

Assistance for Health Schemes in Punjab

1197. Shri Daljit Singh: Will the Minister of Health be pleased to state:

(a) the amount of assistance given to Punjab from the aid received from U.S.A. under the projects in 1957-58 and 1958-59; and

(b) the names of heads for which it has been given?

The Minister of Health (Shri Karmakar): (a) In 1957-58—Rs. 15,28,171.

In 1958-59—Rs. 18,75,980 (Allotted).

(b) (i) National Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (ii) Assistance to Medical Colleges and Allied Institutions and (iii) National Malaria Control/Eradication Programme.

12:02 hrs.

PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE

REPORT OF COMMISSIONER FOR SCHEDULED CASTES AND SCHEDULED TRIBES FOR 1957-58

The Deputy Minister of Home Affairs (Shrimati Alva): I beg to lay on the Table under article 338(2) of the Constitution, a copy of the Annual Report (Parts I and II) of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the year 1957-58. [Placed in Library. See No. LT-1102/58.]

ANNUAL REPORTS OF INDIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION AND AIR INDIA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION FOR 1957-58

The Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation (Shri Mohiuddin): I beg to lay on the Table, under sub-section (2) of section 37 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953, a copy of each of the following Reports:—

(1) Annual Report of the Indian Airlines Corporation for the year 1957-58 [Placed in Library, See No. LT-1103/58.]

(2) Annual Report of the Air India International Corporation for the year 1957-58. [Placed in Library, See No. LT-1104/58.]

12:03 hrs.

MOTION RE: INTERNATIONAL SITUATION—contd.

Mr. Speaker: The House will now take up further consideration of the following motion moved by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru on the 8th December, 1958, namely:—

“That the present International Situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto, be taken into consideration.”

along with the substitute motions that had been moved.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, Sir, the debate yesterday on this motion dealt chiefly with Indo-Pakistan relations, and more particularly, with border disputes. There were many other matters also referred to undoubtedly. I should like, therefore, to say something again about these border disputes and about that agreement which is sometimes referred to as the Nehru-Noon agreement. But before I do so, I shall deal with some of the broader questions again.

The hon. Member, Shri Jaipal Singh, used language which created a good deal of confusion in my mind, and perhaps in other people's minds too. He began by saying that he was in general agreement with our policy, our foreign policy, but he did not agree with the policy of non-alignment. It was rather an odd thing to say, after saying that he agreed with our policy, that he did not agree. Then he said that yet he agreed with the Nehru policy. About this, I am not quite clear in my mind, if he was speaking seriously or was just—what is called in French—*jeu d'esprit*.

I do not know myself the various distinctions and differences between

our general policy, the policy of non-alignment and what might mistakenly be called the Nehru policy. I thought they were much the same,—all these three.

Anyhow, I would submit, in order to clear up any misapprehension that, first of all, when we say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously, it means non-alignment with military blocs. You cannot have a negative policy. The policy is a positive one, a definite one, and I hope, a dynamic one, but in so far as the military blocs today and the cold war are concerned, we do not align ourselves with either bloc. That is all. That itself is not a policy. It is only a part of the policy. And that is clear enough, and we have to lay stress on that because, unfortunately, in the world today, countries talk and act so much in terms of this cold war and in terms of military blocs and of fear of one or the other, that one has to lay stress on the fact that we are not parties to the cold war and we are not members of or attached to any military bloc.

Having said that, of course, the policy can only be a policy of acting according to our best judgment, and furthering the principal objectives and ideals that we have. Every country's foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security, with its own progress, and one has tried to protect that. Now, security can be protected in many ways. The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true; it is true, no doubt, but security is protected by policies; if you have friendship, you, to some extent, gain security; if you have hostility, you are slightly or somewhat endangered. Therefore, a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else. It may not succeed, of course; that is a different matter.

Apart from this, from the larger point of view of the world also, we have laboured to the best of our abi-

lity for world peace. We realise that our influence in such matters can only be limited. Naturally, because we are not in possession of, nor have we the capacity to possess, weapons like the modern atomic nuclear weapons. But still our influence has not been negligible not because, as I said, we ourselves are influential—in such matters, we do not make such a claim—but because we do believe that what we have said in regard to peace has found an echo in people's minds and hearts in all countries, because, in fact, it was the right thing. And in spite of governmental policies and cold war and the like, people have appreciated what we have said and reacted to it favourably.

As to what our influence has been on governments, I hope we have been able to impress them with the urgent necessity of this matter. Anyhow, I cannot say definitely about it, but I can say with some assurance that our influence on peoples generally all over the world in regard to this particular matter of peace has been very considerable, and any hon. Member who happens to go to any part of the world, in Asia, Europe, America, Africa or elsewhere will always find India's name associated with peace. That brings a great responsibility upon us. It is a privilege to be associated with peace, but it brings, as I said, a great responsibility, that we should not only try to live up to it and function so that we may advance the cause of world peace but in our domestic sphere also we should work on lines which are compatible with peace. We cannot obviously have one voice for the world outside and another voice and another action internally which conflicts with that.

Therefore, our foreign policy has this positive aspect of peace. It is obviously the positive aspect of an increase, of an enlargement of freedom in the world, of colonialism being replaced by free and independent countries, of a larger degree of co-operation and all that. So I hope

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that Shri Jaipal Singh on further reflection will see that there is no conflict between the various appellations and various descriptions of our policy that he gave. But anyhow, it is completely incorrect, if I may say so, to call our policy 'Nehru' policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances in India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and inherent in the circumstances of the case today. I come in by the mere accidental fact that during these few years I have represented that policy as Foreign Minister to foreign countries and in this country, and I have spoken about it many times. Personally, I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in charge of the foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have been in charge of the foreign affairs of India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy. Some emphasis might have been greater here or there because, as I said, it represents every circumstance that goes towards making the thought of India on these subjects.

