

[Secretary]

request that the concurrence of the House of the People in the said motion and the names of the Members of the House to be appointed to the said Joint Committee may be communicated to this Council."

MOTION

"That the Bill to provide a special form of marriage in certain cases and for the registration of such and certain other marriages be referred to a Joint Committee of the Houses consisting of 45 members, 15 members from this Council, namely—

1. Dr. Shrimati Seeta Parmanand;
2. Shrimati Savitry Devi Nigam;
3. Shrimati Violet Alva;
4. Khwaja Inait Ullah.
5. Shri Mohamed Valiulla;
6. Dr. Purna Chandra Mitra;
7. Shri Ram Prasad Tamta;
8. Shri B. K. Mukerjee;
9. Shri K. Rama Rao;
10. Shri Hirday Nath Kunzru;
11. Principal Devaprasad Ghosh;
12. Shri Venkat Krishna Dhage;
13. Shri Rajendra Pratap Sinha;
14. Shri Amolak Chand;
15. Shri C. C. Biswas.

and 30 members from the House of the people;

that in order to constitute a sitting of the Joint Committee the quorum shall be one-third of the total number of members of the Joint Committee;

that in other respects, the Rules of Procedure of this Council relating to Select Committee will apply with such variations and modifications as the Chairman may make;

that this Council recommends to the House of the People that the

House do join in the said Joint Committee and communicate to this Council the names of members to be appointed by the House to the Joint Committee; and

that the Committee shall make a report to this Council within two months after its appointment."

PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE

The Deputy Minister of Irrigation and Power (Shri Hathi): On behalf of the Finance Minister, I beg to lay on the Table a copy of each of the following documents under Article 151(1) of the Constitution:

- (1) Appropriation Accounts of Railways in India for 1950-51. Part I—Review. [Placed in the Library. See No. IV u.a. (75).]
- (2) Appropriation Accounts of Railways in India for 1950-51. Part II—Detailed Appropriation Accounts. [Placed in the Library. See No. IV u.a. (75).]
- (3) Block Accounts (including capital statement comprising the Loan Accounts), Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Accounts of Indian Government Railways, 1950-51. [Placed in the Library. See No. IV u.a. (75).]
- (4) Balance Sheets of Railway Collieries and Statements of All-in-cost of coal, etc. for 1950-51. [Placed in the Library. See No. IV u.a. (71).]
- (5) Audit Report, Railways, 1952 (Part II). [Placed in the Library. See No. IV u.a. (76).]

✓ MOTION RE: INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs and Defence (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): I beg to move—

✓ "That the present International situation and the policy of the

Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

At almost every session of this Parliament, this subject has come up for debate and the House has been pleased to express its approval of the general policy pursued by the Government of India in regard to international affairs. In the course of each session a considerable number of questions are put which indicate the eager interest that hon. Members take in international affairs. On my part, I should like to express my deep appreciation of this active interest and the support that this House has invariably given in these vital matters which affect our country and the world.

International affairs are not the privilege of a select coterie of diplomats today. They have to be understood—especially by this House and even, I would say, by the general public—not in their intricate details, but in the matter of policies that lie behind them, because international affairs have become of enormous importance even in the lives of the common people today. They might lead to war; they might lead to other developments which are almost as bad as war and thus affect the lives of each one of us.

Now it is all very well to talk about international affairs or about foreign policy as if that was some integrated whole which you can put forward and say 'aye' or 'no' to it. Of course, the House knows that it is a much more complicated affair than that, and the fact is that even a policy, a foreign policy, which may have and should have, of course, certain fixed and more or less definite ideals and objectives, nevertheless is a collection of foreign policies—not one single item—because the world is not fashioned after our liking. All kinds of different problems arise and there are different interests, and we have to adapt ourselves to them keeping in view this basic policy. Apart from that, international affairs have been taking increasingly a stranger turn. There is an element of

dogmatic fervour, something resembling the old approach of bigoted religion in them, something resembling that ordered division of "either you are with us, or you are against us"; and so we have this, if I may say so with all respect, narrow approach which considers everything in terms of black and white—"those with us or those against us"—and repeating that old, unfortunate bigoted approach of religion which brought about the wars of religion in the past, with not even the saving graces which religion sometimes had provided in the past.

