

its sitting held on the 23rd September, 1954."

OPINIONS ON INDIAN ARMS (AMENDMENT) BILL

Shri U. C. Patnaik (Ghumsur): I beg to lay on the Table a copy of Paper No. IV containing opinions on the Indian Arms (Amendment) Bill, 1954, which was circulated for the purpose of eliciting opinion thereon by the 31st August, 1954.

COMMITTEE ON SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

PRESENTATION OF SECOND REPORT

Shri Pataskar (Jalgaon): I beg to present the Second Report of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation.

ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

PRESENTATION OF REPORTS

Shri Pataskar (Jalgaon): I beg to present the following Reports of the Estimates Committee:

- (i) Tenth Report on the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
- (ii) Eleventh Report on the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

ELECTION TO COMMITTEES

(i) PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE

(ii) EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION

Mr. Speaker: I have to inform the House that up to the time fixed for receiving nominations for the election of one Member to each of the Committees, namely the Committee on Public Accounts and the Employees State Insurance Corporation, only one nomination was received in respect of each of these Bodies. As there is only one candidate for the vacancy

in each of these Bodies, I declare **Shri R. Venkataraman** to be duly elected to the Committee on Public Accounts and **Shri Kamakhya Prasad Tripathi** to the Employees State Insurance Corporation.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

Mr. Speaker: The Committee on Absence of Members in its Fifth Report has recommended that leave of absence be granted to **Shri B. Shiva Rao**, **Shri S. C. Balakrishnan**, **Dr. N. M. Jaisooriya**, **Dr. Susilranjan Chatterjee**, **Shri V. Boovaraghasamy**, and **Shri Biren Dutt**, for the periods indicated in the Report.

Do I take it that the House is pleased to grant them leave?

Several Hon. Members: Yes.

Leave was granted.

Mr. Speaker: The Members concerned will be informed accordingly.

MOTION RE: INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs and Defence (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): I beg to move:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

I confess that while I am supposed to deal with this vast international scene, my mind at the present moment is gravely perturbed by the grievous news, to which you were pleased to make a reference sometime ago, about the railway disaster in Hyderabad.

[**MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER** in the Chair.]

That disaster, a domestic tragedy which we have to face, led me to think of the much vaster disasters that might engulf this world if by some misfortune we were led into the ways of war. Of course, there was no comparison between this disaster,

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big as it is, and the other terrible happenings that might take place all over the world if, unfortunately, the world was foolish enough to enter into war.

Now, it has become a custom for this House during every session to have a debate on foreign affairs. If I may venture to say so, it is a good custom and convention that we have developed, because, for the moment, it makes us think of the larger issues that confront the world and see our own problems in proper perspective. Naturally, we are most concerned with our own national problems. They affect us; we are thinking in terms of building up our country and most of our time is spent in considering them. That is as it should be. But even in order to gain a proper understanding of those problems of ours in the national sphere, we have to see them in this world context, in this context rather of a changing, disturbed, perplexed and, sometimes, tormented world. So I welcome these debates every session during this House. It so happens, however, that these debates often become rather a repetition of what was being said. Although facts, new facts, occur and the world changes and new situations arise, often the debate follows a set pattern.

Some hon. Members on the other side will, no doubt, repeat this time, as they have done before, why is India in the Commonwealth? There are some set phrases, set grooves of thought, set ideas which are not affected, whatever happens in the world. Well, I find it very difficult to deal with those closed minds which have learnt to repeat phrases without understanding them even. So, no doubt, that would be said with great force on the other side. Nothing will be said or considered as to what our being in the Commonwealth means, whether it has helped us in our larger policy of peace in the world or not, whether whatever broad policies we have pursued or we want other countries to pursue are helped by a certain

action of ours, a certain step we take or not. Because, after all, we may talk about individual policies, we may talk about even important subjects like Goa or the French Settlements in India. They are important for us, of course. Nevertheless, even those subjects have to be seen in the particular context of the world and of the policies we pursue in the world. If we lose sight of these broad policies, then we may be right, we may be wrong in the particular action we may take in a special matter. But it will be inter-related to the larger issues. The point I wish this House to consider is this, that today there is a great deal of inter-relation in all these matters which affect the world. We do not interfere or wish to interfere with what happens in Europe. And yet, one of the major issues before the world today is what happens to Germany and to German rearmament, one of the biggest issues which will affect the future of the world, not only of Europe but of Asia, of the world. We do not interfere with that, but we have to understand it. We have to have some views about it and we have to see things in the proper context, in the context of other things. Naturally, therefore, we have to consider this entire picture, although our sphere of action is limited, limited to some extent by geography, to some extent by our resources and by our capacity, because we do not wish to talk in a big way when we know we cannot act in a big way. Therefore, we try to keep our talk in line with our capacity for action. We talk, I hope, in a modest way, because the problems are big and it does not seem seemly to me to talk otherwise, though, certainly I would, with all respect, suggest to other countries too, but so far as we are concerned, certainly I hope we consider these difficult and intricate problems in all modesty and all diffidence. They are intricate, and nothing is easier and nothing is more wrong than to oversimplify them and to describe the problems in the world by a slogan or a phrase. They are difficult problems

for every country, whatever they may be.

