[Shri P. G. Menon]

the Committee on Public Undertakings on the National Buildings Construction Corporation Limited, New Delhi.

12:52 hrs.

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS—*Contd.*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE—*contd.*

Mr. Speaker: The House will now take up Demands for Grants under the Ministry of Defence. Shri Jaochim Alva to continue his speech.

Shri Joachim Alva (Kanara): Mr. Speaker, Sir, our defence problems have increase a hundred-fold by the partition of our land. Only yesterday, or two days ago in Karachi Marshal Chen-yi had the audacity to outrage the sense of protocol and to invite Sheikh Abdullah over our heads and convey that invitation through the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. He also declared that Pakistan under the leadership of President Ayub would foil any attack from any quarter. Which quarter did he mean? Did he mean Russia? Was Russia going to invade Pakistan? Was poor Afghanistan ready to invade Pakistan? Was China going to invade Pakistan? He only meant India.' Today, we are in a horrible, terrible position on account of the partition of our land. I repeat once again the point which I have made several times in this House and being the first and only one to make it that we should never have agreed to the partition of the land without a sovereign clause. The partition of the land was made without that essential, a single sovereign clause. I may refer to the sovereign clause in respect of a Russia and Iran treaty in the twenties which was to the effect that the treaty between them would have somewhat the proportion of seven points for Russia and two points for Iran and that the day when that proportion was disturbed, the treaty would be annulled and Russia would be entitled to enter Iran.

In this country, while we were most anxious to capture the seats of power, no such sense of treaty seemed to have entered upon the minds of our leaders at the time of the partition of our country. If we had said that if Pakistan had a proportion of two points and we had five points, of the Defence ratio and that if that proportion of the ratio was disturbed, we would enter Pakistan stating the treaty was annulled. Today, when that proportion has been gravely disturbed, when the ratio of defence is disturbed, the partition of the land should have been annulled. And we could have entered Pakistan. But then we had forgotten that sovereign nation-saving clause. We entered upon the partition agreement with Pakistan without that sovereign clause, namely, this would be the proportion of defence, five to three, or ten to two or ten to eight, and that the moment we found that the defence proportion or ratio was disturbed, the partition of the land would be declared annulled and we would be free to enter and occupy Pakistan. There was no such sovereign clause. So, today, we are hammered on this side and that side, to the east and to the west. We did not agree to the partition of the sub-continent so that one part may be a permanent danger to the other.

We must have at strong army. I am glad that the Defence Minister has planned that our army would have a strength of 8,25,000 men. But that is not enough. We must have a standing army of two million people. We must reach that target soon. otherwise, we shall not be able to bear the incursion from the Pakistan side, from the Gulf of Ram side, from the end of Bengal. All these insults and thrusts will be repeated and we shall not be able to prevent them. If we had a standing army of two million men, At least we should be able to check the

thrusts on the Pakistan side if not altogether of China.

The United Kingdom last year had a standing army of 393,000 men for a population of just our fifty millions. The Russians had a formidable army of 3, 623,000 men with which they could reach the Atlantic shores in three to seven days. I need not say about China. Perhaps they may reach us in less than seven days or even seven hours. And that is a very, very formidable danger facing us. Though we have declared againt the building of nuclear arms and nuclear weapons, we must make our conventional weapons at least so strong that no one shall be able to raise their hands against us. As I said yesterday, unless we have a self-reliant attitude and a standing army, no power on earth can help us. Nobody can help us, whatever be the magnitude of PL 480 aid and other aids. Nobody can help us. We should therefore, have a standing army of two million men.

Russia has a potential of seven million men who can be mobilised in times of war; they could call up the army of that size in times of danger. But what is our potential? It is true that our hon. Defence Minister has valiantly tried to build up a target of 8,25,000 men. We must have a standing army,— money or no money—of two million men. Then alone we will have security.

What about our Navy? The power of the Indian Navy must exceed that of any country in the area of the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal. Unless we are the masters of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, our lines of security will be throttled and freedom imperilled.

Take the question of submarines. For instance, the Seventh Fleet was in the Indian Ocean. We must build submarines for the Navy. The Germans had more than 800 submarines in the last war and 39,000 officers and men perishad. What does a submarine cost? And again, it takes four years to produce a submarine. We have to go around, asking for submarines. I say that the times have changed. The idea of defence has changed. The times are such that we must produce our submarines. We have got first-class technicians amongst us. We have also great harbours. We must be able to convert our factories overnight to produce conventional weapons. We have four to five automobile factories in the private sector. What have they done? What goods have they delivered? In times of war, these factories should be converted overnight into aircraft factories. Has it been done? No. The Hindustan Aircraft Factory is there, and it has got 500 per cent performance. But there are, four to five automobile factories run by super rich men in the private sector who are capitalists and they are not able to produce aeroplanes overnight, or convert the factories into aircraft manufacturing units overnight. The Americans were also be convert their automobile manufacture overnight into gigantic machines for the manufacture of aeroplanes and thus they manufactured a fantastic number of aeroplanes. What about our private sector? Nothing. They want more time; they want more money and they want more import licences, and even with Rs. 20 crores or so of foreign exchange, Mahindras are not able to make one complete, self reliant jeep, made out of cent per cent Indian parts.

I beg to submit that the Defence Ministry has done a good job in respect of certain vehicles. They have recently been able to produce 5,104 Shaktiman trucks, 7,912 Nissan trucks and 3,065 petrol jeeps. Good or bad, they made an attempt and we shall help them. If the Deputy General Manager of the Hindustan Aircraft Factory has been able to produce a car—it is a challenge—costing about Rs. 5,000 better in performance, better in quality and almost cent per cent indigenous it means that our Defence Ministry is able to take care of itself

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and produce these instruments of war if necessary. So, the private sector too should be able to produce these things. It is time they discharged their responsibilities.

Then, what about intelligence? I really do not know! But I am sure the Defence Minister has done his best to put it first-class basis. We have now got the electric intelligence methods; aerial reconnaissance and other modern methods or techniques. Formally, the intelligence methods were those of tapping that telephone, eaves-dropping, so to say, and by word of mouth. But those days are over. We have to be ready at any moment and for any type of warfare and when our intelligence fails, our country may fail; our men and women will perish on all the fronts if our intelligence fails.

Churchill warned Stalin when Hitler moved his Panzer divisions from Greece to Poland. He said, "Hitler is attacking you." But Stalin dismissed it by saying that it was a pure English story. Churchill had then no intelligence at his command but purely private sources of information only at his disposal. He was the triumphant individual who became Prime Minister in the time of war. He warned Stalin about the invasion; but Stalin just dismissed it by saying that it was a pure English invention.

Our intelligence sources, or the intelligence units of any country for the matter of that, cannot give any political opinion like the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA. I read a horrible story yesterday. The late President Kennedy interfered very violently, when a shipload of sugar was going to be sent from Cuba to Russia, when the Americans put in chemical matter in it. This story was published in the New York Times. I am afraid I have not seen it in the Indian papers. It was the great and noble President Kennedy, who even in times of war, protested against the interference of the Central Intelligence Agency putting harmful chemical solution in a shipload of sugar supplied by Cuba to Russia so that Russia and Cuba may fly at each other' throat. These are cases of the Central Intelligence Agency's activities which were published in the New York Times recently, and which I read in the Dawn yesterday.

It is time that our intelligence agency became more proficient. In the time of war, the frontiers of Burma were guarded by five or six men across our border; it was within the grip of their hands, the British. What has happened to our intelligence? We shall not be able to defend our country if our intelligence system or agency is not improved. The intelligence services or even the police services should not be in just a position to say, "it is not your business or it is not my business." When the security of the country is involved, it is not just like the cook saying it is the maid's work, or the maid passing on the blame to the havildar, and thus allow the dacoit or thief to walk away. These things are past. The Walcott escape is at once a wounderful instance, revealing, X-raying and exposing of our line of security. Our land cannot be exposed to this kind of danger. When we have 3,500 miles of land frontier and 3,000 miles of coastline, it is time we took matters in our hand

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There are first class men in the defence forces. I was the only MP who attended the World Medicinal Aviation Week when the World Medical Congress was held here recently. I was astonished to find that the doctors who presented the papers from India were as good or even better than those who came from Italy, France or USA. They discussed what would be the conditions of the heart up in the air above 30,000 feet. I was amazed to see these two or three Indian Defence Forces doctors—I am ashamed I have forgotten their names—from the Defence Forces, who were not only equals to the best men from the West, but even better. That

gave me the idea that our Defence Forces have got first class men and we shall neglect them only at our peril. I must frankly confess and I must even warn that the scenes of disorder and disobedience to the Chair repeatedly witnessed in our Parliament produce deterioration in our democratic life and it is time that we put our house in order. These are capable people who have thrown away their whole lives for the Defence Forces and they will not sit idle when others attack them or sell away their country for a mass of pottage.

Our production needs must be geared up to the task. Our defence production department is doing a good job. During the first World War, the ammunition used by the USSR was only one million tones. In the second World War, it jumped up to eight million tonnes. So, we can imagine how much we needed in the last war and how much we would need in the next. Our 24 Ordnance factories will have to be kept going. The Bharat Electronics will have to render a good class account of itself. It is yet to come to the standard of HMT or HAL. The Bharat Electronics is producing about Rs. 5 crores worth of electronic equipment. They will have to supply all the equipment needed for our radar and the electronic devices for our fast moving jet aeroplanes. They have got the scientists and engineers and other men who can produce these things.

The Atomic Energy department has produced more than 1730 electronic instruments and 110 accessories. The total sales in the atomic energy electronic department has been Rs. 30 lakhs. After the last war, the Japanese manufacturers started from scratch and they have been able to produce Rs. 700 crores worth of electronic equipment. But we have not reached the Rs. 5 crore target, because there are private importers who want to compete. Licences are issued by the Ministry of Commerce to private people when we have had the Bharat Electronics. All that must be stopped. We must make Bharat Electronics an outstanding factory, the pride of our land, which will supply the electronic equipment needed for our aeroplanes an dother requisite machines.

We must make our navy guard our shores. It does not get the funds that it can. There are courageous men coming up and our naval men have rendered an excellent account of themselves in the Commonwealth exercises far beyond the shores of India. Our men in the Indian air force are as good as the best in the world. Our pilots and others in the Indian Airlines are able to fly planes with safety. They are the pride of our nation and the talk of other nations. Most of them do not drink and thus live dangerous but safe life for others.

Our men in the army are excellent material. I mentioned how the doctors have rendered an excellent account of themselves. We have to give them the tools to put them right; we have to make our army dynamic and progressive and strong, to be ready for an attack. We have to be self-reliant from beginning to end. As I mentioned, the ex-Defence Secretary, Shri H. M. Patel, said that we should buy the planes from other countries and we need not produce anything; and hinted, all this was the work of the private sector. However, we must be self-reliant.

I will end by paying a tribute of praise to the Defence Minister, his colleague the Minister for Defence Production and the Deputy Defence Minister, who as I said, belonged to the INA, and to all the men and women, the jawans, who man our defence forces far away in the snow-clad mountains. We are sitting here is cosy seats and we do not know what war is like. I would like the Defence Minister to take all the 750 members of Parliament by batches to the heights of NEFA and Ladakh, to show how our men are fighting a lonely battle in drak, wintry nights, guarding the safety of our land. I do

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hope that we shall always remember them, and we shall extend to them every kind of help they need. Above all, we shall never forget their wives and children, when they are turned into widows and helpless children.

Shri N. Dandeker (Gonda): Mr. Speaker, Sir, before I make my observations about the defence estimates and some of the matters which I have referred to in the token cut motions, I would like to make two or three preliminary comments, specifically addressed to my hon. friend, the Defence Minister, whom I have had the honour of knowing for quite sometime.

I am aware that much of what I am going to say is concerned with the legacy left to our present Defence Minster by his predecessor. His predecessor, who had been in office for over five years as Defence Minister, is really the person responsible for the deficiencies. I am going to point out. I do not therefore intend my criticisms to mean any kind of criticism of the present Defence Minister's capacity and the way he is tackling the job. Indeed, I am aware that during the two years that he has been in office, he has done a good deal. I am also aware that the defence forces in almost all the knowledgeable ranks and officers' cadres are aware of the consistent personal effort he has been making towards the ends that we all desire. Nevertheless, if I exceed perhaps in the strength and vigour of my criticism, I will ask him to take it as criticism made entirely on a non-party basis. I know that his colleague, Mr. Thomas, resented the vigour of my criticism in connection with the question of ordnance factories and he took it upon himself to believe that I was motivated by partisan considerations. Sir, defence is involved, I am not concerned with 'isms' or with parties; I am only concerned with defence.

The first point to which I wish to draw the attention of the House is the present strength and organisational set-up of the army. As far as I can make out, the present target is that of 825,000 men to comprise of 21 operational divisions, of which 10 are intended to be mountain divisions. Doing a bit of arithmetic with reference to what I know to be the operational division's strength, I find that for 21 operational divisions, the man-power required would be 420,000 (at 20,000 per division), whereas the total man-power is 825,000. I asked myself, what are those remaining 405,000 men, *i.e.* half our total strength, supposed to be doing? And I found they were apparently considered by the Indian army as necessary for backing up activities. So, we have, if I may coin an expression, a ratio per division of something like 20,000operational strength and between 19,000 and 20,000 non-operational backing up strength in administration and all kinds of other groups that are engaged behind the operational army. Sir, I consider this is terribly, terribly excessive. I am firmly of the opinion that an army of 825,000 men, if that is all we can afford,—I do believe that is all that we can reasonably afford,—half of which to be non-operational people appears to me a ratio per division which is fantastic. And so I ask, how does this happen to be so?

Dr. M. S. Aney (Nagpur): Is it the same thing as non-effective?

Shri N. Dandeker: No, Sir. Non-effectives are pensioners and the like.

On reading some of the most excellent Governments publications connected with the Second World War and the part which the Indian army played in it, and the purposes for which the Indian army was then designed, I find we are still geared to the British Imperial Army concepts of the Indian Army's size and organisation.

Sir, the British concept of the Indian Army was that organisationally, the Indian army was intended to be a part of the British Imperial Army. And at that time the functions of the Indian Army were: (a) internal security, (b) to resist aggression by second-class power; (c) only to hold aggression by first-class power until aid came from overseas, (d) to provide operational and non-operational reserves for overseas operations from Suez to Hongkong and, (e) most important of all, to provide standing organisation for extensive recruitment and training of operational officers and man-power, and also as a supply base and transit base for major overseas operations.

Now, Sir, the whole of this organisational set up, geared to the requirements of the old British Imperial Army, nevertheless continues even now to exist on the size and scale at which it was then intended in terms of the proportion of backing-up strength to divisional operational strength. I suggest that the British Imperial Army concept in relation to the functions of the Indian army is admittedly out of date; and we ought, therefore, to rethink this whole question of the over-all army strength. For, the present ratio of non-operational man-power per division, it results in enormous waste of man-power and money. And, more particularly in view of the limitations on the over-all total strength that we can afford financially, it results in a defensive posture and not in a posture operational strength such as the enemy might regard with some respect.

It will be of interest for the House to know that the Chinese army is organised on an entirely different ratio of operational and non-operational strength such as the enemy operating on our border consists of 15,000 men operational and the backing-up strength is only about 5000 making a total of 20,000 as against our present 40,000 per division. It is possible, on account of the kind of slave system that exists in China, that this would be too thin a ratio for the Indian army. But I am persuaded that our present ratio is far too excessive, and I would urge that a complete re-study of the whole question be made with the object of ascertaining whether it is not possible to have a man-power reorganisation in such a fashion that while we continue an operational division strength of 20,000 we should have a backing up strength of not more than 8000 or 10,000. If the Indian land forces were reorganised on this basis within the same overall man-power strength, I suggest it would be possible, even with an overall 8,25,000 limit, to have seven or eight more mountain divisions without any increase in the over-all numerical strength and with, perhaps, only a slight increase in the financial expenditure. Moreover—and this is important,—if we did have an operational divisional strength of not of 21 divisions but of the order of 30 divisions, inclusive of not just 10 mountain divisions, but of the order of 20 mountain divisions, we would not be assuming a posture merely of defense but of aggressive strength which the enemy would respect. It would of course still not be a posture of offensive strength.

In the same way as in the case of the general army personnel organisation in terms of over-all strength and in terms of extravagance of man-power utilisation, the situation so far as I can make out, is precisely the same in regard to transport. I understand that a Chinese Division on our Northern frontiers has something like 400 vehicles. But our mountain division has something like 1200 vehicles. It does seem to me that while, again, the Chinese ratio may be rather thin, our ratio of 1200 vehicles, when a competent enemy army can manage with 400 and when our army has to be organised on quite a different basis as compared to

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the old imperial system, is rather high. Sir, I believe there is a considerable over-provision by way of vehicles in our mountain divisions.

So much, Sir, as regards manpower in general and as regards over-provision of transport.

Among the various other matters I would like to mention is, in particular, the position as regards the armoured corps. The armoured corps is, of course, operationally not particularly useful as against the Chinese. It is essentially an arm to be used in plains warfare. But even so, today in our armoured corps the varieties and the types of vehicles are so many that there is no easy inter-changeability of man-power from one unit to another, or from personnel trained on one particular type of tank to another type of tank, with the result that while we have numerically, perhaps, an adequate number of tanks, from the operational point of view the effectiveness of the armoured corps is much less than it could be if this variety of types were weeded out.

As regards the other specialised Corps, such as the signal Corps, Engineering Corps, the Medical Corps, the Supply Corps and so on, I have nothing particularly to say except this, that I think these are mainly the expenditure wings of the army. The Signal Corps, the Engineering Corps particularly, the Medical Corps, and the Supply Corps particularly, the Ordnance Corps and so on form the expenditure wing of the army. My attitude as regards expenditure in so far as defence forces is concerned can be summed up in one simple sentence: "Ask, and it shall be given to you". I do not propose, nor do I think anybody in this House ever proposes, that in so far as the effective utilisation of money is concerned there need almost be any limit to what this House would be prepared to vote. But by the same token I would say, through the Defence Minister, to our defence forces: please, for heaven's sake, avoid extravagance. We are a poor country. Still we are doing our best. But we want also, at the same time, to do our best financially and otherwise on our developmental front too. Therefore, we would ask them to avoid extravagance and to minimise waste. Let 'Economy' be the watchword of everybody in the army. Economy should be everybody's business. It should be everybody's business here in this House to vote all the money that is required for defence and it should be everybody's business in the defence forces to make the maximum effective utilisation of that money.

That is why I was not impressed with the Audit criticism which said that the actual expenditure was considerably below the appropriations granted by this House. I would give full marks to the defence forces for not having extravagantly spent all the money that we voted saying that they will spend only what they can effectively spend. It is not a proper criticism either by the Audit or by this House to say that they have spent less than what we provided. I suggest it is a matter deserving of some congratulations to the defence forces to find that, notwithstanding that they asked for considerable appropriations, notwithstanding the fact that they had plans, nevertheless, they did what they could and saved the rest instead of being extravagant and throwing the money out of the window. Similarly, I know I can go on to comment on some other aspects of this audit business. Some of the Audit criticisms are valid, some of them are utterly invalid. I would say this to the defence forces, through the Defence Minister, that if ever I have occasion to participate in commenting on these Audit criticisms, believe me, Sir, my criticisms would be intelligent and not this kind of thing

I would like to say something about the finances and audit.....

Mr. Speaker: But if physical targets set before the Defence Ministry have not been achieved?

Shri N. Dandeker: Sir, it is a matter of timing. The point is really this, that for the achievement of any particular target in terms of a date and in terms of a physical performance, they have to converge various activities towards that particular date. Technically, it is called net-work planning. One does one's best. One attempts the intricate net-work of planning in such a way that all the various desparate activities will finally come to fruition on a certain date and at that point converge towards each other. But frequently they do not. One does one's best. If they do not, I do not think it ought to be a ground for criticism that somebody has not spent all the money that he was provided with. To insist on that would be to encourage waste and even extravagance.

Now, Sir, in regard to the general organisation of defence finance, audit, accounts and general administration, I have a strong conviction that we, with the enormous army that we now have and a very large defence force in the aggregate, are working on an utterly antediluvian organisational system, antediluvian rules and regulations, antediluvian control measures and so on. We are working to pre-war books of rules and regulations, with copious amendment slips which make the wretched thing, pretty fat,—every book that one can hardly hold—and you just do not know what the rule on any given subject is. Sir, the time has come, I suggest, to think in terms of modern management ideas, to think in terms of the magnitude of expenditure, to think in terms of the magnitude of man-power and everything else involved. The whole thing has to be streamlined. There is need for a good deal of devolution of power, responsibility and authority. There ought to be a good deal of scrapping of old rules and the re-formulation of new rules and procedure, because what exists at present is in my judgment utterly unsuited to modern times or modern needs.

At this point I would like to say a word on the subject of discipline, morale and motivation in the army. This is a delicate subject. I know that there is no question about the courage of the officers and men in the Indian army, that there is no question of the loyalty of the Indian army or the loyalty of the leadership of the officers and men. But, believe me Sir, among the things that I feel a little concerned about this is one. Whereas during the British days, without a natural motivation of the kind that now exists—it was not there then for they were not defending anything—yet—they were first-class professional soldiers, doing a first-class professional job, today even though they have a larger national motivation, at the same time I feel—and this is a qualitative assessment that I am making—there is something that is required for the upliftment of the discipline and morale of the army. For instance, take what is known as the "toughening process" of the officers and Jawans and their "battle innoculation". Today it continues very much like that of the British other ranks in the old days. This is specially true in regard to such matters as safety distances and heights for firing live ammunition during battle innoculation. What we need is hard, tough and strong commanders leading bold and ruthless men. unless we have thoughts along these lines of the concept of discipline and hardening up, we are not going to face up to what is ahead of us in the event of the Chinese embarking upon a major aggression once again. It is not merely a matter of courage. We have to learn lessons from the kind of tough war, from the kind of tough and ruthless men that the

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Japanese produced in jungle warefare and the kind of tough and ruthless men that the Chinese produced in mountain warfare.

The second point is this, and I am sorry to say this is partly, again, a Krishna Menon legacy. I believe there is some amount of uneasiness still prevailing in the minds of officers in the matter of promotion, as to whether promotions are made on likes and dislikes by direct decisions between the Chief of Staff and the Defence Minister; or whether there is an orderly established procedure of selection by reference to the back history and record of the officer, in particular his record over a period of years, including his background, especially his operational and active service record. Today the morale of the officers in this respect is not quite as high as it ought to be for want of confidence in the promotion system.

I will not dwell upon the question of equipment and arms and ammunition production, though I would like to say that I find the small-arms job has been done very well indeed. But I would like to say a word about signal equipment. Here I think we are in a bad position by any modern standard. Moreover, our communication system is far too elaborated, usually duplicated (which is just all right) but not infrequently it is triplicated and even quadruplicated. Also the signal operations are much too centralised.

I would have liked to say a little more about the ordnance factories, concerning which my hon. friend, Shri Thomas, made a long explanatory statement last time during a special debate. But I shall be content by saying just two things. I have re-read the whole of his speech yesterday and I was amazed to find that the only new material that he produced in reply to that debate was: we came to the conclusion in the circumstances that the two ordnance factories intended for manufacturing propellants and explosives were no longer required. It seemed to me an odd statement. The present Defence Minister in early 1963 said that we needed six ordnance factories. In the budget estimates and appropriations in 1964 he repeated that we need six ordnance factories, inclusive of these two. These are admissions of my hon. friend, Shri Thomas. Six months later, however, they came to the conclusion that we did not need these two. Are we playing a game of chess on a chequer board or are we engaged in doing something serious? I have no criticism to make of the Defence Minister's early statement in 1963 that we need six new ordnance factories. It was, for him, a quick preliminary estimate. Anybody can on a re-assessment of the position change his mind. But when it came to the 1964 budget estimates, when in those budget estimates the Defence Minister said, presumably after due deliberation and consideration that they wanted six new ordnance factories and when only six months later Shri Thomas said "no, no, we do not want two of these" I am left completely sceptical. And I am even more sceptical when we are told that the Americans too have agreed with us that we had better devote our resources for developmental purposes, rather than putting into those two factories, I am sorry, Sir I remain utterly unconvinced.

Sir, if I had time, I would like to say a word about the top organisation in the army. But, before I do so, I must turn to a more urgent subject, the air force. Here the state of affairs is dreadful. There is no other word by which the present state of the Indian air force can be described. In 1962 our air force was quite inadequate even for supply dropping operations, even for army observation operations or for casualty evacuation, much less for transport operations. But when it came to offensive

air operations, or defensive air operations, or even ground support of the operations of the army, our air force was just not there. And if the Chinese had opened up against us any kind of air warfare, our air force would have been smashed, I believe, in about 15 days.

Now, Sir, the reasons for all this are well-known and I will not go into them because similar circumstances prevail in the state of our airforce even now. Today the offensive capability of the Indian air force is nil. I gravely doubt whether it has even adequate defensive capability. Pakistan, for instance, has front line air force and aircraft, far superior to us. And it is welll-known that there are regular air violations by Pakistan into Indian air space and; but air force have just look on as helpless spectators. They are far too ahead of us; and if they are so far ahead of us; I wonder how far ahead the Chinese are even in regard to the kind of air warfare one may expect over the Himalayas.

The reasons for this state of affairs are several. In the first place; our Air Force has a large variety of aircraft; most of them obsolete; none of them in adequate numbers and most of them dispersed in all airfields. The consequences of this *khitcheree* of supposed air force strength are serious; and I would like to put them down, one by one, logically. Firstly, there is the impossibility of achieving standardised air crews. Those who are trained in one type cannot ordinarily, at short notice under operational conditions, be expected efficiently to man any other type. Next, there is the impossibility to standardise maintenance equipment, stores and spares, resulting in extravagence in the aggregate but inadequacy for each type. This is something with which industrialists are familiar. When you have got too many types of plants and machinery, you are overwhelmed by the aggregate burden in regard to maintenance equipment, stores, spares and the lot. But when you come to individual items, the stock is pretty thin and you remain always within danger limits. Consequently, again, in industry as in Air Force there is the impossibility to standardise maintenance organisation, maintenance procedures, ground crew training and so on.

Apart from these ,coming to the other necessary aids to the air force, our radar network and training are still utterly inadequate. Then, apart from the poor quality and efficiency of the general communication system, our communications for rapit MET briefing are still woefully inadequate. I will not speak of the kind of things I have heard in this connection which will shock people; but I will simply say that quick and accurate MET briefing is hardly in existence and the general communication network is quite bad.

Now, Sir, supposing one wanted to strive, not for an offensively-poised but defensively-poised air force, an air force which is strong enough so that anybody would think twice before starting any funny business with us, then I suggest that what we urgently require is a reduction of the multiplicity of types. What we require is rapid picking up of strength and what has been stated as adequate for this purpose something like 45 additional squadrons of fighters, with a full complement of medium range fast bombers, army support aircraft, transport aircraft and helicopters. We are thoroughly ill-equipped and inadequately equipped in egard to all these.

