

श्री बड़े (खारगोन) : दिल्ली क्लाय मिल के बारे में मेरा एक एडजर्नमेंट मोशन था ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : प्राप बैठ जाइयें ।

श्री बड़े : वहां पर लाठी चार्ज हो चुका है ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : दिल्ली क्लाय मिल के बारे में मैंने काल एडेशन नोटिस ऐडमिट किया है जिस को 5 बजे लिया जायेगा । इस पर एडजर्नमेंट मोशन नहीं हो सकता ।

श्री बागड़ी (हिसार) : वहां पर लाठी-चार्ज और अग्न्याय वगैरह बहुत हुआ है ।

12.20 hrs.

#### SITUATION OF INDIA-PAKISTAN BORDER

Mr. Speaker: Now, questions on the statement laid on the Table by the Minister of Defence on the 23rd February regarding the situation on India-Pakistan border.

श्री मधु लिमये (मुंगेर) : इस के पहले मैं एक प्रश्न करना चाहता हूँ उन के बयान के बारे में । चह्दाण साहब ने जो बयान दिया है उस को पढ़ने के बाद मुझे ऐसा लगा कि वह बहुत महत्वपूर्ण बयान है और केवल एक प्राध प्रश्न पूछने से काम नहीं चलेगा । इस पर बहस के लिये कोई और समय निर्धारित किया जाये ताकि उस के सर्वा पहलुओं पर बहस हो सके ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैं कोई समय निर्धारित नहीं कर सकता जब तक कोई नोटिस न हो ।

श्री मधु लिमये : मैंने नोटिस दिया है ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : उस को देखेंगे । ऐसे कैसे हो सकता है ?

Shri Hem Barua (Gauhati): From the statement made by the hon. Defence Minister yesterday it is evident that the ministers of the two countries in pursuance of the Tashkent Declaration are going to meet to discuss certain outstanding problems between the two countries and in that connection it has been said that Kashmir will not be on the agenda. The ministers of both the countries are going to meet without an agenda. In that context may I know whether Government, particularly the Prime Minister, are in a position or are prepared to give us an assurance categorically that since Kashmir is an integral part of India, Kashmir will not be discussed any more with the Pakistani leaders? It is a question directed to the Prime Minister and she should reply.

Mr. Speaker: Anyone might reply; someone must reply.

The Minister of Defence (Shri Y. B. Chavan): As far as the ministerial conference is concerned, I think, some special questions will have to be put because I am not in possession of all the latest facts about it; but as far as the basic attitude of the Government is concerned, there is no question of negotiating the sovereignty of Kashmir. On that question we are absolutely firm.

Shri Hem Barua: My question was.....

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. He wants to ensure that it would not be discussed.

Shri Hem Barua: It is for the Prime Minister to answer.

The Prime Minister and Minister of Atomic Energy (Shrimati Indira Gandhi): The sovereignty of Kashmir is certainly not being discussed.

Shri Hem Barua: My question was different.

**Mr. Speaker:** There is a difference. The Government says that the sovereignty of Kashmir is not negotiable; the hon. Member wants that because the Government's position is that Kashmir is an integral part of India, no discussion should take place in respect of that.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath (Hoshangabad):** That is the pointed question.

**Shrimati Indra Gandhi:** The aim of this meeting is to try and enlarge the sphere of economic and other co-operation, cultural or something like that.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Only not political?

**Shrimati Indra Gandhi:** No. That is our aim. Naturally, if the other side raises a question, we have to reiterate our stand on those questions, whatever they raise.

**Shri Hem Barua:** My question was different.

**Shri U. M. Trivedi (Mandsaur):** The question is.....

**Mr. Speaker:** The answer has come.

**Shri U. M. Trivedi:** No, the answer has not come.

**Mr. Speaker:** The answer has come.

**Some hon. Members —rose**

**Shri U. M. Trivedi:** The House would like to know whether or not.....

**Mr. Speaker:** So far as I have been able to understand—I may be wrong—the Prime Minister has said that we would not discuss it and that if the other party raises it, we would only reiterate our position that we have held so far... (*Interruption*) How can you shut the mouth of the other person that he might not mention it?

