President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1956, in respect of 'External Affairs'."

DEMAND No. 23—STATE OF PONDICHERRY

Mr. Speaker: Motion is:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,89,83,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1956, in respect of 'State of Pondicherry'."

DEMAND No. 24—MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE UNDER THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Speaker: Motion is:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,88,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1956, in respect of 'Miscellaneous Expenditure under the Ministry of External Affairs'."

DEMAND No. 113—CAPITAL OUTLAY OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Speaker: Motion is:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 22,92,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1956, in respect of 'Capital Outlay of the Ministry of External Affairs'."

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Perhaps, it might be helpful if I said something in broad outline about the situation confronting us today, although the subjects before us deal with the Demands for Grants and, no doubt, the various cut motions, or some of them at least, are important in their respective spheres. After all, the whole Ministry of External Affairs is broadly responsible for our international relations, and international relations today play perhaps a more important role in the world, even in affecting domestic policy, than almost anything else.

We live from day to day in fear of something happening which might confront us with a grave situation of war or peace. It is true that I do not think there is any immediate danger of war or danger of war in the near future; nevertheless, I am sorry to say that the situation generally in the world has hardened; it has become more difficult of solution, and things are happening which might well lead not merely to a worsening of the situation but to catastrophic results. Perhaps when the history of these times is written in the future, two things will stand out. One is the coming of atomic energy and the other is the emergence of Asia. There are, of course, many other important things happening too, but I do think that these two matters are, in a historic sense, of high importance, more important than anything else. As the sign and symbol of the latter, that is, the emergence of Asia, we are having, as the House well knows, a conference at Bandung in Indonesia in about two and a half weeks' time, a Conference which is styled the Asian-African Conference, to which all the free and independent nations of Asia and Africa have been invited. I do think that this Conference has something of historic importance about it. It is unique, of course; no such thing has ever happened before, and the fact that representatives, I believe, of 1400 million people meet there, even though they differ amongst themselves, is a matter of the utmost significance.

The House will remember that it had become a regular practice for the affairs of Asia to be determined by

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certain Great Powers in Europe or sometimes in America, and the fact that people in Asia might have any views about those subjects was not considered a matter of very great importance. It is true that some importance is attached to those views now, because they cannot be ignored; nevertheless, it seems to be the high privilege of countries outside Asia to carry the burden of Asia on their shoulders, and repeatedly things happen and decisions are made affecting Asia in which Asia has little say. But it is obvious that things have changed in Asia. Whether they have changed for the right or for the wrong may depend upon the opinions people hold; but they have changed, and changed greatly, and are changing, and this kind of other people deciding the fate of Asian countries is not approved of by the countries of Asia. I cannot presume to speak for other people, but I think I am correct in saying so. So this Asian-African Conference is a gathering, I think, of very great importance. The mere fact of its meeting is important. What it does, I cannot say, because countries coming there have different policies, different outlooks, sometimes opposing policies, and I do not know that it will be very easy for them to evolve any common outlooks or approaches. Yet, it is clear that there is something in common between them, even though they might otherwise differ; otherwise, they would not have agreed to gather together in this way.

So that is an important factor which, I hope, the House will remember, the Conference that is coming. The Conference, of course, is not opposed to anybody, opposed to Europe or America or taking sides as a Conference in the great conflict and tug-of-war that is going on in the world. It is merely a coming together of Asian and African countries. Now, what do the Asian and African countries exactly aim at? All of them? Well, they obviously aim at two things; peace and opportunity to progress. They are all anxious to do that. They are not interested in other people's quarrels or disputes. They want to get on. They want to make good themselves in their own countries just as we, in our country, want to make good. And, for that purpose, we want peace in the world. Therefore, there is this tremendous urge for peace which is present all over the world, I think in the countries of Asia and Africa more than perhaps even elsewhere, just as the urge to freedom too is present, I think, all over the world, but more so among those who were not free for long periods, who either recently achieved their freedom or have yet to achieve their freedom. Freedom for them is much more important than to those who have been used to freedom for a long time past. Therefore, there is this passionate desire for peace and opportunity for progress in these countries and that is a common bond.