International affairs have ceased to be a game of debonair diplomats discussing some secrets and become something where hard things are said, threats are uttered continuously against each other, and so far as the world is concerned, we live in a precarious state between hope and fear. Some people imagine that a country's policy should be what they call a 'strong' policy—strong policy apparently meaning that we should go about looking as fierce and ferocious as possible, threatening everybody, telling everybody that we will punish them if they don't behave as we want them to behave. Now, that kind of thing may sound very well at a public meeting and may evoke applause, but the fact is that that represents great immaturity in political thinking or understanding. Mature nations—as we are certainly in this matter as in many others,—(Hon. Members: Hear, hear), do not behave in this way. We have to show our maturity by trying to understand things, by trying to balance them, by trying always to see and act in a manner which helps, not hinder. Now, all these things put some limitations in our way, limitations in the way of expression, especially for a person who is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, because on the one hand I would like to be as frank as possible with this House and with our country, and on the other hand I would not like to say anything which needlessly irritates or angers any country—whether I agree with that country or disagree with it is another

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

matter—because I do not think we shall advance our cause, our country's cause or the world's cause by merely showing irritation against other countries' policies, in New Delhi. Naturally, where we differ fundamentally from them, we have to express our own view-points of disagreement or agreement as the case may be. The pace of events has grown progressively faster. Whether all this is due to the fact that we live in an age of some kind of a consummation of the Industrial Revolution that began one hundred or two hundred years ago, or other factors are involved in it, I do not know. But you may symbolise that pace of events by the continuous talk of this latest progeny of the industrial age, the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb, or the cobalt bomb of which some people have begun talking about. All this means a terrific threat overhanging humanity, fear and apprehension all over; and oddly enough, at the same time the hope of an infinitely better life for humanity is offered. We have had some extraordinary things, and the choice before the world is between these two. Well, as I have put it, the choice can only be one. But the fact remains that nobody can be sure whether the choice will be war or peace.

Two days ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations began its sessions and they are having very important problems before them. And may I in this connection say something, in saying which I am sure I will be repeating the sentiments of the House, that we express our pleasure that a Member of this House has been elected to the Presidency of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and in particular that a representative of Indian womanhood has been so elected?

In considering foreign affairs we are naturally interested in particular problems which affect us intimately, whether it is the question, the old question, of the treatment of people

of Indian descent in South Africa or the question, also an old one, of the treatment of people of Indian descent in Ceylon, or other like problems of Indians overseas. We are interested in them. Because, we are concerned with the fate of hundreds and thousands of these people who, though no longer citizens and nationals of India, were in the past connected with India, about whom we have various agreements and assurances and the like, and therefore we have a certain responsibility with regard to them, although they are not our nationals. These problems continue, and must continue to interest the House.

Then there are those other problems of foreign establishments in India, and the House and our country is naturally impatient about them and does not like this delay in their solution. That is true. Nobody likes it. Not only do we not like it in the present from a political point of view, but from many others; they are centres of smuggling, of intrigues and trouble, danger spots even in time of peace. And suppose, unfortunately, some kind of war broke out in parts of the world, they might well become even greater danger spots. We have said quite clearly in this House that if war breaks out anywhere—it does not matter between whom it is—so far as we are concerned, we will not admit the right of any part of India, including those parts that are called foreign establishments in India, to be associated with that war in any way. I want to make it perfectly clear that if these places are used, directly or indirectly, in connection with a war, we shall have to take action to stop that. I say that not, obviously, in any sense as a threat, but because it is well to make clear some things so that others may be aware of the consequences of some action they might conceivably indulge in.

Having said that, I have also to put before the House my view as to how we should deal with these problems.

basically, not in detail. That is to say, it is easy enough for us to talk of strong measures, and it will not be difficult to take such measures in their limited significance. But nothing is limited in this matter, more especially when these establishments are connected with nations abroad, some great nations, some small. Then the consequences are far-reaching. And I think that the House agrees with me that to take some step, merely because of our impatience and irritation, some step which might produce these far-reaching consequences, which might entangle us in all kinds of difficulties will not help us in bringing about the solution that we desire. After all, the way of peaceful approach, though it may appear rather humdrum, brings results more speedily and, what is more, does not leave any trail of bitterness which is left among nations even after they have won a victory.

Therefore [we have proceeded in regard to these foreign establishments firmly, I think, in the declaration of our policy—in the sense of pursuing that policy in a quite way but at the same time peacefully and not trying to take, what I would call, measures that are not peaceful. We are perfectly alive to the questions relating to them. We are constantly giving thought and taking such action as may appear expedient within the four corners of that peaceful approach. The other day we withdrew our representative from Lisbon and closed our Legation there. That was a gesture, no doubt. But it was an important gesture showing how we are going in a particular direction, step by step. No doubt that step will have to be followed by other steps. I need not, before this House, go into the reasoning about these foreign establishments.] But for the sake of others who might perhaps read or hear my words I should like to express my amazement at the fact that any country could still think of holding on any foreign country, could still think of having its foot-holds in India, holding on any territory in India, after the great changes that have taken place in India and elsewhere. So far

as we are concerned, [we are against any colonial rule in any part of the world. It is true we do not, because of our—if you like—weakness, do much about it. And because we do not do much about it we do not shout much about it, because shouting without doing does not help.

