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every possible manner and I can assure the House that similar assistance would continue to be extended in future.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Speaker: I have received the following message from the President:

> "I have received with great satisfaction the expression of thanks by the Members of the Lok Sabha for the address I deliver to both the Houses of Parliament assembled together on the 18th March, 1957."

MOTION *RE:* INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs and Defence (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, Sir, I beg to move:

> "That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

In the course of the last few days, when we were discussing the President's Address, many references were made to foreign affairs and, I also, in the course of my remarks, replied to many questions put. In a sense, therefore, we have partly covered the ground of international affairs in that previous debate.

It is now, I think, about four months since we had a debate on international affairs in this House. It was at the end of November last, I believe, when we had that debate, that we were confronted by a very serious situation which had arisen in the middle-eastern region, in Egypt, because of a military invasion of Egypt. Also, in central Europe a serious situation had been created in Hungary. On that occasion, in November, I ventured to deal with these two matters. Many things have happened during these four months and considerable progress has been made in some matters, but I do not think I would be justified in saying that the general atmosphere in the world can be viewed with any optimism, indeed there are many factors in it which are very disturbing.

So far as the situation in Egypt, in the Suez Canal and round about is concerned, we have had the privilege of being in consultations with the Egyptian Government on the one side, and in the United Nations with others intimately connected with these matters, and we have tried to serve, in so far as we could, the cause of peaceful settlement, a settlement which would not only guard the rights of nations or sovereignty of nations concerned, but also be fair to the interests of the international community.

I am not in a position to say anything very much about what is happening in Egypt now except that, I think, there are indications that a satisfactory solution may be arrived at in regard to the Suez Canal, the working or the functioning of the Suez Canal. Probably, in the course of a few days, a few weeks or a week or two, the Canal will be open to traffic. Now, the House will remember that much of the trouble of the last five or six months arose in connection with the Suez Canal and, therefore, if it is settled satisfactorily as to how it should work to the advantage of the international community and safeguarding the sovereign rights of Egypt, that will be a great gain.

I do not say that that will solve the problems of the Middle East. But, certainly, that will go a considerable way in easing tensions there. There are difficulties, as the House knows, in regard to Gaza in regard to the Gulf of Aquaba and, generally, in regard to conditions in

the Middle East. But, I suppose, you cannot expect them to be solved altogether; one has to go slowly step by step.

Possibily, looking at the world picture as it is today, the Middle Eastern region might be said to be the most difficult and potentially explosive region. Inspite of the progress made towards a possible settlement of the Suez Canal issue and other matters, inspite of the fact that the invading forces were withdrawn from Egyptian territory, this area and the Middle East still continues to be a very difficult area. I do not mean to say that the area is difficult, inherently difficult, but it becomes a difficult area because of, I may say so with all respect, certain conflicts extraneous to the Middle East which are projected there.

Unfortunately, in a great part of the world real trouble arises partly from some local difficulties, partly from some distant difficulty which is reflected there in that particular part of the world. This House knows very well our general views about military pacts, which are called 'defensive' but, which inevitably have a certain offensive or aggressive look to others. The moment one has a defensive pact aimed at certain other countries, the result is something more than 'defensive', and we have therefore ventured to say, and repeat again and again, that these pacts, whoever may make them, do not tend to preserve peace, or further the cause of peace, or assure security.

Indeed, one of the obvious things that anyone can see, that has happened in the last few months in this Middle Eastern region or Western Asia, has been the disturbing factor of these pacts. If I may refer to another place, Central Europe and Hungary, it is the pacts that came into the way; so that we have had enough evidence that these military pacts by one group of nations, presumably against another group of nations, do not help the cause of peace or security.

Unfortunately, however, the pacts continue, and are even added on to. Only recently we have heard a great deal about the SEATO Pact, about the Baghdad Pact. These two affect us, India, naturally much more intimately and directly than any other pacts. The NATO alliance or the Warsaw Pact we can view distantly on grounds of certain principles and the approach we make to questions of world policy, but the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO, as everyone knows, have a direct effect upon India and, naturally, we have viewed them with suspicion and dislike,

In considering this question of military pacts, I am not, and I do not wish the House to consider that I am trying to run them down, and to be presumptuous enough to criticise the policies of foreign countries in the past, or to a large extent in the present. It may be that at one time something was necessary. What I am venturing to suggest is that in the present context of events, these pacts do not help the cause of peace. In fact, they have the contrary effect and this has been borne in upon us lately with greater force than ever. But we saw how these pacts, notably the Baghdad Pact, and to some extent, the SEATO arrangements also were utilised against us in connection with the Kashmir issue.