**Shri Hem Barua:** We have already reiterated the position so far as Kashmir is concerned and the Tashkent Declaration contains that particular thing. We explained our case over Kashmir at Tashkent. Why should we go on explaining our position about Kashmir at all the places?

**Mr. Speaker:** That also was explained.

**Shri Indrajit Gupta (Calcutta South West):** On p. 4 of the statement, it is stated that a suggestion was made by our Army Chief of Staff that:

".....the raising, training and arming of Mujahids, Razakers or armed irregulars in the State of Jammu and Kashmir might be stopped."

It is a very important question because it concerns the infiltrators or the possibility of infiltration in future. Then, it is stated here that it was agreed that this matter would be referred to the respective Governments. But immediately after that, it is stated, as our view:

".....the strength of Mujahids, Razakers or armed irregulars in the State of Jammu and Kashmir will have to be in consonance with the overall limit of military potential accepted by UNMOGIP in the context of the 1949 Karachi Agreement."

Does it mean that though we have made a suggestion that such irregular forces should not be raised at all, in actual practice, we are willing or we are acquiescing in the position where they can be raised subject only to the limits which were laid down by the UNMOGIP in 1949 and, if so, what is that limit? We do not know anything about it. Are you permitting a certain number of irregulars to be raised by them?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I would like to explain that position. The term which was used in 1948 Agreement

was 'military potential' and at that time 'military potential' did include regular troops and irregular troops too. Therefore, the practical suggestion that was made by the Chief of Army Staff was a much better one if it at all to be... (Interruption).

Shri Shinkre (Marmagoa): No irregulars . . . (Interruption).

Shri Y. B. Chavan: I am only mentioning the term that was used there. The point that I was making is that the Chief of the Army Staff made a suggestion that in order to completely eliminate the possibility of tensions, it was necessary to stop raising of Mujahids and other organisations. The C-in-C of Pakistan could not give his reaction and he possibly thought that he must refer back this problem to his Government. Naturally, it was said that respective Governments might go into that position. But I have specially made that position clear that if they agree, well and good and if they do not agree at the governmental level, as to what is the quantum, at least that will have to be thought of and that will be subject to the maximum that is contemplated in the 1948 Agreement.

Shri Indrajit Gupta: What is the limit? Under the 1949 Agreement, did we agree to a certain limit of this irregular army being raised in Jammu and Kashmir? What is that limit?

Shri Y. B. Chavan: I would request the House not to press me to disclose some of the information....

श्री यशु सिमये : पाकिस्तान को पता है, लेकिन हम को नहीं बतलाते हैं ।

Shri Y. B. Chavan: Normally, it should be known to the U.N. Organisation. हम को पता है ।

2511 (A1) LSD-5.

The U.N. authorities know the maximum potential on their side and the maximum on our side.

श्री यशु सिमये : हमको बतलान में आप को क्या मापति है ?

Shri Y. B. Chavan: We have some information about this matter. Certainly, we will take care of that aspect.

डा० राज मनोहर लोहिया (फर्रुखाबाद) : अपनी मत बतलाओ, लेकिन पाकिस्तान की बतलाने में क्या हर्ज है ?

Shri Ranga (Chittoor): I am sorry to say that the answer given by the hon. Defence Minister is not at all satisfactory. It is much too vague. In view of the fact that previous to this trouble between Pakistan and ourselves, we were accumulating our complaints against each other in regard to breaches of cease-fire and only reporting to the United Nations without any redress at all, without any satisfactory solution for those troubles, would the Government try to negotiate that both Pakistan and India would set up a joint board or tribunal with ex-Judges of their respective Supreme Courts to examine complaints from time to time, firstly, about the violations of cease-fire and, secondly, about the forces maintained by both the countries as per 1949 stipulations, which is now being suggested in this note as well as in their negotiation as to the respective strength of our armed personnel on both sides and also in regard to the prevention of irregular armed or un-armed guerillas from entering Kashmir and other areas on our side—and their areas also—and doing mischief in any way.

