

Now, if we accept their proposals, which seems so innocuous; they would retire, they said, up to the McMahon line, but then they add that their idea of McMahon line was different from ours: and it is on this side of the ridge, and we should have to retire from where we are today—another 20 kilometres, that is, leaving about 40 kilometres of territory which was not occupied either by their armies or ours. That is to say, they would have a fixed base on this side of the Thagla pass, an open territory which they can walk across any moment they like. It was impossible for us to agree to. And in Ladakh, if meant our withdrawing still further from where we are, and their not exactly marching immediately, but our facilitating their advance in the future if they want to come. So, we rejected those proposals.

We said there should be a reversion to the 8th September line both in NEFA and in Ladakh. That meant in NEFA not only their going

back but our going forward to those posts that we held, with no vacant space left, and in Ladakh our going back a good way.

Some people say, "How can you say that? You must not negotiate. You must not have any talk with them till you completely push them out from the Indian territory." That is a very good thing. But one does not talk with anybody whom one has defeated completely and pushed out. The question of talks does not arise. If we have gained our objective without talks, the question of talks does not arise. I would suggest to the House to remember that in these matters, one has to take a strong view, but a realistic view. The suggestion that we have made, they have rejected, because it strengthens us and weakens them. What is more, the suggestion we have made about the 8th September line is one which has been appreciated in a great part of the world—non-aligned countries and others—because merely saying that we shall not talk to you till you have confessed defeat is not the kind of suggestion that any country makes to another. So, I hope that the House will realise that what we have suggested is a right suggestion and will support it fully.

Some Members talked about our stating that we are going to liberate Tibet.

श्री बागड़ी (हिसार) : मनसर गांव
हिन्दुस्तान में है, वहां की आबादी हिन्दुस्तान
है।

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Some others even mentioned—I think the hon. Member who just intervened said something about Mansarovar.

Shri Baghunath Singh (Varanasi):
Mansar village. (Interruptions).

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Unfortunately, history is not made by men like the hon. Member opposite. It is

really amazing to see that some other Members and others outside talk that we should lay down that we would liberate Tibet. It is a very happy idea if it is liberated. But our undertaking that job at the present moment or at any moment seems to me extraordinary and fantastic and having no relation to reality.

I have said that in a war between India and China, it is patent that if you think in terms of victory and defeat—there might be battles and we might push them back, as we hope to—but if either country thinks in terms of bringing the other to its knees, it manifestly cannot and will not happen. Let us be realistic. Are we going to march to Peking? (*Interruptions.*)

Shri Priya Gupta (Katiyar): Are we going to allow them to march to Delhi?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am sorry I cannot enter into an argument. But I appreciate that a war like this cannot be ended as far as I can foresee by surrender by either party. They are two great countries and neither will surrender. Therefore, some way out has to be found to finish the war in terms honourable to us. We have said that we will finish the war when we liberate our own territory which is in their possession. Our saying that we are going to liberate Tibet is a thing which we cannot do; even if we had the atom bomb, we could not do it. It is manifestly absurd to talk about it, and it justifies everything that China has said about it, in the sense . . . (*Interruptions.*)

They have always been saying that their chief grouse against us is that we have been encouraging a revolt and rebellion in Tibet. That is the thing which ultimately turned them against us. If we say that, it will justify their argument, which had no foundation, and give them in international circles and everywhere considerable strength. It will mean our saying something which we cannot

possibly, feasibly do. It is impossible. We have got a big enough task, a tremendous task, which we should realise, to push them back to their own territory from our own country. We are going to do it. It is going to be mighty difficult; it might take us a long time. So, I hope that while we should be strong and determined, as we must be, we must not just for the sake of appearing braver than others say things which are, I regret to use the word, manifestly nonsense.