As I said,—I hope, I cannot say definitely,—but I hope, the Conference will not line up with these Great Power blocs. It cannot, in the nature of things, because the countries, that are attending the Conference themselves hold different views on that matter. The House knows that it has become almost impossible to consider any matter logically and reasonably or by itself. Everything has to be considered, now, we are told, like this: whether it advances the communist cause or defeats it, whether it is communist or anti-communist. There is no way of dealing with the situation by some Powers and authorities unless you raise the conflict of communism or anti-communism. Now, this has made it difficult to understand any question, much less to solve it. The simple, rather naive view of the world is that you must belong to this bloc or that bloc. If you do not, well, you are either very foolish or you do not understand what is happening in the world or there is some mischief be-

hind your attitude. This kind of approach would have been difficult enough at any time, but, when we live as we do now on the verge, on the threshold, of this atomic age, it is a dangerously simple way of looking at things. And, we might, because of the simple thinking—I mean the world—suddenly find ourselves just on the brink of disaster.

We have endeavoured not to align ourselves with these Great Powers and I speak of them with all respect. I do not presume to tell them what is right or wrong, but, I must confess that I feel very diffident about expressing any opinion in regard to other countries—sometimes in regard to my own—I feel very diffident because the problems we have to face are very difficult. There are new problems being brought out and if people try to solve them by some slogan or precedent of their own times, then, I am afraid, it may be completely wrong. Therefore, I speak with every diffidence about these matters. It passes my comprehension how any of the problems of today are going to be solved by the approaches that are being made today by the Great Powers. I cannot understand this.

There was one approach some time ago, last lear, in Geneva, which was a logical approach. It was an approach directed towards the solution of the problem. It did lead at least to a temporary solution because those who met desired to reach a certain conclusion and because the problem was dealt with as such and not merely as the backwash of the great struggle between communist and anti-communist countries. Therefore it was solved. Having achieved a measure of success at Geneva the world has again drifted back to glaring at each other from a distance, countries glaring at each other from a distance and, it seems to me very extraordinary, laying great stress on all types of military alliances and pacts, in South East Asia, in Western Asia and elsewhere in the name of security and peace.

Now, this question might be argued in theory whether these pacts encourage security or peace, but we need not go into the theory of it because we have the actual facts before our eyes, as to what is happening. There was a situation in the Indo-China States after the Geneva Conference which was a hopeful and a favourable situation, a difficult one, but nevertheless a hopeful one. And, for some months it lasted, and the Commissions of which India has the honour to be Chairman functioned satisfactorily and harmoniously. Then comes out of the blue an attempt, as it was said, to secure security and peace in South East Asia through some kind of a military pact or alliance, the foundations of which were laid at Manila. It was not clear to me then how exactly peace was ensured or security assured by that pact. It is clear to me now that that Manila Treaty and the Bangkok Conference that followed have upset any ideas of peace in that area that previously existed or any ideas of security and the whole conception lying behind the Geneva Conference which was a conception, if I may use the word, of co-existence. The Indo-China States could not continue unless they recognised each other and unless the other Great Powers recognised their freedom and independence and came to an understanding not to interfere with their freedom and independence. It was on that basis that the Geneva Treaty was formed. What is the trouble with the world today? Not perhaps so much the aggressive intention of any country, though individuals may have them, but the terrible fear of each country that the other has aggressive intentions. And, in order to prevent the other from being the aggressor you become the aggressor yourself. It is a most extraordinary situation and that was the position in regard to the Indo-China States because each of the major countries was afraid lest the others take advantage of the Indo-

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China States against it. And the only solution was that both Powers should agree to leave the Indo-China States by themselves and alone, by and large and not to try to line them up with their own group because the moment one group tried to increase its influence or its pressure, or brought the areas under its own sphere of influence' as it has been euphemistically called in the past, immediately the other power got going to introduce itself and the conflict began again, call it a cold war or call it what you like.