A short while ago, a development took place, a big development took place, in the European scene when the Government of France refused to agree to certain terms of the European Defence Community. They refused to join it as they had been asked to. I am not going to consider that question; I do not consider myself entitled to go into that matter or express any opinion. That is for the Government of France and other Governments concerned to do. But what I wish to point out is this: that looking at the reality of the picture, the Government of France and the people of France had to face a terrible dilemma. What was the dilemma? Right or wrong, they are afraid. They are a brave people, a highly developed people, but certain fears surround them, fear, let us say, of this great colossus, the Soviet Union—whether it is justified or not is another matter. Another fear is of German rearmament. They have had experience of the armed might of Germany.

Now, what are we to do? (*Inter-ruption*). I am merely pointing out, not the rights and wrongs of these questions, but how we are apt to simplify a problem and express our opinion as to what this country should do and that country should do, not realising the intricacy, the complexity of that problem as it faced that country, that Government or those people. So I endeavour to approach these problems with a certain humility and modesty and not be over-eager to express my view or my Government's view about matters which are of no direct concern to us; indirectly, of course, they all concern us.

Recently, certain major developments have taken place, more especially in Asia. The House knows, of course, about the Geneva Conference resulting in certain agreements in regard to Indo-China.

The first thing to remember about the Geneva Conference is this, that it was a conference to deal with Asian

affairs, Indo-China, Korea. In that conference, apart from the belligerents or parties directly concerned, no Asian country was present at the conference table, in regard to Indo-China. I am not complaining of that. I am merely pointing out the odd way in which things continue to be done. That is the conception that affairs of Asia are predominantly to be decided by other great countries whom we respect and honour. But, nevertheless, the fact is, this conception that the affairs of Asia could be decided or may be decided by other countries without much reference to Asia.

Now, you will see the reality of the picture. Because an artificial attempt was made or rather an attempt was made to deal with this question forgetting the reality of Asia and the countries of Asia, the reality crept into the picture. Although Asia was not present, although Asian countries, apart from the belligerents, were not present at Geneva, Asian opinion was always there for them to consider, Asian opinion, as represented by certain decisions or recommendations of the Colombo Conference, which, if I may remind this House, were largely based upon what was stated, what was suggested in this House early this year in regard to Indo-China. So, even in Geneva Asian opinion was there present—a shadow of it—and it had to be considered.

Now, Geneva ended with an agreement and the war that has been going on for 7½ years in Indo-China stopped. As we have often said, for the first time in many many years there was no national war in the world. A new atmosphere of concord, of relative peace was established in Indo-China. In Asia, tensions relaxed. Nobody was foolish enough to think that problems have been solved. Of course, no problem had been solved either in Indo-China, much less in Korea or elsewhere, but certain steps had been taken towards the solution of the problems, or, if you like, towards creating an atmosphere which would help in the solution of those problems. That was something and the whole

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world, I believe, every country in the world heaved a deep sigh of relief that at last we were going at least towards some kind of peace.

Recently, another conference was held in Manila in the Philippines. We had been invited to that conference also but we expressed our inability to attend or participate in any way. Now, why was that so, because normally it is our desire to participate in conferences of our neighbour countries or in other countries and to understand other people's viewpoints and to put forward our own? Why did we not participate in the Manila Conference? Apart from every other reason, big or small—I should, probably, refer to some of them soon—it is obvious that our participation in the Manila Conference would have meant our giving up our basic policy of non-alignment. That is patent. Surely, we are not going to give up that basic policy, which we have followed for so many years, merely to participate in that conference.

Secondly, our going there would obviously have affected our position in Indo-China, as Chairman of the three Commissions there. We had gone there and we had been chosen by all parties for those responsible posts because we were thought to follow a certain policy. Now, if we change that policy and go behind that, our whole position in Indo-China would have changed. That would have been a very improper thing to do. That relates only to India joining this conference or not.

[I have often wondered what was the special urge, the special drive towards having this Manila Conference and this South East Asia Treaty that emerged from it? What was the sudden fear that brought the countries together—there were some countries together. Was any aggression going to take place? Was the peace of South East Asia or the Pacific threatened suddenly? Why was that particular time chosen, just after the Geneva

Treaty? I have been unable to find the answer. Now, I understand that there are fears—I refer to the French fears on two sides—and their trying to balance which is the greater fear and how to deal with the situation. I can understand there are fears in Asian countries, in Australia, in New Zealand—may be in other countries roundabout—there are those fears. I do not deny them. It is no good denying the fact. But, how do we meet these fears, how do we get rid and how do we counteract them all or deal with the situation, so as to create more security?