Now, the resolution I have placed before the House is a fairly comprehensive one. It is a resolution of resolve, of determination and of dedication. I hope, therefore, that in accepting the resolution, as I hope this House will, the House thinks in terms of dedication, not in bombast, not in tall talk, but realising that we have a very difficult task before us we are determined to fulfil it however long it may take and whatever the consequences might be. And, in doing so, we will be heartened by the biggest thing that a country can do and which India has done thus far, and that is, produce this enormous emotional upheaval that we see all over India among man, among women and, perhaps more than all, among children. So, I put forward this resolution before the House in the hope, faith and with the strong determination that all those who are present here and the country will abide by it and will act up to it.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: Mr. Speaker, may I by your leave, ask just one question? The Maharajakumar of Sikkim is reported to have said in Darjeeling two days ago that there has been a tremendous Chinese military build-up on Sikkim's borders during the last few days or weeks. Is the Prime Minister in a position to assure the House and the nation, in view of the agreement which India has with Sikkim for the responsibility of its defence, that our army is better prepared to resist the Chinese aggressor in Sikkim than it was, unfortunately, in NEFA a few weeks ago?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I regret, Sir, that such questions are put to me. I will give no assurance of any kind. How can I give assurances. I can give no assurance except that we are taking all measures that we can if such a thing occurs there. How can I give assurances about the future in matters which are determined not by my assurances but by other factors? But I do not think that the Chinese, if they venture to invade and come from Chumbi Valley, will be allowed to come or will find it an easy job.

One thing I have to mention—it is unconnected with this question. I have received today a letter signed by 35 Members of Parliament offering their services to serve anywhere. I am very grateful to those 35 Members and I welcome their offer. I do not quite know how we can immediately profit by it. But I am sure as our organisation progresses work would be found for more and more people in all grades and departments of life.

श्री रामसेनक यादव (दाराबंकी) :
अध्यक्ष महोदय, मैं एक प्रश्न पूछना चाहता हूँ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मेरे ख्याल से इस वक्त प्रश्न पूछने की जरूरत नहीं है।

श्री रामसेनक यादव : मेरा प्रश्न यह है कि और जो देश में जोश है उसको देखते हुए देश और हम सभी जानना चाहते हैं कि इस युद्ध का उद्देश्य क्या है यानी लड़ाई कहाँ रुकेगी और क्या यह आदेश दे दिए गए हैं...
(Interruption.). जहाँ तक चीन आगे बढ़ आया है अगर वह और आगे हमला न करे तो क्या हमारे सिपाही जहाँ हैं वहाँ रुके रहेंगे या आगे बढ़ कर अपना हिस्सा वापस लगे। मेरा सवाल यह है कि यह युद्ध कहाँ रुकेगा। (Interruption.)

अध्यक्ष महोदय : इतनी घबराहट माननीय सदस्य ने दिखाएँ। उनके प्रश्न को सुन

ही लिया जाता। इस प्रश्न का उत्तर तो कोई भी नहीं दे सकता।

I shall put the first Resolution regarding the Proclamation of Emergency to the vote of the House first.

The question is:

"This House approves the Proclamation of Emergency issued by the President on the 26th October, 1962, under clause (1) of article 352 of the Constitution."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. Speaker: The Resolution is unanimously adopted. Now, I shall take up the other Resolution.

Dr. L. M. Singhvi (Jodhpur): Sir, I do not wish to press my substitute motion (No. 1) because I feel that the need to strengthen the hands of the hon. Prime Minister at this juncture is imperative and uppermost. I, therefore, crave the leave of the House to withdraw the substitute motion.

Mr. Speaker: Has the hon. Member the leave of the House to withdraw his substitute motion?

The substitute motion was, by leave, withdrawn.

Some Hon. Members: All amendments are withdrawn.

Shri Surendramath Dwivedy: In order to record unanimous resolve of the House with the nation's desire to drive out the aggressor and because the hon. Prime Minister has promised to make an enquiry about the state of affairs about our unpreparedness, I do not propose to press my amendment, No. 2.

Mr. Speaker: Has the hon. Member the leave of the House to withdraw his amendment?

Amendment No. 2 was, by leave, withdrawn.