I would like to illustrate that by reference to the dreadful state in which we are in the matter of fighters. By fighters I do not mean planes which will attack the enemies miles ahead in their own territory. I am talking of fighters which will do interception work efficiently, and give cover to the army during operations and things of that kind.

Now we have seven types of fighters—three British the Vampires, Gnats and Hunters, two French the

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Toofanis (Ourange) and Mysteres, one Russian: the MIG; and one Indian, HF-24. And what is the effective operational position about this lot? The Vampires and Toofanis are completely obsolete as fighters and useful only for army support work. The Mysteres are mysteriously useless. In fact, they are now being used, I understand, merely for photo reconnaisance work. There was a scandal associated with their purchase; but I do not want to go into that now because it is also my information that that business is being adequately "taped." The Gnats are now being manufactured by HALL under licence. I do not know why. They are not supersonic at level flight; their ejection seats do not always eject; they have poor manoeuvrability, there is the highest fatality rate; they are grounded for two months out of every four; they are not armed with guided missiles; and they have been rejected by NATO as utterly useless. The H.F-24 with gnat engines is again utterly useless and the result,—a very poor performance. We were assured at one time that the British, then the Russians, then the Egyptians and perhaps all sorts of other people were developing suitable power units for this aircraft. But all that has fallen through; with the result that this, much publicised "Indian built Mach 1·5 fighter,"—that wretched thing with 1½ times the speed of sound does not exist in reality at all. It is just a bit of bumkum that has been handed out to the country.

Now, Sir, I come to the Migs. They are doing a firstclass job. They are good fighter aircraft by modern standards. But I am a little worried—to put it mildly—about the supply position and about the production position of Migs, because it all seems to be shrouded in mystery. In 1963 we received six Migs. Those are the only aircraft which we have yet received of this particular brand. Two of them were lost by collision. Two of them have been grounded for technical reasons; and only two are in use. Thereafter we only get all stories, such as that three squadrons of Migs have been *en route* to India since 1963. Even if they were travelling by bullock carts, they should be here by now. I do not know whether they are towed by human beings . . .

An hon. Member: Or coming over the Himalayas.

Shri N. Dandeker: Or whether they are coming over the Himalayas. I do not know. We are supposed to have had by this time three squadrons of Migs which, as I said, are very good aircraft. Also, Mr. Thomas explained in this House the other day about the plans of manufacturing Migs in India. I do not know whom he thought he was talking to, I happen to be one who has some experience in the matter of setting up the manufacture of something, where nothing is made here and where you want to go back, stage by stage, until you produce the whole wreched thing from the raw material stage. What Mr. Thomas said, I am afraid, is a pretty little story which goes like this: he said that we are building factories for manufacturing Migs in this country; the factories will be erected in one year; the production of Migs on assembly basis will be in the second year; production on subassembly basis will be in the third year; and production on virgin raw-material basis will be in the fourth year. It is utter nonsense. It just cannot happen. I have some knowledge of manufacturing complete cement-making machinery in the country. It takes a long time. But, do not rely upon my experience alone. Ask the Chittaranjan Locomotive works how many years it took them to produce a complete ordinary locomotive. Ask Telco how many years it took them to produce an ordinary locomotive until all the components were Indian made. Ask Chittaranjan now how long they have been in producing electric Locomotives and how many more years is it going to take before they produce the whole product in this country. In spite of this,

we were regaled by the Minister with a delightful tale when he said that within as little as four years we were going to produce Mig aircraft from the raw-material stage. I want to repeat that Mig is a first class aircraft. If we could have them, in adequate numbers it would be very good. But I get a little worried with this sort of thing. I am just trying to bring it into the focus of our urgent needs. What we are looking for is an Air Force that will effectively resist aggression from China. Are we going to be dependent on this kind of schedule and plan three squadrons taking two years to come here and not yet arrived, and Migs taking years to produce in the country—and all of them from Russia? I am not, particularly in this debate, taking up an ideological attitude. I am concerned merely with the fact that country 'A' is going to promise the supply and to help us produce these aircraft in this country to be used against his friend. I wonder whether all this delay has some bearing and whether this problem is in some fashion interlinked with the fact that it is China against whom we want these and it is Russia which is going to supply all these. Ordinarily, I would only wonder in a mild way. But I particularly wonder when I am told fairy tales about the short time it is going to take to produce complete aircraft in this country from the raw materials stage

Shri Joachim Alva: Has not the USA played Pakistan and India, one against the other in the case of F.-104, military aircraft?

Shri N. Dandeker: If the Speaker will give me another half an hour, I will answer that.

Sir, the only aircraft today with us, with a reasonable and adequate capability as a good intercepter, is the Hunter. The rest is just useless clutter. MIG could be a first class business. I would suggest that we go a little faster on this Mig business. Let us get more Migs, more quickly I would suggest, too that we get some F.-5s or Phantoms from USA. The important point is this. I do not care where a good fighter aircraft comes from, provided it is a modern and sufficiently competent aircraft. But I want that it should come. I want that it should be here, and not that we should still be merely talking, two and a half years after the Chinese invaded us, about an Air Force which today could be knocked out by the Chinese in six weeks whereas at that time perhaps they could have done it in a fortnight.

Let me just take a few minutes over the peculiar position that exists in the matter of transport aircraft. The Dakotas continue to do an extraordinary job. We have also one or two other transport aircraft. But the story I want to tell is about he Avro-748—another big hoax like HF-24. It was another propaganda gimmick of the previous Defence Minister. It is said that since 1958-59 the factory at Kanpur, which is manned by trained service personnel,—that is, to say, Air Force personnel engaged in the job of producing the aircraft—as if the Vizag or Cochin Shipyard could be better run by sailors,—anyhow since 1958-59 the Kanpur factory manned by trained serivce personnel has in seven years produced two Avro-748 aircraft. I may be wrong, it may be two or three, in.....

An hon. Member: Six years.

Shri N. Dandeker: Make it six years.

An hon. Member: Is it six planes or six years?

Shri N. Dandeker The Avro was discontinued in U.K. because there were no orders for any more of them. The Indian Air Force knows it is a useless junk,—hoax. They do not want any of them. The Kanpur factory are now trying to foist them on the Indian Airlines Corporation.

Sir, I will not take much more time in this debate. I hope I have made my point, which is this. From

[Shri N. Dandeker]

the point of view of Army organisation, from the point of view of army equipment and from the point of view of Army discipline and morale, much still remains to be done, though today the Army is in far better shape than it was in 1962. I would like to repeat that. I do not want anybody to think that I have the same sort of feeling about the Army today as I had about it in 1962 or I have about the Air Force today. The Army is in good shape. The officers and personnel are all right. But in relation to the particular point I made about hardening up and producing tough and ruthless men, even at the cost of a few casualties during battle inoculations, the counterpart of this must also be remembered. If the men lose their lives during battle inoculation training, their families get a miserable pension. I was horrified to hear that. I feel, I should not mention the figure. I do not believe it in fact. I am told that it is Rs. 8 or Rs. 10 if in a non-operational situation a man under training dies. Please, Sir, let us not be so niggardly towards the families of these stalwarts whom we are engaging in the Army on a voluntary in-take basis, not as conscripts. They are men with dependents whom we have taken on a voluntary in-take basis and for whom I have suggested rigourous toughening up and strong discipline. Let us not be so niggardly in so far as their family pensions are concerned.

As far as our Air Force is concerned, I confess, I am utterly horrified at the present state of affairs and I hope the Minister will take drastic, quick and effective remedial action. Let the whole force get geared up with certain clear objectives,—but not with this hotch-potch types of aircraft, of every conceivable variety that we seem to think of. Let us cut out this cackle about Avro-748, the H.F.-24 and the whole lot of other balonies handed out to the country about completely manufacturing modern fighter aircraft in the country with four years!

Shri Raghunath Singh (Varanasi): Mr. Speaker, Sir, in the Ministry of Defence Report for the year 1964-65, it is mentioned that the foreign policy and defence planning must go hand in hand. This is realistic approach to the Defence problem. In other words, if our defence is strong, the foreign policy will be stronger. The power of defence decides the foreign policy of a nation. The Government of India has realised it but it has realised it after a long time.

The second point mentioned in this Report is:

> "Pakistan and China are preparing. There has been no material change in the threat to our security. Pakistan has continued their pressure tactics and all along the cease-fire line the number of incidents of violation of cease-fire line has shown a disturbing tendency to increase."

If you will permit me, Sir, I may add that we are being humiliated every day on our border by Pakistan. Arson, loot and abduction have become the rule of the day. This is the worst type of humiliation to a peaceful nation. We do not believe in war, but we believe in the defence of our freedom which we have achieved after a long suffering and sujugation.

13.41 hrs.

[MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER *in the Chair*]

Marshal Chen Yi said on 28-3-65 at Rawalpindi described Sindo-Pakistan cooperation "as a positive factor in the present international situation". We should take note of this. The great Marshal is moving in our friendly border countries with some purpose.

This Report again is realistic when it says:

> "While our relation with all our neighbours continues to remain cordial, the attitude of these two neighbouring countries and the continued occupation by China of vast tracts of our territory have made it necessary to keep our forces in a state of readiness."

We should not underestimate the strength of Chinese and Pakistani forces. We should not underestimate the newly formed Peking-Rawalpindi and Djkarta axis. The border of Indonesia is only 40 miles away from Nicober. In the north, the Chinese armies are massing. On the western and eastern fronts, Pakistani armed forces are not losing any chance to humiliate us. Let us see what the Chinese leaders say. Mao Tse-tung wrote "On Protracted War" to keep the enemy "in the dark about where and when our forces will attack". Further: "In order to achieve victory, we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds". In the context of this, I hope that India will neither be blind nor deaf to the designs of the enemy. During the border fighting, Peking demonstrated that it could very effectively deploy and support limited but still significant conventional land power beyond the Chinese borders under particular conditions. This it had previously demonstracted, on a much larger scale, in Korea, where he said:

> "There is a preparation afoot. China has got People's Liberation Army of 27 lakhs including ground forces, air forces, navy and border guards. People's Armed Police is estimated at about 5 lakhs."

The bulk of People's Liberation Army (2 million) is believed to be assigned to approximately 40 field armies, each basically consisting of three infantry divisions. The infantry divisions range from 105 to 154 consisting of 11,000 to 12,000 man infantry.

Their Air Force numbers about 2600 aircrafts of which some 2000 are jets. As far as the Army and the Air Force are concerned, I leave it to my friends, Shri Ravindra Varma and Shri Brij Raj Singh of Kotah.

I want to say a few words more about the Chinese intentions. The leaders of China have said that a revolutionary army is not afraid of the enemy, no matter how powerful he is. It is not afraid of any weapon, no matter how strong it is. A well-known expert on defence has said that the Chinese could take over Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Assam should they wish to do so. Troop strength in the Tibetan area amounts to five or six acclimated, well-equipped mountain divisions, plus some separate task groups of regimental size. Overall strength is possibly 1,60,000 at present in Tibet near the border of India. The Chinese army is equipped with nuclear and modern weapons of destruction. India should realise that she has to meet a formidable enemy on her borders.

I welcome that the Defence Ministry is establishing missile complexes. We must equip our Army with nuclear weapons but not the atom bomb. We cannot dream to play with the liberty of the people. Nepolean rightly said: "Blood is the price of victory. We must either resort to it or give up waging war. All reasons of humanity which you might advance will only expose you to being beaten by less sentimental adversaries." China and Pakistan are not wedded to any reason. They understand only the language of force. I would like the Government to adopt a firm and decisive policy against Pakistan and China. Defence against Pakistan and

[Shri Raghunath Singh]

China is to be planned. The army units equipped with weapons furnished by U.S.A. cannot be deployed against Pakistan. Therefore, India will have to meet the menace of Pakistan on her own strength and people's cooperation should be sought in this direction. We will defend India not for ourselves but for our future generations.

During the Second World War, Franklin Roosevelt rightly remarked:

> "We will defend not for our generation. We defend the foundation laid by our forefathers. We will build the lives for generations yet unborn. We defend and we build a way of life not for America alone but for all mankind."

This axis of Djakarta-Peking-Karachi is a menace not only to the continent of Asia but to the whole world. When Prime Minister Nehru appealed to the people of this country to repel the Chinese aggression, they stood as one man in supporting the Government. They responded spontaneously. The time has come when our present Prime Minister and the Defence Minister should give a clarion call to our country and I am confident that if people are taken into confidence, they will rise as one man to defend their motherland.

The Chinese atom bomb blast at Lapnor on the 16th October has caused a great consternation throughout the world. The U.S. Defence Secretary said recently in his testimony to the House of Representative Armed Service Commission:

> "The prospect of unfriendly neighbour on its northern border armed with nuclear weapon is understandably disturbing to the Indian Government and the people."

India should equip her armed forces with nuclear weapons so that we may not face the humiliation again. Our Defence budget is not very inspiring. India is spending only 30 per cent of its Budget on Defence. Pakistan is spending more than 60 per cent of her Budget and so is the case of many nations in the world.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath (Hoshangabad): On a point of order, Sir. It is interesting to hear the General Secretary of the Congress Parliamentary Party reading a written speech. If you permit him to do so, the same latitude should be given to . . . *(Interruption)*.

Shri Raghunath Singh: Come on and see it. It is not a speech. These are the notes.

Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Mr. Kamath should know that a maiden speech is never interrupted. It is his maiden speech in English.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: In that case I am sorry.

Shri Raghunath Singh: As far as our Budget is concerned, in 1963-64, the amount provided was Rs. 704 crores; in 1964-65, it was Rs. 716 crores and in 1965-66 it is Rs. 748 crores. I fail to understand how our army is going to be modernised.

Now, Sir, I want to remind the House about our sea frontier. Our sea frontier is 3,500 miles, whereas the land frontier of India is 9,945 miles. That means, 30 per cent is our sea frontier. But, what are we spending on the Navy? We are not spending even 4 per cent, we are spending at present on the Navy only 3.3 per cent. If we take our general budget, then we are spending on Navy only 1 per cent, when our sea frontier is more than 3,500 miles. Let us

see what America is spending on her Navy. America is spending 29 per cent of her defence budget on Navy.

Let me come to the budget of Navy. In 1963-64 Rs. 22 crores were allotted; Rs. 23 crores were allotted in 1964-65 and Rs. 25 crores are allotted in 1965-66. With this amount, we want to purchase submarines, we want to replace our old ships. How can all these things be done with this meagre allotment? I am not very hopeful. At the present time the whole strategy of the world is changing. In the words of Mr. Khrushchev —he remarked about the new strategy of defence in January 1964— "the Air Force is being almost completely replaced by missiles; in the Navy now submarines are important, but surface ship can no longer play the role they played in past." But what do we find in our Budget? There is not that much of importance given to the development of Navy. In the Report also there is only one line—a phased programme for replacement of over-aged ships of the Navy. When the whole defence strategy in the world is changing and when submarine has gained a pre-eminent position in the defence strategy, I do not know how we are going to equip our Navy with modern weapons.

When our Generals and Defence experts may say that Navy has no importance, a well-known author on defence says in connection with the importance of Navy that "no matter what short-sighted nations may do in allowing their power on the seas to wither there will always be others ready and eager to use the seas for their own purposes to establish their own rules according to their conscience and their ability to enforce their will". If I can give you the comparative figure of China-Indonesia—Pakistan axis, they have got totally 1,069 units of all categories. As compared to this figure of 1,069 units, we have only 44 units. Mr. Aditi, the Indonesian Communist Leader remarked in January last that the border of India from Sumatra is only 40 miles and the Chinese steam boats are seen plying there. Our Andaman-Nicobar islands are exposed to the enemy. There is no defence and I wonder how we can defend the coast-line of 3,500 miles with only 44 units. I would like to say that it is not proper to neglect the Navy. Navy is the life-line of India and we must always remember that our Navy has to protect 3,500 miles of our coast line. There must be a regular planning cell for Navy alone. Rs. 25 crores is a very meagre sum and it will not secure Navy much of modern equipment.

Let us see what programme we have for the development of Navy. In 1972-73 with the collaboration of English-men we will be able to produce only three frigates—after five years. What we will be doing within these five years if war comes, nobody knows. We have got no torpedo boats and no ordinary gun boats. We have got no anti-submarine frigates. I don't think we are realising the strength of the Chinese and Indonesian Navy, which has the attacking force and which has the landing force. We should not forget this. When Indonesia has got six submarines, India has got none. We are still negotiating to get a submarine from the U.K. In view of the fact that the whole Indonesian and Chinese navy is organised on the basis of attacking and landing force, it is high time that our Defence planning is geared up and our immediate needs are attended to. What we need is small fast destroyers, surface torpedo boats and submarine boats and light cruisers. We have to have before us the principles of mobility, freedom of action and flexibility in the use of armed power at sea. We have entered into agreement with the United Kingdom for production of three frigates; but the frigates are out of date. We must have organised our Navy on modern lines as the Navy of Russia is organised. In Russia they have got 500 submarines. It was the U-boat which paralysed the whole allied powers.

[Shri Raghunath Singh]

In the end, I would like to say I assure Shri Chavan that the Indian people will take pride in defending their motherland. We have achieved freedom after several hundred years of slavery and we have got to preserve it, whether we have nuclear weapon or not; we have got to protect our country's freedom and we will do it.

Shri Sham Lal Saraf (Jammu and Kashmir): Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, after hearing the two speeches, one from Mr. Dandeker and the other from Shri Raghunath Singh, I feel that I must give some of the figures given by the Ministry of Defence and try to explain them as I have understood in order to show the progress achieved by the Ministry of Defence on all fronts.

If we take the budget figures of 1963-64 in respect of the Ministry of Defence, the actuals on the revenue side were 704.14 crores and Rs. 119.98 crores on the capital budget side. A year before this it was only 50. 60 crores. In 1964-65 the revised estimates have come to 717.80 crores for revenue budget and 141.10 crores for capital budget making a total of 853.90 crores. In 1965-66 the estimated grants that are before us are 748.74 crores for Revenue and 130.65 crores on capital budget making a total of 878.79 crores. Right from 1962-63 onwards we find that under budget heads there is increase on the revenue side and the expenditure is rising in accordance with the revenue receipts have in the country as a whole. My hon. friend Shri N. Dandeker has made certain remarks about the ideal things that we should have, and he has also pointed out in his own way how those ideal things could be achieved. My hon. friend Shri Raghunath Singh also has done the same thing from another angle. But the point that has to be remembered is this. After all, this money has to come from somebody. It has to come from the people by way of taxes, from the economic strength that the people and the country have. From the time of the 1963-64 budget, we find that the people have been taxed to the utmost, and a large portion of the tax collections has been diverted to the Army. I shall presently explain how the entire activities of the Army are going ahead very rightly in the direction in which my hon. friends Shri Raghunath Singh and Shri N. Dandeker want them to move.

14 hrs.

If we take the 1964-65 budget and see the amount that was earmarked for the Army, this is what we find. On the revenue side, there was a shortfall of Rs. 0.99 crores last year, but that was counter balanced by increase in pay and allowances and expenditure on transportation and works. This kind of reappropriation within those heads was permissible from the budgetary point of view. That is to say, the amount that could not be spent under one head has been spent under another permissible head. This is really creditable on the part of the Defence Ministry.

Again, on the capital side there was a shortfall of about Rs. 18.15 crores. The Ministry could not spend that amount to the extent that it was earmarked for particular things, but that was due to reasons that have been explained in the memoranda that have been circulated to us, and, therefore, I would not like to go into those reasons in detail. But they have spent the amount on other capital works and such other matters. That is to say, they have not allowed that amount also to lapse, but they have spent the amount in the way they could spend it best.

Now, let us see the break-up of the present budget. And this is a point that my hon. friend Shri N. Dandeker should note. On the revenue budget, we find that out of

about Rs. 700 odd crores, Rs. 301.12 crores are for pay and allowances, Rs. 343.9 crores for stores and equipment, transportation and miscellaneous account for Rs. 47.53 crores, and maintenance of buildings and installations etc. accounts for Rs. 35.60 crores. From the proportion of the expenditure on the various items also we find that the strength of the Army is going up and so also that of the Navy and the Air Force, which I shall presently deal with in some detail. Also, if we see the expenditure on stores and equipment and transportation, we find that in comparison with that on pay and allowances, this expenditure is much more. That shows very clearly how the strength as well as the quality of the Army and the other two wings of the Defence Forces are being increased.

Compared with the Revised Estimates for 1964-65, the Budget Estimates for 1965-66 show an increase of Rs. 31.93 crores in the net expenditure to be met from revenue. The increase has occurred mainly under Army (Rs. 2 crores), Navy (Rs. 2 crores) and Air Force (Rs. 28 crores). I would submit that we must be very realistic in these matters and understand what it really means. It is all right if it is said that one must cut one's coat according to the cloth. But as regards the money made available to the Ministry of Defence, I would submit that they are to cut their coat according to the cloth. So, I can fully appreciate the way in which some increase has occurred to the extent of Rs. 2 crores on the Army, Rs. 2 crores on the Navy and Rs. 28 crores on the Air Force. This is a matter which has to be appreciated.

Again, in the capital budget for this year, there is an increase of Rs. 12.10 crores, and that is very rightly being spent on new factories and for the construction of married accommodation. I am very happy to note that more money is being spent now on provision of married accomdation. It is a very good thing that is being done. I had spoken about this matter last year, and I got a letter from the Defence Minister on this matter, and I am very much thankful to him that he is paying his attention to this important matter. It is also really laudable that the Ministry is going to invest money on the establishment of new defence factories.

Another thing that I must appreciate is in regard to the measures for better financial control, with a view to enabling the Ministry to spend money properly and to effect savings wherever possible, by framing proper rules and regulations and checks etc., and by giving the Ministry sufficient financial advice on the spot so that the hurdles that arise from day to day could be cleared on the spot and the money could be spent effectively.

There is one other thing which is very much exhilarating. I am glad that the Ministry has revised and increased the salaries of some categories of the Army, particularly of the nursing services. I know that even in the civilian departments there is a paucity of nursing service personnel, and doctors, and particularly lady doctors. I am happy to see that the Ministry has very realitically given them increased pay and allowances and also pension facilities, and I hope that these will help in bringing up the quality of the Army services.

In regard to recruitment, we are very happy to note the progress that has been achieved. Ever since the emergency was declared, by the end of 1963 the target that they had fixed for recruitment is almost over, as far as officers and other ranks are concerned. And this has been the position in the case of all the three wings of the Defence Services. For the first time during the last two or three years we find that the recruitment has been made open to all classes and to all areas, without any distinction between martial and non-martial classes. Formerly, some years back, only individuals from certain com-

[Shri Sham Lal Saraf]

munities used to be recruited but now that is almost over, and the relations between the officers and jawans are very much cordial because they work together and live together. It is a new thing which is developing in our Army.

As far as recruitment is concerned, particularly in regard to technical graduates for the technical wings, there has been some difficulty in getting doctors and engineers particularly. For this purpose, incentives have been given to our young men. The recruitment is made even at the university level now. For instance, the Ministry has started granting commissions to the under-graduates in the last year of their course in the technical colleges as, for instance, to the engineering students in the fourth year of the engineering course. This has definitely given an incentive to the candidates and this will help in reducing paucity of personnel. After putting in five years' service in the Army, should they want to come back to the civilian departments, they can do so and they are to be given preference in class I and class II appointments in the civil services. A similar thing is there in regard to the doctors also. Doctors who have already put in 6½ years' house job can straightway be given a Major's job. There can be no better incentive than this. I am very happy that this incentive has been given.

I hope that when the Defence Minister replies to the debate he will tell us how these incentives have worked in actual practice. Besides, I must also point out that some ante-date concessions have been given. Two years' ante-dating has been given for engineers and doctors that is to say, for two years, without actually serving in the Army, they will get their seniority, promotion and increments.

As far as training is concerned, the military academies, defence staff colleges, army air transport school etc. are there; physical training, army education and foreign languages etc. are also included in the training. All these things have been going on very well. The Chinese aggression has taught us a few lessons. All of us whether on one side of the House or the other had been very much perturbed at the time of the Chinese aggression and there was consternation all over the country, but the Chinese aggression has taught us a few lessons. The Army has learnt that lesson, and we can see this from the way it has reacted in order to better its fighting units by intensive training, by having better recruitment, and better equipment, by the development of communications and by improving the supply and logistics position. Tactics and strategy have been very much improved, and the concepts of warfare also are brought up-to-date and changing.

Another thing that I would like to mention is the psychological and physical conditioning of the men who fight in the Army. They are provided with light but effective weapons, as I have myself seen on the frontier areas, particularly in my State; I have seen how they are working. The provision of better and quick transport has also very much helped these people, and this has been made possible by the construction of border roads. I do not have much time to deal with this matter, but the opening of border roads in border areas is one of the very best achievements of the Army.

The Directorate of Combat Development which has been set up is something which is self-explanatory. It has helped in training our combat forces in a better manner. Military intelligence, no doubt, is very much important, but I personally feel that a lot more has to be done in this regard.

Then, Sir, with regard to mountain divisions certain definite objectives have been kept in view, namely, extreme mobility, increased fire-power,

training for mental and physical fitness and high altitude living. All that is very important. I am glad that funds are provided and provision has been made to our army personnel as far as these items are concerned. Regarding these mountain divisions some new divisions have been created and some existing divisions have been converted.

I am very happy that army research has succeeded in providing nutritive and palatable food which is light to be carried and easy to cook. That is very important. It is a good thing that they have done. I must pay them my congratulations for doing that.

Two scout battalions have been raised in the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh on the type of Assam Rifles. It is a matter of recent history. It is modelled on the pattern of the Assam Rifles. Recently two battalions were raised.

Our Army personnel were assigned international jobs and international assignments. They have discharged their work creditably and well. They have worked wonderfully and by their work they have raised the prestige of the country; and we are very much thankful to them for that.

As far as the subject of defence research and development is concerned, there is a high-power defence research development council. In this connection certain things have been pointed out by Shri Dandeker. These are being looked into and decision is taken and a number of difficulties are removed.

I want to place a few more points before the House. The army service corps is doing a wonderful job. But one thing is very important. Vigil is to be kept in the matter of transport. Vigil has to be kept on the entire transport service and also in respect of food and other things that they purchase from the Food and Agriculture Department or otherwise. The Defence Ministry purchases lot of such things and vigil has to be kept in these matters.

The Territorial Army is doing very good work and the Auxiliary Force is really the second line of defence which needs to be strengthened and given more push.

The N.C.C. is doing wonderfully well in our schools and colleges and in our universities. More funds be provided for little more intensive training.

Sir, I come from that part of the country where the position is, I should say, highly inflammable. Certain things are happening and certain things happened about which we are not at all happy; and a number of things may come up to the surface how soon, I cannot say.

Sheikh Abdullah's name has been mentioned. Apart from his political importance or what it is I do not know, I would request our Defence Minister to kindly take note of this point that that man is playing havoc with our defence there. If not for anything, for imparing our defence. effort there. For maintaining the morale of our army, such statements as he is making, should be stopped. Once and for all the Government must take courage in their hands and deal with this situation. If they don't do it, God alone knows what is going to happen in the future. It is not merely a question of dealing with ten or twenty or hundred or thousand persons. It is a question of how he is affecting the morale of the army. Mr. Sheikh Abdullah has been addressing meetings in the vicinity of military camps and speaking things which are highly inflammable and which is acting against the morale of the people. This will also adversely affect the morale of the army as well. He is making speeches which are highly inflammable. He is making anti-Indian statements which stand very much condemned. Our Government must take courage in their hands to check

[Shri Sham Lal Saraf]

up this sort of thing as soon as possible. Otherwise I don't know what might happen. I will speak on this when the External Affairs Ministry's demands come up.