Now, I put it to the House, has this Manila Treaty relaxed tensions in South-East Asia or increased them?

Several Hon. Members: No, no.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Has it taken South-East Asia or any other part of the world more towards peace and security or has it not? I confess, I neither see any lessening of tension nor any advance towards peace. In fact, the reverse. The good atmosphere that was created by the Geneva agreements has, to some extent, been vitiated. Now, that is not a good thing. Has the Manila Treaty created any bulwark for peace and security? The Treaty, itself, as a matter of fact, does not go very far. Those who were of a certain notion, I presume previously, have expressed their opinion, if you like, in a more corporate way. It does not add to the strength of those countries, even increase the strength for their strength as such was there; it may develop a little more. So, positively, it has little contribution to make. Negatively, it has definitely added to the tensions and fears of the situation.

I do not suggest and it would be unrealistic for me to suggest that any country in South-East Asia or India should just live in a sense of, shall I say, false security. Nothing is going to happen and let us sing the song of peace and nothing will happen. I realise that responsible governments

and countries cannot merely behave in that manner. They have to take precautions for any eventuality, but, they should also, I suggest, fashion their policy so as to go in a certain direction and, if that is peace, in the direction of peace.

Now, another aspect of this SEATO or SEADO—Whatever it is called—is a curious thing. I can understand a number of countries coming together for their own defence and coming to some agreement and making an alliance. Now, this particular SEATO treaty, although the alliance or the agreement that emerges is not very strong so far as the military aspect is concerned, goes somewhat beyond those very countries. There is constant reference in that agreement or treaty to an area, an area not of the countries concerned, but of course, to an area beyond those countries which are parties to that treaty; an area which those countries themselves can designate: "this is also in our area". That, I submit, is a dangerous extension of this idea. I am not for the moment challenging or criticising the motives of those countries which were parties to this Manila Treaty. I do not know what their motives were and I presume their motives were to get a measure of security and I do not challenge that; but, I do submit that they have set about it in the wrong way. Now, they have mentioned this 'area', an area which is partly determinate and partly indeterminate; because the countries concerned can expand that area, if they so agree unanimously saying "this is also in our area", and if anything happens in that area—that is, even outside those particular countries or the treaty powers are concerned—they can take such steps as they feel like taking.

Our hon. Members may remember the old days—they appear to be old days—when Great Powers had spheres of influence in Asia and elsewhere—of course, the countries of Asia were too weak to do anything. The quarrel was between the Big Powers and they, therefore, sometimes, came to an agreement about

dividing the countries in spheres of influence. It seems to me, this particular Manila Treaty is looking dangerously in this direction of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries; because, ultimately, it is the big and powerful countries that will decide and not the two or three weak and small Asian countries that may be allied to them.

Another fact I should like to mention is this: in this Treaty there is reference, of course, to aggression. One can understand that external aggression, but there is reference also to a fact or situation created within this area which might entitle them to intervene. Now, observe the words 'a fact or situation created in that area'. It is not external invasion. That is to say, some internal development in that area might entitle these countries to intervene. Does this not affect the whole conception of integrity, sovereignty and independence of the countries of this area? This SEATO Treaty, if you read it, a great part of it reads well. There are phrases about United Nations Charter, about their desire for peace, about their desire even to encourage self-government in colonial territories provided they are ready and competent to shoulder this heavy burden: all this is said and it reads well. But, I do feel—I have read it carefully—that the whole approach of this Manila Treaty is not only a wrong approach but a dangerous one from the point of view of any Asian country. I repeat that I realise the motives may be quite good. I repeat that countries in Asia as well as outside have certain fears and those fears may have justification. But, I say, the method of approach of this Treaty is a wrong approach and it is an approach which may antagonize a great part of Asia. Are you going to have peace in this way and security by creating more conflicts, more antagonisms and making people think that instead of bringing security you bring insecurity into that region?

Again, we have ventured to talk about an area of peace and we have

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thought that, perhaps, one of the major areas of peace might be South-East Asia. Now, the Manila Treaty rather comes in the way of that area of peace. It takes up that very area which might be an area of peace and almost converts it into an area of potential war. So, all these facts, I find disturbing.

Some years back there was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation created and when it first saw the light of day it was a defence organisation of certain countries associated in joint defence. I must say, at that time it seemed to me—well, I agree, not in any other matter—nothing but a justifiable reaction of certain countries who were afraid of certain developments to join together in defence. But, observe how this NATO developed. It developed geographically supposed to be the North Atlantic community, but it spread to the Mediterranean, to the coasts of Africa, Eastern Africa and to distant countries which have nothing to do with the Atlantic community. Internally too it began to extend itself. The various resolutions of the NATO powers, meeting from time to time, gradually extended its scope. When the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was first envisaged it was for defence, but gradually we find that it is supposed to cover the colonial possessions and all those powers also. How the maintenance and the continuation of the authority of those colonial powers over their dependent countries is a matter of defence of the North Atlantic community, is not quite clear to me. However, that idea extends itself and becomes a North Atlantic Treaty giving a protecting cover to the colonial domains of the powers concerned.