We are against all forms of colonial rule. We also recognise that in a complicated situation it is not always easy merely to solve a problem by trying to give effect to a slogan. It may take time. We recognise also that the days of the old imperialisms are obviously ended—in a large measure they have ended. They continue undoubtedly in places in Asia and Africa, and sometimes create much mischief. The old imperialisms are past history. They may carry on in the present for a while. But even though they are past history, it is extraordinary how old vested interests cling on to what they have got to the bitter end. Now, if we are against all forms of colonial domination and rule, how much more must we object to anything actually on the soil of India? If we object even in Africa or a part of Asia, surely our objection will be infinitely greater for anything of that kind in India itself. And therefore, it is quite impossible for us as a Government and as a people to tolerate any foreign foothold in any part of India. But I think, if I may say so with all humility, we have shown a great deal of wisdom in not precipitating these matters and bringing about conflicts in order to solve them because any such attempt, I think, would have led to other problems and more difficult problems. I shall not say much more about these questions.]

In regard to Ceylon I would say this, that, as the House knows, I had talks with the Prime Minister of Ceylon—friendly talks—in which we tried to understand each other, each other's difficulties, and I am prepared to say to this House that I recognised the difficulties before the Prime Minister of Ceylon. It is not that he has no difficulties and he is just obstinate. He and his Government have got

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

difficulties as we all of us have, but difficulties should not come in the way of what are obviously right solutions. That is another matter. In recognising the difficulties the Prime Minister of Ceylon and his Government had, I went some distance in agreeing, in putting forward suggestions which normally I would not have agreed to. But it has been an axiom of our policy that we should live on friendly and co-operative terms with our neighbouring countries, and Ceylon is very much a neighbour, very much akin to us; and it seems almost, shall I say, a tragedy for me to think of any conflict between a country like Ceylon so akin to us and this great country of India. So, we approached Ceylon in a friendly way, we made clear the limits to which we can go, beyond which we cannot go without sacrificing the interests of hundreds of thousands of people and making them homeless and State-less wanderers; because, remember, the question is of these people who are no longer Indian citizens or Indian nationals and who, if they are not absorbed in Ceylon, not considered as Ceylon citizens now or later, become State-less and homeless. I hope that this question of people of Indian descent in Ceylon will be further considered in the same friendly way between the two Governments and between the Prime Minister of Ceylon and me, and that we succeed in finding some solution which must obviously be to the advantage of both countries. It is not a question of Ceylon thinking that India, a great big country to the north of it, is trying to bring any pressure or coercion. I do not wish to put it that way, and that is why I do not like anyone here using the language of threat to or in regard to this question in Ceylon. Certainly we have to be clear and we have to be firm about our policy, but we have always to put it forward in a friendly way without rousing any apprehension on the other side.

In regard to South Africa, that question has become, shall I say, a frozen

or a petrified question which does not show the slightest improvement and shows some continuing deterioration. That question, of course, has passed outside the limited sphere in which we raised it originally, in which it was. It has become a much wider issue in South Africa. It has become an issue not of people of Indian descent and the White settlers of South Africa, but a question of the great majority of the population of the Union of South Africa, that is the Africans themselves, and a major question of racial discrimination. There is this racial discrimination in many places in the world, especially in Africa, but more especially in South Africa. In other places it takes place, but there is an element of apology about it, but in South Africa there is no apology. It is blatant. It is shouted out, and no excuse is put forward for it. In fact, this question in South Africa has become one of the major issues, major tests of the world, because there can be not a shadow of a doubt that if that policy of racial discrimination,—of a master race dominating over other races, some colonists and settlers from Europe presuming to dominate for ever the populations of Asia or Africa,—is sought to be justified, then obviously there are forces in this world—not in your or my opinion only, but in this world—which will fight that to the end. Because those days are past when such things were tolerated in theory or even in practice. Therefore, this issue in South Africa, though it apparently lies low today,—to some extent it does not lie low, but other problems have somehow overshadowed it—is one of the basic issues in the world today which may well shake up this world. We have seen other aspects of this racial discrimination and colonialism in other parts of Africa. We have been accused—we meaning India, has been accused—of interfering in the affairs of other countries, in Africa. We have also been accused of, well, some kind of imperialist tendency which wants to spread out in Africa and take possession of those delectable lands

which now the European settlers occupy. As a matter of fact, this House knows very well that all along, for these many years, we have been laying the greatest stress on something which is rather unique—I think unique in the sense that I am not aware of any other country which has laid stress in that particular way on that policy. I do not mean to say that we are very virtuous and all that, and others, other countries, are not, but we have rather gone out of our way to tell our own people in Africa, in East Africa, or in some other parts of Africa, that they can expect no help from us, no protection from us if they seek any special rights in Africa which are not in the interests of the people of Africa. We shall help them; we have told them: "We shall help you. Naturally we are interested in protecting you, your dignity or interests but not if you go at all against the people of Africa, because you are their guests and if they do not want you, out you will have to go bag and baggage and we will not come in your way".