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Now, presumably, the Kashmir issue has nothing to do with the Baghdad Pact or any other pact, but it was dragged into this picture and the members of these pacts functioned, well, as members of those pacts in regard to a particular issue which had nothing to do with it. Thus, we see how these pacts which were meant presumably for some other purpose are used for different purposes and create, therefore, greater difficulties. And thus, because of these pacts, cold war comes and impinges upon the borders and frontiers of India. That is a matter of concern to us. We

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do not want the cold war anywhere, much lessen the borders of India. I am quite convinced that the cold war approach is an approach which will continue to worsen international understandings for a certain basic reason, and that is, if the international situation is bedevilled today by fear, by suspicion, by dislike and harted even, then you do not get over all these by the cold war. The cold war creates all these things or continues them. Some other approach has to be made, as I ventured to say.

I cannot say that in this country or any other, we can give up, abandon, our defensive apparatus or do something which will involve us in grave risks. No country can do that. Nobody suggests to any country that they should be prepared to take risks and hope that all will be well. But there is something in between these two policies. One is of just taking risks and hoping for the best. The other is taking no risks and yet working in the direction of peace.

Take even one of the major issues of today. What is going to happen to hydrogen bombs and the nuclear weapons and the like? I suppose it is the fear of attack by other party that drives those countries which possess these weapons to go on enlarging them, everybody knowing that if once they are used, they may be destructive to both as well as to a great part of the world, everybody realising that they should not be used. Yet, they go on using them for fear that the other might have more of them. And so, we go on moving in this vicious circle and we do not get out of that vicious circle by the methods of cold war. It is obvious some other method has to be adopted, at the same time, protecting yourself against any possible danger or risk. I admit that. Great countries or small countries, both have to do that, but I do submit that the protection has not come in the past and will not come in the future by the systems of military alliances, whether they are with the Soviet Union or the United Kingdom or the United States of America or any other country, because, the whole effect of it is th the other party has them too and th y go on balancing these nuclear weapons and other forms of armaments.

Take the question of disarmament. Lately, there have been some indications, some slightly hopeful indications, that this question of disarmament might perhaps yield some results. There is the disarmament conference. But, during the past months and years, there have often been some such indications which have not yielded any result that we hoped for. So, I do not wish to be too optimistic about it, but; anyhow, I do feel that there is something today which if pursued in the right way might lead to some substantial step later on. More I cannot say, because we have been disappointed so often in the past and it has become a little frustrating experience to hope too much.

Yet, the real reason for disarmament remains there, namely, that any other course really leads to something which may and in utter disaster and that it does not, in the present stage, ensure security, In fact, it has the opposite effect; apart from the vast sums of money that are spent on armaments, so much is required for developing the countries of the world for achieving higher standards for the people.

Recently, two of the great men—of the biggest and the most powerful nations in the world, United States of America and Soviet Union—made certain proposals. The President of the United States made some proposals which are called the Eisenhower doctrine now. They are referred to like that. The Soviet Union made some independent proposals. I do not presume, at this stage, to discuss or criticise any of these proposals. I have no doubt that both were meant to advance the cause of security and peace. But, what I ventured to suggest on another

occasion was this: that proposals being drawn out from a distance in this atmosphere of suspicion and fear, even when they are good proposals, do not take one far, because nobody accepts them or few people accept them as *bona fide* proposals.

I venture to suggest that the situation in the world is difficult and serious enough for these questions to be tackled face to face by the great leaders, more particularly by the great President of the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union, as well as others if necessary, but more particularly those two. It is just possible that that might lead to something better than we have seen in the last few months. On the one occasion that they did meet—it was about two years ago, I believe—that meeting resulted in a change in world atmosphere and the first hopes of some kind of peace.