Unfortunately, that rather happy phase in Indo-China did not last long. I do not say it has all broken up. But the situation is much more difficult today. Quite apart from that, the House will judge of the curious situation when they read only in this morning's papers that there is civil war in South Viet Nam. It was an extraordinary state of affairs in Laos. The outcome of the Geneva Agreement is interpreted in various ways and the Geneva Agreement, I must say, was drafted in such a hurry that it can be interpreted in various ways. And so, I am talking about the Geneva Agreement in regard to Laos, not the whole Agreement. Difficulties are arising. I do not want to go into details about these matters, but I am merely pointing out that all these difficulties arise. I do not wish to say whose fault it is but we have a certain responsibility in trying to resolve those difficulties. To point out or to name people at fault does not help in resolving a difficulty, but what I want this House to bear in mind is this, that because of certain developments in the Far East, in South East Asia, the whole atmosphere has changed there, that is, it has hardened the fear of war or for one person gaining an advantage over another or for one country over another. I mentioned the Manila Treaty and the subsequent Bangkok Conference. Then there is this very dangerous situation in the China Sea between Farmosa and the mainland of China. So far as we are concerned, obviously we can only have one broad approach to this problem, which flows from our recognition of the People's Government of China. I am not going into that repeatedly, but there is something; it may be that there are other countries that do not agree with us—some countries there are, we think. Nobody, of course, says that there is separate State like Formosa because Formosa claims to be China just as China claims Formosa to be a part. But there has been a general, wide agreement of one obvious fact, and that is that the Islands of Matsu and Quemoy, which are four or five miles off the mainland are definitely part of the mainland, and an enemy force there is a constant irritation and constant danger. Countries which are not friendly to the People's Government of China have recognised that fact at least, and yet the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu continues by other forces, and it is stated that if the Chinese People's Government attacks them, then the whole force of the mighty Power will be engaged in defending them because it is said that they might involve the security of the Great Power. That is a very extraordinary approach,—I say so with all respect. It is certain as anything can be certain that these Islands will go to the mainland of China by logic, by reason, by anything, unless you have great wars—and nobody knows the consequences of those wars. Therefore, what are you planning for—the great war to happen? You are just going against every canon of logic and reason and practical good sense. I do not understand this, because things are judged or measured by yard-sticks which I cannot follow. I read articles about my humble self in the foreign press I see something: "Now he is inclined towards this, towards that and so on." Nobody seems to imagine that I am an Indian inclined towards India and nobody else—as if I was inclined towards America, Russia or China. I want to be friendly with

them. Why should I be inclined towards them? I am happy enough now and let me be left in peace to work for my country, for the destinies of my country. But I am interested in the peace of the world because that obviously is of high importance to my country as to every other country and so I cannot keep out of it. We have absolutely no intention to throw ourselves into war even if the whole world is at war; we are not at war. It is quite clear—there will be no doubt about it—that we will not go to war, but if there is war all over the world, we cannot escape the consequences of that war and we cannot be looking on the whole world going to rack and ruin. It will affect us. Hon. Members might perhaps remember a saying by Professor Einstein—it is attributed to him—that after the next war, wars would be fought by bows and arrows, that is, the consequences of the next war would be such that only bows and arrows would be left, and that is the stage of civilisation which is represented by bows and arrows. That is the opinion of a very great scientist and of those who are talking about, at least so far modern weapons are concerned.

Let us, therefore, take a realistic view of the situation and not talk about peace vaguely and do every thing which encourages an atmosphere of fear and war. It is an extraordinary thing and I have no doubt that except for some maniacs nobody wants war in the world, and yet inevitably we indulge in activities which take the world to war. You may sit down and say that this country is at fault or that statesman is at fault, but that does not do much good. We are all, to some extent, at fault perhaps. I mentioned South East Asia. Now take the Middle East. Again, there is a passion for having little military alliances and pacts. All kinds of people rush about and talk to each other, and out comes the statement about military alliance between this country and that country. How that military alliance changes the world situation or the situation in that particular area in the slightest, either in the military sense or in the political sense, I have not been able to understand. I shall correct myself: it does change it, for it changes it for the worse.

Take the Middle-Eastern pacts—I am very sorry to criticise today other countries because they are free to do what they like—and some months back recently, there was news of a certain military alliance between two countries of the so-called Middle East or Western Asia. They are perfectly welcome to do that. I happened to pass just about that time through Egypt and spent two or three days in Cairo, and I was asked by the Press there about my reactions. I said expressively and clearly that I thought that these military pacts, far from being helpful, did a lot of harm; far from bringing any security or assurance of peace, they actually help the other way. Take the effect of this very Middle East pact, to which we find a reference in this morning's newspaper, that a Great Power has adhered to attack itself to it. The first result has been the weakening and also the breaking up of the Arab League, which has brought the Arab countries together for co-operative effort. The second effect is that there is great bitterness. Egypt, for instance, is greatly opposed to this. In Syria, about that time, there was actually a change of government because of this pact. Syria today is very much opposed to these pacts. Saudi Arabia opposes this; there is Yemen and there may be others apart from these, who are opposed to this, so that the Middle East has been split up into hostile camps because that pact was made.