Now, that is a very clear statement which sometimes, naturally, has not been welcomed by our people in East Africa, many of the merchant classes there who have done well; but it is our firm policy and I want them—our Indians abroad—to realise it, and I want others to realise it too. And if that is our firm policy, we cannot actually remain quiescent when things happen in various parts of Africa which, apart from affecting Indians as such, might create dangerous world situations. In Africa, one sees today in its extreme form both racial discrimination and domination, and the old colonialism at work. Recently in North Africa various developments took place which, well, one used to read about in the histories of the second part of the 19th century, and it is amazing that that kind of thing can continue to be repeated now, in the middle of the 20th century. It may perhaps apparently succeed for a while, but I very much doubt if any such policy can possibly bring any

measure of success. Because the fact of the matter is that it has become almost impossible to terrorise the people into submission today, wherever the people may be. We have seen in a country, in a famous country, but in a weak country—a very weak country, either financially or militarily, or otherwise—a weak country in Western Asia which has had ups and downs and troubles in recent years, how many great powers could not force it into coming and following their wishes in some matters. Now, I am not going into the merits of these things. But my point is that it has become almost impossible for this method of coercion to be applied by one country against another. Of course, there are many ways of it, not merely military coercion; there may be promises of reward, there may be help and all that. But the conditions that have arisen today make it increasingly difficult for even the powerful countries to impose their will on the weak. To some extent, they might do it. Now, if that is so, how much more difficult or impossible it is for one powerful country to seek to impose its will on another powerful country? It is patently not possible today, and if one tries to do that, or both try to do that against each other, the result can only be conflict—ultimately war. And that is why we come up against this situation in the world today, this approach of great powers to each other in anger, in fear, in hatred—all this resulting in a continuing thing which has been called 'cold war' and which always thinks merely in terms of some future shooting war. And the problem before all of us in the world is, whether a big war is inevitable and, therefore, one must prepare for it and go in for it when it comes, or whether it can be avoided. That is a big problem. Nobody can prophesy; but I have no doubt that vast numbers of people in the world—in fact, I would say, nearly all the people in the world, in every country—obviously desire peace. And yet I must confess that recent events have made me slightly more doubtful of any permanent settl-

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

ments in the near future. I do not, of course, rule them out; I think there are chances and we should work for them. But when one sees the temper of peoples' minds and of statesmen's minds which are moved, as I said, by that old something, approaching that old religious fervour, without the virtue of religion in it, then anything might happen.

We have heard or read about a long argument, about the shape of a table—whether it should be a round table or a square table or an oblong table. But the real question is of the shape and content of peoples' minds. It does not matter what kind of table you use or whether you have no table and sit in the good old Indian way of squatting on a *takht* or a floor. The point is, how to approach these problems, and if you approach them in a spirit of warfare, well, then, naturally the consequences are different.

The House knows that the name of India came up repeatedly before the Political Committee of the United Nations some little while ago and the proposal was made that India might be made a member of the Political Conference that is the child of the armistice in Korea. India was put in a somewhat embarrassing position. We did not put our name forward and—I am perfectly sincere and honest in what I say—we did not want any additional burden. At the same time, we were strongly of opinion—and naturally—that this Political Conference should succeed, that there should be a settlement, a peaceful settlement, in the Far East of Asia, and that if we could help in that, we should not run away from that help, even if it might involve a burden on us. So, placed in this position, we did not put ourselves forward at all. But other countries, thinking that the presence of India there would be helpful, put our name forward. To the last, we made it clear that we could only function if the two major powers to this dispute wanted us to function. We were not interested in being pushed in by one party

against the will of the other. And when I say 'the two major parties', I do not refer to any particular country, however big it may be, but the two parties being, on the one side, the United Nations, and on the other the Chinese and the North Korean Commands. Those were the two parties which brought about the armistice, and the Political Conference which flows from the armistice would also ultimately be concerned with those two parties as such. I repeat this because there was some confusion which was attached to what we had said about this matter in the United Nations. So, this matter, as the House knows, came to a vote and in the voting there was a considerable majority in favour of India and a big minority against it and a number of abstentions. But there was not the two-thirds majority that would have been necessary if it went to the Plenary Session. At that later stage we begged those who had put our names forward not to press for it and so India was out of it.

But certain interesting consequences flowed from this vote. If that voting is analysed, you will see that apart from the four countries who voted against India, there were 21 votes, 18 of them from the Americas, 17 from what is called Latin America. Now, I have the greatest respect for the countries of Latin America. Let there be no mistake about it. But the facts stand out that nearly the whole of Europe and nearly the whole of Asia wanted one thing in this political Conference while a number of countries, all the Americas, did not want it. They have as much right not to want it as they have to want it. But the question that we have been considering is an Asian question, a question of Asia, and is the will of Asia to be flouted, is the will of Asia and Europe jointly to be flouted because some people who really are not concerned with this question so intimately feel that way? That is an extraordinary position.

