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THE
PARLIAMETARY DEBATES

(Part II—Proceedings other than Questions and Answers)

OFFICIAL REPORT

2907

2908

HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

Thursday, 26th March, 1953

The House met at Two of the Clock

[MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER in the Chair]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

(See Part 1)

3 P.M.

COIR INDUSTRY BILL

The Minister of Commerce and Industry (Shri T. T. Krishnamachari): I beg to move for leave to introduce a Bill* to provide for the control by the Union of the Coir Industry and for that purpose to establish a Coir Board and levy a customs duty on coir fibre, coir yarn and coir products exported from India.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question is:

"That leave be granted to introduce a Bill to provide for the control by the Union of the Coir Industry and for that purpose to establish a Coir Board and levy a customs duty on coir fibre, coir yarn and coir products exported from India."

The motion was adopted.

Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: I introduce the Bill.

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS—contd.

The Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs and Defence (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Some little time ago, this House discussed the estimates in regard to the External Affairs Ministry. In discussing foreign policy, it was often stated that foreign policy

was essentially a national policy of a country. Emphasis may vary and conditions sometimes may introduce some refinement here and there, but essentially it was a national policy. Now, if that applied to foreign policy, much more of that argument applies to defence policy. A defence policy should essentially be a national policy, though, undoubtedly, opinions may differ as to whether emphasis should be made on one aspect of it at one time or another aspect. Also, essentially a defence policy has to keep wide awake. It depends on so many factors

If I may give some kind of a rough and ready equation about defence, I would say that defence consists of armed forces, plus their equipment etc., plus the industrial production of the country, plus the economy of the country, plus the morale of the people, plus the international relations or international position. All these are important, every one of them affecting each other. And the first thing to realise is that defence does not consist merely of the armed forces. Essentially, and more and more, it consists of the strength behind those armed forces, the strength of the nation's economy, the industrial capacity of that nation to produce goods required for defence etc., and other things that I have mentioned.

Now, I have followed personally to some extent, and from reports, the speeches that have been delivered, and we have tried to profit by them. Some of my colleagues in the Defence Ministry have already answered some of the arguments. We shall naturally profit by any criticisms that appear to us to be worthwhile or legitimate. Most of those criticisms, however, either deal with what I might call secondary aspects of our defence, or with such things as pay and allowances and conditions of service. Now, these are important of course. But if the House will permit me, I would rather deal

*Introduced with the recommendation of the President.

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with certain basic things. But I would say this in regard to those criticisms, that some of them astonished me very greatly.

The hon. Member Mr. Nambiar referred to the awful conditions of service, the pays and salaries, of children in chains in hospitals, and generally to the fact that our people in the armed forces are treated badly in regard to food, accommodation etc. Now, if there is one thing that is quite clear and dead certain, it is this: that the men in our services are treated well. In regard to food, it is very good food indeed because I have taken it very often, first class food, and if I may suggest it to Mr. Nambiar if he could go and take that food, his health will improve. In regard to medical facilities, they are excellent—the medical facilities that we give to the people of our armed forces—and in fact the test of all this is the fine young men that you see, fine, strong, hefty, capable of hard work and endurance, far beyond, I regret to say, than any Member of Parliament, and certainly beyond myself. They are good people physically, because they get good food, relatively good accommodation, they are well looked after, medically, and the rest. There is one remarkable thing that I noticed, from the reports, of children being kept in chains; it is an amazing thing to a person who reads about them. The fact of the matter is that in the hospital, small children are given number-plates with small chains attached either to their waists or to their chests, so that they might not get mixed up, and I think he described it as if the children were kept in chains in the hospital. It was a very extraordinary way of describing that.

As for the salaries the hon. Member mentioned, he forgot completely the dearness allowance that they get, which adds up considerably.

Then, some hon. Members are here who have had some brief experience of our armed forces, having been in the army, navy or air force. They were fortunate in having that experience. I have no doubt that that will give them a greater insight into the working of these armed forces. Nevertheless, the mixture, the combination of some small experience as a pilot or something like that, with Membership of Parliament is likely to be heady, is likely to make the hon. Member think that he has become a complete and final expert in all matters military, or air force, or naval. Well, of course we happen to have a few thousands of

persons with infinitely greater experience who advise us in the Defence Ministry,—thousands of pilots who have done much more work than the hon. Member who has become a Member of Parliament, who have spent their lives in ten, 20 years of service. Now, those are the persons who advise us. Naturally we have to take expert advice in all these matters, and we listen to them and their advice, with such intelligence as we possess as laymen, because the final decision is always, of course, of the civil apparatus of a country, but after taking the expert advice. So I would submit that a slight experience as a pilot does not necessarily make one an expert in regard to the use of the Air Force or other matters concerning the Air Force.