Shri Y. B. Chavan: We are not considering any such proposal at the present moment. Really speaking, the machinery of the U.N. and bilateral talks on the matter are the only effective way of handling the matter.

**Shri Ranga:** Am I to understand that they are not going to consider the suggestion for what it is worth and examine the possibilities?

**Mr. Speaker:** He says that they have not so far considered any such proposal.

**Shri Ranga:** There was this earlier difficulty. There was no decision to be given by the United Nations. We were making complaints against each other and were exciting each other.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** At the present moment, we have no such proposal under our consideration. In addition to the U.N. Organisation or its representative, as I said, the bilateral talks will be more useful in this matter. Possibly the Commanders might meet and discuss the matter; that will be a more effective way of dealing with the matter.

**Shri H. N. Mukerjee** (Calcutta Central): I fear the House will be very much perturbed over what the Defence Minister has said. We have been given to understand from the Tashkent Declaration and from the explanation given to us by the Government that, as far as infiltration and that kind of thing are concerned, they would come under the definition of recourse to arms and, therefore, since they have given an assurance that there will be no recourse to arms, infiltration and that kind of thing would be expected to be stopped. Now there is a reference to such peculiar things as Mujahids, Razakars and others who are, in the very nature of things, soldiers by proxy and, in the very nature of things, their names indicate that they are a kind of people who would go under cover of whatever sort and do some damage. Are we going to have a settlement under which permission is given to that kind of very doubtful people operating in our country because they all come under the definition made in 1949 or something like that? This is most peculiar. The Tashkent Declaration is supposed to write a new chapter. Therefore, a

reference to what happened in 1948 or 1949 should not be made in a manner which would enable some mischievous elements on the side of Pakistan—I do not say Pakistan Government—to operate under cover of certain things in which Government of India acquiesced.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** It is exactly for that purpose the Chief of the Army Staff had made a suggestion to which I made a reference in the statement. I quite appreciate the argument with regard to the danger involved in the irregulars. It is for that purpose that the suggestion was made.

**Shri H. N. Mukerjee:** Our Chief of Army Staff made a very good suggestion—Mr. Gupta made a reference in his preface to the question. But on the Pakistan side, they said that they would refer it to the Government and in the meantime, there is a reference to something to which our Government appears to have acquiesced, namely, that some 1948 or 1949 figure will be accepted in regard to even people like Mujahids and Razakars.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** It is not a question of acquiescing; it is a matter of reality. They are there. We have to deal with the situation as it is now.

**Mr. Speaker:** What is agitating the mind of the Member is that we have agreed that the strength would be reduced to what it was in 1949. In this manner, the strength of the Mujahids and others to that proportion is to be accepted.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** If at all they continue there, ultimately we have to take care of what the maximum military potential they will be allowed to have there. (*Interruptions*). Our main problem is two-fold: one aspect is to reduce or limit the military potential that they will have on the other side; the second point is to remove completely, if we succeed is

talks by persuading them and arguing with them, these irregular elements.

**Mr. Speaker:** If we do not agree to the elimination of Mujahids, Razakars and others and only accept or come to an agreement about the strength of military personnel, then these would be additional soldiers that would be coming on our side.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** It is not a question of our wishing for anything; we shall certainly have to try for that, but the basis ultimately becomes the 1949 agreement, and in that agreement, the words 'military potential' were used, and the limit set out will include these elements also.

**Mr. Speaker:** That is all right; according to that, it would mean that the military potential would be reduced to what it was in 1949. A new element has been introduced now by Razakars.....

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** It is not introduced anew; it is there in reality.

**Mr. Speaker:** Actually, it is not for me to put this question; it is not my job; and I am very sorry that I am interfering....