Recently, I hope this House will remember, a reference has been made by the Portuguese authorities that the North Atlantic Treaty covers Goa too in its wide scope. Now, we are not concerned and we are not bound down by any treaties to which we are not parties. We have stated that and

I am not quite sure if the North Atlantic Powers, or most of them, are quite happy about this assertion by the Portuguese Government that Goa is also their concern. What I wish to point out is this: how these treaties meant for a particular purpose might be understood gradually to extend their scope and nature and ultimately become something much bigger and wider than what people imagined them to be. Now, if the North Atlantic Treaty has managed to extend its scope to Goa, I wonder whether the South-East Asia Treaty will extend too. It starts at our doorstep; where will it go to?

These treaties, especially the South East Asia Treaty, take the shape of certain colonial Powers, of certain Powers not colonial in themselves but interested in colonialism and certain associated countries trying to decide or control the fate of this great area of South-East Asia. I think the world is too small now for any few countries, including the Asian countries to say that nobody else will interfere with us and that this area is our sole concern. I am perfectly prepared to admit that what happens in South-East Asia is also the concern of the rest of the world—not only of South-East Asia. But the rest of the world may be Europe or America or anybody and we have all to consult together; we cannot live in isolation. But I do submit that when decisions are made of vital significance excluding the views of the vital part of that very area, then there is something wrong in that procedure. I have said this about this South-East Asia Treaty Organisation because we have felt strongly about this. We have felt not that by itself this Treaty carries events far but the direction it takes is a dangerous direction; it is a direction which may not be obvious at the present moment to everybody but I have no doubt that, unless something is done to it, it will become more and more harmful to the interests of peace in South-East Asia and the world at large.

Now, I have said that there are dangers. People say: eminent statesmen have said in defence of this Treaty how can we trust the communist countries? How can we trust China or Russia? Others have said: how can we trust the other countries? Well, I suppose in the final analysis, no country can trust another country; or, if I may put it differently, no country should rely 100 per cent. on trust alone. It has to think of possible developments, changes in views and policies, etc. Governments change in democratic countries; in other countries too other forces may come up. Therefore, it is not a question of my trusting any of these big or small countries; but it is a question of our following a policy which is not only right in itself but which makes it more and more difficult progressively for the other country to break trust. We need not live in a fairy world where nothing wrong happens. Wrong does happen. But we can create an environment wherein it becomes a little more dangerous to the other party to break away from the pledges given. Surely, that is not only good morality but good commonsense.

I submit that all these statesmen, by all these SEATO and other treaties, create an atmosphere, the reverse kind of atmosphere. It is not a question of trust but creating an atmosphere so that the countries and the parties concerned have to keep in step and if they go out of step they suffer for it. According to the SEATO, you threaten them that if you do this and that, we shall take strong action. Now, this business of carrying on diplomacy by threats has not proved very successful in the past and it is not likely to prove successful in the future because you are immediately brought up to this. If something happens either you live up to your threat with whatever the result is—war, etc.—or you simply pipe down and do nothing which is bad after talking too loudly. So, this whole approach of threats does not help; it hinders; it creates a wrong atmosphere: it creates actually an atmosphere when the

other party need not live up to certain pledges given because you have broken them. Therefore, all this business—whether it is on the side of China or North Korea or North Vietnam, whatever it may be—has a certain result of putting fear in the other party and therefore, producing reactions of that type. And so also these alliances in this side.

The House will see how many countries in the world are getting more and more entangled in these alliances. There are a series of alliances of the Soviet Union, the People's Government of China, North Korea and some other countries. On the other side, if I may mention some, there is of course the North Atlantic Treaty, then the ANZUS—Australia, New Zealand and the United States; and there is the United States Treaty with South Korea, with Formosa—they are secret treaties presumably—and then there is this South East Asia Treaty—all these curious circles of alliances overlapping with some common factors. There is—it is not an alliance exactly—but there is the military friendship between the United States and Pakistan. Some of them are supposed to have common reservoirs and common pools. It is presumed that great countries involved in these alliances are cautious, wise and restrained and that they will not act in a hurry. But some of those with whom they are associated are neither cautious nor wise and they are all the time—as we know in the Far East—threatening—to War and all that. Now, as it is, one of these uncautious and unwise participants of these groups of alliances takes a rash step—it is quite conceivable in the world—and suppose one step leads to another and a big country which is roped in, though not liking that step, will be dragged in with the result that something happens. So all the circles of alliances are built one way or the other and because one big country is being dragged in, another big country is being dragged in. The whole approach that has been carried on for

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the last few years has been fundamentally—if I may say so with exceeding respect to those countries—not a system which produces peace or security. I do not mean to suggest that countries should just live within themselves in the hope that nothing will happen; I do not say that. Let all countries—if they want to—be as strong as they like; let them even have understandings—even some alliances. But this whole system as it is going is trying to envelope every part of the world.