An Hon. Member: Why withdraw?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It is interesting because in spite of the major developments that have taken place in the world during the last few years, somehow it is not realised by many of the great powers of the world that the countries of Asia, however weak they might be, do not propose to be ignored, do not propose to be bypassed and certainly do not propose to be sat upon. The whole of Asia has been and is in a state of ferment. Changes are taking place and revolutionary changes—whether you may like it or you may not like it, it is there. If you make an objective study you will see that the old days of pressure are gone and are going, and something new is coming in its place. Anyhow the old imperialisms have gone except here and there where they hold on for a while. Unless this fact is recognised by the rest of the world,—I believe it is being increasingly recognised,—you do not get a correct appreciation, a correct understanding of the world today.

10. A.M.

The House knows that one of the issues before the United Nations for some time past has been whether the People's Government of China should be accepted there as a member or not. There has been some confusion of thought about this matter when people talk about China being admitted into the United Nations. There is no question of the admission of China; China is one of the founder members of the United Nations. The only question that can arise is who represents China. Can any one say that the present Government of the island of Formosa represents China? Factually, can any undertaking given by the Government of Formosa be carried out in China? Obviously not. They cannot speak for China. They cannot function there; they cannot give an assurance at the Table on behalf of China. Therefore, it becomes completely unreal, artificial, to talk about China being represented in the United Nations or in the Security Council by someone who cannot speak for China, who cannot do anything

in China, who cannot affect China and can only at the utmost express strong disapproval of China. This is one of the basic things which have been levelled against the politics of United Nations.

Dr. N. B. Khare (Gwalior): Is it also unreal, I mean the U.N.O.?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know what is real or unreal, but the hon. Member's nimble wit is very real.

How is this question or like questions considered? As I said, it is no question of likes or dislikes in this matter but of following certain basic realities, trying to change them, if you like. The other day—I think it was yesterday—I saw in the papers that it has been agreed amongst certain great powers that the question of China's inclusion should not be considered this year or this session,—something very much like that. Now, I have no objection to doing things in a way which brings forward the least conflict. It may be that that takes a little time. But, the kind of approach that I see is that an obviously wrong thing is perpetuated and a whole castle is sought to be built on an artificial foundation; and then, if something goes wrong afterwards, complaint is made. It does seem to me to signify that politically these international spheres seem to be getting more and more removed from the realm of logic and reasoning and that is why I said we are entering a bigoted sphere of religion. It is a dangerous sphere applied to politics; applied to ethics and morals, religion is all right, but if it enters the political sphere it has a minus effect on morals; it is only sheer bigotry.

Shri Nand Lal Sharma (Sikar): What has religion got to do with this?

Dr. N. B. Khare: Religion is one of the hon. Member's mental obsessions.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: That is why in another context we have ventured to point out the danger of mixing politics with religion and calling it communalism in this country. However, here is this peculiar position in the world today, when it is not possi-

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

ble for one great country to coerce any other great country. It cannot do so. They are too big to be coerced by anybody. What then is the way out? Well, one, of course, is war, an attempt to coerce one by the other. The other is to give up the idea of coercion, accepting the fact as it is and trying to arrive, if you like, if not at a permanent settlement, at least at a temporary understanding of live and let live. That is possible, because the only other alternative means conflict on a major scale and in these days of atomic and hydrogen bombs the House can well imagine what the result of that will be.

Now, these matters are coming up before the United Nations soon and I understand that the People's Government of China in their reply to the United Nations' proposals have made some counter-proposals. First of all, it should be remembered that all the parties agreed to the fact of a Political Conference being held in Korea to carry on the work of the Armistice and to try to settle the problems there. They agreed to the functions of that Conference. The only question that is being considered or is in controversy is the composition of that Conference. It should be remembered also that a Conference like that does not proceed by majority vote. It does not decide that way—obviously not. It has to decide by more or less—if not unanimity—consensus of opinion, and agreement of the major parties concerned. So, it does not much matter whether there are a few more on this side or that side, except that the more there are, a larger crowd may create difficulty in getting down to business; otherwise, there is no particular difficulty.

The real question that arises is whether there should be neutral countries represented in this Conference. It has been our view that it would be helpful if such countries are represented, simply because they can sometimes help in toning down differences and easing a tense situation.

The real agreement will naturally have to come between the others. The neutral is not going to bring about an agreement; he will only help in providing a certain atmosphere which might lead the others to agree. However, that is a matter for the United Nations and the other party to decide and we have absolutely no desire to be there in this Conference. We have undertaken a very heavy burden in Korea as it is. We are in this Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and we have sent our troops there, and they have only begun their work there. But from such information as we have received, they are having to face considerable difficulties. It is not at all an easy matter for them to deal with—not difficulties, if I may say so, from the South Korean people: well, they hardly come in contact with them—but other difficulties. Somehow passions have been so roused among these prisoners that it is not particularly easy to deal with them. But thus far, hon. Members must have seen from reports in the press, the way our officers and men have handled this question has elicited the praise of everybody there.... (Hon. Members: Hear, hear.)...and I should like our representatives there in the Commission as well as the officers and men in the Armed Forces to feel that they have the goodwill and active sympathy of this House and of the country.