Now, I would like the House to remember certain backgrounds in regard to this matter, in regard to the Indian Army. So far as the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy are concerned, as the House knows, they are small, relatively small. We want to enlarge them somewhat, and we are gradually doing it. But the Army is still the biggest factor in our defence apparatus. Now hon. Members may lay great stress on the one or the other. Some Members said that the Air Force is more important; undoubtedly, it is today. Some Members told us that we should spend more money on our defence, specially on the Air Force, while some other hon. Members said that we should spend less money. Well, all of them, from their respective points of view, are correct. On the one hand, it is obvious that we are spending a considerable sum of money annually on our defence apparatus, and we could ill-afford that sum of money; we should like to economise and reduce it as much as we can, and we continually try to do so.

On the other hand, for the moment forgetting it—of course, I do not want to forget it, it is important—the amount of money that we spend for our defence apparatus considering the size of this country and the obligations that the defence apparatus has to discharge, is not too great. Looking at it broadly, we have to balance all these considerations. Naturally, we cannot spend money which we have not got. Naturally, also there is a certain minimum of defence requirements for the security of the country, for the future development of the country which we must provide. Even we may have to scrape for them. So both factors have to be borne in mind. And there is one very important factor. Hon. Members think of the numbers in the Army, the

Air Force and the rest. But throughout history armies and the like have depended, of course, on numbers, of course on courage and morale, but ultimately on the technology behind them. That was not so obvious in the olden days, but it becomes more and more obvious today. Yet, if any hon. Member takes the trouble to study the history of war—and non-violent as I am, I have taken that trouble occasionally, because it is a fascinating subject,—from the study of the history of war and of famous Captains in history you can see the development of technology even more than in any other way, because war, unfortunately for us, has encouraged the development of technology more than anything else. Because when people are forced into a life and death struggle, their minds function rapidly; they have to find out something. And so always in times of war technology has advanced and ultimately it has not been courage—although courage counts and of course always will count—it has not been numbers, but the technology, the superior weapon that has counted in war.

If I had time I could give many interesting examples to the House, going back to some rather amusing instances of how Attila overcame the Romans because he discovered the stirrup on the horse. A very simple thing—the stirrup—an obvious thing. But the discovery of the stirrup on the horse made his horsemen infinitely better placed to meet the Romans, and they could much more easily defeat the Romans in spite of the courage on this side or that side. So all that counts small improvements have been going on for several hundred years. Constantinople which was under the old Greek Empire with stood the Turks, although the Turks surrounded Constantinople for several hundred years, simply because Constantinople—the old Greek Empire—had what is called the Greek fire. It was that something, that secret weapon they had—the Greek fire—which protected them. And so it went on.

Now coming to the history of India, leaving our ancient history (about which we have no proper historical records; presumably from the technological point of view we were not backward then compared to others), and coming to later times, all our deficiency and defeats have been due to the fact that we were backward in these matters. We stuck to our chivalry, our courage as well as our enormous capacity for fighting each other and disruption. And we were defeated not for lack of courage or lack of brains even, but for backwardness in techno-

logy. It was always so, whether you take it from Babar who first came to this country or others. Why did Babar win? May be they were efficient; but the fact is that they had a better gun. A simple fact—they had a better gun which the Rajput chivalry could not meet. Later, take the whole of the Mughal period. It is a very curious thing that our minds in India were not directed towards technological development. We took things from others. Throughout the Mughal period the persons who made guns in India were Turks always. They were sent for from Turkey and in fact, they had a special title. Most of the ordnance men in those days were called 'Rumi Khans' after the name for Constantinople. 'Rumi Khan' was the title of the man who made the guns. They always used the Turks, that is, always our reliance was on some external person to build something for us to carry on war. Meanwhile, of course, Europe was going ahead—fast ahead—in developing technology and better weapons. And you will see when the English and the French came to India as adventurers, they had the better weapons of course. First of all, their weapons were hired and their officers were hired by the local rulers of the day. They were hired because they had the better weapons; they could train soldiers better, and whoever hired them, they wanted something for it and took a share in it.

So it is extraordinary how dependent we were on others, and ultimately that dependence was bound completely by our becoming totally politically dependent. That happened. That is our history for the last hundreds of years. Now, when we face the problem today, we have to remember this. Hon. Members do not seem to remember that adequately. Hon. Members tell us that we must not be dependent on others. Well, that is obvious. That is the basic fact from which we start in considering defence, that is, we must not depend on others. But how are we to be independent of others? That is not such a simple proposition. We cannot suddenly develop that industrial apparatus in this country. We cannot develop the large numbers of persons who invent things, because, remember, in defence some things are common, that is, they get known by every country. Every country, every big country, has its own types, models, prototypes etc. which nobody else knows till ultimately they are used in warfare and then copied, as for example, the Maxim-gun. So ultimately it is dependence on the development of science and the scientific mind, the inventor, the discoverer. And then it depends on the