1 P.M.

Remember we have still got—I do not know what the developments might be—MEDO somewhere in the background. We may have sometime or the other some Far Eastern States Association. The whole conception is one which is no doubt meant to frighten the opposite party just as the conception on the side of the opposite party and the alliances are meant—may be—to frighten the other party. But, in effect, all this is producing such a tremendous entanglement that all clear thinking and clear action become more and more terrible. As I said, the evil deed of one country may drag in other countries. So, gradually, we are getting into a stranger realm, which reminds me of my early reading of *Alice in Wonderland* or even more so *Alice*, through the looking glass, getting all things upside down. We talk of peace and always prepare for war; we talk of security and take steps which inevitably bring insecurity; we talk of freedom and liberation and we come in the way of freedom and liberation of colonial territories. So, this trend seems to me to be unhappy. Again, I repeat that we must recognise the need to do something, not merely to wait till we are all swallowed by evil forces or other developments which we do not like. What can we do about it? I submit that we can do something about it and the way is to deal not amongst yourselves, because you are together, but to deal with the opposite parties. There are two

parties, and if both the parties face each other today, keep apart and merely threaten each other and combine with their own groups against the other, then obviously it is no way. It is only when the two deal with each other, as they did to a certain extent in Geneva, that you settle the problem. I do not say that settles the problem finally, but there is no other way, because remember the basic thing today, that we have always to keep in mind is that in the opinion of every intelligent person in any part of the world, war has been ruled out as a method to attain a certain objective. War is no good today. War is too dangerous, because the first thing it does is to put an end to your objective itself and put an end to you. If you rule out war as a method of solving problems, you must have some other way of solving them. It is no good taking steps which lead to war. Therefore, the only other step—I do not say it will solve the problem that way—is the way of peaceful negotiation and approach. It may take time, but it is better than war or even cold war. In Geneva, this was tried and it has led to certain satisfactory results. It did not go too far, nevertheless there are results. If these methods are adopted to the solution of the problems that face us in the world, you create a certain atmosphere, a better one, and you tie down the countries which may want to do mischief. They may still make mischief. If you think that communist countries are up to mischief, what is the best way of dealing with them? It is not by threatening them “unless you are prepared to go this way”. The best way is ultimately to talk to them, to talk to any opponent of yours, and if it is in the interests of both parties, some agreement will be arrived at. The House knows about the five principles which were included in the joint statement that we issued here when Prime Minister Chou En-lai came here. I do not think anyone present can possibly take exception to these five principles or any of them. What were they? They

were recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty and independence, non-aggression, non-interference, mutual respect, etc. Can anyone take exception to that? And yet people have taken exception to it. On what grounds? Oh! they say "How can you believe that this will be acted upon?" Of course, if you cannot believe in anything, there is no fun in talking or writing and the only thing left is to live in isolation or to fight and subdue the other party—there is no other way. It is not a question of believing the other party's word; it is a question of creating conditions where the other party cannot break its word, or if I may say so, where it finds it difficult to break its word. Maybe the other party breaks its word and it is likely to find itself in a much worse quandary. Those conditions are created by the joint statement that was made both in India and in Rangoon and if those five principles are repeated by the various countries of the world in their relations to each other, they do create an atmosphere. That does not mean that all the forces of aggression and interference and mischief in various countries have been ended. Of course not; they are there, but it does mean that you make it slightly more difficult for them to function and you encourage the other forces, and that is the way for human relationship whether of the individual or of the bigger groups.

I submit that here is a question of South-East Asia. Obviously, the countries round about, especially like China, are very much concerned. Obviously, the way to have security there is to deal with China and the various other countries there and not sit down there, get angry about something that might happen and then take action afterwards.