Shri Narendra Singh Mahida (Anand): How is Shiekh Abdullah allowed to address the army?

Shri Sham Lal Saraf: He addressed a public meeting and spoke: what is the army doing here, they have no right to be here, they must go away, it is not an army of occupation and so on and so forth.

Shri Alvares (Panjim): It is an act of treason.

Shri Sham Lal Saraf: About defence production, we have got to modernise and expand our ordnance factories and take steps to set up new ordnance factories. No doubt some steps have been taken. Our Minister for Defence Production has to look into this. The production achieved there has led to some very good results, but much more is needed. As far as this year is concerned it has reached over Rs. 120 crores of production. This is a thing which is to be appreciated very much.

Then, Sir, with regard to the Air Force, we have got squadrons, fighters and bombers and reconnaissance planes. In this respect quality as well as quantity is very important. Training is very important. All these are being looked into. That is very good. But still we have to pay a lot of attention in respect of the training establishment in flying, ground control, proper maintenance of air defence units etc. There are much more things needed to be done. There has been a steady rise in respect of our maritime power. I know it. Aflot establishments are there. There are two or three suggestions which I wish to make. The breed of horses, ponies and mules should be improved. There should be much more vigil on the use of military transport. Army supplies should be watched very carefully. There is some corruption which is going on. It should be put an end to. The army workshop should be standardised. The design, construction and maintenance in engineering schemes should be streamlined and we should see to it that the A.E.M.E. Services give us the highest standard required of them.

I have seen some of the army personnel waiting for long hours on the railway stations because they could not get reservation and sometimes they have to spend the whole day on the railway platform. The Defence Ministry should take up this matter with the Railway Ministry to see that the army personnel and officers are not stranded like this on the railway stations when they come from far off places. Something must be done in this regard. Labour welfare and labour laws should be introduced in Defence production units. The work of the District Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Board should be improved and made more effective. Land cases of army personnel should be looked into. Army cantonment boards should be improved. With these words I finish.

Shri Indrajit Gupta (Calcutta South West): Mr. Deputy-Speaker Sir, with your permission, I would like to make a passing reference once again to the basic questions of the defence policy because although the debate so far has more or less steered clear of that field, yet, it is necessary to reiterate these principles, since our defence policy has got a very vital inter-connection with the country's foreign policy. There are one or two observations which I feel I should make, with your permission Sir. I would like to quote a few lines from what I had to say in this House when these Grants of the Ministry of Defence were debated on that memorable occasion two years ago, the first time after the Chinese invasion. I had said on that occasion as follows:

"What is the political and military significance of this huge

burden which the Government of India has proposed and which, so far as I know no one has opposed?.... I believe it is a declaration of self-reliance in national defence. Otherwise, this Rs. 900 crores has no meaning....it is a pledge to stand on our own feet, to build our own independent strength at the cost of enormous sacrifice and to rely on our own resources first and foremost. I think, Sir, this is really the fiscal counterpart of the foreign policy of non-alignment. It means that we are not prepared to walk into any body's block. It means we are not prepared to crawl under any body's umbrella for protection, because if we want to come under somebody else's umbrella we do not need Rs. 900 crores for it; it could be managed in a different way."

We made that observation at that time because we thought it necessary to emphasise that the critical condition in which the country was plunged at that moment required a very firm declaration by the Government and the country, that despite our limited resources, we would give an example to the world as to how to build up our independent defence potential. Now Sir, as far as principles go, I am gratified by the fact that by and large those principles, I think have been accepted by the Government. The matter of execution and implementation is perhaps somewhat different sometimes; but as a matter of policy and principle this has been acccepted. The reason why I refer to this today is because, I just wanted to make reference to the fact that hostile voices within our country still continue to be heard, complaining whenever opportunity arises, challenging this concept, and a chorus of other kinds of slogans are heard sometimes which is designed to subvert if I may say so, the independence of our defence policy. I do not want to go into details because it is rather transgressing in the field of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, recently, we have heard an outcry about the question of building our own atom bomb, about which, I believe firmly that the advocates of that slogan did not really believe in themselves. But I feel that really speaking, it is meant to cover up the second line of argument which is that if we cannot build our own bomb or if it is unrealistic or unwise in any way to build up our own bombs, then we should accept someone else's nuclear umbrella. The slogan of a nuclear umbrella was also bandied about quite a bit a few months ago. For some time, we were not very satisfied with the sort of reply we were able to get from Government on this question as to whether they were clear in their own mind as to whether or not they were prepared to seek some sort of nuclear protection from other powers, in the event of an attack upon us. Later on, the Prime Minister made it clear that we had made no such request. I do not know what is the latest position regarding that particular concept. There were even voices which suggested at the time, when we read about the extension of the US Seventh Fleet's operations into the Indian Ocean, that we should welcome this development. I think it has some bearing, for example, on the recent story put out by Shri Sudhir Ghosh about the aircraft carrier that never was.

All these things have some bearing on the adopting of some sort of a concept of an alternative policy, which is not a policy primarily of self-reliance and indepedence, but is a concept of slowly taking shelter under somebody's umbrella or walking into somebody's bloc.

Therefore, when we again debate these Grants, I feel it is in order that the Government of India should make its position clear once again and the Ministry of Defence should resolutely oppose any sort of concept which may lead to the jeopardising of our national sovereignty in defence matters. On this score, I have actually some criticism to make of the Government itself because, as my hon. friend, Shri Dandeker, said very correctly, in many matters connected with defence

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we find ourselves unable to break our links with the old concepts which prevailed in the pre-independance days when the British Indian Imperial Army was maintained here by the foreign rulers. He was correct in that. But I may say also that that kind of continued link in some fields is going on now, in my opinion, to a stage which may also become quite dangerous to our national security. The whole House is agitated,—practically every day it comes up in some form or other. The country is agitated about two recent developments. One is the obvious fact of the growing collusion between Pakistan and China. We do not know whether it will extend into the realm of defence affairs or not. The other is this sudden flare-up on the Indo-Pakistan frontiers both in the east and in the west. I would like to ask the Minister whether all these things have got any bearing on the pattern of aid we are seeking.

Shri Dandeker was at some pains to point out that he did not wish to bring in any ideology into his remarks though he did make a reference to the fact that if we became dependent only on the supply of MIGs from the Soviet Union, it might jeopardise our defence later on, because he seemed to think that there might be some reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to provide equipment which might be used against China. Well, I do not know. The same argument can be applied in the other case also, because after all, whether we like it or not, Pakistan is and continues to be a very active member of certain military alliances of a war bloc, the SEATO bloc because of the proximity of East Pakistan to it, and of CENTO bloc. In view of these two developments—the obviously increasing aggressive hostility of Pakistan on our borders and its growing collusion with China,—I think it is time that the Government of India gave some thought to the pattern of aid we are seeking, because some compromising position appears to me to be possible of developing here in future.

We have accepted certain arms aid from the partners of Pakistan, *i.e.* the US and UK, partners in the sense of the SEATO and CENTO blocs, on certain conditions they have laid down, that we cannot use these weapons against Pakistan—that is the condition stipulated by the Americans at least. Then we have also agreed that their military observers can, from time to time, tour our forward positions to see whether the material and equipment are being properly used or not.

My question is: is it fantastic to imagine that this list of arms and equipment supplied to us by the western military partners of Pakistan, who have got some political interest too, I think, in keeping the question of Kashmir alive, is it fantastic to imagine from the point of view of security, that much information which we do not want Pakistan to have regarding our defence preparedness can leak out through that channel? If it can leak out to Pakistan, why cannot it leak out *via* Pakistan to China also, in the present set-up? So the whole question of our border dispositions, the locations of our radar stations on the border and so on may all become jeopardised because of this peculiar set-up now developing in the relations between these powers.

So I would ask the Government of India to give very serious thought to this matter. I am afraid they are not—they do not seem to be—capable of breaking new ground at all even to the extent of dispensing with certain hangovers of the past. I think it is an anachronism today left over from the old days that we still continue to participate with absolutely punctilious regularity in these joint common-wealth exercises every time every year. What is so sacrosanct about it, I do not know. Simply because from the time of the British we have been doing that, we continue to participate in these joint commonwealth exercises. Pakistanis are also participating. We

are participating in the joint naval exercises—they participate and we also participate. What is the object of it, I am not able to understand. I can understand Pakistan participating because they are a member of a war alliance, a military bloc. But why do we, who claim to stand firmly on the basis of non-alignment, why do we participate in these joint common-wealth exercises? Why must our top commanders go religiously every year to Camberley or wherever it is in England to participate in those top-level military conferences with other commanders of the common-wealth? These habits die hard, and I think from the point of view of basic policy and outlook, all this needs to be reviewed very seriously in the interest of the country's security.

I cannot deal with all the problems which have been mentioned in this report, because there is no time for it, but I would just like to mention one or two issues connected with our defence preparedness, some of which have been dealt with, I must say, very knowledgeably, by Shri Dandeker. I only wish to emphasise certain examples of what I may call, the painfully slow progress since 1962-63 which stand out. I do not wish to spend my time paying a tribute to the Defence Ministry for many of the good things which have been done. We have spent quite a packet of money. Some things have been done. They are listed at great length in various publications. Good. But certain other things also stand out. One has been mentioned and that is—I do not wish to dilate on it—the failure, which hits one in the face, to develop up to today or acquire or do something about a supersonic engine for the HF 24. We do not know where we are now. That whole project to get the Orpheus engine from the British collaborators fell through. The Minister of Defence Production, to my mind, does not disclose to us what happened. There was a question about it the other day. I thought the replies were most evasive.

Now, it seems we are ultimately reduced to a position where we are banking entirely on the UAR for some engine for this HF 24. The fact of the matter, as Shri Dandeker, said is that except for the MIG project—whatever the detailed position regarding it may be, which we are not able to know—except for the MIG propect and the acquisition of three squadrons of MIGs, which we are now told will arrive by the end of this year, 1965, nothing else has been done, literally. It is very well for Shri Dandeker to say that we should acquire modern planes, jet planes, from other sources. But the whole trouble is that we are not able to get them. It seems a lot of negotiations had gone on with the US for the acquisition of F-104 and other planes. It seems that the CENTO and SEATO partners of Pakistan are not very eager to supply us with that material.

And then, there is this failure to acquire even one submarine so far. I am against Mr. Raghunath Singh's idea of upgrading the priority to be given to the Navy; I am totally against it. I think the correct order of priority has been laid down by the Defence Ministry. Nevertheless, this question of acquiring even one submarine does not seem to have got us anywhere, despite the visit of the Defence Minister recently to the U.K. and secret talks which went on there. The country is not very much illuminated as to the result.

As far as the agreement which has been made with Vickers Armstrong for construction of frigates, for the construction of three Leander class frigates at the Mazgaon docks, is concerned, we are told in this report that the first one will become available only possibly at the end of 1971. So, six years from now, we will get one frigate out of the Mazgaon dock. And whether any submarine will materialise or not is just not known.

Then I would bring to the attention of the Ministry what is really a very slow progress of the tank factory at Avadi. One tank has emerged, of

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course—assembled, one should say—one tank has been assembled. It is not manufactured here; the bulk of it is from components which are not indigenous. But the future projects of this factory to my mind are very dubious. I asked a question the other day as to what was going to happen about the supply of armoured plate, because no tank can be built without armoured plates. And I know that the Hindustan Shipyard's development schemes, for example, for building ordinary ships, ocean-going ships, have been held up because of the lack of even plates required for the ships. The plate mill at Rourkela does not seem to function according to its targets. The Minister said the other day in reply that these armoured plates required for the tanks would have to be imported from abroad, which I suggest is really quite an unhappy state of affairs.

The Minister of Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence (Shri A. M. Thomas): Imported temporarily.

Shri Indrajit Gupta: The question I would like to ask is whether during the interval, assuming we do begin indigenous manufacture later on, as a stop-gap what steps have been taken or are being taken to acquire some tanks, some light and medium tanks, from abroad.

I do not agree with Mr. Dandeker that the armoured corps can be used only in the plains. They may not be capable of being used at high altitudes, but they can certainly be used in the foothills. We debated two years ago the necessity of acquiring light tanks which can be used. And they were used in the battle of Zo Zila during the attack on Kashmir in 1948. There is no reason why they cannot be used in the foothills along our borders. But we are not told anything in this report about the efforts to acquire light or medium tanks from abroad, though there were newspaper reports that the Soviet Union had made some offer to that effect also.

About mountain divisions a good start has been made, I think, and that is all to the good. But no information is available in these reports about certain vital aspects without which I think it is not possible for these mountain divisions to operate effectively. I am referring to the question of knowledge of terrain and military intelligence and communication system, because we came to grief in NEFA in 1962 very largely because of our lack of these qualities or factors. Now, obviously the Minister cannot give us details about military intelligence, and I am not asking him to do that. But we have our misgivings on this question about the efficacy of the mountain divisions, which cannot be achieved simply by giving them proper protective clothing or specialised type of high-altitude diet or acclimatising them to high altitudes, all of which is very necessary as a physical condition. But without these three basic qualities it is not possible for them to function. Our misgivings are caused by certain reports. Firstly—I bring this up every time but I get no reply—we do not know yet whether the organisation of defence intelligence has been handed over to the military or whether it is still retained entirely by the Intelligence Bureau of the Home Ministry, or whether the two have come to any sort of agreement as to how to define their respective fields of activity. There was a newspaper report in the *Statesman* of the 7th December which said that some top-level discussion between Mr. Nanda and Mr. Chavan was taking place on this subject and that "an important subject of discussion lately has been the proposal, emanating largely from professional soldiers, that defence intelligence should by and large be left to the military....The idea is not acceptable to the Government, although the need for the introduction of a larger element of military expertise in the civilian Intelligence apparatus is accepted". This is a responsible newspaper which is putting out this report. We would like to know what is the position.

Secondly, as far as the knowledge of terrain is concerned, I have hunted all through this report and I find just two sentences—one sentence, two lines in one place—which says that at last a Cell has been set up for terrain evaluation, for collating and collecting information regarding terrain. Every time we find reports that in Nagaland, where I believe the terrain, at least the hilly jungle terrain, is not dissimilar to what we encounter along NEFA and our other northern borders, we are totally incapable and our defence forces are totally incapable of detecting or intercepting the fairly large bodies of hostile Nagas who move back and forth between Nagaland and Pakistan. Now, a terrain evaluation cell has been set up. But how these mountain divisions function without specialised knowledge of terrain, I do not understand. It seems that there is a big lag here. I do not know why a few Nagas, young Nogas, who are on our side cannot be employed to give our mountain divisions some specialised training on how to move about.

And then there is, of course, also the admission made here that despite the progress made in the BEL factory in Bangalore, there is still very serious continuing shortage of signals equipment. So, on the basis of this, we would like to know how really the fighting operational efficacy of these mountain divisions can be assessed.

I would just like to quote here one short paragraph from an article which has appeared in the organ of our own General Staff—Army Headquarters. It is appropriately titled "Mountain Troops in Modern Warfare", written by an American, expert I suppose, Major Raymond Motte:

> "The latest military history shows us danger of believing that the issue of the wars of the future can depend solely on the superiority of the technical means employed. It teaches us that ....in a mountainous region, a force which is inferior in men and material but which makes good use of the terrain can, at least temporarily, outclass an adversary with modern arms and equipment."

So this shows that the importance of terrain knowledge and specialised terrain evaluation and assessment is understood very clearly by modern experts.

Then there is no concrete evidence I find anywhere—I would like some—of this: we are told that the relations between officers and men are developing wonderfully. It may be; I should be very glad if it is. But the report should tell us something about the broad methods which are used in training and so on in order to bring this about, in order to break down the old sort of, what I would call, caste system which prevailed in the Army. It seems to me that the Government seems more sensitive of bringing about some sort of equality at the level of the top brass more than anything else. I have seen recently a report of how emoluments have been increased of Indian army commissined top officers in order to close or reduce the gap between their emoluments and the emoluments of the former King's commissioned officers of the same rank. I have nothing against that, although I find that the increments which have been given will still leave a gap of a thousand rupees a month. This is all right, Sir; I mean if there is any discontent among people like the army commanders and the principlal staff officers on this ground, I hope the Ministry will try to sort it out. But the point is, what is being done at the lower rungs of the ladder? We have now a five-year plan, Defence plan. It is a good thing, I welcome it, I had suggested it in 1963 in my speech. But does this plan visualize at least a phased revision of the emoluments and condition of those who are on the lower rungs of the ladder? Mr. Saraf just now paid a great compliment—I do not know where he got his material from—about the great progress made in providing married accommodation to junior officers, JCOs and jawans. But I do not find it anywhere in the report; the report gives rather a contrary picture.

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It shows that there is very acute shortage, and the progress also in providing accommodation is not at all satisfactory.

On the other hand, Sir, I find from this Audit Report that in Calcutta City, one Major General who draws a salary of Rs. 2,250 a month is lodged in a building—in a house—specially requisitioned for him for which the Government has to pay a rent of Rs. 3,900 per month but can only recover from him, according to the Army Rules, a rent of Rs. 112.50 I don't think this is very good for developing a healthy relation between the top officers and men who cannot get even married accommodation and that we have to spend on buildings like this. This kind of thing is not very good from the morale and discipline point of view.

Incidentally, I would like to know whether the Major General concerned is one of the officers who conducted the famous enquiry into the 'NEFA Reverses' and whose report waxed eloquent about the need for improving the relations between men and officers. I would also mention the hardship of our jawans who are going home on leave from front areas. I have raised this point on two or three occasions regarding the most ugly incidents that have taken place at Howrah Station and Gomoh Station when a large number of our jawans are unable to get any sort of accommodation in the trains. I know of these people lying on the platform for three or four days wasting their leave because of their not being able to get accommodation and finally they have forced their way into the ordinary compartments in the through-trains resulting in hand-to-hand fight between them and the passengers thereby creating most ugly scenes. I think this is a very undesirable state of affairs. These are jawans with whom we rightly are very much concerned and so many tears have been shed. Cannot this mighty organization of the Defence Ministry as well as the Railway Ministry arrange for separate railway accommodation for these men who are going back on leave to live with their families for a few days and then returning from their home to the fronts? I hope this will be looked into.

Then, Sir, about the remarks in the Audit Report about which I do not want to go into details. But, still, I cannot resist the temptation of quoting the remarks which I had made in 1963 debate. I said:

> "Then, Sir, the significance in this budget at home, for our own people, is that this is the biggest sacrifice they have ever been called upon to make. They are going to willingly undertake much privation and suffering. But, in exchange for what? I believe it is in exchange for their right to demand that these defence grants are spent wisely and well, and the right to take the Government to task, and bring this Government to book if it fails, and the Parliament, as the representatives of the people, has that task too."

Now, Sir, Mr. Dandeker, of course, said that this Audit Report showed that the Defence Services were spending the money extremely well. I am afraid I cannot agree with him because, the Audit Report may not reveal a very enormous sum of wastage in crores of rupees. But, it does reveal something which, I find, much more alarming and that is the state of efficiency by which this whole policy of stores purchases and allocation of stores and so on is carried on. I have a feeling that a large number of contractors—both private and foreign—to whom we look for supplies of stores and equipments of all sorts of things are making merry just as they do in other fields here too. I would request the Defence Minister particularly to set up some form of a Vigilance Commission or some such thing within his organization because,

if there is any *prima facie* case of corrupt collusion between these contractors who are given orders worth crores of rupees and any officers or any personnel of Defence Ministry who are connected with those orders, that matter might be looked into. This is not a thing which the country is going to tolerate very easily. It is not like any other Ministry or any other field of activity. For example I can only give one or two references. There is a reference in this to the purchase made from abroad of horses. One thousand horses were purchased in November, 1962 from abroad at Rs. 2,455 each. Now it is found after all these years that only 479 horses have been issued to the user units; 46 have died and the remaining 470 horses costing nearly Rs. 12 lakhs are still held in the Depot after more than 15 months of their arrival in India. One is almost led to suspect that the horses were imported for some Army Officers who were keen on replenishing their polo ponies. Certainly they were not put to any other useful purpose.

There is another case cited here about a large number of items that were manufactured at the Naval Dock Yard some years ago which could not be put to any use now because the whole records are missing; nobody knows what for they were manufactured and so on and so forth.

Finally, I would talk—I would only take two minutes—on one other subject. That is regarding the civilian employees of the Defence Undertakings. As far as Ordnance Factory workers are concerned, they really deserve the congratulations of the nation. They have maintained a record tempo of production and they have to learn many new techniques and many new skills which are all the more praiseworthy because, despite our policy and our intentions, we have not been able to modernise the bulk of the machines of the Ordnance Factories. Therefore, I would plead with the Ministry to consider the need for appointing a separate Wage Board for these Ordnance Factory workers. This is the most appropriate time for it. When Wage Boards have been set up by the Ministry of Labour for the Engineering Industry for industrial workers and for the workers of the iron and steel industry why is it that for this sector of Ordnance Factory workers who are considered equal to those working on metallurgical processes and who are doing a first-rate job on old and out-of-date equipment, this should not be considered on an equal level? I would plead that a separate wage board be set up for them also.

Finally there is this alarming news about the retrenchment of civilian employees in the E.M.E. (Electrical and Mechanical Engineering). The Minister has stated a few days ago that nearly 2,500 civilian workers may have to be retrenched. I know in my part of the country too some threat of retrenchment has been held out. For example, in the Gun and Shell Factory at Cossipore, we find that 500 workers are considered as surplus and have to be retrenched and so on. This is a very strange state of affairs. It shows that there is some imbalance. On the one hand we have not been able to provide what is required today but on the other we have got surplus people. In the same way there may have been some stockpiling needs which have been fulfilled. It is mentioned in this report that the policy laid down here is that in such cases, temporarily, those factories may have to switch over a part of their production capacity to civilian production. Of course these are all echoes of what happened during Mr. Menon's time. We have not been allowed to forget those coffee percolators which were made when ammunitions were required. Now the wheel has come round full circle again and we are told that workers have to be retrenched. In many of the Defence Factories there is a surplus capacity and no further production is required. The stockpiling is enough. We need

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not go in for coffee percolators but perhaps do something more on the civilian production side. We should stop retrenching the surplus personnel. Why adopt a policy regarding the transport vehicles which I really consider to be fantastic? Can we afford this luxury? It is stated now that the new policy is that even before a transport vehicle reaches the first stage of major overhaul, it is going to be disposed of. Even one overhaul is not going to be allowed. Before that, thousands of transport vehicles, trucks and jeeps and so on will be disposed of. Can our country afford this kind of luxury; I do not know. The components of these Nissan trucks and Shaktiman trucks are not manufactured here. We are not able to stand on our own feet. Are we going to scrap and discard thousands of vehicles even before they reach the first stage of overhaul? Because of that, these EME workers are to be retrenched. I think this is a very shortsighted policy. I hope the Ministry will look into this carefully. It will be a very sad state of affairs if, in the midst of such a big defence plan and defence production, these technical personnel, who are well experienced and have a long record of work in engineering and mechanical types of work, are going to be thrown out because we say we do not need their services any longer. I hope this will be looked into and the policy will be reversed.

Shri Majithia (Taran Taran): I start off by saying that no praise is too great for the way our jawans and officers have discharged their duties, not only on our frontiers but outside our country, for instance in Indo-China, Gaza, Congo and other places.

While I give my praise for the jawans and the officers, I am afraid I cannot do the same for the Defence Ministry. On page 1 of their Report, they mention in the second paragraph that during the year under review there has been no material change in the threat to our security. This is one line which contradicts the rest of the paragraph, and not only that, but so many speeches made by our Prime Minister and our Defence Minister saying that the build up of the Chinese on our borders has been greater than in the past years. We also know that Pakistan and China are in collusion. That also is being said by our Defence Minister. In spite of this, they say that there has been no material change. I would like our Defence Minister, during his reply, to throw some light on the statement, as to what he means by saying that there is no material change in the threat to our security.

Coming to the army, it is a happy sign that the Ministry has woken up and has started increasing the strength of the army, instead of pulling it down, which was the policy at one time. I think it is a very realistic policy, but I would like to give a word of warning, and that is, that the strength of the army is gauged, as you gauge the strength of a chain, by the weakest link. And the Ministry in their Report have themselves said that the position regarding the signals and the engineering equipment is most unsatisfactory. I would like the Defence Minister to pay special attention not only to the equipment, but also to the shortage that we have in the engineering officers and the signals officers in the army.

I can see from the Report that various incentives are being given to attract people to join these services. Giving certain reservations in the civilian jobs is one of the incentives. While it is happy from the point of view of the individual concerned that his job in the civilian sphere is assured, that he gets a good chance of getting a job there, it produces a certain amount of dissatisfaction in the civilian service in the States and also in the Centre, which is not a happy sign. Besides, that particular officer himself, while in the defence services, also does not put his heart

and soul into his work, because he feels that he has got a job outside as soon as he is thrown out, possibly with a higher pay. So, on both grounds, both in the defence services and outside, the position is not very happy.

I was very happy to read in this same Report that the tanks which are being assembled will shortly go into service with our defence forces, and also that, so far as the vehicles are concerned, they are standardising them. This will reduce a lot of expense in their maintenance and repairs. That is borne out in the Report, and they say that due to this standardisation, a lot of old vehicles will be thrown out, and thus considerably reduce the repairs.

This principle which has been enunciated in the case of these armoured vehicles, I find, is exactly reversed so far as our Air Force is concerned, particularly in the fighter squadrons. There I find that the Ministry is still asking for more fighters of different types. As it is, we have got seven different types in the service only in fighters, and more fighters being added on means another type. Carrying spares for eight different types only of fighters not only means that you have to incur a lot of expense on maintaining those spares, but it also means added expense in the conversion that necessarily has to be done when a pilot from one particular type goes to another type. It takes him some time before he can really get the same efficiency on the second type as he possessed in the case of the type that he was flying. Imagine his being changed to a third or may be a fourth type. Look at the number of hours that we are going to waste in making the same person get the same efficiency which he would get if he were to fly a lesser number of types. But the Ministry, somehow or other, still persists in asking for more fighters. As I said in my speech during the debate on the President's Address, it is all right to say that we will increase our strength to 45 squadrons, but I think the Defence Minister will agree that in case we have to stop any aggression or any intrusion of any foreign aircraft into our country which has got such a long border, we will require not only 45 squadrons but many times that number, and it will become practically impossible for the country to bear that huge burden.

15 hrs.