I say this because some people in foreign countries imagine that this policy has suddenly grown out of nothing and it is merely a policy, as Shri Jaipal Singh himself described it—I hope not very accurately—of sitting on the fence. I do not know what fence he had in mind. There is no question of sitting on the fence or trying to woo this person or that person or this country or that country. Or, if you like, we are always wooing every country. We want to be friends with them. We avoid, as far as possible, running down countries, even though we might differ from them, although we do not hide our sentiments, because we have felt that there is far too much running

down of countries one by the other and creating bitterness so that people's minds are closed. You do not open a person's mind, normally, by running him down. He reacts violently in thinking or action.

So we avoid doing that. There are many things happening in this world which we dislike very much. We do not talk about them except sometimes as a moderate expression of opinion. If they affect us intimately, of course, we have to talk about them. But generally we avoid talking about things which do not affect us intimately or which do not affect basic causes like world peace etc. Then we have to talk. So that I have no doubt that this House, barring perhaps Shri Jaipal Singh, has no doubts about this matter.

But this talking of sitting on the fence does involve an attitude of mind which, I think, is not correct. It is said there are only two ways of action in this world today. One must come down this way or that. Now, I repudiate that attitude of mind. If there are only two ways—if you accept that—then you certainly have to join the cold war, and, if not a military bloc, at least a mental military bloc—if not an actual armed bloc. I do not understand that attitude at all. I just do not see—I speak with all respect to the great countries—why the possession of great armed might or great financial power should necessarily lead to right decisions or a right mental outlook. I do not see how that follows at all. They may be right, they may not be. But the fact that I have got the atom with me does not make me any the more intelligent, wiser or more peaceful than I otherwise might be. It is a simple fact, but it needs reiteration.

The greater a country in armed might, the wiser it must necessarily be in action—I do not think it follows. I said that with all respect to

the great countries. I am not criticising anybody, but I am not prepared even as an individual, much less as the Foreign Minister of this country, to give up my right of independent judgment to anybody else in other countries. That is the essence of our policy.

It may be, as Shri S. A. Dange said, 'Oh, you are friends with all, but sometimes you are more friendly with some people than with others'. That reminds me, of course, of that famous saying that 'all men are equal, but some are more equal than others'. It is true; it may be that occasionally because of some of our activities or some of our expressions, people, who themselves feel strongly about these matters this side or the other, feel that we are inclining too much on this side or that side. The fact of the matter is that we follow our own course of action as we judge right and incline on every side, whenever an opportunity offers itself, to be friendly with them. But it is true that in various matters—let us take economic matters and some other matters, to which I shall refer—we have past contacts which we certainly carry on. In the past, our economic life, rightly or wrongly, in trade, commerce etc., has gone in a certain direction. We have not tried to uproot it. We have tried to develop other directions too, but we have not tried to uproot the old directions, old contacts, old trade ways; we have tried to develop them as well as new ones, and that may give an impression that we have emphasised one and not the other. But, that is the point which Shri Dange laid stress on. He objected to our Chiefs of Staff going to England for certain conferences of military officers there and he thought that that meant some kind of lining up with the military apparatus of some countries of the Commonwealth. He also objected to our Navy joining in manoeuvres with some Commonwealth Navies, or chiefly the British Navy.

I do not think he is justified in objecting to that even, if I may say

so, from his own point of view. I think it must be due to some misapprehension of what is done and what happens. We send our Chiefs of Staff to London occasionally to participate in what is called a joint exercise. We send them because it is a very good opportunity for gaining wider knowledge of modern methods in so far as one can get them there. I do not say that there are no other places where you can get that. But, it is not taking part in manoeuvres; it is not thinking of defence policy vis-a-vis other countries.

For instance, whenever there is a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference and I attend it, there is, usually, side by side with it a conference about defence matters. We do not attend it. I forget now whether there is any other Commonwealth country which has not attended. I think Ceylon does not attend it. Certainly, it has not attended it. We have not attended because we have nothing to do with the defence approach or the peace and war approach of the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth countries.

But, it is quite another matter for us or for our representatives to see an exercise. An exercise means really discussing modern methods of war, usually in a room, how old methods have been affected and so on. We have not got too many of those opportunities to do that by ourselves in this country. Where an opportunity offers itself as it sometimes happens in a limited way, we have to take advantage of that—even in other countries apart from Commonwealth countries. But, in the main, here is an opportunity; we come into touch and we take advantage of it.

Then for the Naval manoeuvres. A Navy or an Army must have some kind of practice. You cannot keep a Navy or anybody in trim without active practice, of mock battles, mock wars. Manoeuvres are mock battles. Our Navy is not big enough to be divided up into two forces fighting a mock battle, one with the other; it is not

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big enough for that purpose. Maybe the British Navy, maybe the American Navy or the Soviet Navy can do that internally; we cannot. So, we take advantage of these naval manoeuvres and participate in these mock battles, try to reproduce very very imperfectly, of course, the conditions of warfare and our people learn from them. It is of the highest importance that our sailors, or for the matter of that our soldiers, should have practical experience in so far as it can be given; and we take advantage of that, whenever an opportunity comes our way.