This is not a question of favouring any particular proposal or not favouring it. I have no doubt that a great deal in President Eisenhower's proposals, more especially those dealing with economic help, are of importance and of great value. I have no doubt that many of the proposals that were put forward by the Soviet Union, on the face of them, are helpful. How they are carried out is a different matter.

But there is one approach that troubles me, and that is this idea of thinking that areas in Asia, say in West Asia, are vacuum which have to be filled in by somebody stepping in from outside. That, I feel, is a dangerous approach, and I think an unreal approach when you say that every country which has not got sufficient armaments is a vacuum. At that rate, if you think in terms of armament, then there are only two countries which have an adequate supply of hydrogen bombs—the United States of America and the Soviet Union. You may say, all other countries are vacuums, because they have not got hydrogen bombs, which would be, of course, an absurd thing. What is the test then? Military power? Two countries stand out above all others. There are other countries, powerful military nations, great powers, two, three, four or five whatever the number may be. Are all the smaller and militarily weaker countries vacuums, apart from these six or seven? What is the test of this vacuum idea? It is a dangerous idea, especially for Asian and African countries. It seems to me really to lead to the conclusion that where an imperialist power gradually withdraws, or circumstances compel it to withdraw, necessarily you must presume that it has left vacuum. If so, how is that vacuum to be filled? Suppose there is a vacuum in power. How is it to be filled? Surely if somebody else comes in, it is a repetition of the old story, maybe in a different form. It can only be filled by the people of that country growing and developing themselves economically, politically and otherwise. Another difficulty is, when there is a conflict in the world, if one country wants to fill a vacuum, if I may use that word, or to have an area of influence, immediately, the hostile group suspects the intentions of this country and tries to pursue a policy in which it can have its area of influence there or elsewhere. So, you get back into this tug-of-war of trying to capture as areas of influence various parts of the world, which are not strong enough, if you like, to stand by themselves or to prevent this kind of thing happening.

This thing happened, you will remember, two years ago, or probably more, three years ago, in Indo-China, where war was in progress. Ultimately an agreement on Indo-China was reached at the Geneva Conference, which agreement was essentially based on this fact that those great power groups should not push in aggressively in the Indo-China States, but leave them to function for themselves. In effect it meant that those Indo-China States should follow an independent and unaligned policy. They may have their sympathisers.

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Of course, they have them; nobody prevents that. But, there should be no military intervention, pacts etc. of a military kind, because the moment one State had it, the other State wanted to have its own pact somewhere in that area and that upset the whole thing. In Indo-China they had a war for six or seven years before this agreement was arrived at and there was a cease-fire, some kind of peace. only on the basis of acknowledging some kind of a mutual agreement that we should not interfere in a military way or anything that might lead up to it. I do not say that everything in Indo-China has turned out to one's entire satisfaction since then, but I think it is true that that agreement not only stopped a war in Indo-China, a terrible war which had devastated parts of it, but also step by step has helped in keeping peace and in improving the situation. There are great difficulties still. We have to shoulder our burden there, as the House knows, because we have been and continue to be the Chairman of the International Commission there. It is a difficult and complicated task, a rather thankless one occasionally, but we could not possibly run away from it. We have been there and we have helped. As soon as we succeed in solving some small problem, others arise. Well, all I can say is that I hope gradually the situation will improve. One cannot do this by some sudden decision or sudden step that you might take. That thing which applied to the Indo-China area in a sense might be considered in other areas too. Why interfere? If you are afraid of the other party interfering, surely the safer course is not to interfer oneself and thus prevent the other party interfering. If the other party interferes even so, well the matter can be considered and dealt with; arrangements can be made to deal with it. In other words, instead of spreading the area of pacts, the way of peace lies in coming to agreement in having less and less of these military pacts on both sides. After all if the military pacts balance each other, the lack of them also will balance each other and will not endanger anf one country more than the other. I do not say these issues are simple. Of course, they are not; they are complicated and the men of goodwill in every country think about them, want to solve them and yet find them difficult.