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development of industry, that is, the application of that science in technology. Therefore, the biggest thing in defence we have done in India is to put up a large number of scientific laboratories. They are not put under Defence yet, but that is the biggest thing. That is the failing we have suffered, from science, for the last hundreds of years. We have been backward and we will continue to be backward not only in defence but in industry generally if we merely relied on buying some idea or invention from outside. That is pure dependence—we will get secondhand ideas and secondhand machines from outside. So the first thing we did both from the larger point of view of the country and the point of defence was to build up the great and fine National Laboratories that we have. Hon. Members sometimes enquire about them, as if they are mass-producing machine laboratories. A laboratory produces first of all the scientist, the human brain, trained brain out of which occasionally come wonderful discoveries, sometimes smaller discoveries, sometimes nothing at all. You have to take that chance. The human brain does not function this way, that it goes on producing something, manufacturing an article. That is the first thing. Secondly, coming to defence itself, we have tried to build up a Defence Science Section which is important. It is of course in complete touch with our other laboratories, but it pays particular attention to the defence aspect of science and it is in charge of very good scientists—I can assure the House. Naturally it would be absurd for me to say whether in our general science or in our defence science we are to be compared at present to the advanced nations of the world. That is not so. In quantity it is not so. In quality we are not bad; numbers may be small. Anyhow we thought of defence in these basic terms. It is not a question of having a few more men or buying a few more aircraft or a few more ships, old or new. But we have to build up something new and build up something which has not been in the tradition of this country for the last few hundred years, because we were copying, getting others to do things for us. But the process of building up itself requires that we should get help where we could. Obviously, if we start discovering and inventing everything from scratch it will take a mighty long time and others will go ahead. We have always to keep in view that we have to rely upon ourselves, our men, our scientists etc. our technicians, our technologists etc. So we have taken help from abroad; we have tried to. Now, you may criticise

that. That is a different matter. But I am putting the basic thing before the House. We have taken help from abroad where we thought it necessary. We have sent for occasionally from abroad eminent scientists connected with Defence to advise us. We have sent for from abroad eminent theoreticians in Defence matters to come and look and advise us. We have not always accepted their advice but we have wanted to learn from them and we have learnt. I do not mean Ministers and others, but large numbers of our officers have listened to them and cross-examined them and thereby sharpened their own wits and minds on those subjects.

I can tell you that although I happen to be in entire overall charge of Defence only now, I have been taking a most intimate interest in the Defence services ever since I became Prime Minister and I have met large numbers of officers of the services and a large number of other men, and I can express not only my own opinion about it but the opinion of the better placed men, better able to judge, I mean, that our young officer, our average officer is very high-class. I need not say anything about our average soldier. He is known to be a stout man and a courageous man, well-disciplined person. I am for the moment talking about the quality of our officers. It is a high quality and it is a quality which can well compare with any elsewhere. I do not mean to say that we are producing Napoleons and Chengez Khans and the like. I mention Chengez Khan, because my personal opinion is that he was the greatest general history has produced. It has nothing to do with what he did. I am really talking about his generalship. People may think that he swept through the whole of Europe through sheer numbers—nothing of the kind—it was because of his generalship he did that. We are developing the very basis of Defence. It is, first of all, advancing scientifically and technologically, secondly, an intellectually trained officer corps, which can understand not only the improved ways of warfare but which can understand modern trends, modern developments, technical improvements etc. because not only our officer but even the soldier, a man in the Air Force has to become more and more technically minded. War becomes more technical. It still remains much else and it is not a purely mechanic's job but it still becomes more technical.

Now, I should like the House to think for a while of the old Indian Army in the British days, what it was. It was

a fine Army, well disciplined and it did well whenever it was put to the test. But, in effect it was an extension of the British Army in India, and composed of Indians except for the officer ranks, generally speaking. Essentially it was an extension of the British Army in India and the policies were laid down in Whitehall. The general staff was in Whitehall—there might have been a small Army staff here. The real decisions were taken in Whitehall and carried out here. All the officers in the Army were foreigners, except for the last few years when some persons did become Colonels and the like. At the time of partition—I am speaking from memory—I think there were roundabout 8,000 British officers in the Indian Army. It is a large number. We had to undergo a tremendous change. First of all, the Army, Navy and the Air Force had to be split up between Pakistan and India; then the removal of these officers, thousands and thousands of them. Now, however bright our young officers might be, it is not an easy matter suddenly to assume higher responsibility without experience. After all, normally speaking, a man becomes a General—I do not know—after about 20 years of service or about that. However brilliant the men might be, the pushing up of thousands of people was a difficult task for all of them. Well, we have survived that test. We built up a general staff here and we had to depend upon ourselves.

Yesterday my friend, Mr. Tyagi, gave some figures about British or foreign officers. I do not know how Members of the House realise the significance of those figures. I should put them somewhat differently. Today in the Army there is not a single British Officer or foreign officer in any operational or executive post. Not one, from top to bottom; it is a completely self-dependent Army so far as personnel is concerned. We have got some British Officers. We have got one Adviser to advise on whatever organisational or other problem is placed before him. We have got one senior Adviser for some time more—not for very long—and we have got a number of technicians in the Army, people to train, without any executive responsibility. Now, that is a very big change in the Army of the size we have. If you like, you can compare things over the border, in Pakistan. You can see a vast number of English officers in executive responsible positions in that Army and they carry on. We have none in that position. Now, in the Air Force—I am not at all sure for the moment—I think I am not saying something wrong—as far as I know, there are only one or two—of course

the Air Marshal is there. Mr. Jaipal Singh is making signs.