Then the question—a question almost always mentioned in the past—of our Commonwealth relationship—on this occasion was hardly mentioned. If I remember correctly, it was rather a Member from the Congress side that mentioned it and not from the opposite side. That is, the desirability of our continuing as a Member of the Commonwealth. I have tried to explain our viewpoint many times. I will just say a few words about it.

The House knows that our membership of the Commonwealth has not led us to forsaking any policy of ours being proceeded with. It has, in fact, rather helped us occasionally to put that policy more strongly and more impressively, if I may say so, on others, whether they are members of the Commonwealth or other people. It has helped us, therefore, in trying to put across our policy more, perhaps, than otherwise it might have been the case. Of course, this does not take us very far, I admit, to other factors. The argument that is advanced is that because South Africa, for instance, is functioning in a particular way, a racial way, apartheid etc. and South Africa is a Member of the British Commonwealth—I am sorry for the use of the word 'British'; it is an old word and it came in connection with South Africa—therefore, it is somewhat below our dignity or not in keeping with what we should do to remain in the same group of nations to which South Africa belongs.

I can very well understand that sentiment and that feeling against the racial policy of the South African Union. It is I believe among the many questions that trouble the world today. It is, I think, more basically wrong and dangerous for the future than for anything else. You can talk a great deal of other conflicts, ideological conflicts, communism, anti-communism and so many other things. It surprises me that those countries, particularly those who stand for the democratic tradition, those who voted for the United Nations Charter and for the Human Rights Convention—may I remind this House that tomorrow happens to be the tenth anniversary of the passing of the Human Rights Convention—it surprises me that those great countries express themselves so moderately or do not express themselves at all about this racial policy of the South African Union. It is not a question of policy only. I say it is the greatest immorality, international immorality for a nation to carry on in that way. We have no desire or reason to interfere with what a country does. The South African Government can do what it likes in its internal policy. But, I say, even apart from the fact that in South Africa people of Indian descent are concerned and these people went under certain guarantees and that therefore we have a special concern, even apart from that, even if we do not have that special concern, nevertheless, we would have held these strong views about the racial policy of the South African Government.

As I said, it has been a matter of some distress to me that from others who stand for the democratic tradition, who stand for the dignity of the individual, who have condemned this South African policy, not a voice can be heard elsewhere. Some do. The House will remember that the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Diefenbaker, when he was here spoke strongly and effectively against this racial policy. But some other countries do not do so.

It is this to which I referred in another context yesterday. It was the context of Pakistan. And, I wish to make it clear again that I am not criticising the internal affairs of Pakistan or martial law. It is up to any people to have the kind of government they choose and it is not our concern unless that government threatens us or unless that government functions, as I say the South African Government functions, against the canons of recognised international morality. That is a different matter, and we have to do it. But what, naturally, has been a matter of some concern to me is how the democratic outlook, the democratic tradition is gradually disappearing or is being gradually converted into something, shall I say, a matter of some verbiage or words, and not of a dynamic view of life and action. It is from this point of view that I have watched carefully the reactions of other countries to what had happened in Pakistan. When I found a constant apology in these other countries for what had happened in Pakistan and almost an attempt to show it as something not far removed from democracy, it really amazed me. There can be no greater, well, attempt to delude oneself, and it showed me how far this type of mentality which the cold war is developing has gone.

We are not interested really in any principle which we hold dear; we are interested only in knowing whether this country is with us in a cold war or not, or is in a hot war. That is the chief test.

Take the case of Goa. Take the case of Portugal. What government Portugal has is none of my business or none of the business of this House even. But everybody knows that Portugal has, what is termed, a very authoritarian government—some kind of a dictatorship. Let them have a dictatorship. But Portugal again becomes the strong pillar of peace and democratic principles from another point of view. It does not fit in my mind, it does not tick in my mind—this kind of thing. It shows that we

have all, whether in the Communist countries, whether in the non-Communist countries, become so apt to use words in meanings which are not the dictionary meanings; we simply distort them in some way to fit in with our approach to a particular problem. Here is Portugal—quite apart from the question of Goa; Goa we know well enough and what they do there. There is not the remotest question of any civil liberty or freedom in Goa. Nobody—well, I won't say 'nobody'; I am talking about not 'nobodies', but important bodies, important people and important countries—they say little about Goa or Portugal, and what they have said in the past has been rather an encouragement to Portugal in Goa. We saw recently, some months ago, an election in Goa—I am sorry there are no elections in Goa; it was in Portugal. It was one of the most odd elections that one has read about. We have seen criticisms of other elections in other countries, but the Portuguese election, apart from some newspaper scribes, was calmly passed over.

So the point is not what policy, what programme, what the objectives and ideals of a nation are; but, in this present cold war conflict, where does this nation stand, is it with us or not with us.

Again, a simple fact is forgotten, that it does not necessarily follow that a government of the day in these matters, major matters, has popular will behind it. Whether it is war or peace people count. Today even people who are not free, even in colonial countries, count. In war they will count still more. And, deals are made with governments forgetting that the deal may be worth nothing at all unless the people of that country approve of that deal or, at any rate, do not resent it. So, all these confusing situations arise.

One of the major examples of this kind of thing is what happened in Iraq, one of the chief founder nations of the Baghdad Pact. In fact, the

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very name of the Pact was taken from the capital city of Iraq. Suddenly the country changed, because all that was superficial, because all the deals were with a group at the top which did not represent the country, the people, and the people threw out the group at the top; and, there you are, the Baghdad Pact high and dry, one day thrown out from the mansion it had built for itself. Where it is I do not know, except in speeches and writings.