Take another thing. One of the basic things that emerged out of the Geneva settlement was that Laos and Cambodia were to be, what is now called, the South-East Asia pattern of countries—this phrase is gradually coming in—in other words, should be countries not aligned to any group, or

to use a word which I do not like, 'neutral' countries. That was the basis of the agreement of Geneva, because on the one hand, the other Governments concerned, whether it was the French or whatever Governments on this side, were very much concerned at the prospect of Laos and Cambodia being absorbed or interfered with in any way by China and on the other hand, China was very much concerned that Laos and Cambodia should not be made bases of action against China, whether it is atom bombing or any other bombing. What was the possible way out? Obviously, the only way out was that Laos and Cambodia should not allow themselves to be used by either party against the other; that is, in a sense, neutral and that was the basis of the Geneva agreement. There was something added to it which was objected to, but basically, the agreement was that Laos and Cambodia must be considered as neutral States, and neither party should use them against the other, I am not quite sure in my mind that this SEATO agreement does not to some extent, go against that basic approach of the Geneva conference, because they have brought Laos and Cambodia in that area, to which I referred. There are these difficulties that have arisen, and I wanted to put them to the House because I feel that in spite of the advance made in Indo-China peace, we live in very dangerous times. On the east coast of China, recently there has been fighting on a fairly big scale in the Island of Quemoy and actually the mainland of China has been shelled and bombarded. But nobody knows when a petty incident might not grow into a big thing. It is an odd thing to think of. The island of Quemoy is, I believe, only a few miles from the mainland. Quemoy is supposed to be essential, presumably, to the security of Formosa and the security of other countries. Presumably it has something to do with the security of China itself—it is right there at its doorstep. So, this kind of thing is going on. That is why I say that any action of the Government of Formosa or the

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Government of South Korea might result in dragging in these Big Powers and these big circles of alliances may be all dragged in and war would result.

Now we may not be in the war. We have no intention to be pushed into any war and the only fighting we propose to do is if anybody threatens India. But let us be clear about it that if war occurs, it would be a terrible disaster for the whole world, including us, because the whole conception of war has changed.

Now the United Nations are meeting in New York. And the United Nations have, normally, a very big agenda; because nothing is ever taken out of its agenda, the agenda grows. But oddly enough the agenda seldom contains the major issues that concern the world. Whatever it may be, whether it is the Far East of Asia or Germany, these are not there. Naturally they govern people's minds there; they affect their decisions.

In regard to the United Nations, this House knows that we have stood for the People's Government of China being represented there. Recently the United Nations have passed a resolution that this matter will not be considered for a year or so. I have long been convinced of the fact that a great part of our present-day difficulties,—certainly in the Far East, but I would like to go farther and say in the world—is due to this extraordinary shutting of one's eyes to the fact of China. Here is a great country and it is totally immaterial whether you like it or dislike it. Here is a great country and the United Nations, or some countries of the United Nations, refuse to recognise that it is there. The result is that all kinds of conflicts arise. I am convinced in my mind that there would have been no Korean War if the People's Government of China had been in the United Nations—it is only guess-work—because people could have dealt with China across the table. It

adds to the complexities and difficulties of the world problems.

Remember this: that it is not a question of the admission of China to the United Nations. China is one of the founder-members of the United Nations. It is merely a question of who represents China. This fact is not adequately realised. It is not a question really of the Security Council, or anybody else deciding, as they have to decide, of new countries coming in. China is not a new country. It is a founder-member of the United Nations. It is really a question, if you like, of credentials,—who represents China, a straight forward question. And it surprises me and amazes me, how this straight forward question has been twisted round about and made the cause of infinite troubles. There would be no settlement in the Far East, or South-East Asia till this major fact of the People's Government of China is recognised. I say one of the biggest factors towards ensuring security in South-East Asia and in the Far East is the recognition of China by those countries and China coming into the United Nations. There would be far greater assurance of security that way than through your South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, or the rest.

If China comes in, apart from the fact that you deal with China face to face at the United Nations and elsewhere, China assumes certain responsibilities in the United Nations. To-day it is a very odd position. Sometimes the United Nations passes resolutions directing the People's Government of China to do this or that. The response from China is: "Well, you do not recognise us; we are not there; we are not a part of it; how can we recognise your directions?" which is an understandable response. Instead of adding to the responsibility and laying down ways of co-operation, you shut the door of co-operation and add to the irresponsible behaviour of nations in this way, and call it secu-

city. There is something fundamentally wrong about it. The result inevitably is that the influence of the United Nations lessens as it must. I do not want it to lessen, because, whatever it may be, it is one of our biggest hopes of peace in the world.

May I refer to one other matter? Among the causes of fear among the Asian countries or countries of South-East Asia, of this great country China, has been large Chinese populations in these countries. In some countries like Malaya, a very difficult problem arises. Now, all of us here, are I believe, in favour of Malayan independence. True, but remember this that the problem in Malaya is not an easy one. It is difficult, because oddly enough, in Malaya the people of Malaya are in a minority. That raises difficulties and confusion. Nobody is in a majority singly considered; the Chinese are in great numbers; the Indians may be 10 per cent. or 15 per cent. whatever it is. Now the indigenous people of Malaya are not at all keen on something happening which might give power to non-Malayans there. I am merely pointing out the difficulties which we have to understand. It is no good our thinking in terms of pure logic without facts. What I am saying is this. Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, Thailand, have large Chinese communities which rather frighten them. In the old days and up till now the Government of China did not recognise the right of any Chinese person to divest himself of Chinese nationality and a very peculiar situation was created. Sometimes there was some kind of dual nationality. That also was a factor in making the position of the Chinese communities in all these South Asian countries very embarrassing to that country. They did not know, just as a vast number of foreigners would, and when the foreigners of a country are almost fifty per cent. it creates difficulties.