**Shri Surendranath Dwivedy (Kendrapara):** As far as the House is concerned, you can express our feelings.

**Mr. Speaker:** I express the sentiments of the House only.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** What I am trying to explain is this. Please let me explain myself. I am saying that I am not agreeing to anything new. The irregular elements will have to be within the limit of the 1949 agreement. We are trying to make a fresh effort to remove these elements from the military potential.

**Mr. Speaker:** Still, the House perhaps might not feel satisfied; and they might still have apprehensions on this account, and Government should take note of that. Certainly, now, the military personnel would be reduced

to a certain strength. But the apprehensions in the minds of the hon. Members are that in regard to this there is likely to be a dispute and controversy about the term 'military personnel', and it may not lead to any satisfactory solution; they would be insisting that their military personnel consists of all those that are in uniform, carrying openly the arms that they have to use....

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** The regulars.

**Mr. Speaker:**..that is, the regulars; and under cover of whatever kind it may be, they might be sending these Razakars and Mujahids. If they do not agree to eliminate those persons, then probably we might always have to face those dangers of large-scale infiltration into our country; that might do damage and might not be acknowledged by them. Then, what would be the use of this agreement? This is what hon. Members have in mind.

**Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur):** That is not the end of the mischief. I want your indulgence for one minute. You may please listen to the other part also. This is a piece of ineptitude and incompetence, and Shri Y. B. Chavan has been ill-served by whoever has put this draft or this brief before him. What is shocking in this agreement is that as a result of the discussions between the two Chiefs of Staff, the presence of Mujahids and Razakars has been admitted; but even more shocking is the fact that Government has conceded the right of the Mujahids and Razakars to operate in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This is a point which even you, Sir, have not pointed out. The relevant sentence shocks the conscience of all Indians; it reads thus:

"Whatever may be the views of the Pakistan Government in this matter, it is clear that according to the agreement reached as a result of discussions on 9th and 10th February between the two Army Chiefs, the strength of Mujahids, Razakars or armed

[Shri Nath Pai]

irregulars in the State of Jammu and Kashmir will have to be in consonance with the overall limit.....".

How did we reach this agreement? (Interruptions).

**Mr. Speaker:** Hon. Members on the Opposition would not allow even one of their spokesmen also to have his say? If this kind of interruptions continues, then nobody can follow what is happening.

**Shri Nath Pai:** It is not only what you have pointed out which is shocking, but there are two dangerous elements in this single sentence; one is what you have pointed out....

**Mr. Speaker:** Because I knew only one.

**Shri Nath Pai:** The offence would have been bad enough even if one had been there, but when the presence has been admitted on the soil of India.....

**Mr. Speaker:** Now, let us hear what Government have to say.

**Shri Nath Pai:** We would, therefore, like the matter to be clarified.

**Shri Indrajit Gupta:** It is 'including Jammu and Kashmir'.

**Shri Nath Pai:** That is the point—'Including Jammu and Kashmir'.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Treachery.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** No, it is not treachery or anything of that sort. Possibly, unnecessarily, we are trying to see more political meaning into it than is necessary. By mentioning this we are not conceding any right, any political right of theirs to maintain any Army or any Mujahids or anything like that. As far as this agreement is concerned, we shall have to see the nature of the agreement. The nature of the agreement is that

it is to implement a certain position that we have taken under the Tashkent Declaration. It has absolutely technical limitations; It has no political significance; it is only limited to the extent of implementing the Tashkent Declaration; and that Tashkent Declaration is subject to all our political attitudes on Kashmir.

We will have to make our minds clear about it. It is merely an agreement to implement that part of the Tashkent Declaration which says that we have to observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line. Therefore, we have to see the whole thing within that framework. But unfortunately, we are trying to read rather more political meaning, more constitutional meaning, into it.

Some hon. Members: No, no.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** You are reading much less.... (Interruptions).