Shri Jaipal Singh (Ranchi West—Reserved—Sch. Tribes): I fully support the hon. Prime Minister. I think, however, my hon. friend is not quite correct when he says there is no executive officer in charge of military training.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I said training technicians we may have, a person training in a Military Academy. Those are training jobs; that is to say, no operational work is entrusted to them. In so far as this training is concerned, we have got a number of them.

Now, in the Air Force, there are very few practically except the man at the top—only the Air Marshal—and may be one or two others, I am not quite sure. That too, I think, in the course of this year, by the end of this year will be completely, 100 per cent., so far as officer ranks are concerned, under Indian officers.

The Navy is in a somewhat different position and in all likelihood we shall continue to have some senior British officers to help us there because, frankly speaking, our young men who are very fine have not got the necessary experience yet. They are gaining it rapidly and even at the end of this year, there are likely to be major changes, so that the change-over from the old 8,000 British officers to the present stage in five or six years has been very remarkable indeed.

After all what are we aiming at? Not, merely calling or saying that we have 100 per cent. Indianised Army etc. Of course, we are aiming at first-rate staff, we are aiming at having a definite apparatus in this country which, not only in quantity but also in quality, bears comparison with anything and creating advancing, progressive apparatus, not merely simulating from somebody else. I see absolutely no reason why we should not take the fullest advantage of such help as we can get from abroad, provided that help is given. There are two ways of giving it. One is self-illuminating help and the other is self-perpetuating help, which is very bad. That is for us to see.

Take another aspect of this problem. As I said, Defence ultimately depends on the Army. I was astonished—I think an hon. Member Mr. Gopal Rao used the words, 'What steps have been taken to change the character of the Army, which is savage and brutal and according to old traditions?' I do protest against our Army or its character being called savage and brutal.

Shri Jaipal Singh: Hear, hear.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I think it is very unfair.

Sri Gopala Rao (Gudivada): What is the relation between the officer and the soldier? How is the treatment given by the officer to the soldier?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know where the hon. Member gets his facts from but so far as I know, the relationship of the officer with his men is exceedingly friendly, exceedingly co-operative.....

Shri V. P. Nayar (Chirayinkil): So far as we know, it is not.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know. Of course, I have no personal knowledge of all the Armies in the world, but some knowledge I do have, and from such as I have had either from books by reading about them, or to a slight extent from personal experience, I have found that in every Army discipline is considered important.

Shri Gopala Rao: But not this kind of discipline.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: In most Armies, discipline is much more rigid than in India. The relationship of the officer with the men is often much more rigid in other Armies than here. Naturally, one cannot generalise about these matters, but I have found here that when we have got 10,000 or 20,000 officers, it may be that some are very good; some are not so good; and some are bad. That is an individual matter. But taking it by and large, my own impression is that our officers get on very well with their men, and I have seen them not only get on well with them, but dance with them, sing with them, eat with them.....

Shri Jaipal Singh: Good show.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I was referring to another aspect of our defence. I have said that ultimately the Army, or the Air Force, or the Navy has to be considered in the background of industrialisation—not only industrial production of the things we need; that of course is there, but it is something much more than that. It is the mind; the technical approach; the technical mind, that we have to produce. In regard to that, if I may say so, the Defence Ministry has made astonishing progress. I say so, because Members ask: 'What have we done? We are static.' I mean Members on either side of the House. They get up and say: 'Oh, it is static; no progress is made.'

I am surprised to learn it, because the progress we have made in that matter is really astonishing, and it is astonishing, not in my own eyes, but in the eyes of others who have come from abroad and who have no reason to praise us. They are experts in this thing and they came here not only four or five years ago, but revisited India two or three times after an interval of a year or two. They can evaluate things, and they have expressed their great surprise at the continuous progress we have made in this business. I can give you figures in regard to the growth of our Ordnance Factories—not only in regard to the growth of our Ordnance Factories and other great industries that are in progress, but to the general progress. Take the Ambarnath Machine Tool Prototypes Factory. It is a magnificent thing which can bear comparison with any factory of that type in the wide world. In fact, building up of these things has produced another type of difficulty for us, of which I will make mention presently.