The only answer, according to me, is that you have to think not of defence all the time but should have a weapon with you by which you could pose a positive threat, that in case some outside power wants to be funny with you, you can also hit that. So, far as that is concerned, we are still carrying on with our Canberras. This report does not mention anything about the replacement of these aircraft. I know that it can be said that India has only one ideology and that is, of friendliness and peaceful coexistence. I entirely support that ideology. But, on the other hand, you find that your neighbours, although they pay lip service to this ideology, in actual fact, are all the time, increasing their activities on your borders, as has been mentioned in the report. There are border violations by Pakistan increasingly; the concentration of our northern border by the Chinese is also going on apace. To that you add the latest factor, that is, that China has exploded a nuclear device and is expected to have another explosion shortly. That means that they are going all out to have all the weapons of destruction in their power whereas we are simply carrying on without them. I for one do not advocate that we should join the race of nuclear powers because not joining that race would be one of our major arguments that we have got no aggressive designs and we want to live in peace and friendship with our neighbours. But we should have with us a bomber force which should be able to deliver weapons of destruction whenever the need arises and we should certainly think of procuring one. I can say it with a lot of confidence that with the present western

[Shri Majithia]

nations as well as Russia going in more for the ground-air guided missiles, their bombers are going into the back number and we may be able to find one which would be suitable and which would stand us in good stead.

So far as the Navy is concerned, I should not like to say very much . . .

Shri Raghunath Singh: Why?

Shri Majithia: Because the hon. Member had already said enough and I am also very happy that we have now a programme by which we would produce our own frigates which we expect to be in service by 1971—I wish it had been earlier—and the Defence Minister has been seriously pursuing the acquisition of a submarine; it is also one of the offensive weapons in the Navy.

Coming back to the Air Force as I said the principle enunciated about standardisation and getting rid of old vehicles to save expenses has not been followed when you come to think that you are acquiring or have acquired old Dakotas from the civilian airlines, an aircraft which the Indian Airlines Corporation found to have past good service and compared to which other aircraft are more economical to use. I find that our Defence Ministry has got hold of this aircraft.

Since my time is up practically, I shall confine to a few remarks about the fighters. They are meant for a particular purpose. If we use the fighter for any other purpose but interception it becomes uneconomical. I shall quote an example. Mr. Petter who designed the Gnat aircraft in our service was asked by the NATO to redesign this and modify this to come up to their requirements not as an interceptor but as a ground-attack but he refused to redesign it and thereby he lost the contract of the NATO which went over to the Fiat for G 91S which could be used for any other purpose. An interceptor, or, I would say, any other aircraft to be used for purposes other than the one for which it is made is a wastage of that aircraft, of your pilots and a wastage of your capabilities.

I find that our officers get Rs. 250 per month as flying bounty for about 36 hours of flight. So far as staff officers are concerned, when they put up 36 hours of flying which is not normally an operational aircraft but on any other aircraft, they have to be paid the flying bounty. But money has to be spent for the 26 hours. In other words, the Ministry has to pay Rs. 3,000 and spends another Rs. 10,000 or so on that aircraft fuel, maintenance, etc. I am all for this flying country but do not throw some additional money like this.

One more word about the ex-servicemen. I have a rather soft corner for them and I need not say very much. After they retire, when they join the AOC as civilians the first thing that is done is that their pensions which they had earned for their service are not given to them. As if the authorities are not satisfied with that, no increments are also given to these technical people whereas the civilian joining at the same time not only gets the same pay but goes on getting increments. This poor ex-serviceman simply because he happens to be a pensioner, does not get any increments. I would particularly like the Defence Minister to look into this matter.

Shri Surendra Pal Singh (Bulandshahr): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, the reverses, which our Army suffered at the hands of the Chinese two years back were no doubt very humiliating and painful at the time but they did one good thing. They gave this country a much-needed rude shock and opened our eyes to the world as it really is, and not a world of our own make-believe, that is, a world,

which has never been free of wars and comflicts, and never will be. And they also taught us one big lesson, and that is, if we are to survive as a self-respecting, independent nation, we will have to be militarily strong. I am glad to note that this last lesson has been taken to heart by the Government as well as by the whole country, and we are today fully prepared to bear any kind of sacrifice to strengthen our defences and to meet the enemy's challenge.

Within a period of two years our army has almost doubled itself. Nearly three lakhs of men and over 12 thousand officers have been selected, trained and equipped with modern weapons. Rarely in history has any army been called upon to perform such tremendous feat in such a short time, and the fact that our army has been able to do it successfully and well in time, is something which the country can be proud of, and I congratulate the Defence Ministry and the army authorities for this very magnificent achievement.

An expansion of this magnitude is bound to bring in its wake a certain amount of lowering of the standards both amongst men and officers, but it is very reassuring to read in the annual report of the Defence Ministry that suitable steps have been taken to reorient our entire system of training to meet the new situation, and emphasis from now on will be laid on toughening of our troops and on putting them through proper battle inoculation courses. This is a very welcome step, and it is very good so far as the programme of training of the jawans is concerned, but unfortunately, I do not feel happy about the training that is imparted to our middle-piece officers and the senior officers. I admit that the system we are following is very sound and comprehensive, but in the light of the experience gained so far, I cannot help feeling that out senior officers greatly lack in field training. Enough emphasis it is not being laid on practical training in the field with troops.

I realise that to undertake a training of that type, that is, field training at the Brigade level and at Divisional level is a very costly affair and our meagre and limited financial resources do not permit us to undertake a programme of that nature and magnitude. But, all the same, it must be realised that field training is an essential, which should not or cannot be weighed in terms of money.

While on this subject, with your permission, I would like to read the judgment of General O' Connor, a very able British general of the last war, who has this to say about the importance of field training for the armed forces. I quote:

> "Training only starts in schools. It is the lack of training facilities in the field in full scale battle conditions of terrain and formations, that leads to a dire effect on the production of commanders in war.
>
> Tactics can only be outlined on paper and on models. It can be taught only in the field. You must absorb with your eyes what formations on the ground look like, and you must get the feel of handling them tactically and physically, if you are to be a commander. All else is academic.
>
> The root cause of failure is lack of training. It is not a matter of hours spent but the nature of training that counts."

In the light of that observation if we look back to our own reverses in NEFA sometime back and if we study them closely, we will find that we failed there not because of any fault of our jawans or the junior officers, but, I am sorry to say, we failed, because of the incompetence of our senior officers and generals and they failed because of lack of field train-

[Shri Surendra Pal Singh]

ing, and because they were not physically and professionally up to the mark to command our troops.

At this juncture, I am reminded of a story which was current in all the army masses immediately after the NEFA reverses, and the story goes somewhat like this. A very senior army officer from Delhi, one of the brasshats, visited a unit in the forward areas soon after the debacle. When he came across the Subedar-Major of the unit, the General asked him in Hindustani,

"सूबेदार साहब विद्ड्राअल कैसे हुआ"

The Subedar-Bajor saluted smartly and said: The

"ठीक हुआ साहब, बहुत अच्छा हुआ, सैनियारिटी के साथ हुआ"

The implication of this remark is quite obvious, and I do not think there is any need for me to elaborate the same. We must realise how and where thing went wrong. The question of field training cannot be overemphasised, and I would urge upon our Defence Minister and upon those who have the control of our purse-strings that they should not grudge any amount of expenditure on field training, however excessive it might appear to be at the time.

I would now like to refer to the subject of recruitment officers. Since the bulk of the target for recruitment of officers has been more or less fulfilled, I agree with the Government's policy to discontinue the giving of emergency commissions. But I do not agree with their decision regarding the intake of officers through the grant of short service regular commission, and I say this for this reason. Since 1962, about 12,000 officers have been commissioned, with the result that today, nearly 50 per cent of our army officers have only got about two years of service to their credit. They lack the requisite calibre, and that is so because at the time of their selection, the normal standards of selection had to be relaxed considerably because of the emergency and because of the abnormal circumstances that prevailed in the country at that time. So, it is my contention that a large majority of these officers will not be able to make the grade and they will not be absorbed in the army, which they will have to leave when the emergency is over, and thus the Government will have an enormous job on their hand of having to find jobs in the civilian sector for the devoted officers. In that context, the present decision to continue the Short Service Regular Commission, in my opinion, would only have the effect of swelling the ranks of such mediocre junior officers who will be below the requisite standard, and the rehabilitation problems that will follow afterwards will be of such an unsurmountable nature that I think this scheme of S.S. Regular Commission should be completely given up. In my humble opinion, the time has now come when we should stabilise the officers' cadre completely, and we should revert to the old system of recruiting officers by granting Permanent Regular Commissions. Utmost care should be taken from now onwards in selecting the most able and the most competent officers for our armed forces who will cherish their career and who would be an asset to the nation.

I would also request the Government to begin from now the preparation of schemes and plans for the rehabilitation of such officers about whom I have just spoken, who will not be able to stay in the army after the emergency is over and will have to be provided with jobs outside. If things are allowed just to drift in this regard, as unfortunately is at the present moment, at the crucial moment a situation might arise that might confuse the entire Government machinery, and cause heart-breaks among those officers who will be demobbed. The Government should come forward and take a definite policy decision, as to the number of vacancies,

or the percentage of vacancies that should be reserved in the Government services for such officers.

In this connection, I think it would be wise to emulate the example of Great Britain. As is well known to all of us, that country, immediately after the last world war started, froze all the vacancies in Government services for war-service candidates. I suppose we have our own peculiar administrative difficulties, and it may not be possible for us to go to the same extent as Great Britain did in this matter but it is my earnest desire, hope and wish that at least 50 per cent of our vacancies in Class I and Class II services will be reserved for these dembobbed officers, both by the Centre and the States.

This is very essential from two points of view, Firstly, from the point of view of boosting up the morale in the defence service, and secondly, for creating a confidence among the young men of this country that their interests will always be looked after by the Government even after they leave the services, and in future, if ever the youth of this country are called to the colours again they will be more willing to come than they have been hitherto. I think a successful solution of this problem is very important.

I would now like to say a few words about the Navy about which mention has already been made by one or two hon. Members. I am very sorry to note that the Navy is still being given a very low priority in the scheme of things as spelled out in the Five Year Defence Plan. So long as our defences all along the northern border were not strong, and so long as the danger of Chinese invasion was looming large over our heads, and over armed forces were not considered competent enough to meet that danger, there was every justification for giving top most priority to the needs of the army and to the Air Force. But now when our defences have considerably improved, I think more and more attention should be given to the requirements of the Indian Navy. The navy too has a very important role to play in the defence of the country. It has three very important functions to perform. Firstly, it has to guard our very long and vulnerably coastline. Secondly, it has to give protection to our territories which are of great strategic importance for the defence of the country, Thirdly, if ever we are involved in a war with any neighbouring country, it will have to do the most difficult task of keeping our sea routes open in times of war. I feel that even our present navy is not really capable of performing all these three tasks. It is of the utmost importance that the strength and fighting powers of the navy is maintained at the highest level at any cost.

The first para of Chapter IV of the annual report reveals two policy decisions, firstly that the navy's strength will be maintained at the present level and secondly that all the old ships will be replaced by modern vessels. I have no quarrel with the first decision, because actually I too realise that our fiancial resources are so meagre that we cannot possibly afford a large-scale expansion of our navy. As for the second decision regarding the replacement of old ships, I very much welcome it. But somehow I could not understand how we can achieve this very laudable objective, in view of the programme that has been spelt out in the annual report regarding the replacement programme.

The position, as I see, it is like this. Nearly 50 per cent of our ships today are between 25 to 30 years old. The normal effective life of a man of war is only about 20 years. So, we can safely discount half of our ships as being completely useless and junk. As regards purchase of new ships from abroad, we have not purchased any new ships every since 1962 nor is there any programme of purchasing more new craft in the near future.

[Shri Surendra Pal Singh]

I am afraid the three frigates which are going to be manufactured at the Mazagaon Docks will not be able to join the navy before 1973. The question then arises as to how, under these circumstances, we are going to fulfil our programme of replacement satisfactorily, and in time? What are we going to do between now and 1973? By the time the three frigates join the navy, I have a feeling that half of our navy would be at the bottom of the sea or very near it. At the present rate, we will never be able to fulfil our replacement programmes, nor will be able maintain the strength of our navy at the present level.

Another difficulty which would arise from shortage of ships is this. Most of our sea-captains will not be able to actually command ships on the seas, because of the non-availability of ships. They will instead have to command shore establishments. The result will be that by sitting in their offices, they will not only become soft, but they will not be able to keep abreast with the latest navel strategies, which are changing fast every day in this modern and scientific world, and it is just possible that if ever they are called upon to fight a battle on the seas, I fear the same sort of thing might repeat itself as happened in NEFA in 1962. So, to keep the sea-captains in training and to keep them abreast of all the latest developments in their profession they must be given command of the ships which float on water, and not ships which are always parked on land like I.N.S. India at Delhi.

The position regarding the acquisition of submarines is also not a very hopeful and happy one. We are told that Great Britain is going to help us in getting a submarine built in Britain. That will take about 4 or 5 years and we will not see a submarine till 1970. So, for many years to come still, our navy will suffer from a very great handicap of not having submarines. I do not relish this position very much, particularly when we know that two or three countries hostile to us already possess a large number of submarines, which pose a grave threat to our defences. We already know that a number of unidentified submarines have made several appearances in the Indian Occean and some of them have also been seen in our territorial waters. It is a clear indication of what they are up to. They certainly do not come all that way on pleasure crises. We know fully well what their intentions are. They made a deep incursion and probe into our territorial waters to see what our sea defences are like. It is about time we took note of this new development and made efforts to get not only one submarine, but a number of submarines, because one submarine alone added to our fleet will not help much. It may enhance our prestige slightly, but it will not add much to the Navy's strength.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: His time is up.

Shri Surendra Pal Singh: If you give me two minutes more, I will say a few words about defence production.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker I am sorry.

श्री जगदेव सिंह सिद्धान्ती (झज्जर) : उपाध्यक्ष महोदय मेरा समय समाप्त होने से दो मिनट पहले मुझे बतला दीजियेगा । मैं अधिक समय नहीं लूंगा ।

वीर भोग्या वसुन्धरा । हमारे नीतिकारों का यह मत है कि जो वीर लोग होते हैं वही वसुन्धरा की रक्षा करते हैं और वही इसकी सम्पत्ति को बढ़ा सकते हैं ।

"न वैशीपुत्रमभिषिञ्चेत् ।
न शूद्रापुत्रमभिषिञ्चेत ।।"

मूर्ख, लोभी, कामी और भ्रष्टाचारी को कभी सेना का अधिकार नहीं दिया जाना चाहिये यह हमारे इतिहासकार बतलाते हैं । इसी तरह पंचतन्त्र में है कि :

"स्वर्णपुष्पितां पृथिवीं विचिन्वन्ति नरास्त्रयः शूरश्कृतविद्यश्च यश्च जानाति सेवितम् ।"

तीन ही प्रकार के लोग राष्ट्र की रक्षा कर सकते हैं । शूर, वीर, योद्धा, कृतविद्यः जिसने रणनीति का अच्छी प्रकार ज्ञान प्राप्त किया है और तीसरे जो सेवा करना जानता है । हमारे यहां तीसरी बात खूब है, अर्थात् जो सेवा करना जानते हैं खुशामदी अफसरों की, परन्तु जो पहले दो गुण हैं अर्थात् शूरश्च कृतविद्यश्च, उस पर ध्यान नहीं दिया जाता । मैं इस पर ध्यान दिलाऊंगा । यह कहा गया है कि :

"अग्निना रयिमश्नवत्"

यदि हम चाहते हैं कि हमारे राष्ट्र की सम्पत्ति बढ़े तो हमारी सेना को और हमारे राजनीतिक नेताओं को अग्नि से खेलना चाहिये । जो अग्नि से नहीं खेलता वह अपने आप तो जिन्दा रहता ही नहीं, अपने राष्ट्र को भी बहुत बुरी अधोगति में डाल दिया करता है । यह बात तो मैं ने सामान्य रूप से कही ।

अभी हम देखते हैं कि इस रिपोर्ट में लिखा गया है कि हमारे पड़ोसी देशों से हमारे सम्बन्ध अच्छे हैं । तो चीन और पाकिस्तान से हमारे अच्छे सम्बन्ध हैं क्या ? अपने मुंह मियां मिट्ठू बनने वाली बात है । कोई कबूतर अपनी आंखें बन्द कर ले कि बिल्ली उस पर झपट्टा नहीं मारेगी तो वह कबूतर बच नहीं सकता । इसी तरह से हमें ध्यान रखना चाहिये कि पड़ौसी चाहे शत्रु हो चाहे मित्र हो, हमें पूरी तैयारी करनी चाहिये । सीमा की रक्षा करना इस समय हमारा सर्वप्रथम कर्तव्य है । हमारी सीमा छोटी नहीं है । उन सीमाओं की रक्षा के लिये अभी सरकार ने इस रिपोर्ट में लिखा है कि हम ने 8 लाख 25 हजार सेना तैयार कर ली है । इतने बड़े राष्ट्र के लिये 8 लाख 25 हजार सेना । कम से कम 50 लाख सेना होनी चाहिये । कोई कह सकता है कि रुपया कहां से आयेगा । तो आग लगाओ सिनेमा घरों में । बन्द करो उनको जो अय्याशी के अड्डे हैं । नौजवानों के चरित्र पर कुल्हाड़ा चलाते हैं । इस इमर्जेंसी के समय उन्हें तुरन्त बन्द कर देना चाहिये । और भी कई महकमें हैं जिन के बिना हमारा काम चल सकता है, मगर सेना का जो काम है, बिना उसके हमारा काम नहीं चल सकता है, हमारे राष्ट्र की रक्षा बिना सेना के नहीं हो सकती । इसलिये मैं माननीय रक्षा मंत्री से प्रार्थना करूंगा कि जितना धन अभी आपको दिया गया है कम से कम उससे तिगुने की मांग वे वित्त मंत्रालय से करें सेना के लिये । राष्ट्र की रक्षा तो तभी होगी ।

यहां प्रायः कहा जाता है कि हम अणु अस्त्र नहीं बनायेंगे । यह हमारे राष्ट्र की नीति है । यह महात्मा गांधी का देश है, यह जवाहरलाल नेहरू का देश है । लेकिन वह तो दो ही थे, यहां करोड़ों लोग हैं, जिनका यह देश है । करोड़ों लोगों की मांग है कि अणु अस्त्र तैयार किये जाने चाहियें । अणु अस्त्र तयार नहीं होगा तो क्या होगा इसकी कल्पना नहीं की जा सकती ।

इसी के साथ प्रश्न आता है सनिक साज सामान का । माननीय श्री सुरेन्द्र पालसिंह जी ने कहा कि सूबेदार का, नान कमिशन्ड आफिसर का, जनरल आफिसर कमांडिंग का दोष नहीं । मैं कहता हूं दोष उन लोगों का है जिनको मेडिकल लाइन से इंजीनियरिंग लाइन से, ट्रांस्पोर्ट लाइन से या इधर उधर की लाइन से उठा कर सेना के बड़े जनरल के पदों पर डाला गया और वह लोग भाग गये । सेना में सिपाहियों की वीरता में कमी नहीं थी, सैनिक अफसरों की कमी नहीं थी, कमी थी तो उन लोगों की जो अपने आपको वीरता में नहीं ढाल सकते थे ।

[श्री जगदेव सिंह सिद्धान्ती]

सैनिक साज सामान की कमी आप स्वयं सैनिते हैं। रिपोर्ट में कहा है कि सनिक साजो सामान अभी तक हमारा पूरा नहीं है। मैं प्राथना करूंगा कि कृपा करके इस सामान को अधिक लीजिए। तीनों सेनाओं में अधिक से अधिक भरती कीजिए। मैं पहले भी यह निवेदन कर चका हूं कि आप सेना में कमीशन दीजिए, आपत्ति नहीं लेकिन जिसको आप कमीशन्ड अफसर बनाते हैं, चाहे सैकिण्ड लेफ्टिनट से चलाइए या जमादार से चलाइए, कम से कम पांच साल तक उसको ट्रेनिंग मिलनी चाहिए। उसको कम से कम पांच साल तक जवानों के साथ कदम मिला कर लैफ्ट राइट करके अपने को फिट बनाना चाहिए। सेना में और योग्यता किस चीज की है ? इसकी नहीं कि उसको अंग्रेजी अच्छी बोलनी आती है, इसकी नहीं कि उसको और कोई चीज बढ़िया आती है, या वह सम्पत्तिशाली है। सेना में तो सबसे आवश्यक चीज यह है कि हर कोई अपने को राष्ट्र की रक्षा के लिए योग्य बनावे। लद्दाख के मोर्चे पर और नेफा के मोर्चे पर हमारे जवानों ने अपनी बहादुरी की ऐसी मिसाल दिखायी है कि संसार में वैसी मिसाल नहीं मिल सकती। ब्रिगेडियर होशियार सिंह और मेजर बहादुर सत्त ने वहां वीर गति पायी। उनके बारे में मैंने माननीय प्रतिरक्षा मन्त्री को कई बार लिखा है कि उनको महावीर चक्र से अलंकृत किया जाए, परन्तु अभी तक ऐसा नहीं किया गया, यह खेद की बात है और इस कारण हमारे इलाके में सरकार की आलोचना की जाती है।

जो हमारे आर्डिनेंस डिपो हैं उनमें जो लोग नियुक्त किए जाएं उनको जाति बिरादरी के आधार पर नहीं रखा जाना चाहिए। इनमें बहुत सुपरीक्षित अफसरों को रखना चाहिए, और इन के बारे में सूचना भी नहीं निकालनी चाहिए। हम देखते हैं कि सरकार इन डिपोज के बारे में पहले से सूचना निकाल देती है कि दक्षिण में फलां स्थान पर हम आर्डिनेंस डिपो खोलने जा रहे हैं। इन सब बातों को गप्त रखना चाहिए, इनको प्रकाश में नहीं लाया जाना चाहिए।

इसी प्रकार मेरा सुझाव है कि पेंशनरों को और रजव फोस वालों को सरकार को कुछ उपयोगी काम देना चाहिए। अब तो आपने नियम कर दिया है कि 15 साल की सेवा के बाद आदमी सेना से पेंशन ले सकता है या रिजर्व फोस में जा सकता है। मेरा सुझाव है कि उनको कुछ न कुछ उपयोगी काम मिलना चाहिए। हमारी सीमा बहुत लम्बी चौड़ी है। इन सनिकों के परिवारों को उस इलाके में भमि दीजिए। वे लोग वहां रह के काम काज करेंगे। वे सैनिक तो हैं ही, और भी इस प्रकार का काम कर सकते हैं। अंग्रेज भी उनके लिए एसा प्रबन्ध करता था। सन् 1918 की लड़ाई के बाद जो सैनिक सेना से अलग किए गए उनको श्री सुरजीत सिंह मजीठिया इस बात को जानते हैं—घोड़े पालने के लिए जमीनें दी गयीं थीं ताकि वे अच्छे घोड़े तैयार करें। तो मेरा सुझाव है कि आप सैनिकों को सीमा के इलाके में जमीन दीजिए। आज आप जमीन देते हैं उन लोगों को जिनकी सात पीढ़ी में भी किसी ने खेती नहीं की है। वे लोग दूसरे दिन जमीन को बेच कर चले जाते हैं। आप उन सैनिक परिवारों को जमीन दीजिए जो खेती करते रहे हैं। ये देश के लिए अनाज भी पैदा कर सकते हैं और लड़ाई के समय आपको शूर वीर भी दे सकते हैं।

लेकिन शूर वीरों के लिए आप क्या कर रहे हैं। हमने देखा कि सन् 1947 से सन् 1962 तक आपने सैनिकों की ओर कोई ध्यान नहीं दिया। सैनिकों को भेजा जाता था बाढ़ को रोकने के लिए या जंगलों को ट्रैक्टरों से तोड़ने के लिए। जब हमारे सैनिक मैसोपोटामिया में कैद थे तो उनसे यह काम लिया जाता था। आज आजाद भारत वर्ष में उनसे यह काम लिया जाता रहा। मेरा सुझाव है

कि आपको सैनिकों का सम्मान करना करना चाहिए ।

आप सेना में हिन्दी के प्रयोग को बढ़ा रहे हैं इससे प्रसन्नता है, लेकिन इतने से ही काम नहीं चलेगा, इसको और बढ़ाना चाहिए जससे कि अंग्रेजी न जानने वाले अपना काम आसानी से कर सकें ।

इसी के साथ मांस खाना कम करना चाहिए । मांस खाना कोई बहादुरी का चिह्न नहीं है । मांस खाने से और शराब पीने से आदमी जालिम हो सकता है, बहादुर नहीं । प्राचीन समय से हमारे यहां सेना में मांस को आवश्यक रखा गया है । गवर्नमेंट रिसर्च इंस्टीट्यूट की भी रिपोर्ट है कि फौज के अफसरों के लिए और जवानों के लिए मांस और शराब जरूरी नहीं है । उनके लिए घी का दूध का और दूसरी चीजों का प्रबन्ध किया जाए ।

एक माननीय सदस्य : वे सन्यासी नहीं हैं ।

श्री जगदेव सिंह सिद्धान्ती : ठीक है, वे सन्यासी नहीं है, वे क्षत्रिय हैं । वे हिंसा करेंगे क्योंकि इसके बिना राष्ट्र की रक्षा नहीं हो सकती, परन्तु मांस खाने से कोई वीर नहीं हो जाता ।

मैं ने जो सुझाव दिए हैं वे राष्ट्र की रक्षा के लिए उपयोगी हैं, अपने वीर जवानों को आप बढ़ावा दीजिए । इतना ही मेरा निवेदन है ।

Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee (Ratnagiri): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, the speakers before me have highlighted the economic, political and strategic aspects of our defence problems. I cannot say I am qualified to compete with them. Others have paid tribute and compliment to the armed forces. They have also expressed grave cencern and anxiety over their pay, pension etc. This, rather, remnds me of a familiar saying in the armed forces, and I trust that it will not be misunderstood in the House. Sir, it used to be said by servicemen that politicians always think of them when there is trouble and for the rest of the time they remain forgotten. Therefore, the very fact that there is so much talk and agitation and also anxiety to participate in this debate and that this House gives so much attention to the requirements of the armed forces certainly establishes the fact that the servicemen are always remembered.

Nevertheless, there is one rather odd feature about the sort of contact between parliamentarians and servicemen which is peculiar to our country. It is not the sort of thing that happens in the west; it is not the sort of thing that happens in England, America or even in a country like Russia. But it does happen here. I think this is a feature that we have perhaps inherited from the old days when the armed forces were kept rather segregated from the people at large and particularly from politicians. It is rather surprising that even today that pattern and systems continues. We are grateful to the Defence Minister for the relaxation he has brought about in this respect, that he has made it possible for Members of Parliament to visit the border areas. Last year we also went to the Air Force Station at Palam to have a look at the air exercises which were taking place there. I certainly hope that there will be greater opportunities for this inter-change of ideas between parliamentarians and servicemen. It was justifiable for the British to keep the armed forces entrenched behind a barbed wire, mainly because during the British time our army was an army of occupation. Even in the pre-independence days, I remember, there used to be a very active and a very determined effort on the part of the leading politicians in our country to speak to servicemen although in those days Indian servicemen hardly held positions of

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responsibility. Even so, there was a determined effort on the part of the politicians to get to know the problems of servicemen. I remember, when we were in the North-West Frontier Province, a heavily guarded area, Dr. Khan Sahab, Abdul Gaffar Khan and his political Colleagues used to meet the armed forces personnel and officers. Today when we are citizens of a free and democratic country when there should be an opportunity of mixing and talking with members of the armed forces, when there should be an opportunity to understand each other's problems, I find it very difficult to understand why members of the armed forces are still separated by a virtual barbed wire. It is not something that the Government have recently imposed but it is a pattern which unfortunately exists in the country. I hope it will be rectified. As I said earlier, I am very glad to see that the Defence Minister has made an effort to break down some of the old rigidities.