**Mr. Speaker:** We would not be able to achieve anything in this manner if simultaneously so many voices are heard.

**Shri Surendranath Dwivedy:** That is the difficulty with this Government. They are committed to a position the implementations of which they do not realise.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** We know the implications.

**Shri J. B. Kripalani (Amroha):** If this is the view taken by the Defence Minister, it appears there is something very wrong about the Tashkent agreement itself and it is capable of any number of interpretations.

**Mr. Speaker:** We have already discussed the Tashkent agreement.

**Shri U. M. Trivedi:** The explanation given by the Defence Minister makes confusion worse confounded. It would have been better if it had remained where it was. But with the explanation with which he has come forward, it has become crystal clear

to this House that this is a question of Mujahids and Razakars living and continuing to live on the soil of Jammu and Kashmir, that is, in the State of India, which has been acquiesced in. This is an intolerable position on which agreement has been reached, and the explanation given cannot go down the throat of this House or the country for that matter. I feel the hon. Defence Minister should apply his mind to the point raised and eradicate this element.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Really speaking, I was trying to say that there is no question of our having basically accepted their right of raising any particular thing. I was merely making a reference to the 1949 agreement. There these realities were there. In fact, they had maintained certain things. As we have to observe the ceasefire agreement, the conditions laid down in that agreement come in. I am only making a reference to that; this agreement only makes a reference to those conditions there.

At the same time, I very well appreciate the difficulty....

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** And fears.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:**...and fears, I share the anxieties and fears of Members. That is why the Chief of the Army Staff raised this question of not raising these irregulars there. As the same time, we have to take care of one thing—I mentioned this point in that statement—that possibly it might be interpreted by somebody as if they can continue to raise those irregulars and that will be an addition. I have mentioned this only in order to make that position clear. It is not a question of reconising their right of raising these irregulars.... (*Interruptions*).

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Very clumsy draft.

**Shri Nath Pal:** Your draftsmen are very clumsy.

**Shri Tyagi (Dehra Dun):** It is obvious that the agreement arrived at between the two Chiefs of the Army Staff was not a direct part of the Tashkent agreement. It is over and above that agreement. I want to know whether before our Army Chief made such a proposal—which, I think, is the biggest strategic blunder committed—did he consult the Cabinet? And did the Cabinet approve of it before the offer was made to the Pakistan Army Chief? Also, there is another point....

**Mr. Speaker:** One is already quite heavy.

**Shri Tyagi:** This is consistent with it. My hon. friend referred to the agreement of 1949. This was a part of that agreement, that is, to reduce the armed forces to that level. But it was conditional on another clause which asked Pakistan to vacate the aggression, to vacate Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** That was a different agreement.

**Shri Tyagi:** It was along with it that the armies were to be reduced. If and when they vacate their aggression from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, we shall reduce our forces. Suppose on the main question—because these are only environments of conciliation created while the main question is being postponed—ultimately there happens to be a disagreement, what will you do? Our armies will take ten days to reach there. They will be readily available for attack. So, strategically why are the Government not putting forth the main controversial question for resolution? Once we have agreed that we shall not use force, well, we shall honour it, but let us first discuss the main question, so that we can find out if

[Shri Tyagi]

ultimately there is an agreement. If there is an agreement, there is nothing like it, and we shall withdraw the army. But why are they avoiding the main question?

**Mr. Speaker:** Enough speech has been made.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Possibly the hon. Member is confusing two different agreements. The cease-fire agreement has nothing to do with the other type of agreement that he is making mention of.

**Shri Ranga:** Can we have a copy of it placed on the Table of the House?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I will place it. It is a known document, that is why I did not bring it with me. This is a different agreement altogether.

About the first question he raised as to whether the Chief of the Army Staff, before he went, had consulted the Government, this question was raised in the Cabinet, the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet did consider these questions, and only on that the Chief of the Army Staff made this proposal.

**Shri Tyagi:** Why is the main question avoided?

**Mr. Speaker:** He has answered. He has said these are two distinct questions, and he will place the agreement on the Table of the House—the first one.