Take the Ordnance Factories. Apart from the numbers that have grown up—and the number has gone up very greatly—at the present moment, as far as Superintendents etc. are concerned, these are highly technical jobs and it is not easy just to put anybody in a highly technical job, unless you have trained him for it. Now, we have got in these Factories some twenty or so Superintendents etc. At the time of the changeover, there were very few Indians who were even Foremen in these Factories. There was only one Indian officer who had reached the rank of Superintendent, and not even a handful of Assistant Works Managers, and very few Foremen even were there. All were in the lower ranks. Today, all excepting 8 Superintendents are Indians. Most of the Works Managers and Assistant Works Managers are Indians, and in all other appointments there is hardly a single foreigner found. The rapidity with which we have changed in these highly technical things is remarkable. If you go into production figures regarding steel and other things, they are also very interesting and show the rapid progress we are making.

Shri Meghnad Saha (Calcutta—North-West): Is there any design section in the armaments industry? My information is that all the designs still come from England.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: There are design sections, but most certainly designs still come from England. But

at the same time, we have design sections and as our designs grow, we do not take others', or we take them and compare them. We are passing through this transition, because we have always to consider this, that we cannot allow our quality to suffer. It is an important matter that by merely sticking to a particular design that we produce, we should not have second-rate things. We must have first-rate things. What we are doing today is to purchase first-rate things. That is more important. So, undoubtedly we go abroad for designs etc. but more and more designing work is being done here today.

Dr. S. P. Mookerjee (Calcutta South-East): About these Ordnance Factories, may I ask one question? At the time of transfer of power, the Ordnance Factories were so equipped that not all the essential parts could be manufactured here, and steps were then being taken to make them completely self-supporting. Has that been done? Are we in a position to make all the essential parts in the Ordnance Factories or are we still dependent upon supplies coming from England?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Obviously, the attempt is always made to become completely independent. That attempt is limited in some ways, because in highly industrialised countries, all kinds of small parts are manufactured in a hundred different industries. That is why I referred to the Ambarnath Factory. Our difficulty is that when we do something, we cannot rely upon that industrial background which England or America or France may have. They can produce certain things in civilian and other factories and take advantage of them. We have to produce every single item ourselves, which makes it slightly more costly. Apart from costliness, it means for example, getting a big machine to produce some small article. That machine may be occupied for, let us say, ten minutes a day and during the rest of the twenty three hours and fifty minutes it has not got any use. That is wasteful. So, we have to balance these factors. One does not suddenly spend Rs. 10 lakhs over a machine which would produce a small but very important component when we can get that small part better and cheaper elsewhere. Therefore, we have to co-ordinate civilian development and the general industrialisation process with this.

In regard to our Ordnance Factories or other defence factories, as some of the hon. Members have pointed out, we have tried to utilise them to the best and the greatest measure and in the largest possible manner for civilian

production also. It is not an easy matter to do all these things. I think my colleague mentioned to the House yesterday that for this very purpose we are appointing a high-power committee to consider and go into some detail about running the Ordnance Factories and other factories more efficiently, but more so to consider how to utilise them for civilian production, so that not only should there be greater production, but this awful question of retrenchment does not come before us. Retrenchment is bad. We do not want to retrench our people, and yet on the other hand, when we are told that we are doing nothing, what is one to do? So, if we can turn over, from time to time, to civilian production and utilise civilian production to produce some goods, that would be desirable. All these things cannot be done suddenly, but since the hon. Member asked me the question, I think it would be correct to say that in a very large measure we are manufacturing those things—not everything.

Here we come up against a very important thing—the basic thing about defence. What does defence mean? An hon. Member yesterday—or was it the day before—referred repeatedly to the inadequacy of "fire power". He repeated the words "fire power" quite a large number of times. I do not quite know what he meant by it, or what exactly he had in mind. What exactly do we aim at? If we talk about our defence, what do we aim at? Are we aiming at—let us put an extreme case—fighting the wide world? No. We cannot do it. No country can do it. Not even the greatest power in the world today can fight the rest of the world. Therefore, you have to keep in mind what exactly is the aim in view. Of course, you have to keep your resources in mind. They are limited. If we had unlimited resources, of course we can do many things. We can have many times over the fire power that the hon. Member referred to, just to play with, not only in Army matters, but in fire-works—I mean occasionally letting off fireworks. I know that. But there is a limitation. Our resources are limited. We have to make the best use of our resources. But how? In this way. You have to determine how much of the resources available are going to be utilised, let us say, with immediate effect. That is to say, suppose we thought that war was coming six months hence—our planning will be completely different. The preparation would be for a war which is coming six months or three months later. We spend money immediately which we normally may not. We would even waste money, because we cannot be left unprepared for that. That would be

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wasteful expenditure, because if war comes, we should be as prepared for it as we can. If there is no such possibility, we will plan our expenditure in a different way.

Therefore, you have to think of how much you are going to spend on today's preparations and how much to lay the foundations of a higher and superior preparation for tomorrow and the day after. That is the problem in everything, whether it is our industrial development, or the Five Year Plan—today or tomorrow—but more especially in defence you have to do it.