Also look at it from the point of view of those very persons that have brought about this pact. Does it serve their own interests—leave out the interests of somebody else—to break up the homogeneity of the Middle East and create discord and trouble there? There was a mention

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the other day about the Yugoslav Government in which they said they viewed with grave concern the development of the situation in the Middle East because of these pacts, because of the pressure that was being exercised on the Government of Syria and other Governments to join the pact, which those Governments have resisted and I hope they will resist, because far too much is being done today under pressure and under threats and under other methods of coercion. So that, if hon. Members will see this broad picture of what is happening in South-East Asia, the Far East and Western Asia, they will find it is not a happy picture. It is a picture full of discord and conflict and pulling in different directions. On the one side one sees Asia resurgent, Asia awake, Asia as if undoubtedly coming out, waking up and stretching out her limbs. It may take some time for her to grow to her stature, undoubtedly growing and troubled with all the difficulties of growth. On the other hand all these attempts, in the name of helping Asia, in the name of preserving peace in Asia, at promoting discord and conflict are made. Obviously we cannot view this with great satisfaction.

In fact, many of the important problems, except one or two, of the world today somehow affect Asia. A very big problem does not affect us, that is of Germany. There again, I cannot speak much about Germany. Nor do I wish to except to remind the House that it is one of the biggest problems in the world today, what happens in Germany with which is involved not only the unity of the two Germanies, but also the question of rearmament of Germany and all that. Now decisions have been made about the rearmament of Germany. There is at present a Disarmament Conference sitting somewhere and considering proposals which we hope will come into effect. I do not know what the results of it will be. At the same time, major policies are based on the rearmament of some powers which at present are not heavily armed. This does not seem to me very logical.

What exactly are we aiming at? Repeatedly we hear talk about the Big Four or the Big Five—I do not know how many are big or how many are small—the Big Four or the Big Three meeting and talking things. Sometimes we are told that there will be an informal meeting without an agenda. For the last two years and a half we have been hearing this. Yet, insuperable difficulties come in the way of their meeting. If one person agrees, somebody else holds him back and does not permit him; if both agree a third person disagrees. So, the situation goes from bad to worse and people are not even brave enough to face each other and have a talk with each other. Because, they want to create a situation previous to the talks, which, according to them, is what is called a situation of strength. "Let us negotiate through strength": that is the formula, forgetting of course that the other power is also strengthening itself at the same time. So, by the time you have produced a situation of strength, the other might have produced a situation of greater strength. So, they do not know where they are.

Again, when you deal with atom bombs and hydrogen bombs, this question of some greater strength or not has little effect. It has little meaning because you have arrived at a stage,—so we are told,—where even if one Power does it, and the other Power is relatively weaker, the effect on both is going to be much the same. That is what is called the state of saturation in regard to atom bombs, or hydrogen bombs. So, even if one is much bigger than the other with a greater number of bombs, may be more powerful bombs, in the ultimate effect both going to suffer terribly. In fact, the world is going to suffer. That is why I said because of all this

that the situation in the world, far from being a promising one, is definitely a depressing one. I do not mean to say that a sudden catastrophe is coming, because countries are so afraid of it that they wish to avoid it. Nevertheless, things move in that direction and great statesmen talk too lightly sometimes of what they will do if something happens, how they will throw in their full weight of atom bombs and all that, if something happens.

Now in this broad world situation, what exactly are we to do? Are we to enter into these manoeuvrings and power conflicts and pacts here and there? I want this House to consider it from the lowest, opportunist point of view—forget for the moment any idealism, although idealism is very necessary,—in fact, more necessary than at any other time. But from the lowest, opportunist, practical point of view, what are we to do about it? Are we going into this mad house also, behaving like lunatics like others? Simply because a person has got a hydrogen bomb, it does not mean that his mind has also become as powerful as the hydrogen bomb. The misfortune today is that we have got atomic energy which is a mighty power. It does depict the advance of humanity and its control over nature and nature's powers—tremendous things. But it is very doubtful how far the human mind has progressed to control them. And one comes ultimately at any rate, when thinking about this, to some kind of a conclusion that atomic energy cannot be met by atomic energy. That is to say, to put it differently the force of violence cannot be outmanoeuvred by force of violence. We have arrived at a stage where the force is so tremendous that it will overwhelm us, both the person against whom it is used and the user of it. And unless we have some other methods of countering it or controlling it, we are likely to be overwhelmed.