So we live in this odd world where, to use another phrase, there is so much double-thinking, so much use of language in a double way, that if one is confused it is not surprising. I do not pretend to possess any peculiar wisdom or intelligence, but I do try to avoid to be wholly confused by this situation. I cannot lay down what the future will show. So far as we in India are concerned, I should very much like not to stray too much from the right path and to serve the cause of peace in India and outside, not only from the larger viewpoint of the world but from the narrowest, opportunist viewpoint of my own country.

We try to do that, and in doing that take the question of our neighbour country, Pakistan I have tried to be fair. As this House knows, I have acknowledged often enough what I thought was wrong on our part. I have said only yesterday that in regard to these border troubles sometimes we are in the wrong, sometimes we emphasise things which should not be emphasised. I have said all that in my attempt to be fair—I do not know if I can be fair because nobody can be perfectly fair in matters which affect us so intimately; but I have tried to be fair—and it has been a matter of grief to me that in spite of all these efforts not too much change is visible on the other side. I did not make those efforts waiting for a change; whether a change comes or not I think we should function in the right way.

That is not only the right way, but it is a way of strength not of weakness—whether it is Pakistan, whether it is South Africa, whether it is some other place.

Hon. Members sometimes ask me, why don't you act with strength. The hon. Member, Dr. Subbarayan, said that in South Africa and Ceylon we must do this and we must do that. Where do these 'musts' come in, I should like to know, in international politics? I do not understand it. Where does 'must' come in in regard to South Africa. Am I to declare war against South Africa? Obviously not. I can only take the matter up in the United Nations or I can express my opinion, that is all. So, why all these fine gestures of defiance which you cannot give effect to? It has no meaning, and ultimately it becomes a sign of weakness if we talk in that way.

Ceylon—of course, Ceylon is in a completely different category. It is a friendly nation. It is our neighbour, and it is very closely aligned to us in cultural and other matters. We want to be friends, and I am quite certain the people of Ceylon want to be friends with India. Yet, we have inherited this problem of a considerable number of people of Indian descent in Ceylon, apart from the Indian nationals. There it is, one of those problems which with all the goodwill in the world is not easily solved. Essentially, it should not be treated as an Indian problem or a Ceylon problem, but as a human problem affecting a large number of human beings. I am not arguing that point. But I say, what is the good of telling me "Go and solve it immediately"? How am I to solve it immediately? I cannot. Am I to threaten Ceylon and make the lot of those people and everybody much worse? It might satisfy some kind of ambition on our part to display the strong hand, the fist. We do not normally, when we are in the right

mood, display the fist to anybody. So, one has to see this matter in that context. One has to see the Pakistan matter in this context. One has to see the border troubles in this context.

It is true; I think Acharya Kripalani said yesterday that these border troubles will continue. That is to say, so long as there is friction between India and Pakistan, it is likely to be reflected on the borders. To some extent, it may become a little less, but it will be reflected, because it is the basic atmosphere, the basic relationship between India and Pakistan that is wrong. That is taken advantage of not only sometimes by good people, but certainly by bad people on both sides. On the Pakistan side specially and sometimes maybe on our side too, the bad people are protected; they are not stopped from doing it, because there a feeling of nationalist pride comes in: We must protect our men. The same thing happens somewhere in the middle of Rajasthan. It is only some evil-doers misbehaving.

Coming to these border matters, Shri Jaipal Singh talked about Chittagong hill tracts. I must confess that when I first went through Justice Radcliffe's award, in which he awarded the Chittagong hill tracts to Pakistan, I was considerably surprised, because according to any approach of principle. I saw no reason for that. But there it was; it was a clear decision and not a question of interpretation. I could not interpret it in any other way. What were we to do? We had accepted soon after partition Radcliffe as arbitrator, in a sense, arbitrator. However much it went against my thinking, against our interests, against India's interests. I could not break it; we could not break our word. We had to accept it, although we thought it very unreasonable and devoid of any approach of principle. There it was and that has been the position till then.

The matter has been raised from time to time, notably by Shri Jaipal Singh. I can very well understand

his feeling in that matter. I share that feeling. But what am I to do? I cannot denounce the Radcliffe award, which definitely, deliberately, in a clearly defined manner, gave that to Pakistan. We can negotiate with Pakistan if a proper atmosphere is present and consider it. But the House can well realise what the answer would be, if we suggested negotiation about the Chittagong hill tracts, which have been given to them precisely and definitely by the Radcliffe award. It would lead us nowhere, when there are difficulties about much simpler matters with Pakistan.

We could hardly raise this matter previously in the United Nations. I do not see how we can raise it in the United Nations. The obvious answer is there: The Radcliffe award and all that. So, there it is. I do not know what I can do about it, however much Shri Jaipal Singh or I may feel about it.

There is a calling attention notice from Shri Premji Assar. In that notice, he has said that a spokesman of the West Bengal Government had said that it would be physically impossible to prevent the exchange of enclaves by the target date. There is some misapprehension about this matter. So far as the Cooch-Bihar enclaves—enclaves in the old Cooch-Bihar State—are concerned, there is no target date at all. There can be none, because their exchange can only take place after legislation has been passed by this Parliament. There was some doubt as to the method we should pursue. It was clear that this required at least legislation by Parliament. Some people said that it might even require an amendment of the Constitution. But all the legal luminaries we consulted have agreed that this does not require an amendment of the Constitution, but it does require legislation by Parliament. Naturally, we will come before this House sometime or other with proposals to pass that legislation and the House will consider it. So, there is no question of target date there.