In this connection, may I say that some of the statements by Government spokesmen have gone unquestioned or unchallenged in this House because of this lack of interchange of ideas? Now there is no really effective defence lobby in Parliament. There are spokesmen or advocates for labour, industrialists and farmers. But, unfortunately, for the servicemen there is no effective lobby. There are Members here who are very anxious to participate in the debate or ask questions but due to an insufficient background knowledge, they are not able to spot discrepancy very often in the replies given by the Government. For instances, other sections of society like farmers, labourers, workers and industrialists have access to Members of Parliament but not the members of the armed forces. The servicemen have no access to any national forum, because they are governed by the rules and regulations issued by the Defence Ministry. Whether it is a question of service conditions, pay or pension or court martial, it is all carried on within the restricted sphere of the armed forces and there is no possible way of outside people knowing about these things. That can change only if there is a free interchange of ideas between politicians and members of the armed forces. The politicians should have acess to members of the armed forces and *vice versa*. In that case, both parties would benefit.

An hon. Member: Then politics will be imported into armed forces.

Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee: I do not think in a free democratic country there will be any politics of that type. Discipline, of course, is a different matter altogether. After all, members of the armed forces are human beings like politicians and there should be no bar to exchange of ideas between them. That will help them to konw the problems of each other more.

Now I come to the Report of the Ministry. In 1963-64 the Report of the Defence Ministry started with this enlightened statement, which I hope you will excuse my quoting. It says:

> "The Ministry of Defence is responsible for matters relating to the defence of the country."

A very enlightened sentence! However, this year's report is a welcome change. I see some of the architects of the report in the official gallery, whom I know; they are probably the same. Without in any way wishing to minimise the ability or intelligence of the people responsible for this report, I would say that it would be a good thing for Parliament if the preparation of the report is a combined effort of all concerned, the Ministry of Defences and the service headquarters.

An hon. Member: Perhaps it is a combined effort.

Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee: With my little knowledge of service matters I can say that this was perhaps not exactly a combined effort. In the air force some people were called Chair-borne pilots. If I may use that analogy, if this reprot was a combined effort of air-borne, land borne and chair-borne generals of the three departments of the Defence Ministry, it would have given a more comprehensive picture of the position.

For many years the Government has laboured under, what I think is a mistaken idea, of what is and what is not in the public interest. It is very encouraging to see that the area of what is not in the public interest has shrunk to some extent. Therefore, if I may submit, this excellent report will be useful to some Members of Parliament who are not adequately familiar with the working and organisational side of the armed forces and the Defence Ministry—I hope, Sir, you will excuse my putting it this way—to them it will be an excellent guide book. For instance, if they receive letters from servicemen and they want to forward them to the right directorate, they will know from this report where they should be sent.

I do not think this will be received with appreciation, but I do think that a report which is presented to Parliament for voting for a demand for a grant of more than one-third of our annual national revenue should be more specific. If it is not specific then the very right of Parliament to examine and assess important polices of Government is defeated or negatived. So, I would submit that if this report had been more specific, it would have served its purpose better.

We support the Government and vote for the grants because we feel it is our duty to strengthen our armed forces and supply the forces with adequate weapons, training and equipment so that in combat our men will have a decent chance of confronting the enemy which, I might say, was denied to them in the NEFA operations. While we give our wholehearted support to the Government and the Government bears the executive responsibility for implementing their policies, is it not equally the duty of the Government to clarify and state categorically to Parliament their objectives and commitments?

If I may read the opening sentence of the Report, it starts off by saying:

> "Defence planning and preparation is essentially conditioned by our.."

I suppose "is" is a printing error; it should have been "are".

> "....by our political, economic and social objectives."

This is the first sentence. Now we are sitting on a veritable volcanoe which may erupt at any time. We have the uncomfortable experience of NEFA behind us. Thousands of miles of our territory are still under the occupation of Chinese and the influence of Chinese is growing in the Far East. In the face of that, what is our defence policy geared to, what is our defence planning or preparation geared to? "political, economic and social objectives". Then the report goes on to say:

> "India continues to be wedded to a policy of non-aggression within the framework of the United Nations."

Are we then tied by eternal wedlock to a policy of non-aggression in the face of impending attack by the enemy at our door? Are our soldiers expected to keep quiet until the enemy fires the first shot? Coming to economic objectives, do you expect

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the soldiers to go to the top of Himalayas and confront the enemy but not to fire? Is that what you mean by economic objective? Secondly, do you tell your soldier that non-aggression is our policy, therefore wait till the enemy comes to our territory; don't do anything till then because you are wedded to non-aggression. This, I think, is a very good policy during peace time. But are we in peace-time? What I would like to know from the Government is a simple thing. What exactly is the charter of the Government to the Defence forces? What is the charter of the Government to the people of India? What are the Government's objectives? Are they preparing for a limited war, border operations on a small scale, or are they preparing for a large-scale military confrontation? Are we to grope in the wilderness of dogmas and slogans of political, economic and social objectives and of non-aggression? This makes little sense to anybody. I doubt whether it makes any sense to Defence forces. So, I would request the Defence Minister, in order to generate confidence in the people which alone can make them contribute their best efforts towards the Government's policies, that the best way would be to make this Report of much greater value. If it is to be a more realistic approach, for that three things would be necessary. What are the specific objectives of the Government? What are their commitments? How do they propose to meet these within the limitations of our resources? We are all aware of the limitations, economic, technical, industrial and other resources and, if anything, the international world knows it much better than we do. We also know that sophisticated weapons of nuclear warefare, guided missiles and such other things are far beyond our scope. And yet we are confronted with this immediate problem of a possible Chinese aggression on our frontiers. Many hon. Members mentioned about Pakistan. One must remember that she is dependent for resources and weapons from the U.S.A. and to that extent, unless we know the stock-piling position, we are unable to say what offensive capacity she has got.

While strategy is and should be a secret matter, a matter which concerns the technicians and the Generals—we do not question it—the objectives and policies of the Government should be known to Parliament and the country. This Report does not make that clear at all. Therefore. I would request the Defence Minister that he provides a charter to the Defence forces and to the people of this country.

Shri Nath Pal: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, as the House debates the Demands for Grants of the Defence Ministry, it will not be perhaps out of place to point out that we are discussing this year's demands under the shadow of Chinese atomic explosion and as the rumblings from what is happening on our eastern border become more louds and menacing every day. Pakistan is terrorising our citizens on the eastern border and we hear apologia from our External Affairs Minister practically every day. Though the House has, as usual, not been taken into confidence and told the truth, Pakistan has only recently grabbed 18000 sq. acres in Kutch and I hope that the Minister will be in a position perhaps to say that it has now been recovered. China is poised with her twenty divisions ,chewing, of course, what she has already swallowed in Ladakh. I am afraid, I am constrained to say that though the things have improved considerably than what they were, when Mr. Chavan took over, fairness demands that

15:54 hrs

[MR. SPEAKER *in the Chair*]

that I should tell him that they are not as good as they should be and as we expected they would be under him.

Mr. Speaker, Sir. our entire land border is subject to active, severe pressure. Our skies are more volunerable today than they ever were and our sea coast is defended by a Navy which is over-worked, over-aged and out-dated.

There is one difficulty which I will be suffering from, which the House as a whoe would be, and that is the allotment of time for this debate. Are we really serious about the defence of this country? Do we want that a judgment of enlightened opinion be available to the Defence Minister and his colleagues? Or, do we make this debate only a ritual through which we have to go? I would like that we should evolve a better system by which the estimates of all the three services, the Air Force, the Navy and the Army, are separately debated. There are other aspects of defence policy which we would like to take into consideration but time will be preventing me from doing that. There is the administrative side; and there is the expenditure side. We are a poor nation. Every penny is valuable for us. We give the biggest share of our budget to the Defence forces. We want to see that parliamentary control of expenditure is purposeful, meaningful and real. But that is not possible because we must use the available time for major considerations. I would like that we evolve a better system. Mr. Speaker, through you, I want to make this suggestion so that our debates here do not become just a big eye-wash and that there are standing committees at least for some of the important Ministries where real day-to-day consultation, guidance and direction take place. So far as this Ministry is concerned, we would like to have every year a separate debate for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Otherwise, I am sorry to say that this will be degenerating into a big farce. We cannot do full justice in this kind of a debate.

Mr. Speaker: Why have all the Ministries every year? That is also another question.

Shri Nath Pai: I can have your guidance about that.

Mr. Speaker: I suggested to the hon. Members that in order to have a thorough debate on a few subjects, we might have a few Ministries this year and then other Ministries next year.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: We have agreed to cut out two or three Ministries this year, as you know, Sir.

Shri Nath Pai: I feel sustained that I have got your consent to my proposal.

Mr. Speaker: He can construe it anyway he likes.

Shri Nath Pai: I would now deal with some points very briefly. I have no quarrel about what we shall have to pay because I do not think the price of liberty and security is too high. But having said that, I must hasten to add that when willingly we make all the sacrifices, we must be satisfied and it should be the responsibility of Mr. Chavan's Ministry to see that every penny is scrupulously used and accounted for. I will not be going into the report of the Public Accounts Committee or the Audit Report in detail but, I think, he should ask his many assistants to make a concise report for him to look at it and tell us if things have improved really substantially. Why do I say this? Sir, the Defence expenditure today accounts for 6 per cent of the national income. It is a very big slice in a very small cake in this country. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Defence expenditure varied between no more than 2½ per cent and 3.7 per cent of the national income between 1880 and 1913 and it was below this level between the

[Shri Nath Pai]

inter-War years and more recently it has gone upto 6½ per cent. That is only recently. I am coming to the more important thing. Australia spends only about 3 per cent of her income on Defence; New Zealand spends less than 2 per cent and Canada spends about 4 per cent of her income. The countries like Italy, Norway, Netherlands and even Turkey spend on Defence only between 2½ per cent and 4½ per cent. Obviously, as to how much should be spent on Defence is not for only economists or only for laymen like me to say. I would basically like to be guided by our Defence experts in this. But having sanctioned that much, I must be satisfied that every penny is turned to good use—it means more weapons, more security, more deterrence and more mobility in the Army and the Air Force. In the first place, may I point out to him that I am not at all satisfied. That a brilliant man like Mr. Dandeker should give that certificate, since he knows that the Swatantra philosophy always makes him somehow unduly worried time in and out about extravagance in public spending, is what I do not understand. He was giving that certificate because Mr. Chavan's Ministry has returned some money. That is not a good performance. It is not the absence of extravagance. There has been enough extravagance. We will be pointing it out at the suitable occasion—today the time is limited. But I hasten to point out the failure to reach the physical targets that have been set before them.

We find that the Audit Report says:

> "The provision included in the budget for the following schemes proved excessive or unnecessary. Over Rs. 68 crores representing 56 per cent of the provision made in the budget remained unutilised.".

16 hrs.

I shall be taking up the question of the foreign exchange unavailability a little later, and Shri Y. B. Chavan should make a very serious effort to see that there is greater discipline, not only among the soldiers in the ordinary sense, but better spending discipline, and better utilisation discipline also in the Defence Ministry. Then again, we find from the Audit Report that during the three years 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64, every year we find that the amounts returned were of the order Rs. 21 crores, Rs. 28 crores and Rs. 42 crores respectively. Why does it happen? It will be a very long story. I shall only cite this for him because the plea will come that we did not reach these physical targets since foreign exchange was not available. Here is the Public Accounts Committee's Report for 1964 which says:

> "The Committee regret to observe that the explanations given by the Defence Secretary before the Public Accounts Committee last year that surrenders were due to non-availability of foreign exchange involved in most of the manufacturing projects does not appear to be consistent with the position now explained to the Committee. The Committee feel concerned to note that in spite of the allotment of foreign exchange for these important schemes, the Ministry have not been able to utilise the funds to the extent expected, resulting in shortfall in plan targets.".

I shall leave this chapter about expenditure at this. I would only remind the hon. Minister that he and we are all placed together to give better shares to our people. Perhaps, I may tell him what I had tried to tell during the budget discussion last year to apparently deaf and indifferent ears, namely that a high proportion of the new taxation levied for the defence purpose has fallen on general commodities and, therefore, the burden has been borne by the common man. If we find that he

bears the burden, let us at least ensure that his money is utilised better and more properly.

Now, I shall turn to the other substantive aspects of our discussion today. The Defence Minister in his very elaborate statement before this House on the 21st of September last year—I may tell him that I read his statements very carefully—had this to say:

> "Our policy in meeting requirements of our defence is necessarily guided by our foreign policy of non-alignment which will continue to govern our actions in the field of defence procurement.".

For how long are we going to bury our heads into the barren sands of dead slogans? Must the Defence Ministry be all the while bothered about what non-alignment is? I know that there is an inextricable nexus or link or relationship between defence and external affairs and the two cannot in the long run be separated from one another. But is this the main consideration of Shri Y. B. Chavan's Ministry, namely non-alignment? I think the defence requirements will be assessed in terms of our estimate of the threat to our security and our determination to repel that threat, and not by these other considerations. I think that we should be very quick to discard these cob-webs and these hang-overs of the past. We want that just like the Army itself, like the Defence Forces, like this Parliament and like all other instruments, non-alignment is only an instrument for the only objective, abiding objective, the perennial objective and the eternal objective of maintaining this country a free country; all these instruments are to be used to that single objective. Their utility, their merit, their virtue, their relevance etc. have to be judged on the touchstone of their relevance to India's needs, and not in themselves, but somehow we are told again and again about this non-alignment. I know that my hon. friend the Minister is a very pragmatic man, and he takes good criticism in good spirit and therefore, I have ventured to mention this.

I must congratulate the Ministry on the fact that this year the report of the Ministry is a very healthy departure, and it does not take away my precious time which it did year after year before when I had to read these triumphant disclosures about military preparedness as the Republic Day Parade being led by an elephant on which sat a trumpeteer, and there being a tremendous applause when the Prime Minister came and so on. That past is gone, and this year's report is a well-prepared document. Of course, there are some unintended jokes like the 'Chinese treat' to India. I think that what they wanted to convey was 'Chinese threat to India'. Barring these minor lapses, I think it is a good document.

The Minister of Defence (Shri Y. B. Chavan): It was a printer's devil.

Shri Nath Pai: It tells us about many of the things, though I think that still the veil of secrecy is not fully lifted; there is only a small lifting of it, but the beginning is welcome, and we hope that this tendency to gradually move the curtain from Parliament's eye and the public's eye will of course be continued. It is a very healthy tendency that we have notice here.

I would like, therefore, to ask him now about one thing. Recently, we had a storm about some disclosure by a Member of his party in the other House about an aircraft-carrier being positioned near Calcutta. I do not want to go into the details of it, but there is one aspect which has got relevance to Shri Chavan's statement too. It was stated on behalf of the Government that no such aircraft-carrier came, and I think that that must be the fact. But the way it has been told or it is being told is neither fair to Parliament nor to those whom we went to for help. Let us not be

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all the while worried, worried and worried that somehow this big virgin of non-alignment will be molested; it is no virginity which can be so easily molested; it must be stronger and sturdier. It must be made of better mettle than that. The truth of the matter is, the fact of the matter is that there is nothing wrong in it. Jawaharlal Nehru, if anything, if only one thing, was a patriot first and foremost, and he knew that his first duty, first commitment was to this country, to defend this country, and he did ask for air protection. Why do we fight shy of it? Why should be ashamed of it? The aircraft-carrier business is perhaps a humbug, that particular thing, but he did ask for air protection. What would we have done to this man had he failed in asking for help from every quarter? It is part of India's sovereignty—and those who try to detract us want to see that sovereignty to be weakened—that we retain the absolute sovereign right to take help from any quarter, and the quarter shall be chosen by us and shall not be dictated by others; otherwise, we shall be letting down this country. This is the essence about it. May I say, therefore, that very bad things can happen by this kind of prevarications, by this kind of tight-rope-walking by Government on such vital issues? I do not like this article here before me, which is totally unfair to India, by Selig Harrison. But what do they think of this kind of thing? They think that there is hypocrisy. The Americans were there flying every day with their Packet planes to the air base, maintaining vital links with our forward areas. Their Commanders were with us here. We are not ashamed; we do not want any apron-strings, we do not want any army bases, but the moment we prevaricate this manner, it is a dangerous thing. It does not please anybody, but it only offends. Let us be very careful, therefore.

Let us also remember that Mr. Churchill did not hesitate to shake hands with Mr. Stalin, and Mr. Churchill's sole objective in life was to destroy communism. When it suited Mr. Satlin, Mr. Stalin called Mr. Churchill a brother too. I do not want to say more about this point, but let us have this perspective about help and once and for all be very clear in our minds.

What is the long-term strategy that this country will be having? Has an assessment been made? Are we thinking of the defence of India only in the isolated terms of our conflict with China, we and the Chinese, and we and the Pakistanis, or do we have a grander long-range strategy about defence? The strategy about defence in the long-range will have to depend upon a couple of things. I think that it depends among many things on a resilient, buoyant and vigorous economy, and on the morale and discipline of the people. You know what is happening to the morale of the people, but Shri Chavan is not very largely responsible for it, and so I do not want to ask him about this delicate question. I would also like to mention that morale is one, unity of the country is another, discipline is another, and economy is another and above all, the leadership, leadership at the helm of affairs, and leadership in the Armed Forces, dynamic, stout-hearted and imaginative. This kind of combination is the first thing, and all this will have to be supplemented by friendships and alliances, not military treaties, but alliances and dependable friendships. Do we give a thought to this?

The periphery of India's defence *vis-a-vis* China must begin from the Sea of Japan and go up to Afghanistan. This is the vital strategic conception which must prevail if we want to contain China, and if we want to prevent China from committing her adventures once again, for her good, for our good, for peace,

stability and security in the whole of Asia. I do not know if a thought has been given to this kind of thing. This is a very important thing. Seldom was a nation called upon to face such a stupendous task of defence, as we have been. Our three northern borders are threatened by two aggressors who right now have become colleagues and comrades, comrades in arms with the only unholy object of harming, hurting and endangering India's security. They, have strength. Mao is not to be ignored. I do not want to quote Mao's disparaging remarks about our armed forces because they get currency. But Mao needs to be studied. I would like Shri Chavan to make the study of one thing by his officers of the armed forces compulsory. If we want to understand China, it will not be enough to go in hysterical protests against China, as has become the fashion in this country; we will have to understand China, study China; particularly Mao's writings on war and war strategy should be made compulsory reading for all Indian officers above the rank of Captain.

Why do I say this? It is a tremendous mind, Mao's; it is an alert mind; it is a mind that is fired with a new revolutionary fervour. We will never be able to understand the enemy thoroughly unless we study him thoroughly; it is not enough to go on protesting all the while. We will have to understand and appreciate how does Mao behave? In his latest interview with Edger Snow, he says: "I know that Mr. Kennedy used to read my writings on war." Kennedy was very serious about war and peace. 'Mao also read writings by General Maxwell Taylor as to how to handle guerillas. These instructions deal with the shortcomings and military weaknesses of the guerillas and hold out the hope for an American victory'. This is Mao Tse-tung speaking: 'They ignore the decisive political fact that Governments cut off from the masses could not win against wars of liberation'.

This is how Mao tries to enlighten himself—I know that time is very short. But I am the only spokesman from my group, and in pursuance of the schedule which we have given, I will not be speaking on the Demands of two of the Ministries and will be utilising that time in this debate; I will give the schedule later....

Mr. Speaker: I have got the schedule. I am going according to the schedule provided by the Member himself.

Shri Nath Pai: We talk of peace. As an Indian, this addiction to peace, runs in my veins. But that does not bring peace. A recent computation says that there have been 14,568 wars in the world during man's recorded history and there have been only 270 years of peace. Let us try to work for peace, to establish peace. But let us not be blind to these realities that wars come. If it is so, what should be our posture?

May I read out what happened earlier? Shri Chavan is exuding confidence.

> "I like self-confidence. But I am afraid self complacency may land us into the kind of trouble from which we have not yet completely extricated ourselves".

In May 1962, this is the item the *Times of India* carried, with headlines. I would quote it because it is so relevant and germane to the subject we are discussing.

> "In spite of severe disadvantages of terrain on the south side of the Himalayas for purposes of military operations, the Indian Army is no win a position to put up a superior fire-power in the event of a general clash in any sector of the border. The military experts of India feel confident that they will repel any surprise major attack from the

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Chinese. They are sure that a headlong clash is coming".

This was the kind of euphoria that was generated in the country. I hope that the assurances which Shri Chavan is giving to the country are a little more realistic than the assurances with which this House had been regaled in the past.

Before I conclude, may I, in the remaining one or two minutes still left, try to point out to Shri Chavan one or two things? I do not know what is the role that our Navy has been assigned to play. Is there any role? If there is, what is it? (*Interruption*). I do not know. I do not know if we really have had success in building a navy. It is a fact that almost all the ships are more than 22 years old (*Interruption*). I said 'almost all'. I know there are some good ships. But are they enough for your 3,500 mile-long coastline?

Secondly, I want to know..(*Interruption*)— these words are harsh and they hurt, but it is better to hurt among ourselves than be hurt by somebody else from outside—I want to know this: must the Indian Navy be always tied to the apron-strings of the Royal Navy? There are other navies. I do not mean only the Russian Navy as some of my friends here do. There are independent, non-aligned nations like Sweden which can purposefully and meaningfully help. Do we explore the possibilities? Let not the Indian Navy be the dumping ground for unwanted, out-dated ships of the Royal Navy. That was true of many of the ships of our Navy.

Before I sit down, I would like to take a minute to say a few words about the Air Force. Shri Dandekar pointed out that we have six types of aircraft. He forgot to mention that we have six types of helicopters too. We have the BEL G2, BEL G3, BEL S 55, BEL S 62, MI 4 and Allouette. This diversification may be pandering to our vanity, but is not likely to be very useful.

About the Air Force, we are deeply disturbed and even alarmed. We are told something about 45 squadrons. I do not want to disclose the figures. But are these 45 an addition to the existing ones? If not an addition, it is not going to be a guarantee. It will not be a guarantee of defence. Let us remember that when the MIG—it would be coming into production after a couple of years; let us all hope and pray that there are no more hitches; but nobody can guarantee that there will not be any stumbling blocks—when the MIG comes into production, it will be outdated by that time. It is a simple fact because the whole field of aeronautics is dynamic and revolutionary. With the kind of aircraft, six types mentioned in the morning—including MIG it is 7; but MIG is not yet in use here; it is only in the stage of demonstration—we cannot go on. I will accept help from everybody in bountiful measure of what I want and which is relevant to my requirements.

Mr. Speaker: He should conclude now.

Shri Nath Pai: Since you have agreed about my complaint about time, I am sure you would show to me a little more leniency by elongating the time for me a little more than you normally do.

Mr. Speaker: He will be putting me in a difficulty.

Shri Nath Pai: I am concluding. As regards the HF-24, it is a sad story. We began with the Orphens engine. Then we came to the DF 9 R Russian engine. We were up against a difficulty there because the fire control power and radar of this particular single plane was to be brought from the west. What a non-alignment? The frame in India,

engine from Russia, and radar control from the west! An absolutely non-aligned plane! Such a plane may be non-aligned, but it may be airborne before it tries to be.

I never like to ignore your rebuking eyes—the rebuke is not against the eyes but against the clock....

Mr. Speaker: That is the only difficulty I experience: I cannot stop the clock.

Shri Nath Pai: It will make me extremely sad if I sat down with the impression that I disobeyed you. I was concluding with an appeal to the House and to the country.

Let us try to build a defence strength which will be of an order, which will be of a dimension and magnitude where all potential aggressors who may be thinking in terms of doing harm to this country will not only be punished if they dared cross the frontiers of this country, but which will also be of such a magnitude that its very existence will act as a deterrent. Our greatest commitment, the commitment of this generation—socialism will come afterwards—is that never again will India have to go through the humiliation of Bomdi la and Se la. Let us build our strength in terms of the requirements of that commitment and determination.

Shri Ravindra Varma (Thiruvella): Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the Demands for Grants of the Defence Ministry. In doing so, it will be appropriate if I start by congratulating the team of Ministers and officers on the work they have done with quiet and consistent efficiency and exemplary devotion to build up the strength of our defence forces and to build up a broad-base for our defence production.

Hon. Members who spoke before me have dealt with very many aspects of this complicated question of defence. The hon. Member for Varanasi (Shri Raghunath Singh) as well as the hon. Member opposite, the Member for Rajapur, who spoke before me, referred to the fact that the explosion by China of an atomic device has introduced a new element into the picture of our defence which can be ignored only at our peril. The explosion by China of an atomic device is a matter of very serious consequence and concern to this country. Sir, with this explosion, China has staked her claim for equality with the mightiest military powers that possess the most frightening weapons of destruction that mankind has yet manufactured, and has exposed the nations along her frontiers, specially the smaller non-nuclear nations, to the terrors and horrors of nuclear warfare and annihilation.

It is true that China has not yet developed a delivery system capable of delivering nuclear bombs and warheads. It is also true that she will need many more years before she can manufacture and stockpile atomic weapons and deliver tactical or Strategic nuclear weapons with operational efficiency. But this country cannot go on the basis of certain assumptions as far as China is concerned.

Sir, we cannot assume that China will not build up an atomic stockpile. We cannot assume that China will not build up a delivery system. We cannot assume that she will let a false sense of dedication to sophistication prevent her from using crude versions and crude delivery systems. We cannot assume that if China has the bomb or nuclear warheads, she will not use them against any one out of humanitarian considerations. We can not assume that she will not use them against nuclear powers for fear of retaliation. Nor can we assume that she will not use them against India and other non-nuclear powers in her periphery either out of compassion or fear of international public opinion. Nor can one ignore

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the fact that when one of the combatants introduces nuclear weapons into the field, the reprieve in Terms of time that one gets to make up the leeway in strength is much less than what one receives when the disparity is confined to conventional weapons.

What, then, were the alternatives before us? We could have sought the security of an alliance, but an alliance is no guarantee as a deterrent, no guarantee against annihilation. We could have sought a collective guarantee from nuclear powers or the United Nations to deter China and prevent the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations, and that, Sir, is what we have done. We could have decided to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons and delivery system of our own, but it is well known to this House that this would have added a tremendous strain on our slender financial resources, without equipping us with the guarantee that we would be able to achieve self-sufficiency in nuclear weapons or in perfecting a delivery system which would enable the country to fight against the possibility of surprise crippling attacks. Hence, even if one had accepted the philosophy of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and, out of pride in one's nation, and the desire to be a great power, even if one had decided to experiment with manufacture and stockpile nuclear weapons and build up a delivery system, one would only have achieved what France hopes to do and what Britain hoped to do namely, the setting up of a sort of trip wire which would trigger off an escalation which would lead to a global conflict which in turn would bring into play the nuclear strength of greater powers which can use nuclear weapons and warheads with adequate efficiency.