An interesting development is taking place, and reference has been made to it recently both by the Prime Minister of China, Mr. Chou En-lai

and the Chairman of the Republic, Chairman Mao Tse Tung. The development is they say that they are going to consider Chinese communities living outside, well, not in the old way, but they will have to choose, those communities will have to choose either becoming nationals of the country they are living in, and if they do so then they are cut off completely from China, they have nothing to do with it, or retaining Chinese nationality and in that even they must not interfere in the internal affairs of the other country. That, I think, is a helpful move which will remove some of the difficulties and apprehensions in these South East Asia countries.

Let us take another matter. Let us be frank about it. Most of these countries are afraid, not of what Governments do officially, but what they might do *sub rosa* through the activities of the Communist Party in those countries. And the fact of the matter is one of the serious difficulties that have arisen in international affairs is that previously one country was against another; you knew where you were; there might be some people in your country, a handful who might sympathise with the other; two nations came into conflict. Now we have this new development that in national groups there are, what I might call if you like, international groups who oppose the national group and who psychologically, emotionally, intellectually if you like, are tied up with another nation's national group. That creates difficulties. In fact that is one of the essential difficulties of the situation. I am not discussing Communism, its theory and practice. I am merely pointing out the essential difficulty of the situation of all these countries. And if there was such a thing as the Communist Party in a country, that is a national Communist Party, that is a party which had nothing to do with another country, that is a different matter. It has got a certain policy, economic, political, whatever it is. It is one of various parties. The difficulty comes in because that party in your country is,

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as I said, intellectually, mentally and otherwise tied up with other groups in other countries. And the other country might well utilise that for its own advantage. That is the fear that comes to all these South-East Asia countries, whether it is Burma or Thailand or any other country; with the result, unfortunately, that problems, economic and other problems which could be considered by themselves get tied up with these extraneous issues, and different types of reactions are created. Therefore, I think that just as in the old days there was the Comintern, that international Communist organisation which was wound up some time during the last war, then later the Cominform which was, I suppose, something of the old type in different garb, I think that these organisations and the activities that flow from that idea have caused a good deal of apprehension and disturbance in various countries and nations. And now, as a reaction to this we have other forms of international interferences in national affairs growing up in various countries, not in that ideological way, but in a practical, governmental, *sub rosa* way. It is extraordinary how this kind of thing is growing in most countries, not on one side but in every side.

So we have, if you want peace in the world to come to grips with this problem, not by threats, not by having these treaties of military alliance and the like, but by coming to grips and coming face to face. Because if once you recognise, as I believe it is recognised the world over, what I said, that war is no solution of this—the two major protagonists are too powerful to be dismissed one by the other—if you have no war, then you have to co-exist, you have to understand, you have to restrain and you have to deal with each other. And the question of co-existence comes in. If you reject co-existence the alternative is war and mutual destruction.

Now I shall refer briefly—very briefly because I have taken up a lot

of the time of the House—to certain other problems, notably Ceylon, Pondicherry and Goa.

Babu Ramnarayan Singh (Hazari-bagh West): And Pakistan.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: And Pakistan? I have nothing to say about Pakistan except to say that I wish it well.

About Ceylon, hon. Members will be aware that in the course of another ten days or so the Prime Minister of Ceylon accompanied by some other Ministers is coming here to Delhi. The suggestion came from the Prime Minister of Ceylon that he wished to have talks with us, and naturally we said: you are welcome to come, we shall have these talks with you. I would not like to say much on this subject, except that I confess that I have been much distressed at developments in Ceylon and at the way the hopes that had been raised, of some satisfactory solution being found, well, have not been realised. And the question of a large number of persons who for all practical purposes are becoming Stateless, continues unsolved.

About the French Settlements, for the last two weeks or so, representatives of the French Government and representatives of the Government of India have been having consultations, discussions, and have made much progress in these consultations. They have been discussing all kinds of details too, apart from major issues. I hope that in the course of some days, or may be a week or two, these will be finalised and I hope that before the end of another month or so, we shall be able to take some formal steps. I should have liked to take the House into confidence more. But, it is a little difficult when we are discussing these matters with each other, to go into these details. But, I am happy that this difficult and intricate matter is being settled. Because however small in size Pondicherry and the rest of the places may be, big

nations, proud nations are involved. There is the pride and interest of India involved in not having any foreign territories in India. There is the pride of France involved, not to do anything which makes that pride suffer. We do not want that to suffer. France is a great nation. Whatever we want to do, we want to do in friendship and co-operation with France, so that whatever action we decide upon should, instead of straining our relations, make them better. We have chosen this way and I am very happy that this way is likely to yield substantial results.