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The target date was fixed for the other exchanges, not the enclaves. That target was fixed some months ahead so as to allow for demarcation and settlement to avoid any confusion afterwards. That demarcation was started and then it was interrupted. According to us, it was the fault of the Pakistani people. However, it was interrupted. Now, lately it has started again. The West Bengal Government approached the East Pakistan Government and they agreed to start it again. The West Bengal Government has suggested to them now that in order to expedite this matter of demarcation, more than one survey party should function and there should be several survey parties. To that, we have had no answer, so far as I know. But one party is functioning now.

A great deal was said yesterday from both sides of the House about the Berubari Union. May I give the facts? One hon. Member enquired when this question arose about the Berubari Union becoming a matter of dispute. In the Radcliffe award, the boundary for the Berubari Union was not very clearly described. There was a map too. But the matter at that time was not referred to Justice Bagge, which came soon after. Bagge finished his work in 1950, but in considering the second Bagge award, then fresh problems arose and there were two interpretations.

It was in 1952 that this question of the Berubari Union became a matter of dispute and discussion between India and Pakistan, that is, about six or seven years ago. It is true that so far as possession is concerned, it had been in our possession since independence. The House may remember that although possession was ours, Pakistan claimed a large part of the area round about Sylhet-Karimganj as an interpretation of the Radcliffe award. It is amazing how much difficulties this Radcliffe award has caused us in interpretation. They claimed huge

areas and Justice Bagge had to deal with this matter together with an

Indian judge and a Pakistani judge. The decision of Justice Bagge plus the Indian judge in regard to a large piece of territory in Karimganj was in our favour. That part was disposed of. But, nevertheless, after the Bagge Award again difficulties arose in interpretation of what Bagge had said and what Radcliffe had said. The difficulties arose chiefly because first of all they laid down a rule that we shall accept, broadly speaking, the boundaries of districts or taluks or administrative areas. Now the administrative areas inside a country does not matter. But when the boundaries become international frontiers, it makes a difference. Sometimes it is said as the other side of the river. Then they attach maps to the description, and the map does not tally with the description. Sometimes they name a river and there was doubt as to which river was meant.

Anyhow, my point is that after the Bagge Award several other matters arose on interpretation and we have been holding to certain interpretations of our own and Pakistan to some others. It was after the Bagge Award, after at least 1952 that Pakistan raised this question about Berubari Union. We contested their claim and in our opinion, we said, the whole Union had been awarded to India. The dispute has gone on. I am merely referring to it. It is not a new dispute. This was finally considered at the Prime Ministers' meetings. I may as well say that the Prime Ministers did not consider it, because I am not an expert on revenue boundaries, but we considered it at the official level, with Secretaries and revenue authorities advising us. And the whole agreement that was arrived at between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, which was really arrived at the official level by various parties advised by Secretaries and revenue officials, was accepted by us after closely examining it. One of the parts of that

agreement was that this Berubari Union, which both claimed as an entirety, should be broadly divided into two parts, northern and the southern, the northern remaining with India and the southern going to Pakistan. I cannot obviously enter into the merits of the case. Large maps and charts and revenue records of what this meant and what that meant becomes highly complicated. I am merely venturing to place before the House the procedure that was adopted. So, we accepted the advice chiefly of the revenue authorities and others of West Bengal that this might be done.

Now I should like to point out that in these various matters of interpretation and dispute, well, there were some matters in which one could say with confidence that our case was strong. In some matters one felt that our case was not very strong. Naturally when we have a dozen such matters, some points are strong and some weak, and we had to take all these matters into consideration in coming to a "give and take" agreement.

A great deal was said even by Shri Jaipal Singh and other Members that we show weakness in dealing with these matters, our case goes by default and we accept everything that Pakistan says. Well, that is not correct. Even in the present case, it might interest the House to know that as a result of the so-called "Nehru-Noon Agreement"—I want to give the figures; I have got them here—as a result of the agreement in regard to the exchange of territories the total area which comes to India is 42.4 sq. miles; the total area that goes to Pakistan is 4.8 sq. miles. And when I say coming to India, a part of it is in India now, but that is taken out of the area of dispute and agreed to that this is India. The total area in dispute in this area was 47.2 sq. miles. As I said, of this 42.4 sq. miles definitely comes to India. So, it is not a question of handing over territory to Pakistan and accepting what they say. The total area of Berubari Union is 2.75 sq. miles, and the agreement was

that about half of it should go to them and about half of it should come to India.

Reference was made to Hili. As a matter of fact, the whole area, a large area of 34.88 miles comes to India, and Pakistan admitted that it should go to India, although they have been claiming it.

Shri Ramga: What about the population? How many are there?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: You mean Berubari Union? The total population of Berubari Union is 10,000 to 12,000. I think half of it remains there. Roughly half of it goes there. But I do not know the density of population in each part. About 5,000 to 6,000 may be affected by this.

श्री रघुनाथ सिंह (वाराणसी) : मैं यह जानना चाहता हूँ कि हिन्दुस्तान के हाथ में इस वक्त जो इलाका है उसमें से कितना जायेगा । May I know the area occupied by India now?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I cannot give the exact figures. But, as I said just now, this includes some parts which are at present in the possession of India. Now, if you go into the details about this, it is a highly complicated matter in which for months and months our experts have been struggling with revenue records, maps and all that, and finally in regard to these particular matters they felt that it would be advantageous, not only from the national point of view but from the point of view of the people of those areas, who were subjected to this constant indecision and conflict, to recommend this settlement of these particular disputes, and we accepted that, rightly.