It can be seen, therefore, that our Government took a decision which was wise, which was consistent with the realities of the situation, both in terms of the demands of nuclear defence strategy and in terms of the quest for a collective guarantee which alone can give us the kind of protection which we may hope for.

I am one with all those who say that it is the paramount duty of the Government to defend the country. No Government can abdicate the responsibility, the inescapable responsibility for the defence of the country. You may defend the country with deterrents; you may defend the country with diplomacy, but defend you must; and if you have to defend the country, it is necessary for you to anticipate the requirements of defence and not depend on piecemeal improvisations as we seem to have done at certain stages in the past.

The hon. Member who spoke before me referred to the need for evolving an over-all long-term strategy. I am in complete agreement with him. To evolve our strategy we have to evaluate the strategy of China. Unless we evaluate the strategy of China and other opponents, it will not be possible for us to gear our defence organisation to our requirements and needs. We must know that the objectives of China, the training that China is giving to her forces, the logistic difficulties that China faces, will perhaps compel China to resort to a certain kind of war. And what is that?

Sir, military operations today are only a means for the realisation of political objectives. The objective of war today, even as the means of warfare today. is not the same as the objective of warfare during the days of Alexander the Great. War is not waged today with the primary objective of acquiring and retaining territory. Eepecially in the case of China, the objective is to establish political hegemony of an ideology, to establish regimes on her periphery that accept the ideological suzerainty of China or serve China's ends during the imme-

diate or intermediate period through political amenability. The strategy that China would adopt under such circumstances has already been indicated by Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. My hon friend, the hon. Member from Rajapur, said that everyone in the Defence forces should read Mao Tse-Tung's writings on war. I do not want to demonstrate immediately that I have done so; but with your permission, Sir, I would like to quote what Mao has written:

> "It is quite clear that, in order to determine correclty our strategic direction, it is necessary to solve correctly all problems of principle, as for instance, against adventurism during offensive operations, against conservatism while on the defensive, and against flightism when shifting our forces; against guerillaism in the Red Army, yet for its guerilla character; against protected campaigns and a strategy of quick decision; and for strategy of protracted war and campaigns of quick decision against fixed operational fronts and positional warfare, and for fluid operational fronts and mobile warfare; against the mere routing of the enemy, and for a war of annihiliation; against the principle of striking with both fists, and for the principle of striking with one first; against a large rear area and for a small rear area; against absolute centralised command and for a relatively centralised command; against the purely military viewopint and the idea of routing insurgents, but for the view that the Red Army is a propagandist and organiser of the Chinese revolution...."

If you look at these principles which have been laid down by Mao Tse-Tung and try to understand how he has applied these principles in the peripheral regions, you will see that he has preferred the strategy of limited war to which my hon. friend from Rajapur referred a little while ago. China's strategy of limited war is a strategy in which the fear of escalation and consequent direct confrontation with the superior might of adversaries is marginal, in which the unwillingness of her opponents to take the onus of extending the area of conflict is fully exploited to make her enemies fight under handicaps, on theatres chosen by China, with weapons chosen by China and for durations chosen by China. This can be matched only if we adopt the kind of strategy that can adequately cope with these wily methods that Mao Tse-Tung believes in. China has proved that she believes in military brinkmanship. In Korea, in Viet-Nam and in Laos, this is the strategy that she has adopted. We who are the victims of Chinese aggression now must also learn that the strategy of warfare which Mao believes in is one of nibbling and negotiating. The strategy of limited war may mean that China would attempt, especially after collusion has been achieved with Pakistan, to achieve her political and military objectives through protracted, phased action, choosing her limited objectives, limited areas, limited weapons and limited durations for each phase of the action. Here I add my voice to that of the hon. Member from Rajapur in saying that the terrain of our frontier is eminently fitted for the kind of warfare that Mao Tse-Tung and China believe in and the training that the Chinese have given to their soldiers which is primarily meant for the kind of warfare that can be waged on such frontiers. The political objectives of China dovetail with the realities of the training firepower, equipment and logistical position of the Chinese army and theories of warfare that Mao has propounded. Because of the collusion with Pakistan now, it is clear that this strategy of limited war may lead China and Pakistan to organise infiltration and guerilla methods of warfare in the Northeastern and Northwestern areas of our country. The immediate objectives may, then be to

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seal off sizeable areas in the north-eastern and northwestern sectors—Assam and Ladakh—sizeable areas which may not easily be held or succoured without aerial support and therefore, without, the fear of extending the area of conflict. The objective may be to have quick campaigns that would seal off and strangulate these areas, especially in Ladakh and in north-eastern frontier, Assam.

It is clear too that the strategy that Mao follows has led him to enter into an alliance with Pakitsan for the training of guerillas. The other day, the hon. Home Minister referred to this in the Rajya Sabha and said that bases for the training of guerillas have been established in East Pakistan and elsewhere. Now, if you look at the map of Assam, you will see how the Brahamaputra ethnically divides the people to some extent you will see how easy it is for China to infiltrate into the regions on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra, and for Pakistan to infiltrate into the regions on the southern bank of the Brahmaputra. I am sure that the Government is aware of this. It is clear that the emphasis that the Government is placing on training for mountain warfare and providing the equipment necessary to meet such guerilla tactics is based on the robust realisation of this possibility.

But certain political decisions too are necessary to meet this strategy. I had occasion to refer to these a year or two ago, in the course of the debate on the Demands for Grants under the Defence Ministry.

Again, I must refer to the hon. Member from Ratnagiri who said that it is bad strategy to allow the enemy to dictate to us where to fight and when to fight. We cannot concede the monopoly of initiative to our adversary. We cannot allow him to dictate to us as to when and where and how we should fight. The strategy we adopt, therefore has to be one that permits diversionary offensives, one which permits surprise counter-attacks and interception of the supply lines of the enemy. Without a political decision, which enables the army to plan its strategy and tactics in this direction, if we ask the army to defend our country, we will be asking it to do the impossible.

To combat infiltration and guerilla activity, one has to prepare for counter-guerilla activity. Here again, I would like to refer to what Chairman Mao has said: the role of the guerilla. He has said that the guerilla has to be like fish in water. He can operate only if the "rear" is such that he will not be exposed. But there are areas on our frontiers which are vulnerable to infiltration where the presence of certain exclusive ethnical groups which bear physical resemblance to the Chinese adds to our handicaps. If counter guerilla activity has to be organised in those regions, we have to give immediate attention to those problems. Unless we think and plan in advance and make those areas in the rear more open, more multi-ethnic in population, it will be impossible for us, when the time comes to deal with guerilla activity and infiltration and organise counter-guerilla activity.

We have also, therefore, to think in terms of providing the equipment, the training and the freedom to adopt the strategy and tactics necessary to meet and counter the tactics and strategy of a limited war to meet infiltration, guerilla tactics and the unconventional warfare, with conventional weapons in which China has specialised.

We will also have to give the training necessary to meet the para-military activities that China, has always used as an adjunct to her military exploits in these regions.

Sir, for lack of time, I will not be able to deal in detail with the ques-

tion of intelligence which plays a very vital part in the preparation for counter-guerilla activities. Nor can I refer to the question that the hon. Member for Rajapur raised, about the increase in the vulnerability of our skies. If we have to protect our skies, if we have to protect our hearths and homes, it is necessary for us today, especially, when Chinese atomic weapons are hanging like the sword of Damocles over our heads, to develop an aerial warning system, to have efficient radar installations on our frontiers, to have interceptors of the types necessary and the missiles necessary to see that our skies are not vulnerable. I am sure that in the plan that the Defence Ministry has formulated, for strengthening our defence forces, they have taken this aspect of strategy as well as the need to decrease the vulnerability of our seas, our skies and our land frontiers, into consideration.

With these words, Sir, I support the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence.

Shri Brij Raj Singh-Kotah (Jhalawar): Sir, following the exuberance of the two distinguished speakers, I feel rather under-armed to say what I have to say. Strategy is logically followed by tactics. Our national strategy takes into account two potential aggressors—Pakistan and China. With regard to Pakistan, the case is quite simple, for it is more or less an issue of a puppet controlled by strings from Washington.

With regard to China, we had the pronouncement by our Defence Minister the other day at the meeting where he had said "we have to achieve technical parity with the Chinese." I would like to ask, what is meant by achieving technical parity with the Chinese? To my mind, there are two aspects. One is the short-term danger that is being met quite adequately by the raising of our armed forces, that is to say in conventional weapons. But the long-term threat is the one that I foresee to be more dangerous than anything else. The long-term threats have to be met by long-term planning. That is the nuclear threat posed by China today by the atomic explosion last September and the impending one in any day to come. If we have to plan against this long-term threat, it is imperative that we have to start thinking on what has to be done to meet this threat. Have we, or have our armed forces or the General Staff of the Defence Services considered this aspect?

There is a relationship between what is called nuclear deterrent and the actual bomb. A bomb has to have a delivery system. It is too complacent on our part to think that China has no delivery system. Even at the present stage, it is quite evident that if there is any malicious design by China, it does have although in its very crudest form, the means to deliver an atomic device on her peripheral regions. I wish to highlight this aspect as much as I can; it is time our defence forces and our national leadership gave its serious thought to meet this impending nuclear threat from China.

It is all right to tolerate the reverses that happened in 1962. But I am quite sure that if, God Forbid, any such thing happens again, we shall all not be sitting in this House, but in some other place.

Regarding defence spending, it is also a pointer towards this. We are at present spending Rs. 1000 crores or approximately to that tune, for our defence needs. If we spend this amount for a consecutive period of 5 or 10 years, it leads to the inevitable conclusion, to my mind, that sooner or later, the mere fact that we are spending so much is going to force us to think in terms of acquiring a nuclear delivery system and a nuclear deterrent. These are modern days of immediate and quick communications, and the report has pointed out that the defence services are rather inadequate

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in this part. I am quoting from the British White Paper on Defence:

> "In modern weapons systems quick action calls for equally quick reaction, the demand is for ever higher speed, faster than human eye, ear and brain can manage unaided. Computors and other electronic devices have to be used. Communications must be swift, reliable and secure; proof against jamming, the interference of nature and the listening ear of the enemy."

I hope the Defence Ministry will go into this part.

The other suggestion I wish to make and which was made by the Estimates Committee last year is that we should have a single defence staff as was done in the traditional British army and in the British way of thinking. This is to keep defence, rather than service, considerations paramount. It helps in creating team work, in achieving balance and in evolving a common defence policy.

Coming to the air force, the primary concern of the air force of this country is, what is called, a tactical conception or a tactical role. The tactical role of this air force is to intercept and to destroy any aggressor who may invade our skies, to support our ground troops wherever it is needed and to supply our armed forces on the battle front. This is not the only air force in the world which has a tactical outlook. Sweden, Canada and Israel are the other countries where the air forces have a tactical biased outlook.

In this connection, I wish to again point out and ask whether it is not for the Ministry to consider, when the time comes, as it surely will have to be considered, that a nuclear device or a nuclear bomb is more suited to us merely from the tactical point of view because, knowing as we do, we are faced with a 5:1 superiority from the Chinese army. A low yield producing nuclear bomb is of immense tactical value if used and it can counter-balance the superiority achieved by the enemy.

We are, Sir, woefully inadequate, as pointed out by other hon. Members, in the possession of supersonic intercepters. I am glad it promises to ease out in the near future by the acquisition of MIG-21 fighters. The MIG-21 is a first-class fighter having the capacity of Mach 2.5 speed and typically designed for the intercepter role. What we lack today is also a ground attack fighter. We have no such modern fighter which can counter-balance our potential enemy across the Punjab. The offer of the F-5 "Freedom" fighter, if it is really genuine, should be really probed into, because this fighter is essentially a ground attack fighter and not an intercepter. Our needs of intercepter is served by the MIG-21. But we must also have the fighter for our ground support of armies in the forward areas. We should not be frightened of the number and amount of Chinese superiority in air force. It is true they have 3000 first class planes out of which 2000 are jets. But we should also keep in mind that they have other commitments too at other places like Formosa, Korea and South-East Asia where their minds are vexed. So that, all forces cannot be put into this sector where we are concerned. For any air defence the primary concern is how much and how many we can put up into the air and how fast. If we have that strength, it will serve our purpose.

I am glad that we have united all the various aircraft producing concerns at Kanpur and Bangalore under one single Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. I hope this will give the industry a broad-based structure to produce aircraft in India. But I wish to point out that this public sector

concern of the Defence Ministry should have a high degree of autonomy to evolve and produce the required weapons system. While on the weapons system I may say that it is the experience of air force all over the world to develop a weapon system which can carry the weapons to the battle field and to think in terms of what is the future requirement.

It is very easy to develop Mach-II fighters like HF-24. But experience all over the world shows that it takes anything up to eight years for that particular weapons system to go into the operational service in squadrons and it can cost up to Rs. 50 crores.

We have yet to see our HF-24 coming up in numbers to the squadron service. Coming to the question of UAR power plant, we are like anxious relatives in India who are waiting to see the marriage of HF-24 with UAR power plant. We are worried and anxious to know what the outcome will be. When the offspring comes then only we shall all be happy.

In conclusion, I wish to take one or two aspects of the army. I do not have enough time; otherwise, I would have dwelved into some other matters. What strikes me is this. It is very good that in the Ishapur factory we are producing self-loading rifles. But anybody who has a little commonsense can see that that rifle is very heavy to carry when climbing heights. Those officers who are responsible for planning these weapons should try to see whether they can evolve some light rifles specially meant for the snowy heights. It is difficult to carry these rifles up in the mountains. When the soldiers carry them they feel out of breath and they cannot even aim the rifles properly. I hope this aspect will be taken into consideration and a light rifle evolved for use in the hilly regions.

In conclusion, I will quote a maxim by Liddel-Hart: "If you wish for peace, understand war, preferably guerilla and subversive forms of war". Though we are a peaceloving people, I hope in our peaceful approach to this problem we will not neglect the most vital aspect of thinking and preparing for war because, as my hon. friend has pointed out before humanity has had very little peace and has always been in constant conflict throughout in history.

Shri Shinkre (Marmagoa): Mr. Speaker, yesterday when I was asked to speak during the debate on the Demands for Grants of the Defence Ministry, I readily agreed without a moment's hesitation because I thought it was in the fitness of things to do so. The Deputy Leader of my group in Parliament perhaps thought that a comparatively new member like myself should be given a chance to speak on the Demands for Grants of a comparatively minor Ministry, according to the ranking of the Government of India. I have been told that the Defence Minister ranks somewhere in the 7th or 8th place in the present Cabinet and I have also been told that the Defence Minister has no place in the so-called inner Cabinet of the present Government. And all this is when we are in the so-called national emergenecy. I wonder what would have happened if we had not been in emergency. I think the Defence Minister would have been ranked somewhere in the reserve, that is, the 12th place—that is the place meant for the reserves in any team. Sir, you will be surprised to know that even the Minister of Information and Broadcasting takes precedence over the Minister of Defence. Anybody who does not know the ins and outs of this country would have naturally thought that this country has produced something like a modern version of Dr. Goebbels, of couse, without attaching a bad side to it.

What I am really surprised at and very much distressed about leaving aside the jocoso or comic aspect of my remarks and observations, is that the state of affairs betrays, unfortunately,

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complete lack of vision on the part of the Government regarding our problems of defence. I am not blaming my hon. friend Mr. Chavan for whatever shortcomings or failures of the Defence Ministry that are there. Well, the Government of India themselves do not know what importance to attach to the Defence Ministry even in the national emergency. How can we blame the hon.. Defence Minister and his colleagues who are doing stupendous work to make the best of the bad job?

When I agreed to the request of the leader of my group in Parliament to speak on this Demand, I was still wondering as to what I would say during this debate because as a layman, not being very much conversant with the country's affairs as well as this particular subject, I was really baffled with many interrogations before me. Even upto this morning, when I got up, I was still living under some such worry and had it not been for this morning's papers—and I refer to the *Times of India* of today which publishes a very interesting article on Defence and Security which came out as a God-sent gift to me—I did not know what I would have been able to say in this debate to the hon. Defence Minister. Incidentally, this article is by somebody who very recently had been on a visit to this country and, I think, apart from other persons, he must have had a chance to meet our Defence Minister and took the opportunity to convey to him some of his feelings and ideas. As I stated earlier, the state of affairs betrays our real lack of vision. I entirely agree with what this gentleman, Mr. Alastair Buchan has said at the very outset of his article. He has said that we have tremendously changed from our concepts regarding the fundamental ideas of economy and welfare from the 1930s to 1960s and the idea came from a real economist whom everyone knows, Mr. John Strachey, who, I think, was the Food Minister of Great Britain during the war time and who, as early as in 1920—I speak subject to correction—had anticipated that there would be a world war created by Germany in about two decades, that is, he had placed it, the Second World War, somewhere in 1940. His argument was that Germany was left completely unscathed during the First War, because most of the warfare took place either in Belgium or on Dutch or French soil or in Italy or in North Africa and other places. As such, most of the industrial equipment and machinery and mounting of Germany was left completely intact. He had, therefore, predicted very wisely that Germany would provoke one international conflagration within something like two decades. He was a little short of the target, because the war came somewhere in 1939, that is, one year earlier. This article says as follows:

> "My friend John Stratechy once remarked that if economic problems were the great intellectual challenge of the 1930's, so have the problems of defence and security become the central intellectual challenge of the 1960's.".

I do not see anywhere either in this voluminous report or in the other publications that have been given to us any reflection of this fundamental change of the very idea of defence and security, which has come about during the period from the 1930's to the 1960's. I do not know if the present Government of India is trying to resort off and on to these two headaches of this country, namely Pakistan and China, as a remedy or as something to keep the people quiet and to shut their mouths and not to let them shout about the many failures of this Government and the sufferings of the people.

It is a well known fact that ever since her inception, Pakistan has tried this trick, and every now and then, she had been giving this plea of the Kashmir trouble in order to keep her

people quiet and not allow them to get excited over their worsening conditions of life from day to day.

I am sure Government are certainly aware of the truth that as long as the conditions in the country are not settled, no effort made by them to settle our outside problems will ever meet with any success. In this connection, I would seek your permission to read out a very interesting observation from one of our most outstanding judges of recent times, which I came across in the course of casual reading. He has written:

> "Stable and lasting peace between nations can only be built by those who live at peace, in their own communities and in their arts and problems. The first requisite is the creation of domestic tranquillity within a nation which will in course of time be reflected in its international attitudes. What holds good between those within a nation will also hold good in the international sphere.".

These are very wise words written by no less a person than Justice Vivian Bose, and these have come out in the issue of World Affairs dated October-December 1964.

So, to repeat what I have said earlier, I feel that Government are giving to us occasionally these doses of Pakistani and Chinese threat in order to make us forget many things regarding which we have every right to shout at the Government and demand justice and fair-play.

17 hrs.

While listening to the speeches of several hon. Members during this debate, I really got myself very much lost. When I was listening to Shri Joachim Alva, he was almost trying to say that everything is "okay", everybody is well and fine in this world and God is in heaven. The only objection or exception that I came across in his speech was regarding our navy, otherwise, he said the army is first-class, air force is excellent . .

Shri Joachim Alva: I referred to our men, not materials or weapons.

Shri Shinkre: Still he recommended the army strength to be increased to 2 million men in arms. I wonder whether Shri Alva really meant what he said. As it is, we have come to the stage of 825,000 men in arms. For this we are spending the equivalent of almost a thousand crores of rupees. Everybody in this country knows that the economy of the country has almost reached over-saturation point; it is almost on the verge and brink of disaster economically. The only things responsible for such economic disaster are the fancies and fantasies of this Government over as many years as have passed since we attained independence. He is wanting to increase the strength of the army to 2 million people. Where would it take us? Certainly not to heaven, if Shri Alva realises the significance of what he has said. What will it eventually mean if we have 2 million men in arms, when we are completely over-saturated and when we cannot possibly raise any more resources even with the present strength proposed, because as it is, under no circumstances can I foresee in the next 20 odd years anything more than Rs. 2,500 crores as the central budget. So I wonder whether we would be in a position to equip properly and maintain an army of more than a million men.

But the real thing today is not the number of people in arms that matters. In this connection, I would like to read a few lines from the same article written by Alastair Buchan— I am not doing so since you have given the red signal.

The Minister of Defence (Shri Y. B. Chavan): I have seen that article.

Shri Shinkre: Anyway, if he has seen it and read it, I hope something will be done in that direction. He

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has his own experts in the Ministry to advise him properly on these matters. I am very much hopeful that he will be doing something in the very near future which will bring about a real change in the whole outlook towards the fundamental problem of defence of this country.

Before concluding, I will just add to what my hon. friend, the lady Member from Ratnagiri, said regarding the first sentence of the report as to what is the defence policy. She has already quoted it. Though I could not properly hear her words, I think she meant to say that the only one consideration that always conditions a defence policy is lacking in this very sentence. The only consideration that conditions and will condition defence policy of any country is its security. That is exactly the word that is lacking there. Therefore, I entirely agree with her that these reports are being prepared by she called them architects—officials of the Ministry who can produce reports only with some stereotyped cliches, most of the time meaningless. Because I do not understand how defence planning is conditioned by political and social objectives. I can understand that it is to a certain extent conditioned by economic objectives; if we have more money, we can have a better and bigger army. Otherwise, what relationship have political and social objectives with defence planning? I am really very short of understanding.

Is our time over? I am the only spokesman on behalf of our group.

Mr. Speaker: Therefore, he was entitled to 10 minutes. I have given him 14.

Shri Shinkre: I am trying to conclude.

But the second sentence of the Report seems to be reasonable, namely that foreign policy and defence planning must go hand in hand. I entirely endorse this sentence, but will add that the illogical postures and positions we have adopted up till now in our foreign policy have necessarily been reflected in our defence policy, becauce from the very beginning we had committed the mistake of conditioning our foreign policy not by the national needs of the country, but by personal bias, by the likes and dislikes of one Minister or another Secretary. It is only the welfare and good of the country that must coidition the defence policy. Whether we mean today what we actually say, whether we change from that tomorrow, is not going to give us any bad name or good name.

Before concluding, I would only remind the hon. Defence Minister that King Ramachandra, to whom my hon. friend Shri Alva also referred yesterday, when signing a treaty with King Sugriva said "अहमत्वारि" "That means your enemies will be my enemies. This treaty and the basic conception underlying this treaty have definitely some lesson for our Defence Minister and for the Government of India.

Shri Iqbal Singh (Ferozepur): I rise to support the Demands of the Ministry of Defence. Before I say something on this subject, I want to say something about the present Defence Minister, in whose tenure things have improved very much. Whether in organisation, equipment or other respects, the general tone of defence is far better than what it was in 1962 or even earlier to that. The whole credit of this tremendous improvement goes to the present Defence Minister and the Chiefs of Staff.

I wish to preface my remarks by saying that my views are those of a person interested in the defence of the country. If these are the views of the Defence Ministry, well and good. If they happen to differ, my only earnest desire is that my views may be given consideration.

17:09 hrs.

[MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER *in the Chair*].

The British created the modern army of India, but they created it for their own purpose, to serve their imperial interests. The conception of the army, its whole organisation, equipment and training were all according to that pattern. When India was in the greatest danger in 1942, what was the conception of the British? Without saying anything of my own, I will only quote from the Joint Plan Staff Paper. The Indian Army's role was defined as:

> "(a) a base for the fleet, on whose ability to operate depends the safety of the sea communications to India and the Middle East *via* Cape and the Persian Gulf,
>
> (b) a supply base for the Middle East,
>
> (c) a supply base and transit area for China, and
>
> (d) a base for offensive action against Japan."

The main object was:

> "to secure the bases from which our naval forces can continue to dispute the sea communications in the Indian Ocean, and from which they will eventually re-establish control. Our second is to impose the maximum delay on the enemy approach to those bases so as to gain time to allow for reinforcements to arrive."
>
> "If we have to give ground it must still be our aim to cover Bombay and Karachi as long as possible."

When India was facing the biggest danger of external aggression, it was the conception of the British. One of the great commanders at that time, Lord Wavell, who was very sympathetic towards India wrote to the British War Cabinet at that time:

> "The War Cabinet must really make up their minds whether or not they propose to defend India and Ceylon seriously."

This is what he cabled:

> "At present we are getting continual messages stressing the vital importance of Ceylon and at the same time our means of defending it are being removed. This seems to me sheer madness if it is really intended to hold Ceylon and India."

That was the conception of the British. I am saying this to see whether we are going in the very same groove, in the very same atmosphere. If we do not make the organisation dynamic and effective, I do not think our Army can play its part as well as it should.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the Indian Army was partitioned and we got two-thirds and Pakistan got one-third The Indian Army had shown great courage and heroism and spirit of sacrifice in Kashmir and Hyderabad but then we neglected them when peace came to Kashmir. That was the price that we have had to pay in 1962. Only in those years when Pakistan got something from the United States, we were alarmed. We have improved our strategic and tactical weapons by purchasing aeroplanes, bombers etc. and we were still superior to Pakistan.

In 1962, we were faced by China, a powerful aggressor. It was sudden, I do not want to say anything about the happenings that caused great alarm. There is improvement in the situation now. The Defence Minister has himself said that it was due to inferior weapons, defect in organisation and training and lack of capacity in comanders and intelligence. There are many improvements in these things also after 1962. We are faced at the present time with a different phenomenon. Pakistan and China have got together. We are faced with

[Shri Iqbal Singh]

the forces of China. What is the nature of this honeymoon between China and Pakistan, nobody knew. But what is certain is that it could not be sympathetic towards India. That is real danger today. Seven divisions of Pakistan are facing us and 16 to 19 divisions of China are facing us. This is the biggest force which India has to face in recent times, which India did not face in the last world war when Japan was our enemy as they could not muster more than ten or 12 divisions in Burma. That is the biggest force that India had to face during that war. I cannot say why China has remained peaceful after 1963. Relations betwen China and the USSR had deteriorated and China had to deploy its armies on the border of the USSR. What is the present position of the Chinese? Forty per cent of their 35 field armies, namely 11 field armies are on the border of the USSR. That seems to be the reason why they have remained comparatively peaceful. Eight field armies are in the border facing Formosa; four on the border with Korea; four on the borders of North Vietnam and three on the border facing India. This is the deployment position. Either it may be 65 or even slightly greater. The Chinese are suffering humiliation at the hands of the USSR, the USA, and when North Vietnam is also showing its teeth,—I do not know to whom—we will be one of the most dangerous parts, and that is why we have to make preparations for that event. That is why I am saying that for that end . . .

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: His time is up.

Shri Iqbal Singh: I may be given a few more minutes. I speak only on this Demand and the Demands under the Ministry of Irrigation and Power. Neither have I spoken on the general budget nor on the President's Address and that is why I may be given more time. I am in the middle of my theme and if you do not give me some more time, I cannot do justice to the subject.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: All right.