I mentioned it previously and the House knows that we have got a force at present in the Middle-Eastern region, mostly I believe in the Gaza strip of the Egyptian territory. It was made perfectly clear at the time when this force was first of all sent that it was sent after obtaining the permission of the Egyptian Government. We did not wish to move in at all, because it was Egyptian territory. Anyhow, we did not wish to take any step in the matter without their permission. Secondly, this force was sent there on the express understanding that it was not to take the place of the invading forces, i.e. it did not go there as an occuping force for occupying other territory It went there to help in keeping peace on the border on the armistic line and it has been serving there in this capacity. At first it was near the Canal; then it was sent to the Gaza area, where it is, and, I believe the work of our officers and men there has met with the approval of all the people concerned there. I am particularly glad that the people there—I am not talking of the authorities—have also looked upon them with favour and they are popular with them.

Since the last debate we had here, some important developments have taken place, which would have been welcome anyhow, but which were doubly welcome because of the frustration we suffer from in other parts. One of the most important development was the emergence of the old Gold Coast colony as the independent and sovereign State of Ghana. It was my earnest wish to go there myself on this happy occasion, but it coincided with the last days of our elections and the meetings of this Parliament.

So, I just could not go, but naturally we sent our best wishes to the leaders and the people of Ghana. The emergence of Ghana as an independent State is, I think, of great importance and great significance not only because any such thing would be important, but because it is rather symbolic of Africa and the trends in Africa. I am particularly glad that a number of internal conflicts that they had in Ghana—party conflicts and others in regard to their Constitution and in regard to their other matters—had been resolved in a spirit of statesmanship and co-operation, which is of the happiest augury for their future. As the House well knows, the difficulties of a country come after independence. The real problems that they have to face come after independence; and, no doubt Ghana will be faced with those problems and is facing them today. I have little doubt that with goodwill and the wise approach that they have shown, they will overcome these problems.

The other day, only yesterday, I think, I had occasion to meet a Minister of the Malayan Government. Malaya is also rapidly forging ahead towards independence, and provisionally, I believe, it has been fixed that the date for Malayan Independence would be somewhere towards the end of August. All these are happy signs which give one some hope for the future in spite of the other disappointments that we have to experience. Then, there is Nigeria adjoining Ghana which also, I hope, is on the verge of Independence. Thus, on the one side, the colonial picture of the world is changing and yet, unfortunately, on other sides, it is getting stuck up and movements for freedom of colonies are met with the stern opposition.

Hon. Members will know that at present we have an eminent visitor from abroad, the Prime Minister of Poland, in this country. I believe Members are going to have a chance of meeting him and listening to him. We welcome him specially not only because Poland is a country with a fascinating tradition of struggle for freedom, with a very powerful nationalism which has moved it throughout history, but also because of the terrible sufferings they had in the last war and the way they have built up their city of Warsaw and other cities which had been reduced almost to ground level. Apart from all these, Poland has been an example in the last year —a few months—of the process of liberalisation and democratisation in the East European countries which has been welcomed by us and by many others. Because, we feel that that is the natural way of bringing about changes, relaxations and less rigidily and that to bring them about by some kind of compulsion from outside fails and in fact, leads to greater rigidity. Therefore, Poland is also a symbol of certain powerful and very valuable trends in the western world which have a larger significance.

We have also in Delhi, at the present moment Mr. Jarring, who was last month the President of the Security Council, and who has come here at the instance of the Security Council in connection with the Kashmir issue. I had the privilege of meeting him yesterday and having a talk with him. No doubt we shall have further talks before he goes away. I need not say anything about our general position in regard to Kashmir because that has been made quite clear. Even in the President's Address it was made quite clear in a few sentences. In the course of the debate on the President's Address also many references were made to it. There were; I believe quite a number of questions which hon. Members put, and the Speaker was good enough to suggest that instead of those questions being answered seriatim, perhaps, I might deal with them or most of them in the course of this debate. Perhaps some of them have already been answered. However, I shall refer to them briefly presently.