I would not like to discuss these matters that are before the United Nations in greater detail, because that might well prove embarrassing to our own representatives there or to us or to other countries. They are difficult questions. Some hon. Members suggest in a fit of frustration that we should withdraw from the United Nations. That, if I may say so with all respect, is immaturity. It is not an understanding of the question. One cannot run away like this from a problem. The United Nations, inspite of all its failings—and they are many—nevertheless is a great world organisation. (Hon. Members: Hear, hear.) It does

contain within it the seeds of hope and peace, and it would be a most unfortunate and rather perverse attitude for any country to try to destroy this structure because it is not to its entire liking. And apart from that, if a country does that, I have no doubt that it is that country which would suffer more than the organisation. So, from the narrowest point of view it is no good. We cannot remain isolated in the world, cut off from everything, and living a life of our own in our limited sphere. Most of us in India are so situated—the House will forgive me for this observation—as to be normally isolated in our minds, in our social habits, in our eating, in our drinking, in our marrying etc. We isolate ourselves in castes, this division and that division, with the result that it is a unique habit in India which does not prevail anywhere else in the world. We live in compartments, and therefore, perhaps naturally, we think in terms of isolation easily as a country too. But the fact is that that isolation in the past has weakened us tremendously and left us rather in the lurch when the world has advanced terms of science or other developments, and we were left behind. So, it is a dangerous thought—this sought of isolation—and we have to keep in touch with the rest of the world, naturally keeping to our own ways: that way, we may learn things from others. But we cannot be isolated: in fact, no country can be. Therefore, to talk of getting out of the United Nations or of otherwise keeping apart from all these problems is not to take cognisance of the realities of the situation.

There is one other matter to which I should like to refer before I close my present remarks, and that is Kashmir. I have already informed the House—on two occasions, I think—of certain developments in Kashmir in the course of the last five or six weeks. Those developments did not come out of the air or as a result of some secret conspiracy. Those who had been following events in Kashmir saw this crisis developing for several months

past, and the crisis was not so much a crisis *vis a vis* India—though we may take that aspect also—but it was an internal crisis which had affected all other relations and questions. Before I went to Europe in May, I paid a brief visit to Srinagar. I had always kept myself in fairly close touch with events there. I went at the end of May there, and I was surprise and distressed to see what was happening there,—what had happened regarding the state of affairs—economic, political and other—internally. In the past couple of years, Kashmir has been praised by us for various land reforms and they were very good reforms. I do not withdraw my praise for those reforms.

But, unfortunately, while the reforms were good, the manner of giving effect to them was not good. It was not good in two ways; one, that other consequences were not thought of; secondly, in the actual implementation of them, as it appears from subsequent reports, a great deal of injustice was done—it was not fairly done. I refer to this merely to show that a large number of factors, among them being these, produced a feeling of grave economic discontent among the people there. Much later a committee was appointed, the Wazir Committee. Its report was published only recently. It brings out much of this discontent, the way the land problem was not properly dealt with and the discontent that arose after hopes had gone up very high among the peasantry and others. There were other matters too: the co-operatives there failed and other things happened.

Now, as a result of all this, which was entirely an internal matter, grave disputes arose within the Government there, within the party, the National Conference, from which the Government draws its sanction. And when I went there towards the end of May I was greatly distressed to see this, because I noticed that gradually the Government of Kashmir was not functioning. It could not function, because of internal conflicts. Naturally, in a

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

friendly way, I advised them to pull together, to lay down one definite policy and carry it out as a Government, and not pull in two or three directions all the time. This was one thing that was happening.

The other thing which gave me some disquiet, a good deal of it, was the fact that over a year ago we had arrived at some kind of an agreement with the Kashmir Government which the House knows well. This House approved of it; the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir approved of it. It was in a very small part given effect to and then the rest remained in cold storage. Now, I could very well understand certain difficulties which, perhaps, the House does not appreciate. So, if there was some delay I would not have minded it. This delay was largely caused by certain events in Jammu which suddenly accentuated a peculiar situation and produced its reactions in the Kashmir valley.

Dr. N. B. Khare: Jammu movement did not accentuate, but only exposed the situation there.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It produced its powerful reactions in the Kashmir Valley and those who are not friends of ours, or friends of the Kashmir Government exploited this position fully. This created another tremendous complication there and delayed the implementation of the agreement.

All these things worked together and, as I said, when I went there in May last I was gravely disturbed. I went away to Europe.

When I was away my respected colleague, the Education Minister who has been closely connected with developments in Kashmir and my colleague the States Minister who also, in his official capacity has been connected with it and who had followed developments there, visited Kashmir. The Education Minister went there at the invitation of the Government and gave them a lot of good advice.