What are the other methods? People go about signing documents: ban atomic weapons, atom bombs; don't manufacture them. I have also sometimes talked about this. But the more I think of it the more am I convinced that it is completely futile now to talk about this business of banning this and that. It has no meaning to me now, or very little meaning. The time is going to come presently when the hydrogen bomb might be made with some ease even by a small country—with gross exaggeration a scientist told me that it might be made in somebody's back-garden. It may be an exaggeration. But it shows where things are going. So, what is going to happen to the world when hydrogen bombs are made anywhere? How are we going to meet this menace to the world, unless you can control it by some entirely different standards—call them moral, call them spiritual, call them what you like,—I am not using the word in a narrow sense,—call them civilised. Because after all humanity has come to a certain stage of civilisation which has taught it restraint and behaviour and all that. We are forgetting all that restraint and behaviour. The events of the last two wars have brutalised humanity. We are now standing at the verge of destiny: whether humanity is to revert to some phase of well being brutish beasts, or advance towards the stage of civilisation. It is a matter of culture and civilisation; it is a matter of standards, of values that we have, and it seems to me—and I say that with all humility—that what Gandhiji put before us and the world perhaps has as even more significance today in the world as it is, than it had previously. I see no other way out except for countries and nations to adopt Gandhiji's gospel, though not thought, but any how to realise that force is no remedy, that war is not only no remedy but is an ultimate evil today, and that violence is no good and does not pay—apart from its moral values.

Now, the House knows about what are called the *Panch Shila*, the five principles. Some people have criticised them. Some people have said—the Prime Minister of a country said—all

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this is some kind of 'communist trick'. Well, the fact of the matter is that these principles—what we call *Panch Shila*—are a challenge to the world and we want the answer of every country in the world as to what they think about them. Let every country say that it is agreed with it. I want them to have the courage to say so because I do say that every country, if it is honest to itself and if it is honest to its desire to peace, must accept them; there is no way out.

What are they? The recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each country, non-aggression, non-interference in iternal affairs, mutual respect, equality, etc. Am I going to be told by any country that this is disagreeable? If they are for aggression let them say so; similarly, let them say if they are for internal interference in other countries' affairs—much of it is taking place, I know but nobody recognises that; nobody admits that rather—I do say that the *Panch Shila* are a challenge of Asia to the rest of the world. And each country will have to give a straight answer to this question and I do hope that the question would be put in all its straightness and boldness by the Asian-African Conference. Let each country search its mind and answer whether it stands for non-aggression and non-interference.

The charge is made—rightly, I say, sometimes—about communist interference in other countries. Non-communist countries also interfere in other countries obviously. How are we getting over this? The present military approach is to get more and more powerful to squash the other party so that it may not do it. In doing so, of course, you squash the world and yourself. It is not exactly the brilliant way of approach to the solution of the problem.

Now, the *Panch Shila* says: Well, both of you or all of you refrain from interference internally or externally in a straight way. It may be that someone agreeing to it does not keep his word; it can always happen, whether you have a treaty or an alliance or a pledge. But anyhow, it is a firm basis for an agreement. If some country agreeing to it does not keep up its word, naturally it gets into hot water much more than otherwise. So that, this principle of *Panch Shila*—or call it co-existence, if you like it in a particular sense—you have to admit. Either you admit co-existence in the modern world or you admit conflict and co-destruction. That is the alternative to it.

The Asian-African Conference is, if I may say so, a rather strikingly remarkable example of co-existence. Countries come there with different outlooks and differing approaches. Some of them have been allied in military alliances. But, still they come there and discuss matters in a different context—in the context of co-existence.

Now again there is a good deal of talk about communism and anti-communism. Both are important—I do not deny that, but what about some little and odd things happening in the continent of Africa? What about things that are happening in the new colonial territories? What about that tragedy—that human tragedy—that is continually taking place in the Dominion of South Africa—hundreds and thousands of people lifted up bodily from their homes and taken away somewhere else? Why do we not hear the champions of freedom talk about this? They are silent; they simply pass it over. But they should realise that people in Asia and Africa, though they may not shout very much about it, feel it; sometimes they feel it more than communism and anti-communism. It is a human problem for us—this racialism—this human problem may become a very dangerous problem. This problem of racialism and racial separation may become more dangerous than any other problem that the world has to face. I should like the countries of Europe, America, Asia and Africa to realise that and not to imagine that we are putting up with these things that are

happening in Africa whether on the colonial plane or on the racial plane. They hurt us. Simply because we cannot do anything effective, and we do not want to cheapen ourselves by mere shouting, we remain quiet. But the thing has gone deep down into our minds and hearts. We feel it strongly. When we talk so lightly about other matters some of which are more important, it simply means that our standards are very different—what we consider important and what we consider less important.

I have referred to some of these matters briefly; I want to refer to some of our immediate problems—there is Goa; there is Ceylon. About Ceylon, I do not wish to go into these arguments because—whether it is Pakistan or whether it is Ceylon—these are neighbour countries and I think it is a bad thing for us to say words which hurt and which create more difficulties in the solution of the problem, to issue threats and the like.

The other day, in another connection, some hon. Members talked loosely about taking military action against Pakistan because of what is happening in East Bengal. All I can say is that those hon. Members who said so are—I say so with all respect—totally lacking in wisdom. I would even go further and say—common intelligence. It is not with a view to criticise anything that I want to say that.