Secondly, you have always to think—and that is a part of the first—in terms of how much you are going to spend on that basic thing which is more important than anything in defence, that is the development of industry, defence industry, if you like. If the last world war was won by the Allies it was on account of the greater production of that colossal apparatus of production of the United States of America than almost anything else. So that everything that we spend for increasing our army today increases our strength for defence in that particular sector immediately, true. But that much we take away from that basic strength which you would get by producing more goods, more equipment for defence. So, we have to balance how much money we should spend on that basic industrial strength, how much for building up more regiments in the army or more aircraft in the Air Force.

Then again, an important question comes up—the types of weapons, etc., that we should use. It is a difficult question which.....

Shri Gopala Rao: What percentage of our defence expenditure is allotted for defence industries, or heavy industries?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am sorry the hon. Member is not trying to follow what I am trying to explain.

Shri Gopala Rao: I ask to substantiate what the Prime Minister says.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I would beg hon. Members to follow something. I do venture to say in all modesty it is worth following.

Shri Gopala Rao: Please speak something concrete.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Speaking about our Army Budget or Defence Budget, I cannot give percentages now. But a fairly substantial part of it is

going in building up that basic thing the capital expenditure and the rest of it.

Now the question comes up as to the type of weapons. When I use the words "types of weapons or equipment" I include in it aircraft, ships, etc. What are we to have? The normal reaction of one is to have the best, of course, to have the latest. Some body asked yesterday why we were purchasing old junk: why not buy new ships? A very brave thing. Nevertheless in some cases it is much better to buy an old thing than a new one. It depends what you are going to use them for. A new ship costs ten times as much as an old one. The latest type, the most modern type of aircraft, the jet aircraft, may cost a tremendous fortune. You may buy it—if you like, certainly. We may buy a bomber which can go two thousand miles. Of course, if we buy that, we do not buy a hundred other things that we might have bought with that money. You cannot go on expending like that. If we do, we give up something.

Secondly, we have to think in terms of the purpose for which we get these weapons. The more technically complicated weapons we get, the more difficult it is for us to maintain them, with the technical background we have; the more dependent we become on others for the spare parts and the rest, which we may not get later on. We can have only a few of them and if by any chance they are destroyed we are helpless.

Shri Gopala Rao rose—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. the Prime Minister must be allowed to proceed.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Therefore, this question is a very important question.

Take the old Indian army. What was it built for? It was an extension of the British Army in India, although manned by Indian personnel and other ranks. It was built as a coordinating branch of the British army to help the British in its wars—either small wars in the frontier, or big wars. So it was like an expeditionary force attached to the British Army. The whole conception of that army was to assist the British army in warfare. Obviously we gave up that conception completely. Today we have no expeditionary force at all. We do not think in terms of any expeditionary force. We think completely in terms of defence, not of

going far outside our country. That makes a complete difference to our outlook, whether it is land force, or air force, or naval force. The Navy is meant to defend our sea coast; the Air Force is to protect our frontiers, if necessary go a little beyond them, but not far beyond them. Therefore, normally speaking we will not get aircraft which however wonderful they are, are supposed to go 2,000 miles out. We have no intention of going a thousand miles away to attack. If we get them, we get them at the cost of other things which are more useful to us, smaller planes and other things.

I am putting these things to the House, so that it may be aware of the method of our approach to these problems. Generally speaking, the more complicated apparatus we get today, it is more costly of course, but apart from being more costly, it seems that much of reduction in the money we could have for really building up our own resources in future. So it affects our future strength—these new ships or aircraft that we may get.

Therefore, it is safer, if I may put it, to get to use a second rate weapon which you produce yourself in the country than to rely on a first-rate weapon which you may not get, or may not be able to keep up and which ultimately does not help you in building up your strength. That is one aspect of it.

The second aspect is that in the modern age you cannot go very far with second-rate weapons, apart from the fact that it may mean producing a dangerous situation for you: it may mean loss of morale of your people, of your services, when they use second-rate weapons and find people round about them using first-rate weapons.

So you have to balance these things. Essentially the outlook is a long distance outlook of building up our industry, strengthening our defence industry, advancing our technological and scientific growth, thereby providing the real basis for defence. You may enrol people in the army and train them in six months or nine months and make them fine soldiers. But it is more difficult to train an officer. It is much more difficult to train a highly specialised technically trained officer, or mechanic, call him what you will. It takes time. Suppose I want to increase my Air Force. It is not a question of my buying so many planes from abroad, quite apart from the fact that I try to manufacture my own aircraft. That will take time. We are beginning and we will go fast

But what is more important is that we have to train men to man that aircraft. That takes time. It is not such a simple matter as all that. Suppose we want to add a dozen squadrons. That process begins not by buying the aircraft, but by beginning to train the men for that and gradually getting them accustomed to that aircraft.

So that the matter has to be looked at from a large number of angles. In this matter of course we have to rely very largely on our experts. They are good people. We take advice where we can from foreign experts too. But ultimately naturally we have to rely on the experts that we have here. And we apply such mind and intelligence as we possess to the expert advice we get and then we decide. Therefore I should like this House to consider this problem of Defence in all its wider ramifications that I have suggested today.