There is a problem which affects all our people here very powerfully and very deeply and that is the question of Goa. On the occasion of the

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debate here a few days ago on the President's Address, an hon. Member of this House who had a good deal of personal experience of Goa and Goan Portuguese administration and Goan prisons, gave us some account from his personal knowledge and experience. I was not present in the House then, unfortunately. But, I read a report of his speech; others have, no doubt, heard or read it. No one can read that account without feeling a sense of horror as to what has been happening and is, no doubt, continuing to happen in Goa. The other day, some of our nationals were released by the Portuguese Government, and among them, is an hon. Member of this House who has spent a long time there under those very bad conditions. I want to make it clear that the fact of the release of some Indian nationals from there, welcome as that is,— we wanted them to be released naturally— brings little satisfaction to our mind. I do not want any one to imagine that we are in any sense toning down our demands and our opinions in regard to Goa and that this chapter is closed or anyhow postponed for the present. Goa is a live and vital issue. The House may criticise us for the type of policy we adopt or may wish to change it. That is a different matter. We may discuss that. But, it is for all of us, to whatever party we may belong, a live and vital issue and we feel deeply on it. I particularly want to say that,—welcome as the hon. Member is here, he has come back from prison and the others will come back—we must remember that hundreds and hundreds of Goans are in prison there and continue to be in prison and continue to be treated worse even than the Indian nationals who were there. I do not know if my voice can possibly reach them; probably not. Anyhow, I should have liked to assure them that this question and their fate are very near our minds and it is a matter of deep unhappiness to us that circumstances should be such that this problem cannot be solved easily and quickly. As with other problems, it becomes tied up with world issues, with international problems and one cannot touch a single problem which is tied up with other issues without, may be, creating all kinds of reactions to it. One cannot isolate this problem, and therefore, we have tried to follow there the broad policy which we have enunciated before the world, the broad policy in regard to foreign affairs or internal affairs, and I do not myself see how we can depart from it basically without giving up that broad policy, and without really launching out into an unknown course of action of which we do not know the results. At the same time, I do feel—in fact, we have been feeling it for some time past—that we must give the most careful consideration to the various aspects of our policy; I am not referring to the broad approach to the problem which I believe is correct and should be pursued, but I do think that we should give the most careful consideration to the various other aspects of our policies relating to Goa. In fact, we are in the process of doing that. These elections had come and they rather came in the way,—and other matters—but I hope that in the course of the next few weeks we shall be able to consult not only our own people who have been dealing with them, but others too; I hope we should be able to consult hon. Members of the Opposition too in regard to these matters, and try to evolve courses of action which can be as effective as anything can be in the present circumstances.

May I refer to some of those questions, chiefly in regard to Kashmir and one or two other matters which the Speaker was good enough to keep over for this debate?

There were questions about Mr. Jarring's visit. I need say nothing about it. As the House knows, he is here. The resolution under which he has come here, the resolution of the Security Council, is a simple resolu-

tion,—it was passed after much debate, I need not refer to that—it is a simple one, reminding him of previous resolutions and asking him to come here and to meet representatives of India and representatives of Pakistan in their respective places and discuss this matter with them and to report by the 15th April. He has been to Pakistan, spent about a week there. He is here now. That is all I can say.

Then there were several questions about atomic weapons in Pakistan. References had been made about this matter both by my colleague, Shri Krishna Menon in the Security Council, and by me occasionally here in some connection. Both our references were based not on any secret information,—we leave that out,—but on certain official statements or speeches by the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief. We did not say,—I did not say and Shri Krishna Menon did not say,—that they had atomic weapons, but we only said what he, the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, had said, that in their military exercises in last December, the use of tactical atomic weapons was envisaged and exercises were carried out from that point of view. That is a preparatory stage—preparation for the use of atomic weapons. I did not say they had them,—I do not know,—and since then the United States Government has denied the fact of their having given any atomic weapons to Pakistan, or, indeed, to any other country. Naturally, we accept that denial, but the fact remains that these preparations and exercises and the possible use of them are matters of some concern to us, more especially when all this is tied up with this large-scale military aid which comes from the United States to Pakistan, and which has made a great deal of difference, I believe, to many problems, between India and Pakistan. It has been my conviction,—it was and is,—that it would have been far easier for Pakistan and India to solve their problems, difficult as they were, after the partition, if other countries, —outside countries,—had not interfered so much, whatever the problem might be, whether it is Kashmir or any other. I am not for the moment criticising outside countries because often they have acted with goodwill in this matter,—though not perhaps always,—but goodwill or not, the fact is that this interference has come in the way of these two neighbour countries solving their problems in some measure, if not with immediate goodwill, anyhow solving them.