In Ceylon we have been, I think, co-operating and patient. We go some way out to understand and to meet the difficulties of the Ceylon Government and the Ceylon people. But I must confess to a feeling of frustration that what we are aiming at is not realised. Just take some simple figures. I am giving you figures of the registration of people of Indian descent as Ceylon citizens. That is the main problem. Otherwise, these people become stateless. They are not Indian citizens unless by another process they are registered as Indian nationals. They are neither here nor there; they remain there because they cannot be thrown into the sea. We had agreed to register them—those people who are anxious to register themselves and who fulfilled our calculations according to our Constitution—as our citizens. And naturally, we pressed the Ceylon Government to go ahead with its registration too so that gradually this process might exhaust these people of Indian descent there. We hoped of course that a very large number would be registered as Ceylon citizens because they are really and in fact residents of Ceylon. Their fathers were born there and they live there. For nine months from December 1953, to September, 1954, the total number of persons registered in Ceylon was 7,505. The number of persons whose applications were rejected was 45,236. The proportion of registrations to rejections is very small, 7,500 to 45 thousand in nine months. Now, we come to the four months since September, last, that is October, 1954 to January, 1955. The total number of persons registered was twenty-one. and the total number of persons whose applications were rejected was 36,260. It is obvious that while previously not many were registered and a large number were rejected, now we have arrived at a stage when hardly any person is accepted: thirty-six thousand rejections in four months and twenty-one registered, which comes to about five and a quarter a month.

So far as our registration of Indian citizens goes, we have proceeded normally. I will give the figures. The number of applicants from January to December, 1954 was 8,000, and the number registered was 5,600. As a matter of fact there were no rejections. The rest are under scrutiny. So, thousands have been accepted. We have been going fairly fast.

At the last meeting of the Prime Ministers of India and Ceylon it was further decided that the Ceylon Government should prepare a list of all the people of Indian descent in Ceylon, in order to know—quite apart from deciding the final question whether they are Ceylon citizens or not,—to

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know who are there, because of their constant complaint that illegal immigrants came in; so let us know who are there. Because very often it so happened that a person who has been resident there for a long time was called an illegal resident. That list too has not yet been prepared.

Nevertheless, as I said to this House, and I would appeal to the House that in this matter and even in regard to the Pakistan matter our approach must continue to be a co-operative and friendly one, not giving up the principles we stand for.

I referred to Goa. The other day, hon. Members must have seen that some *satyagrahis*, so-called *satyagrahis* who went there, I think, on the 26th January, and who to my knowledge have not been accused of any violence or any kind of offence other than going there, which of course is a technical offence—I cannot complain if they are punished; if any person commits *satyagraha* he must not complain and nobody should complain on his behalf that he is punished; that is the inevitable consequence of *satyagraha*; otherwise it is not *satyagraha;* it is something else—I would not have objected if they were punished, but when those persons or some of them are sentenced to twenty-eight years of penal servitude it does shake one up. Some of them were sentenced to varying degrees of imprisonment, some were sentenced to twenty-eight years and to deportation to Portugal—not Portugal but perhaps to some of their penal colonies. That again, trying deliberately to use mild language, I call barbarous. It is really extraordinary that any government anywhere should behave in this way; much more so a government which because of our patience and good-will is allowed to remain in the corner of India. Remember this, and I want them to remember, I want the Government of Portugal to realise that they are there because we are patient and men of good-will; not because we cannot deal with the situation but because we think ahead, we see the world situation as it is, we do not wish to do something, even in a small way, indulging in violence etc. which may have bigger repercussions and all that. We are prepared to wait a little, because inevitably the end must be the one that we aim at. Our objective must be realised. It is inconceivable and impossible, and I do not care what other Powers in the world support Portugal, it is impossible for Portugal to imagine that they can remain in Goa.

I referred to other powers. There has not been much talk of this lately. But some time back some countries, on the basis of the N.A.T.O. alliance, mentioned Goa to us. They mentioned it in rather soft language, but they mentioned it. And immediately—apart from the fact that they had no business to mention it to us; if they had any business they ought to have gone and said something at Lisbon—another fact came out, and that is the wide tentacles of the N.A.T.O. alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was made for defensive purposes of the North Atlantic countries. One of the tentacles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation crossed these continents and seas and came to this continent of Asia, and to India—came a long way. Secondly, it came in order to defend a colonial territory in India. That did not do much good to the prestige of N.A.T.O. It showed that behind its other, perhaps, laudable objects there were some which were not so laudable and could be used for very wrong purposes.