My hon. friend Mr. Patnaik who takes a great deal of trouble and has thought a lot about these matters has put forward many ideas in the course of this debate and previously, many of which are worth pursuing. More specially he is interested in the Territorial Army, in the National Cadet Corps. So are we. And certainly those ideas should be examined. I think it is important that our Territorial Army or our National Cadet Corps should become much bigger. They are far too small today. The difficulty of course arises because the question of expense comes in. Now, I think we shall have to solve that somehow. We have got, if I may say so, into rather bad habits from the British days, that is in regard to the expensiveness of a thing. We think in the old British expensive way, and so we get tied up with it. We shall have to get out of it. There is an Advisory Committee in regard to the Territorial Army and the Cadet Corps and I hope they will make some progress in that direction to expand them. And we shall welcome very much the ideas of Mr. Patnaik, Dr. Mookerjee and others on the subject. We shall certainly welcome them. I should like the Territorial Army to be bigger and the National Cadet Corps to be bigger, certainly if you like as a kind of reservoir, but even more so because I think it is a good thing for our people, for our young men to have their discipline. It will be good for them physically; it will make them better men, better citizens, stronger and healthier people, and generally add to the strength of the country. So I attach a great deal of importance to that. But looking at it from the point of view of sheer

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

defence, there are many other factors which I have pointed out—Industry is one.

And finally may I say there is constant, frequent reference to what are called scandals in the Defence Ministry. One hardy perennial which is referred to again and again is what is called the jeep scandal, and the other thing the ammunition scandal. The third to which Mr. Jaipal Singh referred a little while ago was the Sealand scandal. Everything becomes a scandal!

So far as the Sealand is concerned, my colleague the Deputy Minister gave the facts. I hope they satisfied the House. Again the question was asked: Are the Sealands being employed in any other Navy? And the answer was, as far as I know: No, they are not, but they are used by them for transport and other purposes. But the question is for what purpose we require them. It is perfectly true, if you want to ask me "Are they good for going in battle array against the enemy", they are no good. But we want them for a limited purpose, for training purposes, and we got them. They are no good for active warfare, etc. If we get things for active warfare, apart from our background, we have not got the aircraft carrier, etc. So we get these and train our people accordingly.

And may I say this in regard to this hardy perennial, the jeep scandal, and the so-called ammunition scandal, and what Mr. Anthony referred to as the mystery surrounding the Defence Ministry. I really do not know what mystery he was referring to except the 'mystery' of our not placing on the Table of the House and publishing in the newspapers the exact number of ships, their quality, the number of men, regiments, etc. We do not publish them. That is perfectly true. And we do not intend publishing them. Because, it does no good to supply this information to people who may take advantage of it against us. But there is no other mystery about these matters except the normal secrecy involved in certain things, about the type of weapons we keep. Nobody publishes these things, nowadays.

But again coming back to this jeep scandal, I suppose there are few things or few questions raised in this House which have been so thoroughly enquired into, from every point of view, repeatedly, as this jeep purchase business, which began some time in May, 1948—five years ago, a long time ago. In fact it was the very last purchase on a big scale that was made after the transfer from the old India Office.

They used to make our purchases before that. That was the first thing that was dealt with by our own people there. We had no apparatus, proper apparatus, in India House to deal with these matters, which we have now. It was a very difficult time. We were carrying on the Kashmir war. We were on the point of having the Hyderabad operations. We did not quite know the consequences of all those things. There was the most urgent need felt for jeeps. We sent frantic telegrams: get these jeeps anyhow, any kind of jeep. We were quite unhappy. We made mistakes in it. We lost money, admittedly. But you must look at it in that context of things. Do not think we are sitting in an office here issuing public tenders which may take months and years to be answered. Here was an emergency, a war-time urgency; actually warlike operations were going on and there were threatened operations. The question was: you will not get anything later, get something immediately. So in that hurry we made some contracts which were not adequate and which got us into trouble later on. And we have been trying to get out of them by other processes, and by trying to do that getting more entangled in the business. There it is. But they have gone through it very thoroughly. I confess mistakes were made, I admit. But I see nothing in it which can be called scandal or any corrupt practice. Mistakes have been made. Last session, I think, a statement about this was made by the then Defence Minister, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar after this complete enquiry which he and many of us made. That applies even more to the ammunition business. We got the stuff ordered, and we got good stuff ordered too. There is no doubt about it. But certain procedures have been followed differently. So that, I do beg of the House—I want the House to be as critical as possible, to scrutinize everything most carefully and not to be chary of criticising anything—but I do beg of the House also to consider the context of things and not to run our own people down without being sure that they are deserving of them. If they deserve it let us run them down. But this needless running down of hard-working, honest people, who are doing a difficult job in difficult circumstances is hardly, I submit, desirable.