Nevertheless conditions continued to deteriorate and when I came back these reports reached me. I invited Sheikh Abdulla to come to Delhi. In fact, even when I was in Europe I had sent word that he should be invited. On return I invited him. He did not come; then he said he would come a little later. Later again this invitation was repeated by telephone, by letter. Ultimately he did not come. Meanwhile—in fact, before I had come back—Sheikh Abdulla and some others began speaking in a way which seemed strange to me and distressed us greatly. I could do nothing about it, except to remonstrate with him and ask him why he did so. Obviously he was troubled by these problems to which I have referred, economic and others, that had arisen in Kashmir and for which he could not see any easy remedy. There were remedies, of course; there are remedies, but he did not see them. So, he drifted in a different direction, and rather unfairly cast the blame for some of the economic occurrences there on the Government of India—lack of help or whatever it is. Anyhow the position we took throughout was that it is for the Kashmir Government to decide what policy they will follow. Let their party decide, let the Government decide and have one policy. If that policy was in keeping with the Government of India's policy, as we would like it, of course, and as we have always endeavoured it to be, to have a joint policy in regard to matters affecting Kashmir, well and good. If not, if the Kashmir Government had a policy with which we differed completely, then it was up to us, the Government of India—I told Sheikh Abdulla and other members of his Government—to sit together and consider, even if we parted company, what we could do about it.

The fact of the matter was that Sheikh Abdulla himself was in a minority in his Government in these matters, and a still smaller minority in his party. It was that which pro-

duced this element of confusion. So, apart from giving good advice and feeling rather distressed, I felt I could do very little. The situation was developing in this way. Ultimately it blew up as the House knows and changes took place.

Now, having been connected with Kashmir, politically speaking, for a trifle over twenty years and having been intimately connected in the Government with all these developments that have occurred during the past six or seven years, the House can well imagine the extreme distress that all these developments have caused me. It is not a personal matter, I mean. We have always considered this Kashmir problem as symbolic for us, as having far-reaching consequences in India. Kashmir was symbolic for us to illustrate that we were a secular State, that Kashmir with a majority, a large majority of Muslims, nevertheless of its own free will wished to be associated with India. It had consequences both in India and Pakistan, because if we disposed of Kashmir on the basis of that old two-nation theory, well, then, obviously millions of people in India and millions in East Pakistan would be powerfully affected. All kinds of consequences would flow from it. Many of those wounds that had healed might open out again. So that, this problem was not, it has never been, a problem of a patch of territory being with India or not. It has been a problem of infinitely deeper consequence.

Kashmir is a place of infinite beauty. What is more, Kashmir is a place of great strategic importance, and it has always been a misfortune for a country to be situated strategically, because envious eyes fall upon it. Certainly, so far as we are concerned, it is desirable for us from a strategic point of view. But however that may be, we cannot impose our desire or wish in this matter. Therefore, we have put it aside and right from the beginning we have laid stress on this that the people of Kashmir should

decide this question,—not other considerations. We have held by it, and we hold by it still, that they must decide it in the proper way, in the proper context, not in the way that one would imagine some people in the Pakistan Press want it done. We have been pretty well used to the tone and contents of the Pakistan Press and sometimes to the statements of their people, more or less responsible people, in the past few years, but the actuality in the last few weeks has far exceeded the wildest of my imagination in this respect. It is amazing that there should be so much wild hysteria without the slightest justification. I can understand irritation, I can understand strong language, but this type of wild hysteria does rather make one feel that one is not dealing with a matter which can be dealt with by logic or reasoning or by any argument.

As for the kind of facts, so-called facts, that are given in the Pakistan Press about happenings in Kashmir, they are so very very far from truth that they cannot be called exaggerations. The number given as killed in Kashmir, I say, is false, whoever may say it and there are people who have said it in Delhi, and I say, after due enquiry, that these statements of happenings in Kashmir are 100 per cent. false. I say so with full responsibility having sent our own men regardless of the Kashmir Government.

Dr. N. B. Khare: Thank you for once.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I wish Dr. Khare would not behave all the time like a Pakistani.

Of course, there has been trouble in Kashmir; of course, there have been disturbances, demonstrations and all that; I do not wish to minimise that. Big things have happened; big upsets have happened, because the National Conference which represented the national movement during all these years there had a sudden split—some on one side and some on the other. All these things have happened. I should say, taking everything into

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

consideration, that it is surprising that very little trouble has happened there, not so much. [Anyhow, we have to approach this question with as much calm and wisdom as we possess. It is a difficult question and I repeat that that question is going to be decided ultimately by the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Whether it is Kashmir or any other part, we are not going to hold it by strength of arms.]