**Shri Tyagi:** My point was, why is discussion on the main question on which Pakistan and we differ being avoided, and we are taking steps which weaken our position.

**Mr. Speaker:** What can I do?

**Dr. L. M. Singhvi (Jodhpur):** Because what the Defence Minister has said shows a very alarming lack of comprehension of the implications of the cease-fire agreement of 1948 and the implications of the extent

to which we have to implement the Tashkent declaration, we would like to know whether in this context the Government is going to discuss the U.N. Security Council Resolution and its political aspects, stages three and four, at the next meeting, and whether there are any specific proposals for economic collaboration or will it be a meeting not only without an agenda but without any preparation whatever?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** As I said, on this question of agenda, I have no information.

**Dr. L. M. Singhvi:** The Prime Minister must answer this question. After all, when a question is put, it is not put for the pleasure of putting it. We want an answer to this.

**Shrimati Indira Gandhi:** I think I have said earlier to the House that no agenda had been fixed. Later on there was a discussion here because some agenda appeared which had been sent from the Pakistan side. We have again replied to it and suggested that some of those matters may not come up and we should concentrate on the economic and other matters.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Is it secret?

**Shrimati Indira Gandhi:** It came out in all the newspapers.

**Shri S. N. Chaturvedi (Firozabad):** Do we understand from that the hon. Defence Minister has said that this agreement only accepts the total military potential at that time in 1949, that it does not give recognition to the mujahids and raskars, that pending their disbandment. They will also be reckoned in the total military potential along with the military armed forces already there? Is that the position?

Shri Y. B. Chavan: The position is that military potential as defined in the 1949 agreement will have to be stood up to.

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : मुझे अपना विरोध इस बात पर जता देने दीजिये कि रक्षा मंत्री जी भारत की सेनाओं की सीमा बताने में हिचक सकते हैं जन सुरक्षा के नाम पर लेकिन पाकिस्तान की सेनाओं की सीमा 1949 की सन्धि के हिसाब से क्या रही ? इस को बताने में उनको कोई हिचक नहीं होनी चाहिए ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : उन्होंने कहा है कि वह स्टेटमेंट ही रख देंगे ।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : उन्होंने यह पहले कहा कि हमें नहीं बताना चाहिए ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : वह एपीमेंट ही रख देंगे ।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : सीमा हलमें निर्धारित रहेगी ?

धर मैं मुजाहिद और रजाकार का धर्म पहले बतला दूँ । रजाकार का मतलब स्वयंसेवक और मुजाहिद का मतलब जिंदा में जाने वाला धर्म युद्ध करने वाला, तो स्वयंसेवक और धर्म युद्धी इसके माने होते हैं । पाकिस्तान की सरकार और जनता को काश्मीर जो कि गुलामी में जकड़ा हुआ है, मुक्ति दिलाने के लिए धर्म युद्धी और स्वयंसेवक बनाने का अधिकार है । अगर भारत सरकार कोई भी ऐसा समझता करती है जिसमें एक भी धर्मयुद्धी और एक भी स्वयंसेवक को उठाने का प्रयास पाकिस्तान की सरकार और जनता को मिल जाता है, तब उसके मतलब यह हो गये कि भारत सरकार यह मानती है कि पाकिस्तान की सरकार को काश्मीर की मुक्ति दिलाने का हक है । तो

बाली, यह सीमा का सवाल नहीं है—एक हो या सौ हों या हजार हों, अगर सिर्फ इस लिये कि वहाँ जो कुछ भी हजार, पाँच सौ स्वयंसेवक...

अध्यक्ष महोदय : धर माननीय सदस्य सवाल करें ।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : दूसरे सवाल तो चाहे जितना बोलते रहें, लेकिन मेरा सवाल एक ही मिनट में खतम हो जाना चाहिये । लेकिन धर, अगर धार का यह रथिया धीर रखें हैं, तो मैं क्या कह सकता हूँ ?