It is a fact that whatever you may decide, it causes some inconvenience, some upset to some people. We wanted to see that it is as little as possible.

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One thing more about Tukegram. Tukegram has been all the time since independence in India's possession. The dispute about Tukegram as such only arose this year, that is, Pakistan raised this question. In another sense, Tukegram is part of a larger area about which there was some dispute, a continuing one. But by itself there is no dispute about this and it was undoubtedly, according to our thinking, our territory. I say this because some statement made on our behalf in answer to a question, I think in the other House, has slightly led to some misapprehensions. In fact, our Deputy Minister made a statement in the other House, clearing that misapprehension, today.

13 hrs.

Some Hon. Members suggested that a Joint Judicial Board be constituted to deal with these problems and that the chairman of that Board should be neither an Indian nor a Pakistani, but some outsider and I believe he suggested someone from another Commonwealth country. That kind of proposal, I say, is a completely wrong one and we are not at all prepared to consider it. We are prepared to consider a Tribunal to take up such matters; some matters can be referred to it, because after all finally there is no way of settling these matters except either by agreement or by an arbitrator or by a tribunal.

We suggested this in regard to some other matters to Mr. Feroze Khan Noon, but he rejected that. He did not accept that. I think some hon. Members actually read out yesterday from what he said on that occasion when he went back to Karachi. I do not see any other way of settling them. It is our misfortune that two tribunals, the Radcliffe and the Bagge, still left matters vague.

Shri Hem Barua (Gauhati): Nothing was vague about Tukegram. They did not leave anything vague about Tukegram.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Tukegram is not mentioned at all. The question of vagueness is not there. Normally it is in India.

An hon. Member—I think it was probably Shri Dange, or maybe someone else—said that it was not safe for our pattern of armaments to be linked up with one particular power. Broadly speaking, I agree with that statement. We should not be tied up to any big power. To some extent it becomes a little difficult for us to spread ourselves out all over the world and the real answer to this question is to produce things oneself in one's own country, except any special thing which we may buy here or there; broadly speaking to increase our defence production capacity. We are trying to do that to the best of our ability. It is not an easy matter and we cannot, however much we might produce things ourselves, build up that enormous equipment for research and advance which the great powers have. We do not intend doing it; we do not want it. We are not aiming at any kind of competition in this matter. But we want to be self-sufficient in this respect in regard to our normal defence equipment.

Finally, Sir, I should like to say something in regard to some remarks which Acharya Kripalani made. First of all he said that our Military Department must be above a suspicion in regard to contracts, etc. I entirely agree with him, of course. And not only the Military Department, but all Departments should endeavour to do that. I cannot say honestly that every department of Government here, or in fact anywhere else, is hundred per cent. perfect. There is trouble, there is misappropriation and all that sometimes. But I do believe that the kind of opinion that is sometimes held apparently about so-called corruption etc. in Government departments is much exaggerated.

As I said, we are functioning today as Government over a sphere which

is probably a hundred times bigger than in pre-independence days. It is a tremendous domain and new territories are being included—I mean to say the public sector and all that. Everything is tremendous. If I may use a word each department of Government, each Ministry, is an empire in extent! Now this very extent raises difficult problems and we are constantly struggling and endeavouring to make our apparatus of Government more efficient, more economical and to have people of integrity. I think that marked progress is being made in this direction.

Remember today how many eyes are on Government departments. Every Member of this House or the other House—if not every Member, a large number of them—are vigilant guardians. They are vigilant to see and if anything happens down they come upon them: quite rightly, they should. There are so many people looking at them. In previous days nobody looked upon them. If a mistake happened, it just happened. Our newspapers also are eager to pick up anything that might savour of some scandal. So that there are enough eyes and ears at work and the smallest thing that happens is brought out either by question or in newspaper, or otherwise. One must remember also all this background and see the enormous range of governmental activity. If you pick out something and if something happens, you must see it in relation to it. And do not—if I may say so with respect—because of one case or two or ten cases think that 10,000 other cases are wrong. We must have some perspective in view.

My hon. friend Acharya Kripalani mentioned defence. And defence, remember, is in such a matter the most difficult department of all, difficult, that is to say, so long as it deals with foreign firms. If we produce our goods ourselves then it will be on the same level as others. Nothing is more difficult than purchasing armaments from the big firms abroad and elsewhere. There is no

real competition in that matter. Deals are not done normally in public. They can more or less fix their own prices and we try to argue with them and accept them or not. So defence is always a dangerous thing and in every country it is in deals connected with defence that wrong things happen. I entirely accept that in defence we have to be very careful.

Unfortunately, the first year after independence, 1948 was a very critical year for us. Soon after independence the Kashmir trouble started and nobody knew in 1948 at what time the Kashmir trouble might not extend to an all-out war with Pakistan. Those who held responsibility then found it rather a heavy burden to carry, i.e., about our security, about a possible major war as to what might happen. A little later came the Hyderabad problem. It was a small affair as it happened. But we saw it in terms of all this, i.e., what was happening in Kashmir, what was happening in Pakistan—and just soon after Partition when we had very few arms, very few vehicles and all that in proper condition. We were anxious to buy and certain contracts were made.