Then there were some questions, I think, enquiring if Pakistan had annexed the area of Kashmir in Jammu and Kashmir State occupied by them. Well, the answer to that is "Yes". Even by their Constitution they have stated that all the administered area is part of Pakistan,—and undoubtedly this is one of their administered areas—so that they have for some time past, and practically speaking for a long time past, and later even constitutionally treated this as an area which is part of Pakistan. It has been surprising that little reference has been made to this annexation of part of, in so far as area is concerned nearly half of Jammu and Kashmir State area, while a great deal of discussion has taken place about what is called the annexation of Kashmir State by India. There has been no annexation. The word itself is completely wrong, inappropriate. There was accession, as the House knows, in October, 1947; the circumstances leading to it may have been different, but it was an accession in exactly the same way as was applied to the hundreds of other States in India, the same legal, constitutional way. True, the circumstances were somewhat different, but it was an accession. Nothing has happened since then to lessen that factor and nothing was necessary to add to it.

There were also questions about Gilgit and a story that was published in the press, a story emanating from Brigadier Ghansara Singh. We, of course, had known this story for a

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long time. Brigadier Ghansara Singh was sent by the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Ruler then, under an agreement with the British just prior to partition. They had handed over Gilgit to the Jammu and Kashmir Government, and this Brigadier was sent there to take charge. Some very extraordinary things happened when he went there. Soon after his arrival, after two or three days, he was arrested by the Gilgit Scouts who were under the command of British officers, and the British officers of the Gilgit Scouts informed the Pakistan Government that Gilgit had acceded to Pakistan. I am not going into the merits, but the story was a very odd and curious one. Brigadier Ghansara Singh was kept in prison there or in detention for a considerable time. When he came out, we had met him, and he had given us this story then. Now, it was given out to the public.

I should like to make clear another thing. We have been asked as to the Government of India's position in regard to the Pakistan-occupied territory of Kashmir, and what we propose to do about it. Now, it is clear that in every sense, legally and constitutionally, by virtue of the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State to India, the *whole* State acceded, not a bit of it or a part of it only; and, therefore, according to that accession, the whole State should form part of the Union of India. That is the legal position.

We may have, in the course of these nine years, in our extreme desire to come to some peaceful arrangement, discussed various suggestions, proposals etc. But those discussions did not lead to any result. There they ended, although, sometimes, something that we said in the course of discussion, some idea or proposal or thought that was thrown out is held up to us as a kind of commitment. Anyhow, in law, that is part of the Jammu and Kashmir territory which is an acceded State of the Union.

But it is true that we have stated in the Security Council and outside too—and in fact, this has been our position for a long time past; we have often said—that we for our part are not going to take any steps involving the military, involving Armed Forces, to settle the Kashmir problem. Of course, if we are attacked, we shall defend, and indeed we have made it clear that if we are attacked in Kashmir, we consider it an attack on India, which it is. We have made that clear. But we have also made it clear that while we consider the Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir as legally and constitutionally a part of India, of the Indian Union territory, we are not going to take any military steps to recover it or recapture it. We have given that assurance and we shall abide by it.

There were also questions about some messages that had come to me from the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and China in regard to the Kashmir issue. As for those messages, the House will remember that the Prime Minister of China went to Ceylon; and they issued a joint statement there. In the course of that statement, there was reference to the Kashmir issue, a friendly reference saying that they hoped that this would be settled by mutual discussions or contacts between the two countries concerned, and hoping that other countries would not interfere. That was a friendly wish from two of our friendly countries. And, so far as I know, there is nothing more that followed from it or was intended to follow.

So, I have dealt with most of these questions which were put to us. One thing more I should like to refer to, which may be in the hon. Members' minds, and about which—I had not seen them—presumably some amendments may have been sent, because whenever there is a debate on

foreign affairs in this House, there are always some amendments dealing with India's association with the Commonwealth of nations. I have dealt with this matter in the past on many occasions, and pointed out....