Now, a great deal has been said. Much has been said about foreign interference in Kashmir. These kinds of charges are often made, and if there is a modicum of truth in them, that is greatly exaggerated as expressed and it becomes a little difficult to deal with them. In a matter of this kind, it is not easy for me to state every fact, that may come in our knowledge, before the House, but, broadly speaking, I would say that in the course of the last few weeks, in the course of past few months and some time more, hard cases of this type of interference have come before us—individual interference. It would not be correct to call it governmental interference, but individuals have not behaved properly, because again you must remember the basic fact that Kashmir is a highly strategic area. Many countries are interested in it and they seek sources of information, intelligence and all those things. You go to Kalimpong. It is a nest of spies, international spies of every country—it is perfectly amazing and sometimes I begin to doubt if the greater part of the population is not. News comes out of Kalimpong which sometimes may have some relation to truth—usually it has none. So that inevitably in a place like Kashmir, the people are interested and individuals are interested. There is espionage and the rest, but having said it, it would be unfair for those wild accusations to be made in the Press or elsewhere. Individuals have functioned there. I suppose they try to get contacts and sometimes no doubt the information is passed on from hand to hand and all that: and we have checked

it often enough, but that kind of thing is happening in international affairs in many places—not in Kashmir only. It may be that sometimes it happens even in the city of Delhi. So, I don't think it is right for these wild accusations to be thrown out, and if there is any trifle of evidence of something, well naturally we take action. If there is not, mere shouting is not helpful; in fact, it is definitely harmful.

The House knows that recently I saw the Prime Minister of Pakistan when he was here in Delhi and he issued a statement which was an agreed statement. Soon after the return of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, a tremendous propaganda started there in the Press, partly against me and partly against our country as a whole. Now, I should like to say that Mr. Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and I discussed this question at great length and we discussed it in a very friendly way, trying to find some way out of the difficulty, trying to take at least one step, if we cannot decide about others immediately. And, therefore, I was surprised at this barrage of press propaganda from Karachi especially and later from Lahore. This was chiefly directed to the subject of Admiral Nimitz being Plebiscite Administrator or not. It so happens that since the day Mr. Mohammed Ali left Delhi—since the day our statement was issued to the Press, I have not discussed this subject in public anywhere till today. I haven't said a word in public—in private or in the Cabinet I might have mentioned a little of it—but I have not seen a press man as a press man. And an enormous barrage of propaganda started that I was undermining this agreement that I have made with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and undermining it—well, apparently through the devious method of bringing in Admiral Nimitz into it. I confess I have been greatly surprised at this and I found some difficulty in dealing with it in corres-

pondence elsewhere, with a situation which seems to me difficult to understand or grasp. Here I am, quietly sitting here, and I am being accused of this kind of deep conspiracy. Well, I should like to make it perfectly clear, and I am quite certain that Mr. Mohammed Ali has not only not liked this but actively disliked much of this propaganda there.

Now, so far as Admiral Nimitz is concerned, he is a very eminent person and I would hate to see anything at all in criticism of him. He is a person whom I have had the privilege of meeting. He is not only eminent in his own field but otherwise too he struck me as a very admirable person. I have nothing against him. He was appointed as Plebiscite Administrator about more than four years ago. In a sense he functioned, that is to say, he had an office in the United Nations Building, maybe for a year. Then, about three years ago, he himself felt that nothing much was happening and was not likely to happen soon. So far as we are concerned, we thought that in all probability the thing had ended. But apart from this, frankly the reason I put forward before Mr. Mohammed Ali was this: I said much has happened in these three or four years—just then the discussion in the Political Committee was taking place, this argument about India being in the Political Conference in Korea or not—I told him quite frankly that if we are to get on with this question of Kashmir, as we want to get on,—we must try to isolate it from big power politics. Big powers are admirable individually, and maybe collectively!

Dr. N. B. Khare: Then withdraw the question from the U.N.O.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Therefore I said it will not be fair to any of the big powers to ask them to supply a representative as a Plebiscite Administrator, however admirable he may be, because that would be embarrassing and needlessly creating suspicion, not in my mind necessarily, but in some other big power's mind. I said there-

fore it is far better for us—there are plenty of countries in Europe and Asia which are fortunately not too big—let us try to select the man from there. That was all that I said, and having said that, as I said in public, it should have gone away anywhere. So, I would beg the House, if I may say so, and the Press and others that in this matter of Kashmir, we should not lose our bearings merely because the Pakistan Press has no bearings at all. We have to keep firm to our position and to hold by the statements we have made and continue functioning calmly and dispassionately. That is the best way of dealing with this situation as indeed with any situation. Whenever any important occurrence takes place, I shall naturally come to the House for the advice of the House, for such guidance as the House can give me. I have taken a good deal of the time of the House and have referred to some matters. It is a confused picture that one sees all over the world. We may not always unravel it; we may often make mistakes here and there as we no doubt made, but if there are certain basic principles which guide us in our policy, I think that on the whole we shall not go far wrong. It is well known to this House that the policy we have pursued in the past—foreign policy—has not only had a very widespread approval in this country—otherwise we could not have pursued it—but has been progressively appreciated in most countries of the world. And even those who have not agreed with it have reluctantly sometimes expressed their appreciation of it, or at any rate, their understanding of it. If that is so, I have no doubt that we shall continue to pursue that basic policy with such variations as may be necessitated from time to time.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion moved: —

"That the present International situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."