I would finally beg to submit to the House that taking it all in all—I am not prepared to say that everything that the Defence Ministry has done is free from mistake or error, that it could not have done better here and there; all that is perfectly true; we

can always do better than we have done, and we should do better than we have done—but taking it all in all, the record of the Defence Ministry is, I think, good and has been very advantageous to the country.

½ P.M.

Dr. S. N. Sinha (Saran East): On a point of order.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: What is the point of order? This is guillotine time. There is no point of order.

Dr. S. N. Sinha: There is one, Sir.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I shall apply the guillotine first. Order, order.

Dr. S. N. Sinha: It is about.....

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order please. The hon. Member must resume his seat. Guillotine first and anything else next. I will put all the cut motions to the vote of the House.

The cut motions were negatived.

Shri Jaipal Singh: Demand No. 12... I had requested my young friend there.....

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: No. I am putting the guillotine. At this stage no Demand.....

Shri Jaipal Singh: It is a question of Rs. 40 (forty) lakhs. He promised he would give me a reply.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: No reply now. The question is:

"That the respective sums not exceeding the amounts shown in the third column of the Order Paper in respect of Demands Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 114 be granted to the President to complete the sums necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March 1954, in respect of the corresponding heads of demands entered in the second column thereof."

The motion was adopted.

[The motions for Demands for Grants which were adopted by the House are reproduced below—Ed. P. P.]

DEMAND No. 11—MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 23,92,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of pay-

ment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1954, in respect of 'Ministry of Defence'."

DEMAND No. 12—DEFENCE SERVICES EFFECTIVE-ARMY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,50,06,70,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1954, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective-Army'."

DEMAND No. 13—DEFENCE SERVICES EFFECTIVE-NAVY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 10,37,56,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1954, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective-Navy'."

DEMAND No. 14—DEFENCE SERVICES EFFECTIVE-AIR FORCE

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 23,64,30,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1954, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective-Air Force'."

DEMAND No. 15—DEFENCE SERVICES, NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 14,36,31,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1954, in respect of 'Defence Services, Non-Effective Charges'."

DEMAND No. 16—MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE UNDER THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 4,58,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1954, in respect of 'Miscellaneous Expenditure under the Ministry of Defence'."

DEMAND No. 114—DEFENCE CAPITAL OUTLAY.

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 16,50,00,000 be granted to the

President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1954, in respect of 'Defence Capital Outlay'."

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: What is the point of order? On what has been disposed of?

Dr. S. N. Sinha: The point of order is this. A Member of the Communist Party has called our Army savage and brutal. I am sorry that at that time I was not present in the House. It must be expunged from the proceedings because it is not a parliamentary language and it is an insult not only to our Army but to the whole nation and to this Parliament.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I only wish that I am not taken by surprise. In view of what the hon. Prime Minister said and in view of the fact that Mr. Gopal Rao had referred to something else, the treatment by the officers of the lower cadre—that is how he tried to explain on the spot—I cannot take cognisance of it. If the hon. Member wants, he may kindly write to me. I will look into the whole proceedings and if necessary I will bring it before the House.

SUPPLEMENTARY DEMANDS FOR GRANTS—PEPSU

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The House will now take the Supplementary Demands for Grants in respect of PEPSU for the year 1952-53.

Having regard to the other financial business in the Agenda before the House, I propose to fix a time limit as follows.

The discussion on Supplementary Demands for Grants in respect of PEPSU will continue for two hours at the end of which I shall apply guillotine and put all the Supplementary Demands for Grants to the vote of the House.

Thereafter the Demands for Grants on account relating to PEPSU will be taken up. I think one hour will be sufficient for that, so that at 7 p.m. I shall put the Demands for Grants on Account relating to PEPSU to the vote of the House.

The time limit for speeches will ordinarily be 15 minutes for hon. Members and 20 minutes for Leaders of Groups. The Minister replying may take 20 minutes or more, if necessary.

I shall now place the Demands before the House.

DEMAND NO. 1—LAND REVENUE

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion is:

"That a supplementary sum not exceeding Rs. 2,58,000 be granted to the President out of the Consolidated Fund of the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st March, 1953, in respect of Land Revenue."

DEMAND NO. 7—OTHER TAXES AND DUTIES

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion is:

"That a supplementary sum not exceeding Rs. 98,000 be granted to the President out of the Consolidated Fund of the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st March, 1953, in respect of Other Taxes and Duties."

DEMAND NO. 11—ELECTIONS FOR LEGISLATURES

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion is:

"That a supplementary sum not exceeding Rs. 2,06,600 be granted to the President out of the Consolidated Fund of the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st March, 1953, in respect of Elections for Legislatures."

DEMAND NO. 14—FINANCE DEPARTMENT

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion is:

"That a supplementary sum not exceeding Rs. 61,000 be granted to the President out of the Consolidated Fund of the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st March, 1953, in respect of Finance Department."

DEMAND NO. 15—REVENUE DEPARTMENT

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion is:

"That a supplementary sum not exceeding Rs. 25,300 be granted