Mr. Speaker: There is no such amendment now.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I hope that my suggestion need not be considered as an amendment-invitation. But whether there is an amendment or not is immaterial. The question is an important one. And I can very well understand hon. Members, not only on the other side of the House, but on every side of the House, thinking about this matter much more now than they did previously, and enquiring from me, as they have done, sometimes in writing, sometimes orally, as to why in spite of all that has happened, whether in the Middle Eastern region or whether in regard to Kashmir,—that is, the attitudes taken by some Commonwealth countries in regard to Kashmir, which were certainly not impartial or neutral, which were siding with one party, and which were siding with a party which we considered the aggressor party, we still think it is right for us to continue this Commonwealth connection. They put this question to me, and we discussed it with them, but even more so, I have discussed it with my own mind and with my colleagues and others, because this is not a matter which I can settle just because I feel one way or the other. Indeed, we cannot settle any matter that way. It can only be settled, not only after the fullest consultation, but without doing violence to public feeling. Sometimes, it may be that public feeling has to be restrained or even opposed for the time being, because people may get excited, and they may think differently somewhat later. But in the final run, public feeling cannot be ignored, much less violated. So, this was a serious matter, and is a serious matter.

But I have felt, and for the first time I felt, the first time in these many years, that it may some time or other require further consideration. But in this as in other matters we are not going to act in a huff or in a spirit of anger merely because we dislike something that had happened. I feel, as I said here, that in spite of these occurrences that have happened and that have distressed us, it is right for us to continue our association with the Commonwealth for a variety of reasons which I mentioned then, among them being primarily the fact that our policies, as is obvious, are in no way conditioned or deflected from their normal course by that association. So, nobody can say that there has been this conflict in our policies, that these policies have been affected;—affected every policy might be by consultation; that is a different matter. We consult other countries. We have close relations with other countries. But the decision is ours, and is not affected by the fact of our being in the Commonwealth.

Secondly, at this moment, when there are so many disruptive tendencies in the world, it is better to retain every kind of association, which is not positively harmful to us, than to break it. Breaking it itself is a disruptive thing. It does not add to that spirit of peaceful settlements and peaceful associations that we wish to develop in the world.

Therefore, after giving all this thought, I felt,—and I felt clearly—in my mind, that it would not be good to break up this association in spite of the painful shocks that all of us had experienced in these past few months.

But, again, no decision that we can take in these or other matters for today can be said to be a permanent decision for ever. All kinds of things happen and one has to review these matters from time to time in view of changing conditions. And I would remind the House that the Commonwealth itself is undergoing a change. Ghana is a member of the Common-

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wealth. Possibly Malaya will be a member of the Commonwealth. Possibly a little later Nigeria might be. Its inner composition and content is changing, and changing, if I may say so, in the right direction. Therefore, keeping all these things in view and well realising the strong reactions that have been produced in the country in regard to this matter, I would still respectfully submit to the House that it is desirable, in the present context, to continue this association with the Commonwealth.

That is all I have to say on these subjects now. At the end of this debate, I hope that my colleague, Shri Krishna Menon, might be able to deal with the points raised in this debate and with questions that might be asked. He has been, as the House knows, very intimately connected not only in the Security Council with the various international questions that have arisen there, but also in our discussions with the Egyptian Government.

Mr. Speaker: Motion moved:

> "That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

There are two amendments given notice of.

Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava (Gurgaon): I beg to move:

"That for the original motion, the following be substituted:

> 'This House having considered the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto, fully agrees with and approves the said policy'."

Shri Kamath (Hoshangabad): I beg to move:

'That for the original motion, the following be substituted:

> "This House having considered the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto regrets that even in the tenth year of our freedom and the eighth year of our Republic certain parts of Indian territory are in Portuguese and Pakistani occupation, and urges Government to take speedy measures for the liberation of these territories from foreign rule".'

Mr. Speaker: Amendment moved:

'That for the original motion, the following be substituted:

> "This House having considered the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto, fully agrees with and approves the said policy".'

'That for the original motion, the following be substituted:

> "This House having considered the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto, regrets that even in the tenth year of our freedom and the eighth year of our Republic certain parts of Indian territory are in Portuguese and Pakistani occupation, and urges Government to take speedy measures for the liberation of these territories from foreign rule".'

Shri Radha Raman has given notice of a substitute motion, similar to that of Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava's.

Shri Kamath: We have not got it.

Mr. Speaker: I do not think it necessary to allow it. Therefore, I will confine myself to the amendments which have already been tabled, that is, Nos. 1 and 2.

Hon. Members who want to participate in the discussion will confine their remarks to 15 minutes each nor-