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैंने माननीय सदस्य को कहा है कि वह सवाल करें धीर वह इस पर नाराज हो गए हैं । वह मुजाहिद और रजाकार की डेफिनीशन करने लग गये हैं ।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : यह जल्दी है, क्योंकि वह समझ नहीं रहे हैं ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : उन्होंने समझ लिया है ।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : उन्होंने बिल्कुल समझा नहीं है । वह मुजाहिद और रजाकार का धर्म ही नहीं समझे, नहीं तो वह इस तरह लापरवाही से जवाब न देते । उन्होंने अपने बयान से पाकिस्तान का यह अधिकार मान लिया है कि पाकिस्तान काश्मीर को मुक्ति दिलाने के लिए इस तरह की कार्यवाही कर सकता है । एक भी धर्मयुद्धी और एक भी स्वयंसेवक के बारे में फंसला करने का प्रश्न है । तो धारियर यह बात बताने का मुझे हक है या नहीं ? धर मैं यह बताऊँ, तभी तो यह सवाल उठता है । इसी लिये मैंने इस बात को यहाँ पर रखा है । सवाल पढ़ने से पहले मैं यह भी कह दूँ कि जब बरसाई की सन्धि के बाद जर्मनी निरस्त्र कर दिया गया था, तो इसी तरह से... (Interruptions).

श्री मधु लिवधे : क्या प्रश्न को सुनना नहीं चाहते हैं ?

**अध्यक्ष महोदय :** जब मैं गाननीय सदस्य का सवाल सुन रहा हूँ, तो वह खामोश क्यों हो गये।

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** आप धक्कर कह दिया करते हैं कि...

**अध्यक्ष महोदय :** मैं आप का सवाल सुन रहा हूँ। आप पूछिए...

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** जब कोई बेश निरस्त्र कर दिया जाता है, उस समय भी कई ऐसी जालों से वह अपनी पल्टन बना लिया करता है और यूरोप के देशों में धक्कर यह हुंसा है। जहाँ कहीं आप किसी तरह से भी मुजाहिद और रजाकर वगैरह के प्रतिस्त्व को स्वीकार कर लेते हैं, वहाँ आप दरवाजा खोल देते हैं कि चाहे जितने दिन यह करार चले, लेकिन फिर पाकिस्तान एक ही जगह एक लाख, दो लाख इस तरह के मुजाहिद और रजाकार लाकर चढ़ाई कर सकता है।

तो इस लिये मैं रक्षा मंत्री महोदय से यह पूछना चाहता हूँ कि क्या वह करार के इस भंग को छोड़ देन को तैयार है और इस को जनता के सामने कहने को तैयार है कि यह खराब है, इस लिए हम इस को छोड़ देते हैं।

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Sir, the hon. Member has made certain observations. I would like still to explain our position. When we say that the cease-fire line has to be agreed, the fact is that a part of Jammu and Kashmir has been occupied by those forces on the other side.

**Shri Shinkre:** They do not call it the State of Jammu and Kashmir; they call it Azad Kashmir.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Even that area is the State of Jammu and Kashmir; that is what I am saying. They may call it by any other name. For us it is the State of Jammu and Kashmir and by saying that we have not conceded any right of liberation to the

mujahids or others. If any attempt at liberation is made, it will certainly be resisted with all the forces at our disposal; there is no doubt about it. Unfortunately certain terms are being misunderstood. I am saying that this agreement had absolutely technical significance because we have to observe these rules since we have agreed to observe the cease-fire; cease-fire line has to be observed; the agreements have to be observed; it is only a limited sense. In no political sense we have agreed to allow their people to liberate that area; we have not concerned even that part of the area that is under their occupation; it still belongs to us; our sovereignty is still there over that area. That position is clear; we are committed to that position.

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** अध्यक्ष महोदय,...