The first contracts were made—the very first—by the new department at India House. Till then every contract was made through the India Office, i.e., through the British agency. The early contracts were made when no proper establishment was built up and all that and here we had a violent hurry because of this acute dangerous situation which might result in sudden war with Pakistan and we would not have this or that. Certain contracts were made then which led ultimately, as the House knows, to enormous trouble and still pursue us, i.e., what is called the jeep scandal and all that. So, see the context of it.

We have gone into this matter very, very thoroughly and we are convinced—I cannot say honestly that some people in England or some people elsewhere did not make money out of

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it; some people did because we have lost the money and obviously it has gone somewhere, but I am simply speaking after all the long enquiries that have been made—that people in India House were by these circumstances and not by anything else hustled in agreeing to certain terms, etc., which normally they would not have agreed to or to deal with certain firms which they might not have dealt with. Considering everything we thought that it was our misfortune that we have got caught in that way and not that any person is deliberately at fault. That was our firm opinion and of those who examined it

Now, remember again the enormous scale on which Defence purchases things from abroad. It is a very big scale and I beg you to consider that dealing in this big way how few instances have arisen which have been challenged in this House. Maybe, of course, some misappropriation was not caught. That is quite possible. It does not necessarily follow that because it was not challenged it was all right. But still what I am venturing to point out is that by and large if you look at this picture it has been a picture of straight dealing and care-taking. Sometimes a mistake has been made. Even now we are enquiring into some matters which really go back to—I think the story goes back probably about four or five years—1954. We are enquiring into it. We have taken action to occasionally dismiss some high-ranking people and all that. So, we are trying to do what we can. But, again I would beg this House to consider one aspect of this. We have to be vigilant, we have to be careful and we have to take action—and firm action—whenever necessary. But it is a wrong thing—and a dangerous thing—to create an atmosphere.

Shri Tyagi (Dehra Dun): I must submit that firm action is lacking.

Shri Braj Singh (Ferozabad): It will always lack.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Hon. Member, Shri Tyagi, knows about these matters and his advice is always valuable. He may be right. He may be right that firm action is lacking but what I am venturing to say is that wherever necessary or when it is proved we come down with a heavy hand. But one thing is dangerous as it is wrong and that is, first of all, to condemn large numbers of people—fine Services—because somebody had erred. The person who has erred—cut off his head, if you will. Certainly, but do not colour the whole Service with that. It is a bad thing. It is bad anywhere whether it is civil or anybody. It is worse when the military and those people are concerned

Secondly, do not do anything which discourages the bright people—the scientists, the technicians and others. Thus far they had no chance or very little chance of doing anything special—they had to work in routines, in grooves. The best of them become affected by this and become dull. That unfortunately is sometimes the result of too much bureaucracy. People are promoted by virtue of years of service and not that they have got greater intelligence in their heads. They go on being promoted one after the other and at a certain stage they are asked to quit, whether they are good or bad. I think it is quite illogical and insensible. This may be all right for your lower grade clerks but for intelligent men, when you spend a large sum of money and when you get them trained, to be asked to quit when it is the best time of service, it is quite absurd. Of course, in the educational field it is fantastic. In other countries I have seen the professors reaching the hundred years standard and nobody kicks them out—they are 95 or 92 years of age—because they all are respected, whatever be their age. It is not a civil

service kind of thing—the rotation of coming and going.

So, with this bureaucratic approach the brilliant person is treated like a mediocre, on the same level. That may not matter so much in the normal governmental administration. It does matter, of course, but not so much. But it matters ever so much where you have to deal with scientific and other discoveries and progress. The scientist cannot function in that atmosphere. It is possibly, if all the time he is pulled up and told not to do this and not to do that, just a madness for a man of acute intelligence who is trying to do a bit of high intellectual work. We have got some very fine men in our Defence installations—good scientists and good technicians—and they have been doing particularly fine work in the course of last year or two, and you have seen some examples. Why? Because they are enthusiastic now. They have been given free play—do something I do not want this House to create an impression on them, “We do not approve of your doing them”

Now, Acharya Kripalamb mentioned Kashmir and said that it is not safe to rely completely on one person and he referred to certain previous incidents. We should rely on the people.

Shri Tyagi: That is what they are doing in India too.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I think, for once I completely disagree with Shri Tyagi. So long as there are many Shri Tyagis in this country that cannot happen and fortunately there are many such persons.

But about what Acharya Kripalamb said—and he said it in all earnestness—I should like to remind him that one has to see these things not in a vacuum but in particular situations. Here is Kashmir. It has gone through such an ordeal for many years, which

today has armies on the cease-fire line on either side and which in the last year or two, as the House knows, has had to face a secret and deliberate campaign of sabotage. Schools—and I speak with some knowledge—being started to teach people how to commit sabotage and people sent across just to commit that sabotage—on the other side of the border it started not in our territory—sent deliberately. This is difficult situation to face. It is not a normal situation. And difficult situations have to be faced sometimes in abnormal ways. Nevertheless, in spite of all this elections have been held in Kashmir twice. You may say—and you may perhaps be right—that the elections are not of that high standard as we would like them to be or as they have been held in the rest of India. Nevertheless, whatever be the standard, it does give a great opportunity to the people there. It has given them that opportunity. There are those difficulties. We cannot have it in ideal conditions anywhere. In these conditions, the situation throws up men to deal with those situations. And the present Prime Minister of Kashmir, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, is a person who undoubtedly has shown quite remarkable qualities of organisation and leadership. He has done something. I am quite free to confess here that sometimes he has acted in ways which I have not liked at all—just as all of us may act in some ways—and I have ventured to draw his attention to these too. But the fact is that here is this great problem and this great responsibility which he is shouldering, and carrying this burden