I referred to Quemoy and Matsu. And almost every country, barring one or two, agrees that the islands of Quemoy and Matsu are a part of the mainland of China. Goa is not an island; Goa is the mainland of India; it is not even separated by a few miles of sea as Quemoy and Matsu are. And yet these arguments are

advanced, and this barbarous behaviour is indulged in.

In regard to Pakistan the House knows that the Prime Minister of Pakistan was to have come here on the 28th of this month. But then we decided to postpone this meeting for a variety of reasons—we were much too rushed and all that—and we are meeting now, after this Asian-African Conference, on the 14th May, in New Delhi. I have no doubt at all that the leaders of Pakistan, and more specially the Governor-General of Pakistan, are very anxious to settle Indo-Pakistan problems. I am anxious, and I am sure that this House is anxious, that there should be no interference in the way of settling these problems in a friendly way. I have still less doubt about the general good-will among the people of Pakistan and India towards each other. We have had some evidence of this recently, rather remarkable evidence, that whatever the people at the top may say or do, there is this basic good-will among the people. Our people went to Pakistan and they came here. Both these are very desirable things, very helpful. Yet it is true that the problems we have to face have not become easier by the passage of time. All kinds of things have happened in the course of these seven or eight years since Pakistan came into existence. And it is very very difficult to un-write history. We shall consider them. But we have to consider them in a realistic way, not ignoring what has happened. Among those big problems there is the problem of evacuee property, canal waters. So far as canal waters are concerned, we have been dealing with the World Bank for two years now or more. We have now arrived at a certain stage. It has been a slow, slow process. But, anyhow, we have made some progress. I think today or yesterday a joint mission arrived here, consisting of representatives of Engineers of the World Bank, of Engineers of Pakistan and of course, our own Engineers, who are going to visit various places in India in the Indus basin, and various places in Pakistan in the Indus basis and formulate plans more or less on the basis of the World Bank's recommendation which we had accepted and which Pakistan also had accepted. Anyhow, we are moving there although the movement has been remarkably slow. In regard to evacuee property, there has not been much movement. My colleague the Minister of Rehabilitation is going to Pakistan in four or five days time at their invitation to discuss these matters again.

1P.M.

There is a very big question, Kashmir. Perhaps,—why "perhaps"? —certainly, that is the most difficult of all these problems as between India and Pakistan,—I say problems between India and Pakistan, certainly. But, we must always remember that Kashmir is not a thing to be bandied about between India and Pakistan. It has a soul of its own; it has an individuality of its own. We cannot, certainly much less can Pakistan, play with it as if it were something in the political game between the two countries. Nothing can be done without the good-will of the people of Kashmir. I am not going into that.

But, I might say this. The House will be glad to know, if it does not know it already, that in recent months, there has been a very considerable, in fact a rather remarkable progress in Kashmir. Economically and otherwise, I doubt if Kashmir has been so prosperous—it is a relative term! I do not say it is prosperous; it is relatively prosperous—for many many long years as it is today. In regard to food, in regard to other things, in regard to many schemes that have been undertaken, they are just on the verge of yielding fruit. There is the Sind Valley Electric Works which will be extraordinarily useful in the whole valley of Kashmir, apart from lighting, for industrial and other purposes. The old power works at Mohra, constructed 40 or 50 years ago, are on the point of collapse. Then, we are starting the great project, the Banihal

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

tunnel. The great work has started. It is really the numerous small projects that are bringing about a new atmosphere in the whole of the Jammu and Kashmir State. So that, the conditions are more satisfactory there either from the political or the economic point of view than they have been for a long time. I do not say that everything is 100 per cent. satisfactory. But, things are on the way.

The other day, I think, two Members of this House have sent me questions. I shall probably answer them in due course. The questions were about certain statements that the Prime Minister of Kashmir made the other day in his Assembly. I was asked if Sheikh Abdullah had communicated with me in regard to that statement. The statement as reported was that the Prime Minister of Kashmir, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed had in his possession correspondence, etc., which would throw light on many things that happened 1½ years ago, but he could not publish them because I or the Government of India came in his way. I do not remember his words; but, by and large, this is what he has said. On this I received a telegram from Sheikh Abdullah saying that he had seen the statement and that he would like publication of these papers or documents and he hoped that the Government of India would not come in the way.