**अध्यक्ष महोदय :** श्रीमती तारकेश्वरी सिन्हा।

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** अध्यक्ष महोदय, रक्षा मंत्री जी खाली किसी

**अध्यक्ष महोदय :** क्या जब तक आप का जो चाहेगा, तब तक आप भुझे होल्ड किये रखेंगे ?

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** अध्यक्ष महोदय, मेरे प्रश्न का उत्तर नहीं आया है। रक्षा मंत्री जी खाली अपने इरादे को बताने हैं कि जब पाकिस्तान हमला करेगा...

**अध्यक्ष महोदय :** मैं इसने ज्यादा इजाजत नहीं दे सकता।

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** मैं आप से धर्ज कर रहा हूँ। आप उन को इजाजत न दीजिए। मैं तो आप से कह रहा हूँ।

**अध्यक्ष महोदय :** मुझ से सवाल नहीं किये जा सकते हैं। श्रीमती तारकेश्वरी सिन्हा।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया: मेरा व्यवस्था का प्रश्न है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय: श्रीमती तारकेश्वरी सिन्हा।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया: अध्यक्ष महोदय, क्या मैं व्यवस्था का प्रश्न भी नहीं उठा सकता हूँ?

अध्यक्ष महोदय: जब मैंने आप को इन्कार किया है, तब आप व्यवस्था का प्रश्न उठाते हैं। किस रूप के मातहत?

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया: मैं इतिला देने के बारे में व्यवस्था का प्रश्न उठा रहा हूँ। इस में लिखा है कि सवाल पूछे जाते हैं मन्त्री से लोक-महत्व के विषय पर इतिला देने के लिए और इतिला देने के बदले जब मन्त्री खाली अपनी छाती फुला कर भविष्य की किसी कार्यवाही को बता देना चाहते हैं कि पाकिस्तान ऐसा करेगा, तो हम ऐसा करेंगे, तो वह इतिला नहीं रहती है। इस बक्त इतिला सिर्फ इस बात की देनी है कि मुजाहिद और रजाकार प्रथम में ही, शब्द में ही, यह बताते हैं कि पाकिस्तान को काश्मीर की मुक्ति करने का हक है और इसलिए यह शब्द इस्तेमाल करके और उनका अस्तित्व मान कर, चाहे एक ही सिपाही क्यों न हो. रक्षा मन्त्री ने अपने सारे हक को खत्म किया है। यह इतिला का सवाल है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय: उन के पास जो इतिला थी, वह उन्होंने दे दी है।

श्री मधु लिमये: अध्यक्ष महोदय, उन्होंने कई गलत बातें कही हैं। मेरा इस बारे में एक व्यवस्था का प्रश्न है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय: व्यवस्था का कोई प्रश्न नहीं है। मैंने इस को खत्म कर दिया है।

श्री मधु लिमये: उन्होंने इतिला कहाँ दी है? उन्होंने कहा है कि शब्दक्रमही है। वास्तव में खुद उन को शब्दक्रमही है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय: इस का फ़ैसला आपने नहीं करना है।

श्री मधु लिमये: मैं कहाँ कर रहा हूँ? आप कीजिए न।

अध्यक्ष महोदय: श्रीमती तारकेश्वरी सिन्हा।

**Shrimati Tarkeshwari Sinha (Barh):** May I know whether the government is aware of the letter which the late Mr. Nehru wrote to the U.N. commission in which he pointed out that in the peculiar situation of Kashmir, the question of security from external aggression and the problem of law and order were linked together and hence India could not agree to a reduction of the forces *suo motu*. May I know whether the government is aware that at that time Mr. Nehru did not use this word, the State of Jammu and Kashmir because he knew that the Pakistani occupied area of Azad Kashmir was in their unauthorised occupation, he put in these two words 'peculiar situation'? Is the Government aware of this particular expression being used by the late Mr. Nehru realising the importance and the complexity of the situation and if so why did the government put in categorically the State of Jammu and Kashmir?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** As I said whatever term they may be using, we consider even that part of Jammu and Kashmir as Jammu and Kashmir.