Shri Iqbal Singh: This is the present position. We are going to raise those 16 divisions which may go up to 21 divisions in 1969. Whether it is sufficient force or not, it is not for me to judge or to give any opinion. But it must be said that they could expand easily, and there should be elements of expansion.

Take, for instance, the case of the officers, the JCOs and the NCOs. The number of JCOs and the NCOs should be proportionate to each other, so that in the time of crisis, we can expand and whatever thing that our adversary could afford, we also should have, such as more weapons. As was suggested, it is not so much the number but the quality that is more important. That also must be taken into consideration.

I have read out the two statements the Defence Minister made after his return from tour. I find many things in them, which we are lacking. He has tried to procure them and tried to standarise them in India and improve the defence production in India. It is good that it is being done, but in those statements, I do not find any mention about heavy bombers, heavy tanks, rockets and many other things or even long-range artillery equipment. These are now the decisive weapons which every war and every battle requires. If we ignore them, it will be too dangerous for us, and it will not be good for us to ignore them. Therefore, I request the hon. Defence Minister to realise the need for them. They may not be immediately needed to check China, but you must know that our second enemy is Pakistan, and we cannot ignore the threat of Pakistan. Pakistan is creating a hard situation for us. It is creating a situation all around—in Kutch, in Kashmir, on the Cooch-Behar-East Pakistan border, on the Assam-East Pakistan border and on the West Bengal-East Pakistan border

stan border as a whole. China is also creating a hard situation for us. We should also take note of Pakistan's threat. That is why we should not ignore the need for heavy weapons such as heavy tanks, heavy bombers and artillery, which will be suitable for use on the ground if not on the mountains.

Raising the mountain divisions is the answer to the situation. It is a good answer that we are trying to give. It is the only effective answer, in that climate, in that terrain and in that situation, and India should have more mountain divisions. When we create them, we cannot also ignore other things. We have to balance the needs, taking into account both sides China and Pakistan. If we ignore any front, it will be dangerous to us, especially when Pakistan is always on the look-out for things which are not favourable or sympathetic to us. It is always on the look-out for situations which will be dangerous to us.

Then I come to one of the most important aspects which the Defence Ministry has neglected, namely, rockets and missile forces. These are the weapons of the future. I do not say that nuclear weapons should be had. They may or may not be obtained. I am not entering into that aspect, because I cannot do enough justice to the points which I want to make. But may I emphasise that these are the weapons of the future, and if we do not devalop the rockets and missiles if we do not train our defence forces in the handling of these weapons, we will be handicapped. They are not only tactical but also starategical weapns in course of time. If we do not train our men in these weapons, it will be a great loss to us. I do not find anything in the report to the effect that the Government are really serious about it. As I said, these are the weapons of the future, whether we like it or not. These are the future weapons of war which must be developed in this country. If we cannot develop them, we must at least train our soldiers with that view in mind. Any army which is not mobile cannot play an effective part. We have produced in this country 5,000 Shaktiman trucks, 8,000 Nissan trucks and about 3,7000 jeeps. In the first World War, every soldier was backed with about 1½ H.P. and in the second world war with 5 H.P. Have we got some standard about it in the Indian army? Can these 5,000 Shaktiman trucks and other vehicles give the mobility which we require for dispersal at the decisive time? Moreover, by creating the mountain divisions, we are taking away mobility from those divisions. We have to give something at the other end.

Coming to JCOs and NCOs, I ask whether the time has not come to review the whole position. Is it necessary to have so many ranks in the Indian army? Take the case of subedar major and havildar. They do not have any increments at all in their whole life. What is the use of a rank which cannot give a further opening to progress further? These people are the real backbone of the Indian Army. If the Defence Minister makes an analysis, he will find that in the battles of NEFA and Ladakh, the JCOs and NCOs have given their due account of themselves. So, the time has come to consider whether we should not reduce the number of the ranks. Their scales of pay should be something which will really inspire confidence in them. There are only three increments for jamedars and there are no increments for the havildars. Even a labourer gets increment every year. But a man who is fighting for the defence of the country in Ladakh and in the hills is not getting increments. These things should be looked into.

With these words, I support the demands for the Defence Ministry.

श्री यशपाल सिंह (कैराना) : उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, हम यहां सब से ज्यादा काम करते हैं, हमारे बेटे व पोते वहां नेफा में भारत की

[श्री यशपाल सिंह]

आज़ादी की रक्षा करते हुए कटते हैं तो भी मुझे बहुत कम समय बोलने का मिलता है ।

श्री यशवन्तराव चव्हाण और उपमंत्री डा० राजू के द्वारा इस प्रतिरक्षा मंत्रालय के काम को चलाने का जहां तक सवाल है मैं किसी तरीके से भी नहीं कह सकता कि उनके इंतज़ाम में कोई कमी है, अपने कर्त्तव्य का निर्वाह उन्होंने बड़ी योग्यता से किया है और उन में सूरज की जैसी प्रखर देश-भक्ति की भावना विद्यमान है । उन्होंने हमेशा देश की सेवा की है लेकिन जिस पार्टी में यह शामिल हैं, उस कांग्रेस पार्टी का इतिहास, कांग्रेस गवर्नमेंट का इतिहास पराजय का इतिहास है ।

श्री माननीय सदस्य : नहीं ।

श्री यशपाल सिंह : इन 17 सालों में इन्हों ने इतना बड़ा पाकिस्तान काट कर दे दिया जिसमें कि 242 वैटिकल एम्पायर्स बन सकते थे । आज यह हालत है कि हमारी जन्मभूमि, मातृभूमि के 38,000 वर्ग मील के क्षेत्रफल पर दुश्मन का झंडा लहरा रहा है । हम यह भी देखते हैं कि मुट्ठी भर नागाओं ने इन की नाक में नकेल डाल रक्खी है । अगर आज देश की रक्षा करनी है, देश की आज़ादी को बरकरार रखना है तो मैं आप के साथ जो सुपरस्टीशंस हैं उन से ऊपर उठना होगा । देश आज ख़तरे में है लेकिन एक दिन के लिए यह नहीं पूछा गया कि इस का इलाज क्या हो सकता है और कैसे हो सकता है ? आज सब से ज्यादा और सब से पहली ज़रूरत इस बात की है कि जो इलाके चीन ने ख़ाली किये हैं, उन ख़ाली किये हुए इलाक़ों में हमारी पोस्ट्स क़ायम होनी चाहियें, वहां हमारे गार्ड होने चाहिएं, वहां हमारे सैनिक होने चाहिएं । थागला रिज के ऊपर हमारा कोई सैनिक नहीं है, हमारा वहां न तो एक झंडा है और न सैनिक है न ही कोई गार्ड है । वहां पर न ही हमारी कोई पी० ए० सी० बटालियन है । हकीकत यह है कि थागला रिज हमारे बिलकुल कब्ज़े से बाहर है । धोला पोस्ट के ऊपर हमारा कोई निशान तक नहीं है, झंडा तक नहीं है, सिपाही तक नहीं है । वहां पर हमारा कोई एक गार्ड तक नहीं है । उन खाली की हुई जगहों को जब तक हम औकुपाई नहीं करेंगे, जब तक हम उन के ऊपर अपना झंडा नहीं लहरायेंगे, जब तक उन पर अपने गार्डस तैनात नहीं करेंगे तब तक हरगिज़ हरगिज़ हम चीन को पीछे नहीं हटा सकते । सबसे ज्यादा ज़रूरत है देश के गद्दारों को माकूल सज़ा देने की । लेकिन किसी एक भी गद्दार को आज तक सज़ा नहीं दी गई है । जिन गद्दारों ने चीन को नक़शा पेश किया, जो गद्दार लड़ाई के मोर्चे से भाग कर आ गये, जिन गद्दारों ने चीन को ईंटें, सीमेंट तथा लोहा दिया और जिन गद्दारों ने 1600 मील लम्बी चीन की सड़क बनवा दी, उन में से एक भी गद्दार को सज़ा नहीं दी गई । जबलपुर जेल के अन्दर मि० शर्मा को सात साल की सज़ा दी गई । वे फ्लाइट लैफटिनेंट थे । सात साल की सज़ा उन्हें इसलिए दी गई कि वह एयर फोर्स के सीक्रैट्स पाकिस्तान को डाइवल्ज कर रहे थे । मि० शर्मा ने यह बयान दिया था कि मैं अकेला इसमें नहीं हूं । मेरे साथ 13 अफसर भारतीय फौज के और हैं जो कि पाकिस्तान से रुपया लेते हैं । उनकी लिस्ट मेरे पास है लेकिन किसी के खिलाफ कोई एक्शन नहीं लिया गया । फौज में वे बड़ी ऊंची पोज़ीशन में लगे हुए हैं । जब तक मिलेटरी के अन्दर बाक़ायदा एक छात्र धर्म की ट्रेनिंग नहीं दी जायगी तब तक यह मसला हल नहीं हो सकता है । देश के गद्दारों को जब तक सामने खड़ा कर उन को गोली नहीं मारी जायेगी तब तक यह मसला हल नहीं हो सकता है । आज सरकार इस बात का दावा करती है कि हमने दुगनी फौज की है लेकिन क्या मतलब है दुगनी फौज का ?

अंग्रेज़ों ने तीन साल के अन्दर इस देश के बाशिन्दों को फौज में ले कर दस गुना फौज कर दी थी । 2 लाख से 20 लाख की फौज हो गयी और कांग्रेस सरकार कहती है कि हम दुगनी फौज कर सके हैं । यह कांग्रेस सरकार क्या दुगनी फौज करेगी ? जब तक बच्चे, बच्चे को फौजी तालीम नहीं दी जायगी, हर एक बालिग़ को, हर एक बेटे, बेटी को जब तक हर तरीक़े से ट्रेन नहीं किया जायगा तब तक काम नहीं चल सकता है ।

न्यूक्लियर वैपन्स की जब बात कही जाती है तो मैं साफ़ कहना चाहता हूं कि सरकार इसका नाम लेना छोड़ दे, यह कहना छोड़ दे कि हम देश को बचायेंगे क्योंकि अगर उसे देश को बचाना है तो न्यूक्लियर वैपन्स को उसे अपने पास इकट्ठा करना पड़ेगा । ऐसा नहीं हो सकता है कि पार्लियामेंट भी चलती रहे और स्पीकर भी न रहे स्पीकर के बगैर पार्लियामेंट बेकार है । ऐसा नहीं हो सकता है कि बारात भी चलती रहे और दुलहा न हो । जिस तरह से दुलहे के बगैर बारात बेकार है, उसी तरह से न्यूक्लियर वैपन्स के बगैर सारी फौज व डिफेंस बेकार है । इन के बगैर हमारा मुल्क कमजोर बना रहेगा । हमें इस बारे में गम्भीरतापूर्वक सोचना होगा । अगर हम न्यूक्लियर वैपन्स नहीं बना सके हैं तो एक दिन हमारी तमाम फौजें ख़त्म की जा सकती हैं । वर्ल्ड ओपीनियन आपके साथ नहीं है । जब यहां भारत में आकर दावतें लेने का समय होता है, तो वर्ल्ड ओपीनियन आपके साथ होती है लेकिन जब देश के ऊपर कोई संकट आता है तो वर्ल्ड ओपीनियन आपका साथ नहीं देती है । कड़ सत्य तो यह है कि हम अपना कोई भी मित्र बाहर पैदा नहीं कर सके हैं । नीति शास्त्र के अन्दर यह बात मानी गई है :—

असाधना वित्त हीना : बुद्धिमन्त : सुहत्तमा
साधयन्ति आशु कार्याणि काक कूर्म मृगा
खुवत् ॥

नीतिशास्त्र में यह बात लिखी हुई है कि चाहे जायदाद नष्ट हो जाय, चाहे रुपया नष्ट हो जाय लेकिन जिसके पीछे सेना हो तथा जिसके मित्र वफादार हैं वह हमेशा जीतता है । आपने मित्र पैदा नहीं किये जबकि चीन ने मित्र पैदा किये हैं । इंडोनेशिया ने कह दिया कि अगर चीन को जगह नहीं मिलती है तो मैं भी इस्तीफ़ा देता हूं लेकिन किसी ने भी एक भी मित्र ने आपके लिए यह आगे बढ़कर नहीं कहा कि हम आपके देश की इज्जत की खातिर आपका साथ देंगे और दुश्मन का लोहा लगे । और हिन्दुस्तान की इज्जत को बचाने के लिए लड़ेंगे । इसलिए सब से ज्यादा जरूरत इस बात की है कि देश के आत्मसम्मान को जागृत किया जाय । किसी देश में इस तरह की मिसाल नहीं है कि उसने अपने दुश्मन से भीख मांगी हो । हमारी सरकार ने कहा कि जिन देशों के पास न्युक्लियर वैपन्स हैं, जिन देशों ने न्युक्लियर वैपन्स का निर्माण किया है वह उन देशों की रक्षा करें जिनके कि पास न्युक्लियर वैपन्स नहीं हैं । यह दुश्मन से भीख नहीं मांगी गई तो और क्या मांगी गई? चीन के पास न्युक्लियर वैपन्स हैं और हिन्दुस्तान के पास नहीं हैं और जब सरकार यह कहती है कि जिनके पास ऐटम बम हैं वह उन देशों की रक्षा करें जिनके कि पास यह ऐटम बम नहीं हैं तो यह दुश्मन से भीख मांगना नहीं तो और क्या है ? आज मामला बहुत गड़बड़ा गया है । देश के सामने संकट मुंह बाये खड़ा हुआ है । जब तक इस देश के बच्चे बच्चे को फौजी ट्रेनिंग नहीं दी जायगी तब तक हरगिज हरगिज यह मसला हल नहीं हो सकता है । यह मसला तभी हल हो सकता है जब हर लिहाज से हम अपने डिफैंस को मजबूत करें । देश की जो भी मूल आवश्कताएं हैं उनकी तत्काल पूर्ति की जाये । जाहिर है कि सरकार देश की रक्षा नहीं कर सकेगी अगर देश को खाना नहीं दिया जायगा । इसलिए देश की खाद्यान्न सम्बन्धी आवश्यकता को हमें पूरा करना है । सरकार राष्ट्र के चरित्र निर्माण का काम भी सम्पन्न नहीं कर

[श्री यशपाल सिंह]

सकी है । यह सरकार क्या काम करती है? सरकार तीन काम करती है । एक पंचशील का काम, एक पीसफुल लिविंग का काम और तीसरा काम वह नौन एलाइ मैंट का करती है । अब इस तरह के कामों को बैल बहुत अच्छी तरह से कर सकते हैं । जाहिर है कि अगर 20 बैल एक चरनी पर एक साथ रहेंगे तो वे पंचशील का पालन करेंगे, पंचशील में रहेंगे और वे एक दूसरे पर हमला नहीं करेंगें अगर बीस बैलों को एक जगह बांध दो तो वह को ऐग्जिसटैंस के साथ रहेंगे । अगर बीस बैलों को एक जगह बांध दो तो वह पीसफुल लिविंग अख्तियार करेंगे । राज का शासन का यह धर्म है कि वह राष्ट्र और कौम की रक्षा करे राज का धर्म है कि वह देश की सीमाओं की रक्षा करे । राज का धर्म है कि वह राष्ट्र के चरित्र का निर्माण करे । इन सभी कामों में यह कांग्रेस सरकार फल हो चुकी है । एक छोटा सा बच्चा भी इस बात को जानता है । एक छोटे से बच्चे को भी पता होता है कि चूंकि लैम्प के ऊपर उसका हाथ गया है इसलिए उसका हाथ जल गया है वह तमाम जिन्दगी उसे लैम्प के ऊपर हाथ नहीं लगायेगा लेकिन दुःख की बात है कि सरकार इससे सबक नहीं लेती है । जब पंचशील से हमारी प्रत्यय हुई, हां शिकस्त दी गई तब हमें पंशशील को त्याग कर, शांति से नहीं अपितु शस्त्र ग्रहण करके और युद्ध का मार्ग अपना कर में अपनी आजादी व इज्जत की रक्षा करनी चाहिए । गीता माता हमें इस के लिए यह उपदेश व आदेश देती है :—

सुखिनः क्षत्रियाः पार्थ लभन्ते युद्धमीदृशम्

आज युद्ध की पालिसी को अपनाना पड़ेगा वरना देश बच नहीं सकता है ।

बातों से यह मसला हल नहीं हो सकता है । आज युद्ध का युग है। जिन देशों के अच्छे भाग्य थे, उन्होंने वैपंज अख्त्यार कर के अपनी फतेहयाब के झंडे फहराए और हम लोग पंचशील और कोएग्जिस्टेंस के पीछे मारे गए । मसोलीनी ने भविष्यवाणी की थी :

"The sword will be the plough and the tears of war will produce the daily bread for the generations to come."

जो मसला तलवार से हल होने वाला है, उस को सरकार बातों से हल करना चाहती है । लेकिन बातों से यह मसला हरगिज हल नहीं हो सकता है ।

इस देश की रक्षा के लिए जो रुपया रखा गया था, उस में से 68 करोड़ रुपया वापस आया और देश की रक्षा के लिए उसका कोई इस्तेमाल नहीं हो सका । यह इतना बड़ा पोर्टफ़ोलियो है, इतना बड़ा महकमा है लेकिन इस पर बहस करने के लिए सिर्फ़ पांच छः घन्टे मिले हैं । अगर कोई दूसरा देश होता, तो इस विषय पर पांच छः दिन तक बहस होती । जब हमारे पास टाइम नहीं है तो हम मंत्री महोदय को क्या राय दें ?

आज हमारे देश की यह स्थिति है कि एक तरफ़ तो फ़ौज में इंजीनियर्ज नहीं है और दूसरी तरफ़ इंजीनियर्ज बेरोजगार फिर रहे हैं । इस का कारण यह है कि सरकार ने वे कन्डीशन्ज पैदा नहीं की हैं, जिन के मातहत इंजीनियर्ज अपने आप को फ़ौज के लिए डिवोट कर सकें । हमारे यहां एक तरफ़ तो गाड़ियां बेकार खड़ी हैं और दूसरी तरफ कोटद्वार से कलकत्ता तक जो गाड़ी फ़ौज को ले कर गई, उस के साथ कोई किचन नहीं था, कोई ऐसा डिब्बा नहीं था, जिस में खाने का इन्तजाम हो । फ़ौजियों को जहां भूख लगती थी या चाय पीने की जरूरत होती थी वे वहां पर ही जंजीर खींच कर गाड़ी को रोक लेते थे और खाना या चाय ले लेते थे । इस का नतीजा यह हुआ कि गाड़ी 48 घंटे लेट पहुंची । जो देश फौज के मामले में 47 घंटे लेट हो जाता है, वह हरगिज कामयाब नहीं हो सकता है ।

अगर देश की रक्षा करनी है तो सरकार कोलम्बो प्रोपोजल्ज़ को छोड़ दे, पंचशील को छोड़ दे और बच्चे बच्चे को फ़ौज की तालीम दे । यहां भी चावन है और चीन में भी चावन है, लेकिन चीन का जो चावन है, वह चावन लाई है और हमारा चावन है चावन दि ट्रुथ । और हम सब जानते हैं कि सच की फ़तह होगी, धर्म की फ़तह होगी, सत्य की फ़तह होगी। जैसा कि मैंने अभी कहा है, सरकार देश के बच्चे बच्चे को फ़ौजी तालीम दे और पंचशील के सिद्धान्त को समुन्दर में फैंक दे तो हमारी विजय-पताका फहरायेगी।

Shri M. R. Krishna (Peddapalli): The Defence Ministry has streamlined the entire border road organisation. The roads which existed on the map have actually come into existence now. I am happy to say that the Defence Minister has taken personal interest in this and he has actually looked into the entire border road organisation, and today the country and Parliament have been assured that our troops will not suffer for want of better communication. I think the people who are responsible for giving us this communication on the border areas, which are supposed to be have the very rotten terrain in the whole world deserve recognition and, if need be, rewarded.

We are grateful to many countries, particularly United States, United Kingdom, Australia and USSR for the assistance they have extended to us.

One of the most important things that has to be borne in mind when we think of the defence forces is, not the equipment, material or other benefits that we extend to them but the speeches and doubts which would discourage the defence forces. Often we hear from important persons connected with the defence forces of the United States about our defence preparations. Sometimes they say that they would like to extend to us some very effective air power squadrons. They talk of F-104. Suddenly, they change their mind and tell us that we should not spend a lot of money on defence preparations but we should concentrate more on economic matters and things of that kind. Our country has really suffered some very bad defeats at the hands of China.

Now, Pakistan has been getting a lot of military equipment and got earlier from America. We had protested against it and at that time we were told that Pakistan will not use the military equipment against India. Today, in practice, actually it is not China which is fighting a war with us but China's war is being fought by Pakistan. When China is to plead against any military assistance to India, since it is against her, it is Pakistan which speaks and protests. Actually, China has achieved what she wanted. The equipment which has been supplied to Pakistan to fight against China is actually being utilised against us.

I wanted to draw the attention of the Defence Minister on one or two very important points. The defence equipment given to Pakistan, I am told, is on the condition that whatever equipment they give to Pakistan, will remain a secret between the United States and Pakistan and that it will not be divulged to any other power, to any other country. But as regards the military assistance or whatever we purchase from the United States today or from the United Kingdom, because of various agreements with Pakistan, they cannot keep it as a secret from Pakistan. Not only that, I am told further that the Military Attaches with these Embassies here have the right to go and inspect the equipment which we have purchased from foreign countries and in case we have any of those unused equipment, we have to return them back to the country from which we had procured. If those are the conditions on which we are purchasing military equipment from some of the coutries, I think, it is not only dangerous but also humiliating to a country like ours.

[Shri M. R. Krishna.]

Then, my friend Mr. Dandekar spoke about various kinds of aircrafts that we produce. No country in the world can think of defending its borders and defending its integrity and security merely with the equipment or funds provided by any other foreign country. If we, in this six years time, have produced some aircrafts and some epuipment in our own ordnance factories, we may be more dependable on this equipment rather than depending upon something which is going to come to us at the time of emergency from any other foreign country. We should be proud of our own production.

About MIGs we have been talking too much. The MIGs have been really said to be very effective aircraft. They said that China is having MIG-17s and we are yet to find out whether China has started producing MIG-19s and MIG-21s. If you are thinking of MIGs in our country, I would like you to switch on to modified version of MIG-21s rather than trying to produce MIG-17s.

Why do the people join our Defence forces? They do not just join the Defence forces because of any facilities or the salaries that they get. But they join the forces because of their patriotic fervour and because they want to protect the motherland. We have seen how some of our officers and jawans are functioning and how they have also worked well when the Chinese attacked and in some sectors they exhibited their true courage and valour and they gave really a good fight. There were so many reasons for our failure. But the Defence Ministry has taken note of it and when we will be able to provide all the equipment necessary and all the facilities to them, we have no doubt that our forces will be able to give a good account of themselves. At the same time, I do not want the Defence Ministry to lose sight of some of the facilities which are still not being given to them. If I were to speak only of the officer class, I would say that the pension that they receive is not free of income-tax. These are small things but they will go a long way in attracting a number of good people to the defence services. The United Kingdom has introduced various kinds of scholarships to the students in the high schools and colleges in order to attract them to the Armed services. Some of our messes like Air Force and Army here do not even get their daily rations like milk and dry rations. If this is the condition of the Armed Forces officers in the peace areas, I do not know how we are going to tackle this problem in the forward areas.

Talking about pension for the defence forces, I find something really surprising here. In the case of the civil employees, class IV to class I, the entire period of service of the employees is counted for pension, whereas in the Armed Forces, however important work they might do, only half the period of their service is counted towards their pension. These are not things which will encourage people to join the defence forces in large numbers.

Since my time is up, I would like to mention some smaller points now. So far as the ordnance factories in the UK are concerned, they do not waste their well-trained officers to man the ordnance depots and factories. We are following the pattern of the British in various defence matters. In our country we spend a lot of money in producing officers, but having produced them, if we place them in places where they are not required really, that is a waste to the country. Nearly cent per cent of our ordnance depots are manned by military officers who have been trained for a different purpose. I would request the Defence Ministry to consider whether the ordnance depots and factories may not be manned by civilian employees who have got similar field service liability and who can be punished under the various military Acts and so on. If we do that, then most of our officers who are posted in places like ordnance depots etc. where they are not really required could be spared for other

work and they can do more useful work elsewhere.

I would also request the hon. Minister to look into the grievances of the civilian employees in the ordnance factories and other places. For civilians in factories, there are various kinds of cells and sections to attend to their problems but for defence civilians, are concerned as a whole, there is no machinery which can attend to their grievances and help them with quick remedies. I would suggest that there should be a cell to consider the problems of the civilian employees in defence. I think that the Defence Ministry has not so far given thought to their problems. After all, the civilian employees in defence also play a very important role in the defence services, and therefore, their interests should not be neglected.

I hope that the hon. Minister will give due consideration to all these points.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: I am very grateful to the Members who have participated in this debate. This is the third debate which I have had the privilege of participating in, and I must say that I have seen a marked change as the years have gone by, in the tone and content of the debate. I find the debate becoming more and more constructive, it is becoming somewhat more pleasant, if I may say so. But at the same time, the most important part of it is that it is becoming more realistic.

In this debate, many points have been raised, but with your permission, I would only deal with the main lines or main arguments of the criticism or the major topics of the criticism.

Before I come to the points made by Members who participated in the debate, I must certainly give my own assessment of the situation in the country from the point of view of defence. I feel that in 1962, when the Chinese invaded our country, some sort of a new era dawned in the life of our country. It was certainly a rude shock to us; we did not expect that type of attack from that corner. But certainly this new realistic thinking started functioning more effectively since then. I have no doubt about that in my mind.

An hon. Member referred to an article by an expert on strategy. I entirely agree with one argument in that article. Recent trends in international thinking are also changing in relation to the importance of the problems of security. Naturally, more and more importance is being given to the problems of defence and security in different countries today. This is more particularly true in the case of our own country. I have no doubt in my mind that the central theme of political thinking at least for a decade, if not more, will have to be the consideration of national security. Other topics and other matters will have to be related to this. I do not want to under-estimate the importance of other matters, particularly economic development which is equally important; but certainly economic development also will have to take into account the problems of national security and defence.

It is from this point of view that the remarks made by the hon. Member, Shri Nath Pai, become more relevant. He mentioned the percentage of expenditure on our national defence. He made a reference to India's own expenditure. I would like to correct him slightly. It is 5.3.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: Instead of 6.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: That is why I said 'slightly'. Since we are giving the figures, I think we should be rather more accurate. Then he compared the figures of our expenditure with those of Canada and Australia. I would consider that comparison to be rather unrealistic because the problems of Canada and Australia are completely different from those that we are facing in our own country. If at all we want to compare—at least have an assurance of comparison of

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figures with any other countries—I would recommend the figures for UK and USA. Of course, their problems are different; their development is different. Naturally, they will have a bigger slice of a bigger cake—to borrow the words of Shri Nath Pai himself. The UK figure is 8.3 and the US figure 10.6.

Compared to these, our slice of our small cake is still smaller. Naturally, we will have to go further and further in this matter. How far that will be will naturally have to be related, again, to our other problems in the country.