All this, of course, relates to what happened about a year and a half or 2 years or 2½ years ago. I would say straight off that so far as the Government of India is concerned, so far as I am concerned, I do not wish to come in the way of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir in regard to this matter. I tried to refresh my memory. I may add that the report of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed's speech in the papers, although broadly speaking, is this, it is not a correct report. Some sentences in between have been left out. However, broadly speaking, it is that. As I do not wish to come in the way of the discretion of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, they have to decide this. I have not got all these papers with me. I do not know what they are. I have some. My own correspondence with Sheikh Abdullah, I have got. Shri Rafi Ahmed Kidwai had some, as also Shri A. P. Jain and Maulana Azad: some correspondence and others. But, apart from correspondence, there were numerous talks. It is difficult to produce those talks. The correspondence itself relates to these talks. They are not there. It is difficult to form a picture of these events right from 1952 onwards and throughout 1953.

There is another aspect of this question which naturally concerns me and concerns the House. We are for, I hope all of us, friendly ways of settling problems and not adding to bitterness. How far the publication of the letters or reports of conversations 1½ or 2 years ago, charges and counter-charges, will help in producing that atmosphere which leads to a friendly settlement or come in the way of it, it is for the House to judge. Therefore, anyhow, I have left it to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. I have not got all the papers. I have told them that I do not wish to come in the way. They may consider and publish if there are any.

One thing I should like to say, Hon. Members may remember, that on the 10th August, year before last, 1953, I made a statement here. That was one day or two days after Sheikh Abdullah's arrest. Then, I made a much longer statement a month later, I think on the 17th of September. I was reading the statement of the 17th September. There was much in it that, if I wanted to deal with this matter, I will repeat again. I would refer the hon. Members who are interested in the matter to this statement because I dealt with the situation that had then arisen at some length. Naturally, even then I tried to avoid saying anything which would worsen the situation. In regard to

one matter which I find is still raised often, charges are brought. These charges were brought recently again in the Kashmir Assembly about all kinds of horrible happenings in the valley of Kashmir after Sheikh Abdullah's arrest: that 1500 people were killed or massacred and all that. At that very time these charges were made, I took it upon myself to have a very full enquiry made, not through the Government of Kashmir, but through entirely our own people, intelligence people and others, completely independent. I have no doubt in my mind that the enquiry we made—it may not have been hundred per cent accurate, but it was 98 per cent accurate or very nearly so, I cannot say—has by and large resulted in confirming the figures which the Kashmir Government had published, and I think our figures and their figures were out by four or five. I pointed this out to the very persons who were making these tremendous charges of 1500 people killed and massacred. And it was a detailed report of each place, each village, containing the names etc. and everything in fact. I said, here is this report. Well, they had nothing to say. Now, a year afterwards, they again raise the same thing. I think that is highly improper, if they know—they ought to know—that the charges they make are false completely, *i.e.*, going on repeating them.

In the course of the next few days we are having a number of eminent visitors from abroad. They will be the Prime Minister of Egypt, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Afganistan: after that, we will have the Prime Minister of Sudan. Even earlier, that is in the next week or ten days, we are probably having—I am not quite certain —a deputation from the Government of South Viet Nam, the Foreign Minister of Viet Nam; I am not sure if recent happenings might not interfere with that visit. And a little later, we shall have a deputation from North Viet Nam, the democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and the Foreign Minister—all in the next eight or 3916 days. The House knows that prince of Cambodia came here. the Prime Minister of Cambodia and others.

All this puts additional burdens on us, responsibilities on us, and we can only discharge them with a thorough understanding and goodwill of this House.

Shri H. N. Mukerjee (Calcutta North-east): It is good to see the Prime Minister warm up in debate and to hear him say certain things which we can all applaud, but I fear that there are still certain somewhat pernicious bees in his bonnet, which he will have to discard before we can clasp him in the way so many of us wish to do.

[PANDIT THAKUR DAS BHARGAVA *in the Chair*]

I say this because I am happy we are meeting on the eve of the Bandung Conference, and the Prime Minister has said very clearly that it is for the Bandung Conference to place before the world certain ideas represented in the main by our *Panch Shila* which only in today's context can build that force which can guarantee peace to humanity. It is exactly there that we have to take a positive and firm stand. It is exactly when we think in terms of the *Panch Shila* that we have to discard our old notion, a notion which did us a great deal of harm in regard to our foreign policy in the period from 1948 to 1953, a notion that there are two war blocs in the world.

There is today only one war bloc in the world. There is another bloc, if you please, but that is a peace bloc, a bloc which is represented by countries like the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, who have come forward to say what is ancient history or what is very well-known to everybody, that the principles of *Panch Shila* are principles which they always apply in their relations with other countries, principles to which they are ready and willing at