We tried to choose this way in regard to the Portuguese possessions also. But, unfortunately, it has led to no result and what the Portuguese Government has done, in recent months especially, does not make the prospect hopeful so far as they are concerned. We are determined, however, to solve this problem by peaceful methods and we are convinced that we are going to solve this by peaceful methods.

Hon. Members have often expressed some, shall I say, dissatisfaction at our not encouraging Indian nationals who are not Goans, Indian non-Goan nationals, from entering these territories in large numbers. There is no, if I may say so, high principle involved in this that Indian nationals will not go there. The Indian nationals have every right to go there. It is not on high principle that we have done that, but for a variety of reasons. We did not think it desirable to encourage them, because, if we encouraged them, the aspect of Goans' struggle would be eclipsed, the aspect that it is essentially a struggle of Goans whether in Goa or outside, would be eclipsed. It would be said that non-Goan Indian nationals are doing it in spite of and against their wishes. We wish to make it clear to the world that it is Goans whether outside or inside Goa who want this association with India and to get out of Portuguese association. I think that gradually the world is beginning to realise that.

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In Goa itself, of course, it is a hundred per cent. police state. There is no question of meeting or anybody expressing any opinion. Papers cannot go, opinions cannot go from outside and the slightest expression of opinion in the mildest way against the Portuguese Government means long-term imprisonment, exile and all that, whatever your position. Even so, inside Goa, so far as we know, quite considerable numbers of persons have been arrested for some kind of *satyagraha* or otherwise. Outside Goa, in Bombay city, more especially, as the House must know, there is a large body of Goans, many of them occupying high positions in professions and in various occupations. It has been most encouraging how all these Goans, who are not, if I may remind the House, normally politically-minded, who are not politicians, who have not taken part in any agitation, professors, doctors and other people, on this occasion, in the last month or more, have come out—many of them may I also say, persons who have received honours from the Portuguese Government in the past—and stood for this freedom of Goa and its association with India. So that, we are moving forward; perhaps not as fast as Members would like, but certainly and surely in a particular direction. There are also, of course, certain economic steps that we have taken.

One thing I should like to say. On another occasion, I said something about some talks or negotiations which the old Hyderabad authorities had with the Portuguese. (*An hon. Member*: In the Council of States.) I am afraid that a few sentences I used there have neither been well reported in the Press, nor bring out correctly what the facts were. I should like to state more precisely what the exact facts were. I did not state them that there was any official negotiation between the Portuguese Government and the old Hyderabad Government. This was sometime before Independence, in 1945 or 1946. About that time, through other intermediaries there were talks about some

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kind of joint control of the port and other facilities in Goa: not of the transfer of Goa as such. My whole point in making this reference was that the Portuguese were willing at that stage to discuss various matters concerning the internal administration of the port and others even with the then State of Hyderabad in early 1946. I believe, at that time, the Government of India of the day, that is, before any of us were in the picture, were kept informed too by the Government of Hyderabad. It is nothing very secret and we have looked up our old files. Nothing much happened, it is true, because other developments took place in India and elsewhere. My whole point was that they were prepared to have some talks then. The line that they have taken up recently is practically that there were no talks of any kind about Goa.

The House will remember, there has been some correspondence. The Portuguese authorities asked for some international observers to go there. We agreed immediately. We said, let us talk as to what their functions should be and who they should be. In answer, they said, no. They wanted to lay down previously before they appointed. We have plenty of correspondence that has been published and the result is that that matter has ended. We are prepared. We said, come and talk to us. Observe, all that we have asked is, come and talk as to what the functions of the international observers should be and how they should be chosen. They refused to come even then. Because, the fact is, once they talk, they cannot very well adhere to the action they have taken, because it is absolutely unreasonable. Therefore, they refused. There is going to be, I take it, no observation of any kind. The deadlock continues. It does not exactly continue in that way because other things are happening which inevitably, will put an end to Portuguese administration in Goa.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion moved:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

I have received notice of a number of amendments. I would like hon. Members to indicate to me what amendments they would like to press. I will call them one after another.

Shri Jethalal Joshi (Madhya Saurashtra): I beg to move:

That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely:

"This House having considered the international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto endorses the foreign policy of the Government of India but, in view of the political developments in Pakistan and the Portuguese territory in India, is of the opinion that the Government should mobilise the country for unity and self-defence to meet any danger and thereby create an atmosphere of 'strength at home' along with 'prestige abroad'."

Shri Raghunath Singh (Banaras Distt.—Central): I beg to move:

That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely:

"This House having considered the international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto approves of all the steps taken by Government."

Shri N. M. Lingam (Coimbatore): I beg to move:

That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely:

"This House having considered the international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto is of the opinion that it is necessary to restate