Now, Acharya Kripalamb referred also to the case of Mrudula Sarabhai. I do not think it would be proper for me, since he has referred to her case, to pass it by and say nothing. That would be unfair to the House. Well, all of us or nearly all of us have known her well. I think I have known her for a trifle over forty years, since she was a child, a girl. And there are few persons in India, men or women, whose courage I have

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admired so much as hers. She is a brave, courageous young woman. But there are also few persons whose judgment I have disputed and thought wrong, often enough. I mean that wrong judgment is alike to courage. It often produces very wrong results, because she has the courage to go wrong, and repeatedly wrong, and not to be cowed down by anybody into any other course of action. Speaking for myself, I can assure Acharya Kripalani or anybody else, and for myself I have never doubted her own motives, her *bona fides*. But I have been amazed to see how she can persist in wrong doing and harmful doing to her country. Almost every member of this House has received no doubt vast bundles of papers from her frequently. It is amazing that type of propaganda being carried on—and I had that examined repeatedly—much of it baseless, without foundation. I do not say that she deliberately tells a lie. But she believes every liar that comes to her and puts it across to the people with her own imprint and gives publicity to that. We talked to her, tried to reason with her and tried to explain to her but it had no effect.

So it is not a question of Midula Sarabhai being guilty of high treason. I do not say that at all. But under an unfortunate set of circumstances her courage and her capacity is being utilised and exploited for wrong and dangerous purposes. She got far greater publicity in Pakistan than in India. That is no argument, I know but I merely say that her whole activity—not that she meant it—became so anti-national, so harmful to India that it became rather difficult to leave it where it was. In fact for months and months, in fact for a longer period, we did allow matters to remain where they were. I do not think we would have acted in this way with any other person in India for so long, whoever he might have been. But because of our high regard for her and because of her known courage we did that, and if I

may quote some lines that come to my head

And to be wrath with those we
love
Doth work like madness in the
brain

Now, one thing else. He referred to the case of Mr Balraj Puri, his treatment. I enquired into this matter. I cannot say what the exact facts were except to say that the lengthy reports that have come to me after enquiry did not wholly support Mr Balraj Puri's own account in the sense that—and it is quite possible occasionally that varying reports may come and people are excited—here was a crowded court room and this is in Jammu when Mr Balraj Puri entered it and rather threw his weight about.

Shri Goray (Poona) Mr Balraj Puri is the last man who can throw his weight

Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur) Sir, you have seen the man. He is not a man who can throw his weight. All that he did was that he raised his hands.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It is not in the physical sense. I am not complaining, I mean to say that even the Magistrate noticed this pushing about and he commented upon it and he was asked I think, by a police officer to go out. I am not for a moment judging this incident. All that I say is that here is a crowded room where a person comes in, and he said something and I am sorry that he suffered any inconvenience. But the conditions were peculiar. In a crowded room this kind of thing happens.

Shri Nath Pai I may be excused for interrupting the Prime Minister, because Mr Balraj Puri won't be having a chance of defending himself and the Prime Minister's version will go before the country. There is a medical certificate that he has produced of the beatings he has received in the police

lock-up, which he has brought to the notice of no less a person than the Prime Minister himself. Mr. Balraj Puri will not be having an opportunity of saving his honour. He was ill-treated and maltreated and beaten up for the offence that he raised his hand in the court when Sheikh Abdullah was being tried in the court.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: As I said it is difficult for me, I have spent some time over this enquiry and I have no doubt that some things that Mr. Balraj Puri says are correct, but I do get the impression that some other things that he has not said are also correct, and there are exaggerations on all sides.

That is all, Sir. I am thankful to the House for the patient hearing it has given me.

Raja Mahendra Pratap (Mathura): On a point of order, Sir. There is some confusion in my mind on your speech. How do you think that non-alignment and Commonwealth can go together? That is one thing. And how do you explain that non-violence and the preparation for war can go together? It means that non-violence cannot protect us, army is needed.

Mr. Speaker: Order order.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: As regard the amendments to this motion, I am prepared to accept one of them, Shri Jaganatha Rao's. I do not particularly mind if there is no amendment. There is no necessity for an amendment. But, naturally in sheer self-defence I have to accept that amendment.

Mr. Speaker: There are the other amendments.

Shri Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri (Bengal): I press my amendment.

Shri Mahanty (Dhenkanal): I press my amendment.

Mr. Speaker: The question is:

"That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely —

"This House, having considered the present International situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto, places on record its dissatisfaction with the present posture of India's relations with Pakistan and the manner in which the Government of India have hastened to conclude with Pakistan in the month of September, 1958, the Border Re-adjustment Agreement (known as the Nehru-Noon Agreement) and have agreed to transfer under terms thereof, certain territories of the Indian Union, particularly a part of the Berubari Union of the district of Jalpaiguri in West Bengal, without obtaining the prior consent of the Indian citizens numbering about 10,000 living there or their elected representatives, and also to make other concessions to Pakistan without obtaining any dependable guarantees or assurances that these concessions would lead to any change for the better in its attitude on these borders and that border violations and other depredations from Pakistan side would cease and that the Agreement would be respected.

(2) The House also deploras the fact that the Government have so far failed to take any effective steps for obtaining the resolution of the outstanding problems concerning our vital interests nearer home, such as the question of the status of Indians in Ceylon and that political repression still continuing in Goa against the freedom fighters, and express its concern at the way the Government is moving step by step into the economic and financial orbits of Western powers like U.S.A., Britain and such other countries.