But I must say that this country has accepted the challenge in a more realistic manner. I was very glad indeed that in all the three debates I have participated, nobody complained about sanctioning money for defence expenditure. That means the country as a whole, the nation as a whole, has accepted this challenge.

Why do I say 'challenge'? Really speaking, why did China attack India? According to my analysis of the problem, apart from the military objectives,—certainly they had military objectives, there was a major political and economic objective in their mind. By posing a military threat, after attacking and withdrawing, and putting some sort of pressure on our economic resources they know that certain difficulties would arise in our economy. Really speaking, the military techniques of the Chinese are certainly frightening and dangerous.

But, I am more afraid of their political techniques, because these internal economic conditions help them in their techniques of political subversion. Despite this, this country has accepted this challenge and decided to spend more and more on defence preparedness. I cannot say that everything is all right. It will be absolutely dishonest to say that. I do not want to make that mistake. It would be the last thing I would like to say. But, certainly, I would like to tell this hon. House, and also through this hon. House I would like to assure the people, that the prepartions that we have made quietly in the last two years have certainly created confidence in the defence services and the country at large that they are in a position today to strongly defend the country if any adventurist tries to commit aggression.

श्री गिरधर पटनायक (सम्बलपुर) : क्या आप अपनी जमीन वापस ले सकते हैं।

Shri Y. B. Chavan: When our country has accepted the challenge, the other political fact of life that we have to accept today and take into account rather more carefully is this growing association between China and Pakistan. China is sitting there. On many occasions I gave information in reply to questions on the floor of the House that the Chinese are sitting there in a sort of threatening posture. At the same time, we find that basic hostility towards India is driving Pakistan into the folds of China. Now, we will have to watch carefully who uses whom. Possibly, Pakistan may be thinking that with their clever foreign policy, they can make use of the Chinese for their ultimate political ends, but I am afraid that the Chinese are cleverer and are bound to make use of Pakistan.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: Watch Indonesia also.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: I would like to make it clear that we want friendly relations with Pakistan. We do not want any tensions with Pakistan. The defence preparedness in this country has nothing to do with our relations with Pakistan. It is something in reply to the danger that we have to face as far as China is concerned. At the same time, we cannot afford to forget this growing association between the two. I think we will have to be rather watchful, and I can tell you we are watchful about it.

Coming back to the other criticisms, which are very constructive criticisms, I would like to take up first the issue of the Air Force. Naturally, the criticisms offered were about our Air Force, Army, Navy and defence production. Some Members did make mention about the Border Roads Organisation too.

The most important fact of last year, 1964, for me was the preparation of the defence plan, because when we have to prepare our country for any eventually, we will have to think for the coming decade or possibly a longer period, and in order to do that, we thought of certain areas in which we should move in a planned manner. So, we decided to modernise and expand the Army, we decided to expand and modernise the Air Force. We have certainly taken note of certain problems of the Navy. I will go into these details a little later and also about border roads and defence production. I will mention each point and the point referring to each area separately.

I will take up the Air Force first, because many Members have tried to touch it. Here I must make mention of one point. Hon. Member, Shri Nath Pai, reminded me of a certain statement that I made last year when I returned from the Soviet Union about non-alignment. The point that Shri Nath Pai made was that for purposes and for the considerations of national security, we should not care from where the aid comes. This is exactly what I meant when I made a reference to non-alignment. I was not doctrinnaire about that. Non-alignment. In its very essence, means freedom to choose from where you want your help. We do not want to be guided by doctrines or ideologies in this matter. We certainly want to be guided by friendship, not friendliness. At the same time, if we bind ourselves to any particular groups, when really speaking, this inhibition starts asserting itself; Yesterday, I heard a very interesting speech of the hon. Member who is not present here now. He went to the length of suggesting that if we had gone into some sort of an alliance possibly we would not be required to make defence preparedness. That would be the saddest argument if we ever accept it. The idea of going into an alliance is an argument not to prepare yourself. That is a dangerous aspect of it which we must take into account. Really speaking, defence preparedness is in a sense preparing yourself so that you will have faith in yourself. You can have faith in yourself when you have got the capacity to fight, capacity to manufacture the equipment that you want and to develop technical capacities in our country and it is only with the help of these things that you will ultimately succeed in the real defence preparedness. There is nothing wrong in this particular matter because as I said in the beginning the central theme should be national security. I must say that the central theme of national security has much to do with the principle of non-alignment and loyalty to world peace. I have no doubt about it. I am prepared to argue this point, not on the floor of this House, but somewhere else if Members want to argue that point. My idea is not to go into that point at this stage.

Somebody made fun about the idea of having an engine from one country for our Air Force, the air-frame from somebody else and electronics from somebody else. One of my colleagues on this side tried to make use of the idea of marriage. I will tell him that this is not an era of feudal marriages. At least in the field of technological development, not only international but continental marriages must take place. Even today we find this. For instance, the Boeings in which most of us must have travelled is a plane whose air-frame and other equipment from the United States and the engine in it, the Rolls Royce engine, comes from the United Kingdom. There is nothing wrong there. I do not understand why we should have this type of inhibition. About the idea of development of capabilities of Mach II in HF 24, we want to give a trial to this Egyptian engine. What

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is wrong therein? Here is a friendly country; it has the possibilities of developing an engine. We have got the possibilities of developing our air frame. What is wrong if we marry the ideas? If we are afraid of this idea, we have no place in the modern world. If ever we want to prepare the nation for national security in the modern concept we must completely clear ourselves of these wrong ideas.

Shri Indrajit Gupta: The engagement period should not be too long.. (*Interruptions*).

Shri Y. B. Chavan: It is not a question of engagement. Possibly engagements sometimes have to wait for maturity too. I do not want to go into that aspect now. Apart from that, there was one main criticism from Mr. Dandeker. I must say it was a very useful speech and a constructive speech. I liked that speech. He said that our Indian Air Force consists of varieties of machines. I would like to explain why it is so. The Air Force has to play different roles. Sometimes people have got some wrong ideas about them; it is not that Shri Dandeker has got those ideas. The Air Force planes have got different roles in the sense that it has to have fighter planes for interception role; it has to have fighter planes for the ground support role: they have to have plane for transport purposes, for reconnaissance purposes, for bomber squadrons, for helicopter purpose, training purposes and so on. These are the different roles for which we have to have different planes. You cannot afford to do without these. When the Air Force took its birth, it had naturally to depend upon the supply that it got from the other countries. And beggars are not choosers when one has to get it from somebody else. It is not one's own capacity to purchase. Sometimes the political reasons also come in our way. Sometimes you like 'A' plane of 'B' country, but even if one is prepared to pay for it, the political attitude of 'B' country comes in our way, whether they want to give it or not.

18 hrs.

I entirely agree that there should be standardisation. The main theme of the hon. Member was that there should be standardisation in the types of planes that we have, so that our problems of maintenance and supply become a little more rational. I entirely agree with that view. But when we are trying to get more and more planes, what are we getting them for? We are not getting them to add to the already existing varieties. We are getting them to get the existing one replaced, some obsolete things, as he himself mentioned, such as the Toofanies, the Vampires and the Mysteres of which he made fun saying they are mysteriously obsolete planes or something like that. The Mysteres are getting old and we will have to replace them. That is why we are trying to get some good planes from the United States of America; if we get them, we will certainly try to replace them.

Now, really speaking, we can achieve standardisation in the planes only when we succeed in setting up the production of planes in our country. That is the ultimate answer for this. As long as we have to depend upon the supply of modern weapons and modern aircraft on someone else, we are not our own masters as far as organisation and the composition of our own Air Force is concerned. It was a thing that was planned years before, and I must say it was a very wise thing.

I said this criticism is becoming more and more realistic. I would take for illustration the criticism about MIGs. I remember two or three years ago, there was lighthearted criticism about them. Today, everybody has accepted that MIG is the most modern aircraft that we have in our country. Shri Dandeker had some doubts about the schedule of production that we have before us. I can assure him that the schedule of production is as rea-

listic as is possible, as he himself may realise, since he is a seasoned person in matters relating to the process of production.

I can tell him that the production are two quite different propositions. In the production of HF-24, we have to develop a plane and then produce it. In the case of MIGs of HF-24 and the production of MIGs, no development is involved. We are taking a well-devloped plane for production purposes. So, I have no doubt that we will certainly keep up the schedule and produce these planes in the scheduled programme.

The hon. Member then made some fun about three squadrons of MIGs that we have ordered. He was wondering whether we will use bullock-carts to bring them. This is the first time I find that he was wrong on facts. He was very weak in respect of that criticism. These three squadrons of MIGs were contracted for during my visit in September or October, 1964. The Russians will fulfil that contract according to which the three squadrons will be received by the end of this year, which is the contracted period. Let him not have that wrong idea only because they are Russian planes. Let him not have that idea.

Some criticism was made about the Avro. I can tell him that the Air Force has no longer any doubts about the Avro, because they were got the Air Force for the role of training purposes—the first group. The IAF has accepted them and we have contracted for the other type of planes which is the military freight version. The first prototype, I think, will reach here for tests sometime next month. I can tell the hon. Member for his information that even that plane has been accepted by the RAF. So, it is accepted by the IAF. I can tell him that from my personal information. So, there should be no doubt about that particular matter.

Again, the hon. Member pointed out five or six types of helicopters. That is not so. We have got some different types of helicopters, but some of them are in the wasting category. Really speaking, we have got two types of helicopters—MI-4 and Alouettes—which are meant for different roles in different regions. They will have to be there, there is nothing wrong in that

I quite agree that we have yet to go a long way to have a very powerful air force in our country. But this is the way we will have to go; there is no other way I can think of. We try to get it from friendly countries, from wherever we are likely to get them. Fortunately, Russia and other countries are trying to help us. At the same time, we must not forget our responsibility to establish production of these things. Naturally it will take more time, because development takes more time. For example, regarding the British supersonic fighter Lightning—he can verify those facts—really speaking the production programme was accepted sometime in 1949 and the first production plane came in 1960 or 1961. This is the position in a country like UK, where technical development has gone much ahead. Naturally in our country, where we are quite new in the fields of designing and manufacturing techniques, we will take more time. We must show more patience and be more realistic about it. There is no use taking some example of some country and trying to make fun about these things. It would ultimately amount to creating a feeling of defeatism in our coutry. That would be rather unfair to ourselves.

About HF 24 or MIGs, Mr. Noth Pai made one statement. He said, what is the use of getting this plane because it is going to become obsolete after some time?

Shri Nath Pai: I said not about the squadrons. I said, by the time they come out of the production lines, they will be obsolete.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: Yes; after three or four years, when we reach the stage of ultimate production, they will be obsolete. But I think that is true

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about every plane. Aviation development is going so fast that by the time any plane reaches the stage of production, it is obsolete because somebody has gone ahead. Does it mean that we should not do anything? Ultimately we have to accept something and as long as the plane that we have accepted for production is going to meet our own requirements and fulfil the role it is expected to fulfil, I think that answers the question. I have no doubt that if MIGs meet our requirements at least for a decade, they have done their job. The MIGs 21 that will be ultimately produced will be a modified version, which certainly fits in 100 per cent as far as the role of interception is concerned, for our air defence. So, hon. Member should not have any misgivings about these things and we must take these things as rightly as we can.

Dr. M. S. Aney: When you order new types of planes, is there a contract with them that the spare parts will also be available?

Shri Y. B. Chavan: Yes, Sir. Otherwise, it would be wrong to order new planes, unless we have not only spare parts, but facilities to train our people. Even training our pepole forms part of the agreement. Briefly I have referred to some of the arguments about the Air Force.

I now come to the Navy. Shri Raghunath Singh is very particular about this. When I took over in 1962, even then I felt that the strength of our navy was certainly not adequate for our purposes. Naturally in the last two years, if I had come to this house asking for more funds for the navy at the cost of the army and air force, I think I would have done the greatest disservice. But certainly now we have come to a stage that we cannot any longer neglect the development of our navy. I have no doubt about it. How we do it is a great challenge for us. I think I must take the House into complete confidence in this matter. It is a very difficult task, because the army can be developed in a short period; perhaps even the air force can be developed, but navy cannot be developed in such a short time.

Sir, I am making this statement because of certain new developments that took place in this month. Just round about Andamans-Nicobars a submarine had made its appearance twice in the last month. In one of the flights of the Indian Air Force dakota, our people sighted a submarine in our territorial waters. Immediately when the submarine saw that air force plane, it immediately dived.

An hon. Member: Why was it not bombed?

Shri Y. B. Chavan: At a distance they saw it. At the appearance of the plane on the horizon they dived out. But our people saw it. Again, after ten days or so, this submarine was sighted. This is the information that we have. We are making assessments as to what type of submarine it can be, whose submarine it can be and so on. I do not think it can be a Chinese submarine. Why I am mentioning this thing is that submarines are making their appearance in our Indian waters. So we cannot be gullible about this matter, about this problem of naval development. I may tell you that I realised the importance of this problem and, therefore, in all the three visits to different countries last year—USA, United Kingdom and USSR—I took up this problem of naval supplies.

But, Sir, the facts as they are we must accept them and find some other way about it. I quite agree that we should not depend upon any particular country and give it a monopoly of supplies to us. Theoretically I accept this proposition. But there are certain realities also that you and I will have to accept. For example, the USA has got a navy which is not built taking into consideration the requirements of a country like India. They have their own strategic needs for which they have built their own navy. So have Soviet Russia and the United Kingdom built their navies. Naturally,

therefore, we will have to take into account these realities and then go ahead on this question.

The most important thing that has happened in the matter of naval development is the agreement about frigates. I know it is a time-consuming affair and it will take some time. But there is no other way of doing it. That is the speed at which frigates could be built and delivered. We have also an assurance of technical co-operation for building submarines from the United Kingdom. Well, it depends upon whether we get the necessary financial arrangements or not. But certainly one good thing has emerged out of that. They are going to give us a submarine two months a year for training our people. That is also an important thing. What steps will have to be taken, we will consult them. I can assure the House that the Defence Ministry, myself and the Government are quite aware of this problem of naval development, but we must take into account certain facts of life as they are and make a concerted and energetic effort to gradually develop the navy as well.

Coming back to the problem of the army, the hon. Member Shri Dandeker went into the details of some of the problems. I think they are very realistic problems. The only thing that I am trying to tell him is that we in the army headquarters also are very much aware of this problem. I can tell him that in the last year and a half or nearly two years, many staff studies were undertaken about this organisation of the divisions. He spoke about the ratio between fighting and non-fighting groups in the division. I can tell you, they call it in the army parlance "ratio between tooth and tail". As was rightly pointed out, formerly the ratio of tooth to tail was rather different because the whole thing was based on the British model and the British model was different because they had different ideas, they had different roles or functions of the army. Their main base was England and their units were functioning in different parts of the world. For them the tail was ather more important than the teeth. The teeth was also not important because the people were rather backward; the people were unawakened people and it was very difficult for them even to deal with those people. So for the roles they had in different parts of the world they did not need very sharp teeth. But in recent months we have made attempts about re-organisation. This is the information that the Chief of Army Staff gave to the National Defence Council only last month and I think it is better that this House also knows this. This is the result of certain re-organisation schemes introduced in the army. I will give only a few comparative figures. These figures are the teeth and tail ratio with Pakistan. Teeth 78; tail 22 for standard infantry division. For the Chinese infantry the figures are: teeth 86; tail 14. As a result of our own re-organisation of the Indian army now our figures for Mountain Division, teeth 75; tail 22; for infantry division the figures are: teeth 83 and tail 17. I know it is somewhat less than that of the Chinese. But there we will have to take into account different methods of calculation and different methods of organisation. The rear organisations of national service which we have to organise are of different types than they have in their country. The engineering and medical services are organised in a different way. They do not possibly calculate them in the organisation of the type of the army. Possibly that explains why our teeth and tail ratio becomes a little more than that of the Chinese. But I can assure the hon. Members and the House that we are very much aware of this position because, as he has very rightly pointed out as was also stated by Shri Nath Pai, we have to make very effective utilisation of the resources that this hon. House is pleased to keep at the disposal of the Defence Ministry. We are very much aware of this and we are pursuing the matter from that point of view.

He also referred to the other aspects of promotion, moral discipline and

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training. I will first take up promotion, because that is more important. Possibly, he is still hearing complaints. Perhaps, some disgruntled officers are carrying tales to him. I am prepared to accept it. But I can assure this hon. House and I have made this statement before also in this House—that up to the level of Lt. Colonel promotions are generally made on the basis of seniority. After Lt. Colnel, which really-speaking becomes a very important cadre of leadership, the promotions are made on the basis of selection. And the selections are made on the examination of their annual confidential records. The selection boards or committees consist of very high officers. They sit together, assess the capacity of officers and then make a recommendation about the promotion of the officer concerned. It is only on very rare occasions that I had an opportunity to differ from the recommendations of that board. Normally I find they go very scrupulously by the merits of the officers concerned. So, really-speaking, there should not be any ground for complaint. Certainly, some members are superseded when others are promoted and at higher levels the posts are few. So, some people might be feeling disappointed, but possibly unjustifiably.

Then I come to another aspect, training. I have made it my business to go to different parts of our forward formations. Very often I see how exactly the training is given, particularly the training about battle inoculation to which the hon. Member made a reference. The type of training that is given to the new officers, particularly the officers recruited during the emergency, is absolutely first-rate. The hon. Member made a mention of live grenades. Standing within a few yards of the exercises, I have seen with my own eyes live grenades being used. The way in which the young officers were facing the situation indicated that the training which was being given was very praiseworthy. This particular aspect of the training is undertaken with a view to make our army a fighting force, and I have no doubt that the training that they are getting now will certainly be put to better use if any opportunity comes in their way. I know the morale of the men and the officers, whenever I have an opportunity to meet them, and it is something very wonderful. They are, really speaking, waiting for an opportunity to avenge the injustice and the humiliation suffered by them. Of course, they cannot do it on their own. We do not have to think in a personal way about these matters. But the idea of self-respect and the idea of patriotism, the feeling of patriotism, in them is something very, very admirable. I can tell the hon. Members that if some of them are willing to come and see this training programme, I am prepared to arrange for that.

Some hon. Members: Yes.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: I will personally invite Mr. Dandekar to come and see it sometimes. The money that we are spending is being spent well and for better purposes of making our young recruits tough fighting soldiers.

He also mentioned another point about the ratio of vehicles. I have got some figures with me in terms of infantry divisions. Chinese division has got about 1209 vehicles whereas our mountain division has got 1362 vehicles. I must concede that with the type of terrain that we are using and its length, this additional number of less than a hundred is not much.

Incidentally, I must make a reference here to another point made by Shri Indrajit Gupta and that was about the policy of discarding the vehicles. He made a point that we are, even before reaching the first overhaul stage, trying to sell a large number of vehicles. Yes, this is a policy that is accepted after full consideration. Firstly, the area, the terrain, in which our vehicles have to go, is more difficult than we usually

used to have before. We do not want to take chances about taking the type of vehicles which at the eleventh hour are likely to fail. Therefor, we have accepted a standard that either the vehicle has run for 35,000 miles or 7 years, after that period, it will be sold.

Shri Indrajit Gupta: Does this standard apply only to those vehicles which are used in mountain terrain? Your Report does not say so. It says about all the vehicles.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: Most of the vehicles are wanted for the divisions and, a part from this, there is another argument. I will give you another argument. By making these vehicles the responsibility of the Army to maintain them, the problem of their maintenance and their occupying the space becomes so very difficult and so wasteful. So, it is found in the interest not only of the efficiency but also of the economy and the economics of the divisions concerned to discard these things. The Army has welcomed this decision more than anything else. I know that by this way there is not going to be a national loss because these vehicles will certainly be available for the civilian purposes and they will also get more and more better types of vehicles for their use. There is nothing wrong in this.

Another small point that Mr. Dandeker mentioned was about the pension to widows. He said that they are getting about Rs. 8 or something like that. I would like to tell him for his information that very recently we have increased the quantum and the minimum is Rs. 25.

Shri Narendra Singh Mahida: That is not enough.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: Well, nothing is enough but certainly this is what we have done to them and it is certainly an improvement.

Here, I must make a mention of certain remarks made by the hon. Members, Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee. She expressed her anxiety for the welfare of the services and I entirely share her anxiety. But I must say that I do not accept the other part of her arguments. She will forgive me for not agreeing on that point. What does she expect in the Report of the Defence Ministry in regard to the framework of the United Nations? What else does she want us to do? Does she want us to declare to the world that we want to have aggression, that we have nothing to do with the United Nations? Does she want us to follow China or does she want us to follow her own ideas about it?

Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee: May I intervene for a minute? What I meant was that the Ministry had declared as their primary aim the economic, political and social objectives and non-aggression; I said that instead of that, the security of the country should have been declared as the primary objective.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: That is exactly what I am saying. Security has not only an important place but the first place.

Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee: What I meant was this. The report has put it in such a way that it gives a prior place to the other considerations instead of to security.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: I am glad the hon. Member has explained it. But if I had not expressed my view, possibly it would mean that I agreed to what she tried to convey, at least from the impression that she gave, because Shri N. Dandeker had started clapping from the other side when she said that.

As far as the border road development is concerned, during the last two years, this has occupied an important place; this was the most important factor in the defence preparedness. As we all know, ultimately these battles in the Himalayan terrain are going to be battles of logistics. And the logistic

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capability of any Army depends upon the system of communiactions that we can develop. During the last year and a half or two years, this organisation has made a tremendous progress, at great risk, I should say. In order to see the risk that they are running in developing these roads, it is better that some Members go and see the thing for themselves; some of the Members had gone and seen those border roads, and they have come back with praise for those people. I know that this programme has still to make a long progress yet and it has to go through a long way yet. But I am sure that if we proceed at the speed with which we are proceeding now for a few more years, this question of communications will be solved satisfactorily.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: The Tusker and the Dragon are in good shape?

Shri Y. B. Chavan: They are; they are much better. I wish that my hon. friend Shri Kamath goes there and sees things for himself.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: I have been there, but long before the hon. Minister came here.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: I am referring to the period after I came here.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: I have not been there after that.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: The last point was about the ordnance factories.

I would like to assure Shri Indrajit Gupta, Shri Banerjee and Dr. Melkote that what has happened during the last few months was not any proposal of retrenchment of any regular workers. Some casual workers who had been taken for some specific jobs for temporary periods had to be discontinued. There is no proposal now, nor do I think there is the likelihood of any proposal in the near future, to retrench the employees. But I must say at the same time that the work that the labour in the ordnance factories have done during the last two years is something worthy of national pride. The way they have functioned is really remarkable. Naturally, Dr. Melkote and Shri Banerjee and others also have written to me about it asking me in what way we could appreciate the work done by these people. I do not want to take the time of the House in going through the benefit schemes and welfare schemes that we have got for labour. But we have taken into consideration many schemes, and many schemes are already being implemented. But we shall keep this in mind while dealing with the problems that they will have in the future also. Before I conclude, I must thank this House for the fact they have shown a great appreciation of the work that is being done; I must also thank them for the good-will that they have shown in the speeches because I know that the type of task that I am entrusted with is something which is rather a difficult one.

One hon. Member made a personal reference to me. He made a mention about my place in the Cabinet. My place in the Cabinet has something to do with my age, and I cannot help my age. But I can tell him that I have got the fullest faith and confidence of my Cabinet colleagues and the Prime Minister in this work of defence preparation or defence efforts; and the good-will that hon. Members here have shown me will also go a long way to sustain me in this task.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: By your leave, may I ask one question? I am constrained to bring to your notice and to the notice of the House the rather unclear, if not, confusing statement that the hon. Minister made on the 22nd February, just over a month ago, in answer to a question on the India-China boundary. I am quoting from the reporters' copy of the proceedings of the House. The hon. Minister said:

"I can certainly say in a general way that international frontiers are established frontiers and they are naturally what they were before November, 1962".

That is to say, 'after the Chinese invaded', because as we all know, they invaded India in October, 1962. Now, the hon. Minister says that the frontier or the India-China boundary was what it was before November, 1962, that is, after the Chinese invasion when they had forcibly altered the India-China boundary. Thereafter, my hon. friend Shri Yashpal Singh asked:

वह सन् 1947 की लाइन को मानते हैं या 62 वाली लाइन को मानते हैं ?

Then the Minister, in answer to that—I do not know what exactly was in his mind—said:

"I do not know what is the distinction between the two,".

That is, between the 1947 and 1962 boundries.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: Because I do not make any distinction between 1947 and 1962. It is the same as in 1947—that was what I meant.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: Does he mean *de facto* or *de jure?* Because even the late Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru's stand, which we did not accept, was that before talks began, the *status quo ante* September 1962 should be restored. That is what he regarded, in his own way. But the Defence Minister goes further. I do not know what he meant by this. It should be clarified.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: I would like to make it clear that I do not want to make any distinction between the boundries of 1947 and 1962. That is what I meant.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: Please say, 1947 boundary then.

Shri Nath Pai: I thought he had received my note....

Shri Y. B Chavan: I am sorry I forgot to reply to that.

He mentioned about the classification in INA of white, grey and black. We have not accepted those distinctions.

Shri Nath Pai: They were made by the British, relating to the degree of participation and enthusiasm of personnel in that Army. They were told persistently about it; if it is true, is it not invidious? What steps are taken to remove that?

Shri Y. B. Chavan: In 1963 or 1964, we announced a scheme to give them relief by sanctioning Rs. 30 lakhs.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: It is very paltry. Rs. 1 crore is due.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: That is a different point which is arguable. But this was given in spite of the black, grey or white, whatever it is. So we have not accepted that any such distinction.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Should I put any of the cut motions to vote?

Shri Narendra Singh Mahida: In view of the assurance given by the hon. Minister, I beg leave of the House to withdraw my cut motions.

Cut motions 17 to 21 and 30 Nos. were, by leave, withdrawn.

Shri Yashpal Singh: I also seek leave of the House to withdraw my cut motions.

Cut motions 1 to 6 were, by leave withdrawn.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question is:

"That the respective sums not exceeding the amounts shown in the fourth column of the order paper, be granted to the President, to complete the sums neces-

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sary to defray the charges that will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1966, in respect of the heads of demands entered in the second column thereof against Demands Nos. 10 to 14 and 117 relating to the Ministry of Defence."

The motion was adopted.

[*The motions of Demands for Grant which were adopted by the Lok Sabha, are reproduced below—Ed.*]

DEMAND NO. 10—MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 56,90,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1966, in respect of 'Ministry of Defence'."

DEMAND NO. 11—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—ARMY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 4,88,97,75,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1966, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective—Army'."

DEMAND NO. 12—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—NAVY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 20,92,30,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1966, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective—Navy'."

DEMAND NO. 13—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—AIR FORCE

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,31,15,00,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1966, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective—Air Force'."

DEMAND NO. 14—DEFENCE SERVICES—NON-EFFECTIVE

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 17,89,27,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1966, in respect of 'Defence Services—Non-effective'."

DEMAND NO. 117—DEFENCE CAPITAL OUTLAY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,08,79,17,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1966, in respect of 'Defence Capital Outlay'."

18.32 hrs.

The Lok Sabha then adjourned till Eleven of the clock on Wednesday, March 31, 1965/Chaitra 10, 1887 (Saka).